Kant and the Problem of Optimism: The Origin of the Debate
... that this is the best of all possible worlds and in favour of the theory that there are several good worlds. God’s choice of the actual world owes therefore to the freedom of contradiction (libertas contradictionis) and to the freedom of contrariety (libertas contrarietatis), which are eliminated in the teaching of optimism.
Anonym. 1753, Leipzig, in: Krause, J. G. (hg.), Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen auf das Jahr 1753, Leipzig, pp. 934—936.
Anonym. 1755a, Abhandlung über den Satz des Herrn Pope: ...
Kant and the Crusians in the Debate on Optimism
... researchers from seeing the validity of Weymann’s criticism of Kant for ignoring the problem of freedom. To prove his point, Weymann addressed the difference between the freedom of contradiction (libertas contradictionis) and the freedom of contrariety (libertas contrarietatis). Apparently, Kant himself noticed to a certain degree the validity of Weymann’s criticism, since, after 1759, he abandoned the term “optimism” and, in his later years, distanced himself from his early work An Attempt at Some Reflections ...
