Who is Rationalising? On an Overlooked Problem for Kant’s Moral Psychology and Method of Ethics
- DOI
- 10.5922/0207-6918-2022-1-1
- Pages
- 7-39
Abstract
I critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalising, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory-independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalising. Kant believes that rationalising is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalising. Yet, his opponents could, in turn, charge him with rationalising and some theorists, namely Act-Consequentialists, seem to be in an even stronger position to charge Kant with rationalising than vice versa. In response, I propose standards that do not assume a specific normative theory and that become apparent when we look at clear-cut abuses of rationality. These standards of minimally decent reasoning can help us diagnose rationalising. I develop these standards by looking at inadequate uses of rational capacities that should strike us as problematic regardless of the specific ethical theory we adopt. I emphasise that even an abuse of rational capacities can yield true results and that we can never tell from a single judgement that someone rationalises. Rather, we must look for patterns.
Reference
Ackeren, M. van and Sticker, M., 2015. Kant on Moral Demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(1), pp. 75-89.
Ackeren, M. van and Sticker, M., 2018. Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant. Kantian Review, 23(3), pp. 407-428.
Allais, L., 2016. Kant’s Racism. Philosophical Papers, 45(1-2), pp. 1-36.
Allais, L., 2021. Deceptive Unity and Productive Disunity: Kant’s Account of Situated Moral Selves. In: A. Lyssy, C. Yeomans, eds. Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality. Practical Dimensions of Normativity. London: Palgrave, pp. 45-66.
Ameriks, K., 2000. The Fate of Autonomy. Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baumgarten, A. G., 2000. Ethica philosophica. Hildesheim: Olms.
Callanan, J. 2019. Kant on Misology and the Natural Dialectic. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(47), pp. 1-22.
Crusius, C. A., 1772. Kurzer Begriff der Moraltheologie, oder nähere Erklärung der praktischen Lehren des Christentums. Theil 1. Leipzig: Ulrich Christian Saalbach.
Dancy, J., 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Di Giulio, S., 2020. Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Zur Irreführung des Gewissens bei Kant. In: S. Di Giulio and A. Frigo, eds. Kasuistik und Theorie des Gewissens. Von Pascal bis Kant. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 233-287.
Ellis, J., Schwitzgebel, E., 2020. Rationalization in the Pejorative Sense: Cushman’s Account Overlooks the Scope and Costs of Rationalization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, e35. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002152
Formosa, P., Sticker, M., 2019. Kant and the Demandingness of the Virtue of Beneficence. European Journal of Philosophy, 27(3), pp. 625-642.
Frankfurt, H. 2005. On Bullshit. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Grenberg, J., 2010. What is the Enemy of Virtue? In: L. Denis, ed. 2010. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 152-169.
Grenberg, J., 2013. Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience. A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haidt, J., 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment. Psychological Review, 108, pp. 814-834.
Herman, B., 2011. A Mismatch of Methods. In: S. Sheffler, ed. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-116.
Hill, T., 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kant, I., 1996a. The Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-603.
Kant, I., 1996b. Critique of Practical Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-271.
Kant, I., 1996c. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273-309.
Kant, I., 1996d. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Religion and Rational Theology. Translated and edited by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-217.
Kant, I., 1996e. On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy. In: I. Kant, 1996. Religion and Rational Theology. Translated and edited by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-37.
Kant, I., 2007. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In: I. Kant, 2007. Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited by G. Zöller and R. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227-428.
Kant, I., 2011. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by J. Timmermann and M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Papish, L., 2018. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Piper, A. M. S., 2013. Rationality and the Structure of the Self. Volume 2: A Kantian Conception. Second Edition. Berlin: Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation. Available at: http://www.adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/PiperRSSVol2KC.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2021].
Reath, A., 2006. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shell, S., 2009: Kant and the Limits of Autonomy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Singer, P., 1972. Famine, Affluence and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), pp. 229-243.
Stark, C., 1997. The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35(1), pp. 65-82.
Sticker, M., van Ackeren, M., 2018. The Demandingness of Beneficence and Kant’s System of Duties. Social Theory and Practice, 44(3), pp. 405-436.
Sticker, M., 2015a. Educating the Common Agent. Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 97(3), pp. 358-387.
Sticker, M., 2015b. The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent — A Reply to Ido Geiger. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 23(5), pp. 976-989.
Sticker, M., 2016. When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks — Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 51(1), pp. 85-104.
Sticker, M., 2017. Experiments in Ethics? Kant on Chemistry, Means of Education and Methods of Practical Philosophy. Idealistic Studies, 46(1), pp. 41-63.
Sticker, M., 2020. Kant, Eudaimonism, Act-Consequentialism and the Fact of Reason. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 102(2), pp. 209-241.
Sticker, M., 2021a. Rationalizing (Vernünfteln). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sticker, M., 2021b. Kant, Moral Overdemandingness and Self-Scrutiny. NOUS, 25(2), pp. 293-316.
Timmermann, J., 2005. Good but Not Required? — Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2(1), pp. 9-27.
Timmermann, J., 2006. Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended. Philosophy, 81(3), pp. 505-530.
Timmermann, J., 2018. Autonomy, Progress and Virtue: Why Kant Has Nothing to Fear from the Overdemandingness Objection. Kantian Review, 23(3), pp. 379-397.
Vogt, K., 2008. Duties to Others: Demands and Limits. In: M. Betzler, ed. 2008. Kant’s Ethics of Virtue. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 219-243.
Ware, O., 2021. Kant’s Justification of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wehofsits, A., 2016. Anthropologie und Moral. Affekte, Leidenschaften und Mitgefühl in Kants Ethik. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter.
Wehofsits, A., 2020. Passions: Kant’s Psychology of Self-Deception. Inquiry, https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1801498
Williams, B., 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press.
Wood, A., 2002. Preface and Introduction (3-16). In: O. Höffe, ed. 2002. Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 25-43.
Wood, A., 2014. The Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.