The Problem of the Possibility of an Artificial Moral Agent in the Context of Kant’s Practical Philosophy
... and cannot have a moral understanding that proceeds from the moral law. Another consequence is that it has no sense of duty, which would follow from the moral law. Thus, moral action becomes impossible for the AMA because it lacks autonomy and moral law, moral understanding and sense of duty. It is concluded that, first, AMA not only cannot be moral, but should not be that, since the inclusion of any moral principle would imply the necessity for the individual to choose it, making the choice of the principle ...
The Kantian Concept of Human Dignity Today
... Moscow: IGiP RAN Press. (In Rus.)
Zor’kin, V. D., ed. 2011. Kommentarij k Konstitucii Rossijskoj Federacii [Commentary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation]. Moscow: Norma. (In Rus.)
human dignity, human dignity within us, personality, duty, moral law, values, right, Constitution of the RF
47-75
10.5922/0207-6918-2024-1-3
Freiheit des Willens in der frühen Kant-Rezeption
... Human beings are determined by laws of nature in all their perceivable alterations which include all their actions, but their noumenal selves, not being in time, are not determined by the necessity of causal laws of nature, but can be determined by the moral law of their pure practical reason which they give to themselves. The actions of the will, observable volitions and external actions, can therefore, at the same time, be under the necessitating law of nature, i.e. be unfree, and, as appearances of the ...
