NONE20260529204719370Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal Universityno-reply@journals.kantiana.ruImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityKantian Journal0207-69182310-370105292026423Введение в раздел «Кант и метафилософия»M.LewinImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityThere is a growing interest in both Kant’s conception of philosophy and contemporary metaphilosophy, understood as philosophical inquiry into philosophy, its aims, purpose, subjects, structure, practice and methods. Kant has not contributed to metaphilosophy qua contemporary discipline, but his direct analyses of what philosophy is and how it is to be done can be identified with general subjects and problems constituting the research field of metaphilosophy. Several aspects of Kant’s conception of philosophy and its metaphilosophical value are the subject of current debates, such as the taxonomy of philosophy, relation between empirical and non-empirical philosophy, relation between philosophy and its history, conceptual analysis, deductive reasoning and philosophical disagreement.0529202671610.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-1https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5405/44124/Bacin, S., Ferrarin, A., La Rocca, C. and Ruffing, M., eds. 2013. Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110246490.Illetterati, L. and Miolli, G., eds. 2022. The Relevance of Hegel’s Concept of Philosophy: From Classical German Philosophy to Contemporary Metaphilosophy. London, New York & Dublin: Bloomsbury Academic.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited by M. J. Gregor, translated by A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-604.Lewin, M., 2021a. Kant’s Metaphilosophy. Open Philosophy, 4(1), pp. 292-310. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0190.Lewin, M., 2021b. Transcendental Philosophy as a Scientific Research Programme. Kantian Journal, 40(3), pp. 93-126. https://doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-3-4.Lewin, M., 2023. Metaphilosophie als einheitliche Disziplin. Berlin: Springer & Metzler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-66704-0.Loeb, P. S. and Meyer, M., eds. 2019. Nietzsche’s Metaphilosophy. The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108381338.Raatzsch, R., 2014. Philosophiephilosophie. 2. Auflage. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04436-7_1.Reinhold, K. L., 1803. Beyträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts. Volume 6. Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes.Rescher, N., 2014. Metaphilosophy. Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective. Lanham: Lexington Books.Rescher, N., 2021. Philosophy Examined. Metaphilosophy in Pragmatic Perspective. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110747386.Theunissen, B., 2014. Hegels Phänomenologie als metaphilosophische Theorie. Hegel und das Problem der Vielfalt der philosophischen Theorien. Eine Studie zur systemexternen Rechtfertigungsfunktion der Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hamburg: Meiner. https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-2720-1.Williamson, T., 2018. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Чистая и нечистая философия в метафилософии КантаE.V.GarciaUniversity of Massachu­setts AmherstKant’s metaphilosophy has three main parts: (1) an essentialist project (“What is philosophy?”); (2) a methodological project (“How do we do philosophy?”); and (3) a taxonomic project (“What are the different parts of philosophy, and how are they related?”). This paper focuses on the third project. In particular, it explores one of the most intriguing yet puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy, viz. the relationship between what Kant calls ‘pure’ philosophy vs. ‘applied’, ‘empirical’ or what we can broadly refer to as ‘impure’ philosophy. (As we shall see, in order to be able to address this third project, we shall also need to examine the other two projects in detail.) My plan is as follows. First, I discuss four main areas of pure vs. impure philosophy: (i) ‘pure logic’ vs. ‘applied logic’; (ii) ‘rational psychology’ vs. ‘empirical psychology’; (iii) ‘pure metaphysics of nature’ vs. ‘physics’ and (iv) ‘pure morality’ or a ‘metaphysics of morals’ vs. ‘moral anthropology’, ‘practical anthropology’ or ‘applied moral philosophy’. Based on this, I identify four key differences between pure and impure philosophy. Second, I critically examine four different readings of Kant’s views about the status of ‘impure’ philosophy: (a) that it is not genuine philosophy; (b) that it is bad or inferior philosophy; (c) that it is instrumentally valuable; and (d) that it constitutes an indispensable part of Kant’s philosophy, both in a theoretical and practical sense. I argue that Kant is best interpreted as endorsing readings (c) and (d). Third, I offer some concluding remarks.05292026174810.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-2https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5405/44126/Ameriks, K., 2001. Kant on Science and Common Knowledge. In: E. Watkins, ed. 2001. Kant and the Exact Sciences. New York: Oxford, pp. 31-52.Bird, G., 2006. The Revolutionary Kant. Chicago: Open Court.Brandt, R., 2003. The Guiding Idea of Kant’s Anthropology and the Vocation of the Human Being. In: B. Jacobs and P. Kain, 2003. Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge, pp. 85-104.Caplan, A. 1980. Ethical Engineers Need Not Apply: The State of Applied Ethics Today. Science, Technology & Human Values, 5(4), pp. 24-32. https://doi.org/10.1177/016224398000500403.Frierson, P., 2003. Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge.Garcia, E.V., 2006. Book review of “Essays on Kant’s Anthropology”. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3(2), pp. 240-244. https://doi.org/10.1177/174046810600300209.Gregor, M., 1963. Laws of Freedom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Kant, I., 1992. The Jäsche Logic. In: I. Kant, 1992. Lectures on Logic. Translated by J.M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 521-640.Kant, I., 1996a. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-108.Kant, I., 1996b. Critique of Practical Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-272.Kant, I., 1996c. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273-310.Kant, I., 1996d. The Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-604.Kant, I., 1996e. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Religion and Rational Theology. Edited and translated by G. di Giovanni and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-216.Kant, I., 1997. Lectures on Ethics Mrongovius. In: I. Kant, 1997. Lectures on Ethics. Translated by P. Heath. Edited by P. Heath and J. Schneewind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 223-248.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2002. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In: I. Kant, 2002. Theoretical Philosophy after 1891. Translated by M. Friedman. Edited by H. Allison and P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171-270.Kant, I., 2012. Anthropology Friedlander. In: I. Kant, 2012. Lectures on Anthropology. Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel. Edited by R. Louden and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-256.Korsgaard, C., 2008. The Constitution of Agency. New York: Oxford.Lewin, M., 2020. The Universe of Science. The Architectonic Ideas of Science, Sciences and Their Parts in Kant. Kantian Journal, 39(2), pp. 26-45. https://doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2020-2-2.Lewin, M., 2021a. Kant’s Metaphilosophy. Open Philosophy, 4, pp. 292-310. https://doi.org/10.1515/op phil-2020-0190.Lewin, M., 2021b. Transcendental Philosophy as a Scientific Research Programme. Kantian Journal, 40(3), pp. 93-126. https://doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-3-4.Louden, R., 2000. Kant’s Impure Ethics. New York: Oxford.Louden, R., 2011. Kant’s Human Being. New York: Oxford.Louden, R., 2018. The Moral Dimensions of Kant’s Anthropology. In: G. Lorini and R. Louden, eds. 2018. Knowledge, Morals, and Practice in Kant’s Anthropology. London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 101-116.Makreel, R. 2001. Kant on the Scientific Status of Psychology, Anthropology, and History. In: E. Watkins, ed. 2001. Kant and the Exact Sciences. New York: Oxford, pp. 185-204.Overgaard, S., Gilbert, P. and Burwood, S., 2013. An Introduction to Metaphilosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge.Paton, H. J., 1971. The Categorical Imperative. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.Stark, W., 2003. Historical Notes and Interpretative Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology. In: B. Jacobs and P. Kain, 2003. Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge, pp. 15-37.Sturm, T., 2001. Kant on Empirical Psychology: How Not to Investigate the Human Mind. In: E. Watkins, ed. 2001. Kant and the Exact Sciences. New York: Oxford, pp. 163-185.Wilson, C., 2014. Kant on Civilisation, Culture and Moralization. In: A. Cohen, ed. 2014. Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge, pp. 191-211.Zinkstok, J., 2011. Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic. Kant Yearbook, 3, pp. 107-130. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110236545.107.Zande, R., 2006. The Design Process of Problem Solving. Academic Exchange Quarterly, 10(4), pp. 150-154.Кант и анализM.LewinT.WilliamsonIn the current dialogue between two authors with different views on analysis, philosophy, and the use of labels, the leading question is: How should one understand the expression ‘analytic philosophy’? Lewin argues that as there are no generally agreed tenets and methods of what is being called ‘analytic philosophy’, the name is to be replaced by a more specific one or abandoned. Williamson defends the use of this phrase, claiming that it is quite serviceable, as it relates to a broad tradition of influence, while it is not even required to adhere to the method of analysis in any distinctive sense. Lewin counters that, in this case, ‘analytic philosophy’ is too empty. One could heal this by conceptual analysis of ‘analytic philosophy’ — but then Kant, for whom philosophy is inherently analytic, would be a proponent of analytic philosophy. Another option is to follow Ryle’s ideal of a label-free, coherent and honest thinking. As Lewin argues, Williamson’s views seem at least partially to agree with Kant’s conception of the difference between philosophy and history of philosophy as well as empirical analysis and the underlying empirical realism. Williamson replies that he uses ‘analytic philosophy’ in its current meaning, which is not composed of the meanings of ‘analytic’ and ‘philosophy’. The current use is different from the earlier ones and not applicable to Kant. He argues against the transcendental idealism and the coarse-grained distinction between analytic and synthetic and a priori and a posteriori that requires an update.05292026497310.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-3https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5405/44128/Beck, L. W., 1956. Kant’s Theory of Definitions. The Philosophical Review, 65(2), pp. 179-191.Boghossian, P. and Williamson, T., 2020. Debating the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Cicatello, A., 2018. Der seltsame Fall der ‘Gegebenen Begriffe’ bei Kant. In: V. L. Waibel, M. Ruffing and D. Wagner, eds. 2018. Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 1183-1190.Dummett, M., 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth.Glock, H. -J., 2008. What is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Hiltscher, R. and Breitenstein, P. H., 2011. Deutscher Idealismus. In: P. H. Breitenstein and J. Rohbeck, eds. 2011. Philosophie. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, pp. 69-85. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-00402-4_5.Kant, I., 1992. The Vienna Logic. In: I. Kant, 1992. Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 250-377.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2002a. Jottings for the Progress of Metaphysics. In: I. Kant. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Edited by H. Allison and P. Heath, translated by G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 413-424.Kant, I., 2002b. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. In: I. Kant. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Edited by H. Allison and P. Heath, translated by G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-169.Kripke, S., 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Lewin, M., 2021. Kant’s Metaphilosophy. Open Philosophy, 4(1), pp. 292-310. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0190.Lewin, M., 2022. The Faculty of Ideas. Kant’s Concept of Reason in the Narrower Sense. Open Philosophy, 5(1), pp. 340-359. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0203.Lewin, M., 2023. Metaphilosophie als einheitliche Disziplin. Berlin: Springer & Metzler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-66704-0.McAndrew, M., 2022. Kant’s Theory of Concept Formation and his Theory of Definitions. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-9002.Radcliffe, E., McCarty, R., Allhoff, F. and Vaidya, A. eds., 2007. Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Blackwell.Ryle, G., 1937. Taking Sides in Philosophy. Philosophy, 12(47), pp. 317-332.Quine, W. V. O., 1951. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 60(1), pp. 20-43.Williamson, T., 2011. Knowledge First Epistemology. In: S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard, eds. 2011. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 208-218.Williamson, T., 2018. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Williamson, T., 2022. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Second Edition. Hoboken and Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.Трансцендентальная дедукция категорий как философское доказательствоE.FicaraPaderborn UniversityMy aim is to reconstruct the basic steps and the fundamental idea of Kant’s transcendental deduction of categories as well as Hegel’s interpretation and reframing of Kant’s idea. Hegel’s reading is crucial for two reasons: first, for fixing the basic form of the Kant­ian argument and secondly, for understanding its metaphilosophical relevance. For Hegel, philosophical proof has a specific nature, which distinguishes it from scientific proof and brings it closer to a juridical one. In this perspective the transcendental deduction, which is universally considered one of the most difficult chapters in the history of philosophy, reveals itself as the genuine clarification of specifically philosophical proof. I first present the idea of Kant’s transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as its Hegelian reading in the Science of Logic and reformulation as the very method of philosophy in the Philo­sophy of Right. I show what in the Kantian argumentation constituted the basis for Hegel’s own interpretation and transformation. In so doing, I highlight a ‘red thread’ between the two ideas of the transcendental deduction. I conclude by proposing a formal account of Kant’s and Hegel’s ideas and by summing up the main metaphilosophical insights we can gain from Kant’s idea and its Hegelian interpretation.05292026749610.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-4https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5405/44131/Allais, L., 2013. Kitcher on the Deduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(1), pp. 229-236.Allison, H., 2015. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Bauer, S. M., 2021. Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter.Baum, M., 1986. Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. Untersuchungen zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Königstein: Hain.Chiodi, P., 1961. La deduzione nell’opera di Kant. Torino: Taylor.De Vleeschauwer, H. J., 1934-1937. La déduction transcendentale dans l’œuvre de Kant. In 3 Volumes. Amsterdam: Martinus Nijhoff.Düsing, K., 2013. Subjektivität und Freiheit: Untersuchungen zum Idealismus von Kant bis Hegel. Second Edition. Stuttgart Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog.Erdmann, B., 1878. Kants Kritizismus in der ersten und zweiten Auflage der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’. Leipzig: Voss.Ferrari, M., 2013. Book Review of Kant’s Transcendental Arguments. Disciplining Pure Reason, by Scott Stapleford (2008). Kant-Studien, 104(2), pp. 254-256.Ficara, E., 2006. Die Ontologie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.Ficara, E., 2021. The Form of Truth. Hegel’s Philosophical Logic. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter.Ficara, E., ed. 2012. Skeptizismus und Philosophie. Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Sonderausgabe von Fichte-Studien, Vol. 39. Leiden: Rodopi.Ficara, E., 2013. Kant e il rapporto dello scetticismo con la filosofia. In: S. Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. La Rocca, M. Ruffing, eds. Akten des XI. Kant Kongresses. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, pp. 543-555.Forster, M., 2008. Kant and Skepticism. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.Forster, M., 2021. Skepticism. In: J. Wuerth, ed. 2021. The Cambridge Kant Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 404-407.Gadamer, H. -G., 1971. Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik. In: H.-G. Gadamer, 1971. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger. Mohr: Tübingen, pp. 49-70.Gadamer, H. -G., 1976. Hegel’s Dialectics. Five Hermeneutical Studies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.Grundmann, T., 2003. Was ist eigentlich ein transzendentales Argument? In: A. K. Engelhard and D. Heidemann, eds. 2003. Warum Kant heute? Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, pp. 44-75.Hegel, G. W. F., 1969. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. In: G. W. F. Hegel, 1969. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe, Volume 7, edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Hegel, G. W. F., 2001. Philosophy of Right. Translation by S. W. Dyde. Ontario: Batoche Books Kitchener.Hegel, G. W. F., 2010. Science of Logic. Translation by G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Henrich, D., 1976. Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion. Heidelberg: Winter.Henrich, D., 1989. Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique. In: E. Förster, ed. 1989. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford: Standford University Press, pp. 29-46.Hiltscher, R., 1993. Kants Begründung der Adäquationstheorie der Wahrheit in der transzendentalen Deduktion der Ausgabe B. Kant-Studien, 84(4), pp. 426-447.Horstmann, R. P., 2006. Hegels Ordnung der Dinge. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes als “transzendentalistisches” Argument für eine monistische Ontologie und seine erkenntnistheoretischen Implikationen. Hegel-Studien, 41, pp. 9-50.Houlgate, S., 2015. Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument? In: S. Gardner and M. Grist, eds. 2015. The Transcendental Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173-194.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2004. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. Translated by G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kitcher, P., 2011. Kant’s Thinker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Laywine, A., 2020. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Lewin, M., 2021. Transcendental Philosophy as a Scientific Research Programme. Kantian Journal, 40(3), pp. 93-126. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-3-4.Lukács, G., 1973. Der junge Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Moeller, S., 2020. Kant’s Tribunal of Reason. Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Pippin, R., 2015. Finite and Absolute Idealism. The Transcendental and the Metaphysical Hegel. In: S. Gardner and M. Grist, eds. 2015. The Transcendental Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159-172.Priest, G., 1979. The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), pp. 219-241.Puder, M., 1974. Stringenz und Ausdruck. Freiburg: Rombach.Schäfer, R., 2011. Das bi-polare Ich. Analytische und synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption in Kants Kategoriendeduktion. In: E. Ficara, ed. 2011. Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 245—272.Stapleford, S., 2008. Kant’s Transcendental Arguments. Disciplining Pure Reason. London & New York: Continuum.Stekeler-Weithofer, P., 1992. Hegels Analytische Philosophie. Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung. Paderborn: Schöningh.Westphal, K., 2021. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: Critical Re-Examination, Elucidation & Corroboration. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.Кант — сторонник метафилософского скептицизма?D.MinkinUniversity of WuppertalThroughout history, both philosophers and non-philosophers have doubted that philosophical positions qua philosophical positions are justified and that philosophy is a rational enterprise. Today, such doubts are grouped under the term “Metaphilosophical Skepticism”. Nicholas Rescher, in his book Strife of Systems, includes Kant among the proponents of this kind of skepticism. I want to argue that while Rescher is wrong, Kant has con­tributed to a new version of such skepticism. In the first step, I characterize the basic idea of metaphilosophical skepticism in more detail and identify a version of this idea, which I call “Second-Stage-Skepticism” and on which I will focus. In the following part, I reconstruct Rescher’s reading of Second-Stage-Skepticism as well as his reasons for considering Kant to represent this version. My main claim in this part will be that there is no reading of the mentioned basic idea that makes Rescher’s view reasonable. In the third step, I introduce a newer form of metaphilosophical skepticism — “Third-Stage Skepticism” — and conjecture that this form can be seen as inspired by Kant’s thought on philosophical diversity. Finally, I point out a way to reject this newer form.052920269712910.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-5https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5405/44133/Ballantyne, N., 2016. Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(4), pp. 752-765.Baum, M., 2015. Metaphysik. In: M. Willaschek, J. Stolzenberg, G. Mohr und S. Bacin, Hg. 2015. Kant-Lexikon. Berlin und Boston: de Gruyter, S. 1530-1540.Bernáth, L. and Tözsér, J., 2021. The Biased Nature of Philosophical Beliefs in the Light of Peer Disagreement. Metaphilosophy, 52(3-4), pp. 363-378.Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D., 2013. What Do Philosophers Believe? Philosophical Studies, 170(3), pp. 465-500.Brennan, J., 2010. Scepticism about Philosophy. Ratio (New Series), 23(1), pp. 1-16.Cappelen, H., 2012. Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Coliva, A. and Doulas, L., 2022. What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge On. Synthese, 200(3), Article 251. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03735-6.Crone, K., 2015. Erkenntnis, empirische/reine. In: M. Willaschek, J. Stolzenberg, G. Mohr und S. Bacin, Hg. 2015. Kant-Lexikon. Berlin und Boston: de Gruyter, S. 545-547.Fischer, E., 2018. Wittgensteinian ‘Therapy’, Experimental Philosophy, and Metaphilosophical Naturalism. 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Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, S. 225-580.«Консервативное просвещение» как «героизация настоящего»B.V.MezhuevLomonosov Moscow State UniversityInstitute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences RASImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityThis text is a polemic against the 2023 article by Sergey N. Gradirovsky who wrote about the present-day relevance of Immanuel Kant’s concept of enlightenment and challenged the idea of the modern human being as a child who needs an external guardian or guide to control his behaviour. In my polemic with Gradirovksy I point out that in addition to “self-incurred immaturity” Kant writes about the historical “immaturity” of savage or backward peoples. I also argue that for Kant “maturity” carries not only biological but also socio-historical connotations. I show that in the modern world Kant’s idea of the social or even historical maturity of the modern human acquires serious problematisation which was shown to be possible and inevitable in the article “What Is Enlightenment?” (1784) and its notion of the historicity of enlightenment, i.e. the very strategy of modernity is possible only when humankind reaches a certain historical age. Using as a point of departure the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, I maintain that the Kant­ian conception of enlightenment is at once ironic and tragic. It is ironic because it does not rule out that its main thesis on the historical maturity of the human being may turn out to be wrong. It is tragic because its main thrust is “heroisation of the present”, i.e. a readi­ness to resist the temptation of being absorbed by the future, which takes on added relevance in view of the virtualisation of reality.0529202613015810.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-6https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5406/44135/Avtonomova, N. S., 2009. Michel Foucault. In: Filosofy dvadcatogo veka [Philosophers of the 20th Century]. Book 3. Moscow: Iskusstvo-XXI vek, pp. 274-294. (In Rus.)Foucault, M., 2005. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London & New York: Routledge.Foucault, M., 1984. What is Enlightenment? In: P. Rabinow, ed. 1984. The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 32-50.Foucault, M., 2010. The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982—1983. Ed. by F. Gros, F. Ewald and A. Fontana, translated by G. Burchell. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Fukuyama, F., 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York & Toronto: Free Press.Gradirovsky, S. N., 2023. Dare to Know, or the Gospel According to Kant. Kantian Journal, 42(2), pp. 141-170. http://dx.doi:10.5922/0207-6918-2023-2-7.Habermas, J., 1994. Taking Aim at the Heart of Present: On Focault’s Lecture on Kant’s “What Is Enlightenment?” In: J. Habermas, 1994. The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate. Boston: Policy Press, pp. 173-180.Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T., 1972. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Herder and Herder.Kant, I., 1999. An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784). ln: I. Kant, 1999. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-22.Kant, I., 2007. Review of J. G. Herders Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity. Parts 1 and 2. In: I. Kant, 2007. Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden; translated by A. W. Wood. 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КалинниковаV.A.KonevSamara University0529202615917110.5922/0207-6918-2023-3-7https://journals.kantiana.ru/kant_collection/5409/44136/Kalinnikov, L. A., 2021. Filosofskaya sistema Kanta. Zamysel i itogi [Kant’s Philosophical System. Conception and Results]. Kaliningrad: IKBFU Press. (In Rus.)Kant, I., 2008. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by I. Johnston. Arlington: Richer Resources Publications.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by P. Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 1993. Opus Postumum. Edited, with an introduction and notes, by E. Förster, translated by E. Förster and M. Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.