The Problem of the Relationship between Apperception, Self-Consciousness and Consciousness in Kant’s Critical Philosophy
Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the ...
"I am" and "Something is", or The ontology of Dasein
... Philosophie. 1966. 48. S. 207—216.
17. Marion J.-L. The Final Appeal of the Subject // Deconstructive Subjectivities / ed. S. Critchley, P. Dews. SUNY Press, 1996.
epistemology, experience, objectivity, phenomenology, reflection, transcendental subject, apperception, phenomenon, category
Artemenko N. A.
Moral inscrutability and self-constitution in Kant (translated from the English by V. Belonogova and D. Khizanishvili, edited by V. Chaly)
... Kant introduces two innovations in respect of the fundamental project presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. He emphasises that freedom is not justified and postulates a transcendental structure similar to the unity of transcendental apperception in order to unify all volitions of an agent and make the initial application of freedom possible. The first innovation gives rise to a number of questions as to the justification of maxims, whereas the second leads to the theory of moral ...
Kant’s transcendentalism as a transcendental paradigm of philo¬so¬phiz¬ing
... metaphysics interprets knowledge as a relation between the (empirical) subject and the object, the transcendental metaphysics understands "possible experience”(Erfahrung) as a relation between the transcendental subject (transcendental unity of apperception) and the transcendental object. At the same time, unlike contemplative classical metaphysics, Kant’s transcendentalism is an "experimental" metaphysics, whereas the “transcendental” is defined as a borderline ontological area ...