2015 Issue №2(52)

This article considers the development of N. O. Lossky’s concept of intuitivism in the context of the translation of Kant’s works and revision of Kant’s epistemology. The development of Lossky as an independent philosopher required overcoming Kant’s scepticism, which was not consistent with the ideal-realist’s belief in the cognoscibility of transsubjective world given us in the original. The means necessary to overcome it determined the key characteristics of the new system of intuitivism, which emerged in a discussion of Kant’s epistemological system. The author identifies the key themes of transcendental philosophy that drew special attention of Lossky. These include the fundamental logical issues of the essence of logical connection, the nature of judgement and inference, and that of the synthetic and analytic. The article addresses the interpretation of the concept of ‘intuition’ by Lossky and the influence of this interpretation on the translation of Kant’s Anschauung.The author identifies a number of reasons that inspired the intuitivist to translate the CPR. Fol¬lowing Kant’s philosophy, Lossky had sufficient arguments in the game played in the field of his teacher and opponent, the Russian Kantian A. I. Vvedensky; moreover, he proved the inconsistency of Vvedensky’s interpretation of transcendental philosophy. It is shown that the experience of translating CPR and the critical analysis of Kant’s epistemology helped Lossky to overcome the complications that emerged in the history of philosophy and develop his own complete and organic worldview. Moreover, there arose an objective need for a new CPR translation, since some intellectuals were not satisfied with that made by N. M. Sokolov. The article contains excerpts from reviews of Sokolov’s and Lossky’s translations of CPR by G. G. Shpet

This article examines the relation between J. Rawls’s philosophical and political conceptions and I. Kant’s ideas and the intellectual and political tradition of the Enlightenment in general. The author defends Rawls’s approach to Kant’s works interpreting it as “discipleship”, the assimilation and intrinsic reconceptualization of Kantian ideas preserving the essence of the assimilated. Rawls justifies his own re-description of Kantian philosophy by using Kant's ideas. Transforming Kant’s ideas, the he implements Kantian ethos (spirit), which can be understood as the free use of reason. Using Rawlsian approach, the author attempts to defend Rawls from the accusation that he fundamentally misunderstands Kant. This defense is based on that the most important element of Kant’s philosophical legacy is the critical attitude (or ethos) rather than a specific concept (for instance, the categorical imperative). This article identifies the intersections between Rawls’s and Kant’s ideas, as well as their differences. Kant and Rawls have much in common. Rawls agrees with Kant that moral philosophy has to depart from commonplace human reason; the content of "political justice" can be an object of construction; construction presupposes the use of practical rather than pure reason; moral philosophy requires a complex concept of a person; the function of moral philosophy is the rational defense of reasonable faith. The main differences between Kant’s and Rawls’s include the understanding of practical reason; the concept of a person based on fundamental ideas originating from different sources (political culture in Rawls’s works and transcendental idealism in Kant’s); the understanding of rational faith.