2008-2009 Selected articles

All three meanings of the notion "thing-initself" (object, subject and the transition between them), despite the evident opposition, constitutes the object of the central problem of philosophy in Kant's system. Kant is an innovator in both posing and answering the question. This answer is agnostic but not in the empirical or scientific sense, but rather in the solely philosophical meaning of these notions. The answer to his question — regarding both the world and the human being — is infinite as human freedom of creativity.

This article focuses on the logical inconsistency of Kant's classification of judgements presented in the "Critique of pure reason". The author shows how Kant's division of judgements violates elementary logical rules. The article analyses an earlier attempt by G. Ryle to detect logical errors in the table of judgements. It is shown that the correct divisions were not unfamiliar to the 18th century German logic, nevertheless, they were not accepted by Kant. The author proposes possible explanations for Kant's violation of logical rules and offers a critical analysis of K. Reich's arguments in favour of the consistency of Kant's table of judgements.

On the basis of Kant's texts, the author attempts to prove that two and three-element logical-semantic structures — called the judgements of understanding and reason by Kant — represent logically organized complexes of propositions grouping around the structural core of both types of inferences and are  communicative forms of textual material "packaging" and, thus, are forms of textuality in I. Kant's discourse. Moreover, they give assertoric and apodictic modality to Kant's discourse.