2026 Vol. 45. №2

The article examines the status of the apperceptive “I think” in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The central issue is that the “I think”, on the one hand, functions as a condition of the possibility of cognition, while, on the other hand, it is not itself an object of self-knowledge. This leaves open the question of the sense in which the “I think” can nevertheless be understood positively. Accordingly, the aim of the study is to distinguish the different meanings of the “I think” in the Critique of Pure Reason and, on this basis, to outline the contours of a transcendental theory of subjectivity. The relation between the synthetic and analytical unities of apperception in the transcendental deduction of the categories is made clear together with the analysis of the logical sense of the subject in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason”. Here the possibility of understanding transcendental self-consciousness as a pre-reflective self-relation is considered. It is argued that the logical I and the metaphysical subject, understood as a hypostatised logical I, are derivative of the original synthetic activity of self-consciousness. The transcendental “I think” is interpreted neither as an object of cognition nor as a substance, but as a non-objectifying form of self-relation that constitutes the perspectival structure of experience. It is concluded that the positive meaning of transcendental self-consciousness consists in a pre-reflective “consciousness” of synthetic activity: it expresses the self-relation inherent in the very structure of experience, by virtue of which every experience is given as mine (as belonging to me).

According to K. Lindsey Chambers (2025), “if we start from within Kant’s moral framework, the non-identity problem doesn’t arise for morally responsive procreators”. However, Chambers is mistaken: the nonidentity problem is independent of whether we start from a Kantian or a consequentialist framework. Understanding this is important; otherwise, we run the risk of mistaking either the boundaries of normative ethics, the nature of the nonidentity problem, or both, with all that this entails. To explain this, this article is divided into three sections. First, I introduce the version of the nonidentity problem with which Chambers is primarily concerned, Teenaged Mother. Second, I introduce, and subsequently critique, Chambers’ explanation of how Kantian ethics obviates this problem. Third, I explain how Chambers’ account nonetheless can be applied to another philosophical issue of recent interest in reproductive ethics — namely, the ethics of prenatal injury.

The problem of coercion, raised as part of the theory of natural right in Germany in the late eighteenth century, is discussed with particular reference to the polemic between Gottlieb Hufeland and Immanuel Kant. In his Essay on the Principle of Natural Right (1785) and the first edition of the Principles of Natural Right and Related Sciences (1790) Hufeland derives right from the moral imperative, the duty to contribute to the perfection (Vollkommenheit) of all intelligent creatures. This is premised on the legitimacy of coercion as a means to achieve that goal. This approach is developed against the background of the tradition represented by Gottfried Achenwall and Ernst Ferdinand Klein with whose works Hufeland was familiar and whose positions he either criticised and called into question or used to bolster his own arguments. Achenwall’s teaching has a theological basis while Klein’s position gravitates toward Kantianism. Kant himself, though he does not openly criticise Hufeland’s natural law system which, in spite of its author’s professed adherence to Kantianism, contradicts the key Kantian ideas, takes a very different view of the problem of coercion. In the second edition of his textbook, The Principles of Natural Right (1795), Hufeland revises his concept to make noticeable changes to his grounding of natural law and the function of coercion, which attests to Kant’s influence on his position. The discussion between Hufeland and Kant, in turn, contributed to the shaping of Kant’s theory of right in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797).

Today, with the growing popularity of republicanism, literature on the topic includes more and more works whose authors attempt to re-read classical political thinkers in terms of republican theory, so as to situate them within the republican canon. Some such efforts have been made with respect to Kant. Traditionally, his political philosophy is thought, more often than not, to be liberal. Republican authors break this consensus, representing him as a republican sympathiser. Some even regard him as a special figure in the history of republican thought. The reason for this is that in Kant’s time, republicanism was gradually leaving the historical stage, giving way to liberalism, to eventually be ousted and practically forgotten until the twentieth century. From this perspective, Kant comes across as one of the last republicans of his time. He is believed to have abandoned some significant republican ideas under the influence of competing politico-philosophical systems, such that he is thought to be a republican only up to a certain point. In this article, I challenge this view, demonstrating that Kant has more in common with republicanism than some researchers believe. To this end, I put his political philosophy in the context of what is known as Roman republicanism, one of the best-studied and currently most popular strands of republican thought. Its main elements are 1) freedom as non-domination, 2) supremacy of law, and 3) self-government. My analysis of Kant’s socio-political views from the perspective of these elements shows that, on the whole, they agree. I conclude that Kant should be viewed as a representative of the Roman branch of republicanism.

Continuing from Part One (see “Kantian Journal”, vol. 44, no. 3), this article reviews Kant’s dismissal of chemistry as a ‘proper’ science in light of his specific examples (instancing Stahl’s spagyric experiments, cinnabar, and gold) to argue that understanding Kant requires an historical hermeneutical approach to science. Close textual analysis of Kant’s writings is compared with an historically-informed reading of early modern chemistry and alchemy, which looks at Stahl, Boyle, Paneth, discussions by historians and philosophers of science, Goethe (in connection with his business enterprise), and, on a theological level, Reiner Schürmann, among others. A “material hermeneutics” of exemplary substances — cinnabar, in particular — in addition to Kant’s use of chemical examples, can illustrate gradations in science, the distinction between analysis and synthesis, and the conditions for possible experience, as well as the later reception of these themes in the philosophy of chemistry and the history of alchemy. The main findings show, first, that Kant’s treatment of chemistry is more complex than a simple exclusion from “proper science” suggests. Secondly, Kant’s example of cinnabar “now red, now black,” presupposes empirical instability. Lastly, the article argues that the continued marginalisation of alchemy in historical writing perpetuates a Whiggish scientistic bias, and that a hermeneutic approach can reveal deeper continuities between alchemy, chemistry, and Kant’s critical philosophy.