2024 Vol. 43. №2

Kant’s mourning letter or necrology for his student Johann Friedrich von Funk (1760) has hardly been received. This study attempts to change this by explaining the contexts of the short missive. In the first part this concerns in particular the influence that Gottsched exerted on the style of such printed speeches or necrolo­gies. Kant’s references therefore to the ‘Royal German Society’ in Königsberg and its founder Flottwell, a friend of Gottsched’s, are described. The influence of the Roman Stoa then becomes much clearer through the influence of Gottsched’s rhetoric textbook. All in all, Kant attempts to present rational arguments for dealing with death, which can suddenly strike human life; he writes under the obvious influence of a Stoic mindset (see the second part). Most of the comments by Kant scholars on the little work to date have been negative or vague. Here, the text is to be made fruitful for the development of Kant’s thought by shedding light on its historical contexts. On this basis, the little treatise appears as an important link for Kant’s early thinking. It shows how he makes ancient tradition fruitful again for the Enlightenment as a substitute for rapturous and irrational mysticism as we know it from Jacob Böhme, for example.

Modern formal logic, which is based on Kant’s logical project, interprets logical consequence as formal, which leads to substantive paradoxes that combine any thoughts at all and so to the loss of consequence as such. Beginning with A. Tarski, modern history of logic brings the problem of logical consequence into the realmof search for the relation of consequence, or grounding. In his doctoral dissertation on the nature of logical formality J. MacFarlane claims that the paradoxes of formal theories of logical consequence stem from the loss of grounding by the transcendental system of logic in the post­Kantian logical tradition. Arguably, analysis of logical terminology of consequence in Kant’s seminal works — Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of the Power of Judgment — in comparison with the terminology of earlier works, Prolegomena and lectures on logic attributed to him will clarify the question of the relation oflogical consequence in the  formal and non­formal sense. The key concept of consequence in Kant’s terminology is Folgerung, which denotes ‘following’ in logical and non­logical contexts. I have also analysed related concepts: Folge, Abfolge, folglich etc., established dif- ferences between logical terms with similar meaning ‘inference’ (Schluss) and ‘conclusion’ (Konklusion). Finally, I make an attempt to formulate the problem of logical consequence in formal logic through the logical terms Schlussfolge, Folgerung and Konsequenz. On the strength of my analysis I propose to consider Kant’s consequence (Folgerung) to be a concept of transcendental logic that reflects the relation of consequence and grounds formal consequence.

This paper deals with the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” in the second main chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. It provides an account of the role these categories are supposed to play and also of their conceptual content. The key to a proper understanding lies in the realisation that they are derived from the so­called table of judgements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the functions of thinking, which it compiles by means of a metaphysical deduction. I therefore interpret the categories of freedom consistently from the table of judgements and reconstruct their conceptual content from the functions of thinking underlying each category. Furthermore, Kant justifies by means of a transcendental deduction the fact that the categories of freedom necessarily relate to all objects of the will. I argue that the categories are concepts constitutive for the object of the will: the role they play is that of the functions of willing an object. Finally, I show that the categories of freedom reach beyond Kant’s foundation of moral philosophy. They point to the later Metaphysics of Morals in that Kant associates an ambitious system­building claim with them. The idea is therefore that the table of the categories organises the system of moral philosophy.