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The goal of this study is to investigate the non-linear impact of crises on integrative structures through theoretical, empirical, and comparative analysis of four cases. This paper proposes a novel explanatory model of how integrative structures respond to various crisis junctures. The authors test the hypothesis that it is not the nature or intensity of the crisis, but rather the maturity and depth of integrative groupings’ institutional arrangements — along with the actual balance of power between governance levels—that ultimately determine whether the organization consolidates further or begins to disintegrate. Based on a survey of 409 specifically selected experts on integration, the study reveals that strongly integrated unions tend to strengthen during crises but often experience disintegrative backlash once the crisis subsides. Conversely, weakly integrated unions tend to loosen their ties during crises but regain their capacity for cooperation shortly thereafter. This model is explored through four case studies that consider how the 2022 and ongoing Ukraine conflict affected the EU (with a special focus on the energy crisis), NATO, BRICS and a quasi-integrated network of world-class universities. The findings show that policy responses to crises should be specifically calibrated to the integration model that the organisation follows.

The issue of using frozen Russian sovereign assets has remained at the centre of political and expert debate for nearly three years. In 2024, the G7 decided to allocate profits generated from these assets to service a syndicated loan intended to finance military and other forms of assistance to Ukraine. In early 2024, within the framework of its sanctions policy, the European Union adopted a set of legislative instruments designed to establish a Union-level legal mechanism for appropriating the profits derived from the investment of frozen Russian sovereign assets. This decision poses a serious challenge to modern international law and the system of international relations. This article seeks to outline the key characteristics of the EU-agreed mechanism for the utilization of Russian sovereign assets, with a view to evaluating its consistency with international law and the legal framework of the European Union itself. In pursuit of this aim, the author examines the legal dimension of the mechanism for the expropriation of profits from the use of Russian sovereign assets and attempts to model its potential implications, including possible countermeasures by the Russian Federation. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the mechanism as adopted may result in a breach of the Russian Federation’s sovereign property rights, as well as other foundational principles of international law. Moreover, the EU’s decision to channel profits from Russian sovereign assets into the EU’s ownership raises a number of additional legal conflicts under both national and EU law.

This article examines the evolution of German-Polish cooperation in the political and military spheres. Methodologically, it draws on comparative analysis and the theoretical framework of armed forces development. Against the backdrop of heightened confrontation between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, Poland’s strategic orientation has echoed that of West Germany during the Cold War. Poland has asserted its role as the largest NATO member state on the alliance’s eastern border. It has significantly expanded its armed forces, and has become a key host of the large US military contingent. Poland expects to join the group of ‘Western powers’. Concurrently, Germany has also strengthened its role within NATO. This has resulted in a complex dynamic of both cooperation and strategic rivalry between Germany and Poland. Germany has conceptually and practically emphasized the Weimar Triangle as a platform for representing EU interests, particularly in the post-Soviet space. In the 2010s, however, Poland suspended the activities of the Weimar Triangle and bilateral intergovernmental consultations in an effort to limit German influence. By the mid-2020s, both formats had been reactivated, and Germany had consolidated its position in relation to the Republic of Poland (RP). This shift was driven by Germany’s growing influence in Eastern Europe beyond Poland and shared concerns about the weakening of Western influence in Ukraine and the broader post-Soviet region. Poland rapidly expanded its armed forces, becoming NATO’s third-largest military by personnel in 2024. Germany has been more inert in its response, yet it has employed the Bundeswehr more rationally — particularly in the region considered a ‘domestic’ one — by establishing a ground presence both to its north and south. The article concludes by assessing the future trajectory of German-Polish security cooperation and the implications for the defence strategies of Russia and Belarus.