The Problem of the Possibility of an Artificial Moral Agent in the Context of Kant’s Practical Philosophy
... and cannot have a moral understanding that proceeds from the moral law. Another consequence is that it has no sense of duty, which would follow from the moral law. Thus, moral action becomes impossible for the AMA because it lacks autonomy and moral law, moral understanding and sense of duty. It is concluded that, first, AMA not only cannot be moral, but should not be that, since the inclusion of any moral principle would imply the necessity for the individual to choose it, making the choice of the principle ...
Feyerabend’s Natural Law Notes and their significance for Kant studies. Preface
... history and significance of its deferral, Kant’s “Metaphysics of Morals”. A Critical Guide, ed. by L. Denis, New York, p. 9—27.
20. Wildberger, H. 1972, Jesaja, Biblischer Kommentar. Altes Testament. Bd. X. Tl. 1. Neukirchen-Vluyn.
natural law, moral, ethic, categorical imperative, moral law, freedom, object, will, motive
Kryshtop L.
68-74
10.5922/0207-6918-2016-3-6
Kants praktischer Platonismus
... Philo of Alexandria. Kant reinterpreted this doctrine by taking the intelligible world as a moral world consisting of free rational agents who ought to transform the empirical world of human society and history according to the norms and standards of moral laws. This was meant to be a programme for a moral reform of the human world, both with regard to individual morality and to the cosmopolitical task of the establishment of an international order of legal institutions. Kant’s practical Platonism insists ...
The Kantian Concept of Human Dignity Today
... Moscow: IGiP RAN Press. (In Rus.)
Zor’kin, V. D., ed. 2011. Kommentarij k Konstitucii Rossijskoj Federacii [Commentary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation]. Moscow: Norma. (In Rus.)
human dignity, human dignity within us, personality, duty, moral law, values, right, Constitution of the RF
Krouglov A. N.
47-75
10.5922/0207-6918-2024-1-3
Kant on evil in the human nature
...
11. Schiller F. Über Anmut und Würde (1793) // Schiller F. Sämtliche Werke. Bd. 8 : Philosophische Schriften. Berlin, 2005. S. 168—224.
12. Jaspers K. Das radikal Böse bei Kant // Jaspers K. Rechenschaft und Ausblick. München, 1958.
good, moral law, categorical imperative, human nature, sensibility, reason, freedom of will
Soboleva M.
15-29
10.5922/0207-6918-2013-4-2
[text]1. Kant, I. 1996, Religija v predelah tol'ko razuma [Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone]. In: Kant, I. Traktaty ...
Freiheit des Willens in der frühen Kant-Rezeption
... Human beings are determined by laws of nature in all their perceivable alterations which include all their actions, but their noumenal selves, not being in time, are not determined by the necessity of causal laws of nature, but can be determined by the moral law of their pure practical reason which they give to themselves. The actions of the will, observable volitions and external actions, can therefore, at the same time, be under the necessitating law of nature, i.e. be unfree, and, as appearances of the ...
Convergence of legal thinking from the perspective of the uncertainty principle
... a transdisciplinary approach, i. e. extrapolating methodologies from across disciplines to the theory of law. We propose to extrapolate to jurisprudence the principles of uncertainty, which implies that a legal rule cannot deal with both elements of moral law and rules of conduct. I conclude that developing a single framework for the understanding of law by converging methodologies from across disciplines will help to identify new facets of law.
1. Алексеев И. С. Концепция дополнительности....
God’s Law or Categorical Imperative: on Crusian Issues of Kantian Morality
The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature ...