Systematicity of the CPR and Kant’s system (III)
This article continues to analyse the systemacity of the CPR as a text ensuring the integrity of Kant’s philosophical system. Following the ideas presented in the first two parts of this work, part three considers the correlation between the spheres of concepts and reality. Kant divides concepts into phaenomena and noumena. The former are apprehended by the senses and the latter express the things-in-themselves. It is shown that, as concepts of things, noumena are divided into substan tial and empty...
Freiheit des Willens in der frühen Kant-Rezeption
... its differentiation of appearances and things in themselves. Human beings, with their bodies and observable inner and outer activities, are objects of perception (empirical intuition) and therefore appearances. These are only the appearances of their noumenal selves. Human beings are determined by laws of nature in all their perceivable alterations which include all their actions, but their noumenal selves, not being in time, are not determined by the necessity of causal laws of nature, but can be ...
The Problem of Being: Kant and Heidegger
... fundamental faculty of ontological cognition. He links it with the phenomenon of time, arguing that the object of knowledge as such is also linked with this phenomenon. True, for Heidegger what matters is not a singular empirical object, but the universal noumenal object, including being. Consequently, Heidegger draws a distinction between empirics and sensibility: all empirics is sensible, but not all sensibility is empirical. A triangle in general, a dog in general, etc. have an image, but it is not ...
Kant’s transcendentalism and concept of the thing in itself
.... It is a methodological notion rather than an actual object. There are several possible conceptualisations of Kant’s thing in itself [that use the apparatus of contemporary logic]. Secondly, the thing in itself has two modes — the empirical and noumenal ones (B306). This should be taken into account in analysing the concept of transcendentalism. Thirdly, Kant introduces the concept of the thing in itself through a negation. Being a notion of the ‘family resemblance’ type, the concept comprises ...
