2024 Vol. 16 №1

The possible confiscation of Russian assets by Western countries is one of the serious challenges to modern international law and the system of international relations. Since the greater part of the frozen assets is under the jurisdiction of EU countries, special attention should be paid to studying mechanisms for the use of Russian assets within the EU. The purpose of this article is to identify the key characteristics of the EU’s approaches to the use of frozen Russian assets, determine their compliance with international law and investigate possible consequences for the modern system of international relations. To achieve this goal, the author analysed the legal aspect of this problem, examined the compliance of the initiatives to confiscate Russian property with the norms of modern international law and pinpointed the potential consequences of such actions. It is concluded that possible options for seizing sovereign assets contradict the norms of international and national law. Therefore, all these methods are unfeasible within the current legal framework. Yet, the main obstacle to implementing the plans to seize Russian sovereign assets lies not within the legal realm, but in the political sphere since such actions could result in unforeseeable ramifications. The mechanism proposed by the European Commission for seizing private property within the framework of criminal proceedings implies the use of criminal law to solve political problems, which is at variance with the objectives of criminal policy.

Economic sanctions and countersanctions are expanding worldwide, posing spatially heterogeneous threats to most countries. The study aims to develop and test a methodology for assessing regional exposure to sanctions risks using Russian data. The share of foreign trade with the countries that introduced restrictions can be used to evaluate the exposure to new trade barriers. In several cases, this share exceeded 50 %, necessitating a rapid reorientation of product flows in Nenets, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Areas, Komi, and Murmansk region. The Kaliningrad, Kaluga, and Leningrad regions exhibit high import dependence in the production sector, particularly in the automotive industry, due to their active involvement in global supply chains. Sanctions against large legal entities created risks for the stability of regional economies but the increase in demand for domestic products offset this impact. Foreign enterprises exiting the market posed risks of disrupting production chains but also provided opportunities for local business development. Before some countries introduced sanctions, their companies had held more than 20 % of the market share in Kaluga, Moscow region, and the city of Moscow. However, the share of foreign firms that announced complete withdrawal exceeded 5 % of the market only in the Komi, Samara, Leningrad, and Moscow regions. An integral index of exposure was proposed based on the mentioned indicators. Its value is lower for the regions with a more diversified economy and foreign trade. The greatest risks were observed in the closely connected to the European Union northwestern territories of Russia: Karelia, Komi, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, and Arkhangelsk regions. In 2022, regions with a high index value were more likely to experience a decline in economic activity, but in 2023, this impact was less explicit due to economic adaptation and transformation. Based on the results of the study, some recommendations can be formulated.

The current economic crisis conditions call for a search for new mechanisms to maintain the population’s well-being. Within this setting, cooperation may be considered a priority form of entrepreneurial activity, enabling the consolidation of financial resources and reducing business costs. This article aims to assess the potential of consumer cooperation in the Kaliningrad region under anti-Russian sanctions. The authors analyse the features of cooperation development within the territory and investigate the demands and expectations of the local populace. The principal method employed in the study is a survey of residents of the Kaliningrad region (N = 481), with its results strongly indicating that conditions for a renaissance of cooperative economic models have emerged in the Russian exclave. The region’s residents tend to express positive attitudes towards cooperation, drawing a link between economically challenging conditions and opportunities for cooperative development. Moreover, amongst respondents with personal or vicarious experience of cooperation, a substantially higher proportion assess cooperative practices positively. Yet, the deficit of interpersonal trust places a serious limitation on the development of cooperation. It is concluded that the economic crisis has shifted the focus of the region’s population’s expectations from social interests (collaborations with like-minded individuals) to undertakings aimed at increasing material well-being. Therefore, expectations of participating in cooperative activities are primarily associated with the opportunity to start one’s own business and increase personal income.

Since the mid-2010s, Germany has significantly adjusted its approaches to the use of the Bundeswehr, pivoting its strategic focus from regions distant from the Euro-Atlantic community to those within or near it. This has underscored the pressing need to address issues related to securing steadfast allies in Eastern Europe and enhancing cooperation with them. This article aims to explore the current evolution of German-Lithuanian re­lations in both political and military domains. The approach of Germany to the factor of historical memory is demonstrated, along with its aspiration to position itself as the defender of Lithuanian national sovereignty. Yet, there was a notable lack of strategic focus from Germany towards Lithuania in the early 21st century, contributing to a decline in bilateral relations in 2014 and 2015. Amid the confrontation between the ‘Western democracies’ and Russia, Germany adopted a strategy of gradually but steadily increasing pressure on the opponent. The perception of this approach by Lithuanian elites has shifted from negative in the mid-2010s to increasingly positive as Germany has become more involved in deterrence of Russia. This article explores the process of the Bundeswehr troops’ deployment and buildup up to having constituted the ‘core’ of a multinational brigade in Lithuania under NATO’s mandate. The study focuses on the im­pact of military cooperation on political collaborations, as illustrated by the case of the B3 + 1 format, which has brought together high-ranking public officials from the three Baltic states and Germany since 2018. It is concluded that Germany has developed a dependence on Lithuania, driven by the increased desire of the former state to maintain the latter as a reliable junior partner.