2026 Vol. 45. №1

Antagonism, although often neglected, is one of the key categories of Kant’s philosophy. Its formation in Kant’s pre-critical works on natural philosophy owes much to the influence of Newton. Kant overcomes Newton’s static and providential mechanicism with his concept of dynamic development of the universe out of natural causes. He challenges the monistic and harmonious view of preceding metaphysical (Leibnizian) and “mathematical” (Newtonian) doctrines with a pluralistic and antagonistic one, the sole force of gravitation with the dualism of attraction and repulsion. The result is the characteristic Kantian concept of natural history as the development of the universe through the interaction of opposites whereby human history is an extension of natural history. Kant generalised the physical results by elaborating a metaphysical distinction between logical and real opposites. The role of repulsion and attraction as necessary concepts in the consideration of matter is grounded in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. This development was the underlying foundation of the widely known concept of “unsociable sociability” in Kant’s critical philosophy of history and politics.

This concept is arguably a particular case of the general antagonistic worldview and it cannot be dismissed (as does much of the current literature) as a minor and insignificant addition to the Kantian political rationalism and idealism.

In § 26 of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant calls the “Leitfaden” section of the Transcendental Analytic (A 67-79 / B 91-106) “metaphysical deduction” (MD). The MD is a relatively short, but fundamental (and somewhat enigmatic) passage. While contemporary contributions offer detailed reconstructions of the MD, which also help to settle a series of thorny exegetic questions much debated in MD’s classic and current reception, I propose to take a step back and ask about the general setting of the MD, and about its meta-philosophical and metalogical implications. I believe that the question of the role of “formal logic” in philosophy, and in the establishment of a philosophical logic (something which was at the heart of Hegel’s interests in reading these Kantian passages), is at stake here. I begin the paper by examining some controversies concerning the question of the contribution of Kant’s thinking about logic to the history of logic. I then turn to Hegel’s reading of Kant’s thoughts about formal logic and truth (A 57-60 / B 82-84) in the Science of Logic. I conclude by critically assessing Hegel’s critique of Kant’s supposed “formalism”. While Hegel laments Kant’s anti-alethic treatment of the forms of judgement and of the categorial forms, I show how Kant accomplishes, in fact, an important operation of repositioning and rethinking traditional logic; and, in so doing, makes a crucial step towards the establishment of a philosophical logic.

Space and time may be seen either as independent entities, as properties of things or as properties inherent in the subject. Kant, of course, maintains that space and time have a subjective character: he rules out their objective reality, which leads to a substantial separation of the cognising subject and the reality being cognised. This approach to the definition of the ontological and epistemological statuses of space and time is often criticised in the studies of Kantian philosophy. Attempts are made to clarify the objective side of cognition and the exclusiveness of the subjectivistic conception of space and time is problematised, leading to interpretations that try, along with subjectivity, to reconstruct the objective component in Kant’s understanding of space and time. This article purports to summarise and systematise the approaches which stress the ambivalence of Kant’s conception of space and time. The study identifies the following main approaches to the problem of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity of space and time in Kant’s philosophy: 1) the approach which claims that space and time in Kant’s philosophy are subjective only in the epistemological sense whereas ontologically they have objective reality; 2) the position which interprets subjectivity and objectivity of space and time in the context of the Kantian distinction between transcendental idealism and empirical realism; 3) the interpretation which stresses subjectivity as objective validity; 4) the subjective-objective understanding of space and time. I arrive at the conclusion that subjective-objective interpretations of the Kantian doctrine of space and time are mainly based on the problematisation of the concept of subjectivity, which is manifested in the broadening or, on the contrary, the narrowing of the concept of subjectivity, making it more complex and hierarchical, establishing a link between this concept and the concept of empirical reality and the concept of general validity.

This article examines Kant’s ideas on the a priori character of space and time in the context of modern cognitive research and neuroscience. Proceeding from the Kantian view of space and time as forms of sensibility, I look at how neurobiological data confirm and simultaneously modify classical philosophical nativism. I pay particular attention to empirically-confirmed, inborn cognitive mechanisms such as the “sense of number” and the supposed “sense of space” which have ontogenetic and neural foundations. I look at discoveries pertaining to the brain’s navigation systems, including “place” cells, which point to the existence of a functionally autonomous “geometric” (and not just a “number”) module. This module has been shown to play a key role, not only in one’s orientation in physical space, but also in the formation of abstract concepts, semantic structures, and social ties. I examine data on the independence of basic geometric intuition from cultural and sensory experience, including research on spatial representations in born-blind individuals. A special section is devoted to the analysis of the Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect: its possible influence on the character of the writing system, and, conversely, of script configuration on spatial-numerical and cognitive associations. This phenomenon demonstrates an interconnection between the perception of numbers and direction in space, which is partly determined by cultural features: people with left-to-right writing associate numbers of a larger magnitude with the right side, while people who write from right to left have the reverse association. Thus, human perceptions of space and time are the result of intricate interactions between congenital properties of the nervous system and extra-personal cultural influence. In conclusion, I stress the prospectivity of the concept “biocultural co-constructivism”, according to which congenital neuron structures and cultural practices are in dynamic interaction, and which promises deeper insight into the meaning of the Kantian research programme as implemented in modern neuroscience.

This article compares the ideological foundations of the political projects of Sergey Hessen (Gessen) and Immanuel Kant as projects of political development and transformation, i.e. gradual reform. The starting point is the project of “rule-of-law socialism” which Hessen saw as a synthesis of the new liberalism and new socialism of his time. The main question is overt or covert reception of Kant’s ideas in this project. Kant and Hessen share historical optimism and reject utopias, but the core of Hessen’s philosophy of history is the transformation of Neo-Kantian doctrine of values. The influence of the Baden school of Neo-Kantianism can also be traced in the fact that Hessen defines the stages in the development of liberalism and socialism in accordance with Hegel’s dialectical method. But while Hessen’s “rule-of-law socialism” combines liberal values, i.e. law and freedom, with the socialist values of welfare and equal opportunities, Kant’s political philosophy on the whole belongs to classical liberalism which emphasises law and freedom. But for Hessen Kant, as it were, stands aside from liberalism and is perceived first and foremost as a moral philosopher, author of the teaching on the freedom and autonomy of the individual which should be protected even under socialism. Hessen interprets the relationship between right and good differently from Kant, without turning to him for support, although similarities of their ideas exist. The situation is similar in the interpretation of the concept of the social contract and the common will, which are equally important for both philosophers as reference points, but their ideas on how to achieve them differ substantially. A separate section is devoted to the comparison of the principles of property relations, Kant’s anti-feudal theses and Hessen’s anti-monopoly theses. On details, Hessen’s project of “rule-of-law socialism” has more differences than similarities to Kant’s ideas, but is similar to Kant’s in spirit. An analysis of Kant’s ideas from Hessen’s viewpoint shows that some provisions of Kant’s philosophy are formulated in such a way that they do not fully apply to Hessen’s critique of classical liberalism.