2021 Vol. 40. №2

This is a review of the main research achievements of Professor L. A. Kalinnikov presented in his articles and monographs. The theoretical issues of Kantianism considered in Kalinnikov’s works include the problem of cognisability of “the thing in itself” and noumenal affection, the character of systematicity in Kant’s philosophy and the methodology of its interpretation. Cycles of articles are devoted to the reception of Kant’s ideas in the philosophical and poetic work of V. S. Solovyov, Kant’s impact on A. S. Pushkin, A. A. Fet, and E. T. A. Hoffmann. These topics are elaborated in the monographs Immanuel Kant in Russian Poetry (2008), E. T. A. Hoffmann and I. Kant (2012), The Philosophical and Poetic Worldview of A. A. Fet: the Impact of I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer (2016), Pushkin and Kant. The Poet and Philosophy (2018), The Philosophical System of Kant. Conception and Outcomes (2021). L. A. Kalinnikov’s works form an impressive and original part of contemporary Russian Kantiana.

The aim of this research is to explore what relations self-affection bears to the intuitions of inner sense. I propose that self-affection makes some contribution to formal intuitions and empirical consciousness by arguing that the functions of self-affection consist respectively in conceptualising and conscious-making. I begin by examining Kant’s concept of inner sense and point out that inner sense as a receptive faculty depends on self-affection. In so doing, I emphasise that self-affection includes both a pure and an empirical aspect which corresponds to Kant’s distinction between the transcendental synthesis of imagination and the empirical synthesis of apprehension. Then, I focus on the pure aspect and argue that the conceptualising function involved in the pure self-affection is decisive for the generation of formal intuition. In particular, I explain why the formal intuition of time depends on the intuition of space and how it is constituted by drawing a line. After that, I turn to analysing the empirical aspect of self-affection and show that by virtue of the empirical synthesis of apprehension one is aware of both the empirical contents of representations and the mental actions performed on them, whereby I suggest that this empirical conscious-making function can be understood as an act of distinguishing from a mereological point of view.

The metaphysical layer of what can be called philosophical Christology in Kant’s treatise on religion reflects his idea of the embodiment of the archetype of moral perfection. Kant raises the problem of the ontology of the ideal in the shape of the question about the conditions that make actual experience possible: the ideal of holiness resides in reason, i. e. in the human being, but the dominance of radical evil over the human will puts it out of human reach either in thought or in practice. For rational thought it is more natural to imagine the practical reality of the archetype as the embodiment of the authentic man proceeding from God. Using the Gospel narrative about Jesus, Kant interprets the human nature of the archetype in the light of his general notions about the properties of this nature. It is widely believed that Kant’s ethical theology eliminates the divine nature of the archetype by stating that an entirely holy will cannot be a moral example for the infirm human will. Kant however says, merely as a critical philosopher, that there are not enough rational grounds for thinking divine nature. Rational philosophy can think the archetype of perfection only as its pure and whole moral attitude through all the maxims and acts. Philosophy would transcend its boundaries if it claimed more and expected recognition of the prototypical theology of the ideal as the content of church faith. But it is not by chance that Kant sets forth the philosophical theory of the archetype as the content of faith in the subjunctive mood. According to Kant, the preaching of the divine character of the archetype as extra-philosophical supplement of the paradoxes and symbols of philosophical theology is only possible on condition that this statutory preaching does not obstruct the overall aspiration toward the actualisation of the pure moral attitude. If these conditions are observed the philosopher and the biblical theologian remain each with their theologies and within their rights.

Prof. Deng Xiaomang’s translations of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (2002), the Critique of Practical Reason (2003), and the Critique of Pure Reason (2004), were the first Chinese editions of Kant’s three Critiques translated in their entirety from the German originals. This interview tracks his scholarship, placing it within the broader scope of historical and contemporary Kant scholarship in China. Among the topics addressed, the reception of Kantian philosophy among the so called “New Confucians”, as well as the utility of Kantian thought as a tool for the reformation of traditional Confucian culture, are given considerable attention. Professor Deng also shares some thoughts on the process of translating classical German philosophical texts into Chinese and provides an overview of his scholarship as a translator and thinker.

This review of contemporary discussions of Kantian philosophy of mathematics is timed for the publication of the essay Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Volume 1: The Critical Philosophy and Its Roots (2020) edited by Carl Posy and Ofra Rechter. The main discussions and comments are based on the texts contained in this collection. I first examine the more general questions which have to do not only with the philosophy of mathematics, but also with related areas of Kant’s philosophy, e. g. the question: What is intuition and singular term? Then I look at more specific questions, e. g.: What is the subject of arithmetic and what is the significance of diagrams in mathematical reasoning? As a result, the reader is presented with a fairly complete overview of modern discussions which can be used as an introduction to the problem field of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics.