2026 Vol. 17 №1

The article demonstrates, through a series of examples, that reflection on signs relates to two distinct mental operations: the exchange of sign messages between subjects (com­mu­nication), and the interpretation of signs and sign systems that lack a subjective sender and originate either in natural objects or in the impersonal domain of “culture”. This duality of the object of analysis gives rise to persistent terminological difficulties, which surface in Aris­totle’s treatment of the relationship between sign and symbol, in Charles S. Peirce and Roman Jakobson’s definitions and exemplifications of the sign-index, and in Roland Barthes’s theo­ry of connotation. These two dimensions of sign activity receive a macrosemiotic interpreta­tion in Yuri Lotman’s concept of the “system” and, more particularly, in his theory of the semio­sphere: a distinctive participant in sign processes that combines subjectivity with a uni­versal character. Against this background, the understanding of the two types of semiosis can be seen to evolve historically: from philosophical reflection on individual signs (Aristotle, Peirce) to linguistic and semiotic investigations of holistic sys­tems (Barthes, Lotman). The capacity for such an expansion of perspective, together with an awareness of the heterogeneity of hu­man sign activity, ultimately underpinned the emergence of scientific semiotics in the XX cen­tury.

Based on some of the states of Sergey Zenkin’s article, I describe the relationship between affect and symbol. Affect has two sides — cognitive and non-cognitive. The latter manifests itself in unconscious reactions. Conscious affect is regulated by the communicative situation and the sociocultural environment. Sergey Zenkin describes two systems of meaning circu­la­tion. The first is sign communication, the second is working with features and symbols. Sym­bols can be generated unconsciously and evoke similar reactions. Disruption of the flow of in­for­mation through the system of non-cognitive affectations leads to their objectification. Af­fects arise in their place, centred on the tension between the source of the affectation and the individual. The former becomes a symbol of the relationship underlying the affect. I illustrate the transition from non-cognitive affectation to affect with the emergence of a new symbol with examples from "practices of the self" in the digital environment. Here, representation dis­places the thing, and the source of non-cognitive affectations becomes the interface, net­work, account, etc. Affects of hope, togetherness, and a new naivety characterise the tension between the individual and the digital environment. When objectified, they become symbols of social status. Thus, representation and its tools evoke a sense of elevation above the world. The overall modulation of these affects is positive; status symbols convey the meaning of a better future, which encourages a shift in the boundaries between the real and the virtual. The me­chanism of symbol generation during the transition from noncognitive affectation to normal affect may be part of the third system of meaning circulation discussed by Roland Barthes.