Peripetien der Erfahrung. Kants „Erfahrungserkenntnis“ und Hegels „Erscheinungen“
- DOI
- 10.5922/0207-6918-2025-1-3
- Pages
- 68-88
Abstract
It was not until German Idealism that philosophy briefly regained the importance it had in antiquity. This is indicated precisely by the “peripeteia” in the concept of experience. When Kant and Hegel write about experience, they mean quite different things on the other. Kant’s concept of experience is law-like, invariant and rigid. Only for this reason can it form the basis for a critical reflection on the validity of knowledge. However, Hegel’s analysis of object experience “dynamises” Kant’s concept in various ways: firstly, he provides an interpretation of the process of how perception and its contents ultimately become the “play of forces” via the life of things. Secondly, Hegel works out the self-referentiality of the subject in this process of experience. Finally, Hegel shows how the experience of objects refers beyond itself to more complex forms of knowledge. In the chapter “Power and Understanding” of his Phenomenology of Spirit he undertakes a subtle differentiation of what Kant calls “objective cognition” and shows, on the one hand, which process is already necessary in order to grasp a thing even sensually. On the other hand, he analyses the different levels of experience that are already involved in the simple process of perception. The authors analyse this process as a silent dialogue between Kant and Hegel and show why Hegel’s concept of experience can claim to contribute more to the understanding of man than Kant’s.
Reference
Adler, H., 2016. Sind Anschauungen ohne Begriff blind? In: H. Adler und S. Gross, Hg. 2016. Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit Visualisierung im Wahrnehmen, Lesen und Denken. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, S. 27-44.
Arndt, A., Bowman, B., Gerhard, M. und Zovko, J., Hg. 2017. Hegels Antwort auf Kant I. Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2016(1).
Baum, M. 2015. Kants „Möglichkeit der Erfahrung“. In: R. Enskat, Hg. 2015. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, S. 151-167.
Barteczko, D., 2017. Hegels Antwort auf das kantische Verhältnis von Anschauung und Denken. Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2016(1), S. 281-285.
Gentile, A., 2018, Bewusstsein, Anschauung und das Unendliche bei Fichte, Schelling und Hegel. Freiburg & München: Karl Alber.
Ginsborg, H., 2006. Kant and the Problem of Experience. University of California. Philosophical Topics, 34(1-2), pp. 59-106.
Harrison, R., 1988. Wie man dem transzendentalen Ich einen Sinn verleiht. In: B. Homburg, Hg. 1988. Kants transzendentale Deduktion und die Möglichkeit von Transzendentalphilosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 32-50.
Hegel, G. W. F., 1989. Phänomenologie des Geistes. In: G. W. F. Hegel, 1989. Werke. Band 3. Hg. von K. M. Michel und E. Moldenhauer, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Henrich, D., 1982. Kant und Hegel. Versuch der Vereinigung ihrer Grundgedanken. In: D. Henrich, 1982. Selbstverhältnisse. Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 173-208.
Henrich, D., 2008. Between Kant and Hegel. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Hösle, V., 2013. Eine kurze Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie. München: C. H. Beck.
Houlgate, S., 2013. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. London: Bloomsbury.
Kroner, R., 1961. Von Kant bis Hegel, 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Longuenesse, B., 2007. Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oizerman, T. I., 2014. Kant i Hegel: Opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya [Kant and Hegel: A Comparative Study]. In: T. I. Oizerman, 2014. Izbrannye trudy [Selected Works]. Volume 4. Moscow: Nauka. (In Rus.)
Pippin, R., 1989. Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C., 1975. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Cleve, J., 1999. Problems from Kant. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.