Kantian Journal

2022 Vol. 41. №1

Back to the list Download the article
ENG
Сохранить XML для: JATS (вып.)
RUS
Сохранить XML для: JATS (вып.)

Digital Technology: Reflections on the Difference between Instrumental Rationality and Practical Reason

Abstract

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms (or, in Kantian terms, “imperatives of skill” that are implemented by technological means) do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways (even if, in so-called “machine learning”, digital technologies are able to probabilistically adapt to new data). This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms (possibly) are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” (Utopian or dystopian) ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its (partial) AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”.

Full text

json#{"TEXT":"","TYPE":"HTML"}

Reference

Becker, C. and Seubert, S., 2020. Die Selbstgefährdung der Autonomie. Eckpunkte einer Kritischen Theorie der Privatheit im digitalen Zeitalter. In: P. Kruse and S. Müller-Mall, eds. 2020. Digitale Transformation der Öffentlichkeit. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, pp. 229-261.

Bostrom, N., 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, S., 1986. Coping with Change: Why Computers Can’t and Humans Can. In: L. Nagl and R. Heinrich, 1986. Wo steht die Analytische Philosophie heute? Vienna: Oldenbourg, pp. 150-170.

Dreyfus, H. and Taylor, C., 2015. Retrieving Realism. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.

Forrest, K., 2021. When Machines Can Be Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Justice in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing House.

Habermas, J., 2019. Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Volume 2: Vernünftige Freiheit: Spuren des Diskurses über Glauben und Wissen. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Herman, B., 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.

Hochreiter, S., 2020. The Algorithm Can Learn Anything — Good Things as Well as Bad Things. In: M. Hengstschläger, ed. 2020. Digital Transformation and Ethics. Salzburg & Munich: Ecowin Verlag, pp. 362-375.

Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T., 2016. Dialectic of Enlightenment. London & New York: Verso.

Kant, I., 1996. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited by M. Gregor and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-108.

Klingel, A., Kraft, T. and Zweig, A., 2020. Potential Best Practice Approaches in the Use of an Algorithmic Decision-Making Systems with the Example of the AMS [Austrian Arbeitsmarktservice] Algorithm. In: M. Hengstschläger, ed. 2020. Digital Transformation and Ethics. Salzburg & Munich: Ecowin Verlag, pp. 178-196.

Kurzweil, R., 2005. The Singularity is Near. London: Viking Penguin.

Marantz, A., 2019. Antisocial. Online Extremists, Techno-Utopian, and the Hijacking of the American Conversation. New York: Viking Penguin.

Mersch, D., 2019. Ideen zu einer Kritik ‘algorithmischer’ Rationalität. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 67(5), pp. 851-873.

Mitchell, M., 2019. Artificial Intelligence. A Guide for Thinking Humans. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Nagl, L., 1983. Gesellschaft und Autonomie. Historisch-systematische Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Sozialtheorie von Hegel bis Habermas. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Nagl, L., 2018. What is it to be a Human Being? Charles Taylor on ‘the Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity’. In: B. Buchhammer, ed. 2018. Re-Learning to be Human in Global Times: Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspective of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 117-136.

Nagl, L., 2022. Merits and Limits of AI. In: H. Nagl-
Docekal and W. Zacharasiewicz, eds., 2022. Artificial Intelligence and Human Enhancement. Affirmative and Critical Approaches in the Humanities. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 33-50.

Nida-Rümelin, J. and Weidenfeld, N., 2018. Digitaler Humanismus. Eine Ethik für das Zeitalter der Künstlichen Intelligenz. München: Piper.

Nida-Rümelin, J., 2019. Structural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason. Berlin, Dordrecht, Heidelberg & New York: Springer.

Putnam, H., 1981. Brains in a Vat. In: H. Putnam, 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-21.

Putnam, H., 1992. The Project of Artificial Intelligence. In: H. Putnam, 1992. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-18.

Searle, J., 1987. Minds, Brains, and Programs. In: R. Born, ed. 1987. Artificial Intelligence. The Case Against. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 18-40.

Spiekermann, S., 2020. On the Difference between Artificial and Human Intelligence and the Ethical Implications of Their Confusion. In: M. Hengstschläger, ed. 2020. Digital Transformation and Ethics. Salzburg & Munich: Ecowin Verlag, pp. 88-117.

Sudmann, A., 2019. The Democratization of Artificial Intelligence. Net Politics in the Era of Learning Algorithms. In: A. Sudmann, ed. 2019. The Democratization of Artificial Intelligence. Net Politics in the Era of Learning Algorithms. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 9-31.

Taylor, C., 2016. The Language Animal. The Full Shape of Human Linguistic Capacity. Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C., Nanz, P. and Beaubien-Taylor, M., 2020. Reconstructing Democracy. How Citizens are Building from the Ground Up. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.

Werthner, H., 2020. The Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism. In: M. Hengstschläger, ed. 2020. Digital Transformation and Ethics. Salzburg & Munich: Ecowin Verlag, pp. 350-385.

Wood, A., 1998. Humanity as End in Itself. In: P. Guyer, ed. 1998. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Critical Essays. Lanham, Boulder, New York & Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 165-187.