2015 Issue №2(52)

Logical hylomorphism considers logic as a theory of formal relations. However, it is difficult to give a precise definition of these relations due to a multitude of interpretations of formality in logic. This paper acknowledges the dichotomy of the substantial and dynamic models of formality. Firstly, the author suggests revising certain interpretations of Aristotelian syllogistics and attempts to answer the question as to why Aristotle did not become the founder of logical hylomorphism. It is argued that, as a metatheory, Aristotelian syllogistics addresses formal relations between the perfect and imperfect rules of inference rather than the canonical structures of categorical statements. The absence of a strict distinction between logical syntax and semantics in Aristotelian syllogistics and his reductive approach to the patterns of inferences (i. e. the syllogistic moods in the three figures) shifts focus from the schematic to dynamic model of formality. Secondly, the author assesses the logical hylomorphism of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who connected it with metaphysical form vs. matter dichotomy. Thirdly, it is argued that Kant’s transcendental logic is a logic in the formal sense. Whereas general logic is concerned merely with constitutive rules of inference, transcendental logic is concerned with regulative rules aimed at better reasoning