2025 Vol. 44. №1

Kant’s treatise “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures” has logical, epistemological, and cognitive-psychological implications. These three perspectives on his conclusions are practically undifferentiated. The first part of this article discusses the logical and ontological-gnoseological content of the treatise in order to reveal the prerequisites for the cognitive interpretation of syllogisms. The second part is an attempt to explicate the treatise’s cognitive content, i.e. a systemic representation of the cognitive properties of syllogisms, as understood by Kant. Kant’s syllogism is characterised as an intellectual act aimed at eliminating opaqueness in cognition and consists of several mental procedures. The cognitive properties of syllogisms are discoverable in Kant’s general characterisation of syllogisms, as well as in the characteristic marks of individual figures. The third part is an attempt to reconstruct Kant’s cognitive syllogistics from angles which can be discerned, but are not explicitly discussed, in the treatise. This reconstruction is based on the distinction Kant draws between two modes of formulating conclusions, one of which is “in the form of judgements”. Here, formal and “ontological” syllogisms are distinguished by the type of relation that obtains between parts of the premises. An ontological syllogism, unlike the formal kind, conforms to the most stringent rules in terms of content. The procedure of making an inference, even according to a perfect figure, is described as ‘composite’, involving, as it does, the transformation of a formal syllogism into an ontological one, or the supplementing of the formal syllogism with an intermediate inference which brings the parts of the syllogism under the categories contained in the highest rules. Errors in inferences in individual cognition are attributed to the use of the “form of judgements”, which obscures the connections that must be clearly understood according to the highest rules. In conclusion, the author systematically presents the cognitive content of the treatise and outlines cognitive pathways that are generated by the ideas of “The False Subtlety” and connected with the study of the unfolding of syllogisms in cognitive reality.

Kant’s theory of enthusiasm has received relatively little attention in Kant studies. This is surprising in view of the fact that Kant was preoccupied with the theme of enthusiasm throughout his life. One of the reasons may be that for Kant enthusiasm is an affect. Therefore, it cannot be used to justify ethics. On closer examination, however, a more differentiated picture emerges. In addition to pathological enthusiasm, Kant recognises an aesthetically sublime enthusiasm, and in his reflections on the reaction to the events of the French Revolution, Kant coined the concept of a true enthusiasm, related to the ideas of freedom and justice. Finally, Kant introduces the concept of the enthusiasm of good resolution. It is a preliminary stage of the feeling of respect for the moral law in moral education. It is no longer regarded as an affect, but is under the guidance of reason. The first part discusses the partly incompatible conceptions of enthusiasm. The second part examines Jean-François Lyotard’s interpretation and critique of Kant’s philosophical-historical theory of enthusiasm. In the face of the devastating catastrophes of the twentieth century, Lyotard sees no reason for the enthusiasm that Kant perceived in the people’s reaction to the French Revolution and interpreted as a prognostic sign of future history. It has been replaced by a general world-weariness. However, Lyotard’s critique of Kant is based on a historicist fallacy. The reference to historical catastrophes is not an argument against the a priori validity of the ideas of freedom and justice and against the endeavour for their realisation.