2015 Issue №2(24)

Russia has a vested political interest in the Eastern Baltics; yet acting upon this interest is made either difficult or altogether impossible when it comes to the Baltic States. For 20 years, the Russian Federation has been actively promoting a model of mutually beneficial co-operation. The anti-Russian discourse of the Baltic States' political elites — driven by their own wish to maintain their political monopoly — halts most of co-operation efforts. It is time to accept that the previous model of co-operation with the Baltic States is now irrelevant, since these states now form the avant-garde of anti-Russian movement; whether they will — or, indeed, shall — be held accountable for that is another question that bears answering. for which they should certainly be held accountable. The author of this article believes that the current model is unprecedented and failing, so it is unwise to speak of its continuing long-term application. The aim of this study is to draw some conclusions on the 25 years of interg overnmental relations between Russia and the Baltic States. The author uses a number of cross-disciplinary methods and relies heavily on the method of historical analysis. It is concluded that there are reasons rendering mutual co-operation impossible — however beneficial such co-operation may seem. Conservation of the current political system will inevitably lead to economic stagnation in the Baltic States. If external pressures continue to rise and the relations with Russia continue to deteriorate, the destruction of economic and political systems of the neighboring states may become a reality.

The article scrutinizes Lithuanian foreign policy within the framework of the regional leadership concept first introduced in the early 2000s. The reasons of failure of the first leadership attempt in 2004—2008 are analyzed, as are the reasons behind the revival of the concept in 2010 and onwards. While the overall economy seems to be on the mend and the relationships with the adjacent countries (Poland, mostly) are improving, Lithuanian leadership, argues the author, is still very much a subcontract one: it follows the model of “export democracy”, has a narrow agenda and is implicitly geared towards curtailing the influence of its eastern neighbor. The escalation of violence and further development of social and economic crisis in Ukrane make a European-style reform (where Lithuania is a selfproclaimed expert) even less relevant, and confrontational rhetoric towards Russia may lead to economic losses and contribute to rising political tension in the region.