NONE20260529204720828Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal Universityno-reply@journals.kantiana.ruImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityKantian Journal0207-69182310-370105292026411M.StickerI critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalising, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory-independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalising. Kant believes that rationalising is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalising. Yet, his opponents could, in turn, charge him with rationalising and some theorists, namely Act-Consequentialists, seem to be in an even stronger position to charge Kant with rationalising than vice versa. In response, I propose standards that do not assume a specific normative theory and that become apparent when we look at clear-cut abuses of rationality. These standards of minimally decent reasoning can help us diagnose rationalising. I develop these standards by looking at inadequate uses of rational capacities that should strike us as problematic regardless of the specific ethical theory we adopt. I emphasise that even an abuse of rational capacities can yield true results and that we can never tell from a single judgement that someone rationalises. Rather, we must look for patterns.0529202611Ackeren, M. van and Sticker, M., 2015. Kant on Moral Demandingness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(1), pp. 75-89.Ackeren, M. van and Sticker, M., 2018. Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant. Kantian Review, 23(3), pp. 407-428.Allais, L., 2016. Kant’s Racism. Philosophical Papers, 45(1-2), pp. 1-36.Allais, L., 2021. Deceptive Unity and Productive Disunity: Kant’s Account of Situated Moral Selves. In: A. Lyssy, C. Yeomans, eds. Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality. Practical Dimensions of Normativity. London: Palgrave, pp. 45-66.Ameriks, K., 2000. The Fate of Autonomy. Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Baumgarten, A. G., 2000. Ethica philosophica. Hildesheim: Olms.Callanan, J. 2019. Kant on Misology and the Natural Dialectic. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(47), pp. 1-22.Crusius, C. A., 1772. Kurzer Begriff der Moraltheologie, oder nähere Erklärung der praktischen Lehren des Christentums. Theil 1. Leipzig: Ulrich Christian Saalbach.Dancy, J., 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford, Oxford University Press.Di Giulio, S., 2020. Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Zur Irreführung des Gewissens bei Kant. In: S. Di Giulio and A. Frigo, eds. Kasuistik und Theorie des Gewissens. Von Pascal bis Kant. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 233-287.Ellis, J., Schwitzgebel, E., 2020. Rationalization in the Pejorative Sense: Cushman’s Account Overlooks the Scope and Costs of Rationalization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, e35. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002152Formosa, P., Sticker, M., 2019. Kant and the Demandingness of the Virtue of Beneficence. European Journal of Philosophy, 27(3), pp. 625-642.Frankfurt, H. 2005. On Bullshit. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Grenberg, J., 2010. What is the Enemy of Virtue? In: L. Denis, ed. 2010. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 152-169.Grenberg, J., 2013. Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience. A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Haidt, J., 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment. Psychological Review, 108, pp. 814-834.Herman, B., 2011. A Mismatch of Methods. In: S. Sheffler, ed. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-116.Hill, T., 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Kant, I., 1996a. The Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-603.Kant, I., 1996b. Critique of Practical Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-271.Kant, I., 1996c. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273-309.Kant, I., 1996d. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In: I. Kant, 1996. Religion and Rational Theology. Translated and edited by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-217.Kant, I., 1996e. On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy. In: I. Kant, 1996. Religion and Rational Theology. Translated and edited by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-37.Kant, I., 2007. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In: I. Kant, 2007. Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited by G. Zöller and R. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227-428.Kant, I., 2011. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by J. Timmermann and M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.Papish, L., 2018. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Piper, A. M. S., 2013. Rationality and the Structure of the Self. Volume 2: A Kantian Conception. Second Edition. Berlin: Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation. Available at: http://www.adrianpiper.com/rss/docs/PiperRSSVol2KC.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2021].Reath, A., 2006. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Shell, S., 2009: Kant and the Limits of Autonomy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Singer, P., 1972. Famine, Affluence and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), pp. 229-243.Stark, C., 1997. The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35(1), pp. 65-82.Sticker, M., van Ackeren, M., 2018. The Demandingness of Beneficence and Kant’s System of Duties. Social Theory and Practice, 44(3), pp. 405-436.Sticker, M., 2015a. Educating the Common Agent. Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 97(3), pp. 358-387.Sticker, M., 2015b. The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent — A Reply to Ido Geiger. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 23(5), pp. 976-989.Sticker, M., 2016. When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks — Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 51(1), pp. 85-104.Sticker, M., 2017. Experiments in Ethics? Kant on Chemistry, Means of Education and Methods of Practical Philosophy. Idealistic Studies, 46(1), pp. 41-63.Sticker, M., 2020. Kant, Eudaimonism, Act-Consequentialism and the Fact of Reason. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 102(2), pp. 209-241.Sticker, M., 2021a. Rationalizing (Vernünfteln). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Sticker, M., 2021b. Kant, Moral Overdemandingness and Self-Scrutiny. NOUS, 25(2), pp. 293-316.Timmermann, J., 2005. Good but Not Required? — Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2(1), pp. 9-27.Timmermann, J., 2006. Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended. Philosophy, 81(3), pp. 505-530.Timmermann, J., 2018. Autonomy, Progress and Virtue: Why Kant Has Nothing to Fear from the Overdemandingness Objection. Kantian Review, 23(3), pp. 379-397.Vogt, K., 2008. Duties to Others: Demands and Limits. In: M. Betzler, ed. 2008. Kant’s Ethics of Virtue. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 219-243.Ware, O., 2021. Kant’s Justification of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Wehofsits, A., 2016. Anthropologie und Moral. Affekte, Leidenschaften und Mitgefühl in Kants Ethik. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter.Wehofsits, A., 2020. Passions: Kant’s Psychology of Self-Deception. Inquiry, https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1801498Williams, B., 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press.Wood, A., 2002. Preface and Introduction (3-16). In: O. Höffe, ed. 2002. Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 25-43.Wood, A., 2014. The Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.D.BakhurstThis paper defends the doctrine that moral requirements are categorical in nature. My point of departure is John McDowell’s 1978 essay, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, in which McDowell argues, against Philippa Foot, that moral reasons are not conditional upon agents’ desires and are, in a certain sense, inescapable. After expounding McDowell’s view, exploring his idea that moral requirements “silence” other considerations and discussing its particularist ethos, I address an objection that moral reasons, as McDowell conceives them, are fundamentally incomplete in ways only a full-bloodedly Kantian appeal to pure practical reason can remedy. I conclude that the objection fails: ordinary moral reasons do not stand in need of a grounding in Reason. There is no prospect of deriving them from a supreme principle of morality or other canons of rationality. Ordinary reasons are sufficient in themselves, though their significance can be elucidated and illuminated by various strategies — some broadly Aristotelian, some drawing inspiration from Kant’s formula of humanity — in ways that can strengthen and vindicate them. Notwithstanding the failure of the objection, I conclude by reflecting on how Kantian insights can yet play a significant role in a McDowellian view of moral deliberation and moral education.0529202611Ackeren, M. van and Sticker, M., 2018. Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant. Kantian Review, 23(3), pp. 407-428.Anscombe, G. E. M., 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124), pp. 1-19.Anscombe, G. E. M., 2005. Good and Bad Human Action. In: G. E. M. Anscombe, 2005. Human Life, Action and Ethics. Edited by M. Geach and L. Gormally. Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 195-206.Bakhurst, D., 2000. Ethical Particularism in Content. In: B. Hooker and M. O. Little, eds. 2000. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, pp. 157-177.Bakhurst, D., 2013. Moral Particularism: Ethical not Metaphysical? In: D. Bakhurst, B. Hooker and M. Little, eds. 2013. Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 192-217. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.003.0010Foot, P., 1978. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. In: P. Foot, 1978. Virtues and Vice and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 157-173.Hare, R. M., 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Kant, I., 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by M. Gregor; with an introduction by C. M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2007. Lectures on Pedagogy. In: I. Kant, 2007. Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 434-485.Kant, I., 2015. Critique of Practical Reason. 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In Search of the Moral “Must”: Mrs Foot’s Fugitive Thought. Philosophical Quarterly, 27(107), pp. 140-157.Rödl, S., 2007. Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Wiggins, D., 2006. Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.L.NaglAre computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms (or, in Kantian terms, “imperatives of skill” that are implemented by technological means) do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways (even if, in so-called “machine learning”, digital technologies are able to probabilistically adapt to new data). This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms (possibly) are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” (Utopian or dystopian) ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its (partial) AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”.0529202611Becker, C. and Seubert, S., 2020. Die Selbstgefährdung der Autonomie. Eckpunkte einer Kritischen Theorie der Privatheit im digitalen Zeitalter. In: P. Kruse and S. Müller-Mall, eds. 2020. Digitale Transformation der Öffentlichkeit. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, pp. 229-261.Bostrom, N., 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, S., 1986. Coping with Change: Why Computers Can’t and Humans Can. In: L. Nagl and R. Heinrich, 1986. Wo steht die Analytische Philosophie heute? 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Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first (triage), and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first (vaccine distribution). Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives (survival to discharge) and life-years (survival for years past discharge). This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years.0529202611Afroogh, S., Kazemi, A. and Seyedkazemi, A., 2021. COVID-19, Scarce Resources and Priority Ethics: Why Should Maximizers Be More Conservative? Ethics, Medicine and Public Health, 18, September, 100698. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep.2021.100698Alexander, S., 1962. They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies: Medical Miracle Puts Moral Burden on Small Committee. Life, 53(19), pp. 102-125.Allais, L., 2016. Kant’s Racism. Philosophical Papers, 45(1-2), pp. 1-36.Altman, M. C., 2011. Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell.Altman, M. C., 2021. A Consequentialist Argument for Considering Age in Triage Decisions during the Coronavirus Pandemic. 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Positions derived from the third formulation, John Rawls’s Kantian Constructivism and T. M. Scanlon’s Contractualism, cleave closely to Kant in idealising the process of legislation. For Rawls, the citizens of the Kantian Reich can be reduced to one, a representative of all, who deliberates behind the veil of ignorance using minimax reasoning. Scanlon includes other lawmakers, but any potential diversity among them is overridden by trans­historical canons of reason. By contrast, I view morality as developing historically through the interactions among people with different views and conflicting aims. The task of moral theory is to construct an appropriate methodology to govern their deliberations. My naturalised Kant takes the first steps. Morality arises from the recognition of problematic situations, identified first by listening to the complaints of actual people, by judging whether they are warranted, and by seeking to amend them when the warrant is confirmed. Societies (and individuals) make moral progress when they deliberate (or simulate deliberations) in accordance with three norms. All those potentially affected should be included; the best available information should be used; and participants should aim for an outcome all can accept. How far is naturalised Kant from the great philosopher? I leave the answer to the scholars.0529202611Bennett, J., 1966. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Dahl, R., 1956. A Preface to Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Dahl, R., 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy and Control. New Haven: Yale University Press.Dewey, J., 1988. Human Nature and Conduct. In: J. Dewey, 1988. The Middle Works, Volume 14. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University PressFrege, G., 1968. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Оriginal text and parallel translation by J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.Hobbes, T., 1998. Leviathan. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.James, W., 1979. The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life. In: W. James, 1979. The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 141-162.Kant, I., 2011. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by M. Gregor and J. Timmermann. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Kitcher, Ph., 2011. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Kitcher, Ph., 2021a. Moral Progress. New York: Oxford University Press.Kitcher, Ph., 2021b. The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education. New York: Oxford University Press.Kleingeld, P., 2015. Freedom of the Will as Moral Self-Legislation. Lecture delivered at the 12th International Kant Congress, Vienna. [unpublished manuscript] (Personal communication, 10 October 2015).Nagel, T., 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.Parfit, D., 2011. On What Matters. In 2 Volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Rawls, J., 1980. Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 77, pp. 515-582.Scanlon, T. M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Scanlon, T. M., 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Sticker, M., 2021. Kant on Thinking for Oneself and with Others the Ethical A Priori, Openness and Diversity. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 55(6), pp. 949-965. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467- 9752.12615Strawson, P. F., 1966. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.Sturm, T., 2017. What Did Kant Mean by, and Why Did He Adopt a Cosmopolitan Point of View in History? In: J. Schaffner and H. Wardle, eds. 2017. Cosmopolitics: The Collected Papers of the Open Anthropology Cooperative, Volume I. St. Andrews: Open Anthropology Cooperative Press, 2017, pp. 72-88.G.CospitoReconstructing the evolution of Gramsci’s judgement about the Russian Revolution implies an overall rethinking of his own relation to Marx as well as to Kant. Already in the spring of 1917, Gramsci foresaw that the February Revolution could become a proletarian revolution and that this would realise in fact Kant’s moral: only a society completely freed from oppression and exploitation would allow people to be free and autonomous. After the fall of the Winter Palace, Gramsci wrote that the revolution happened “against Marx’s Capital”, or better, against its literal interpretation as spread by the positivistic Marxism of the Second International. Between the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s, Gramsci thought it possible for Italy and the whole of Europe “to do as in Russia”; yet, from 1924, he started elaborating a different vision of the revolution in the Western World, which in the Prison Notebooks became a contraposition between a war of movement and a war of position. At the same time, he developed the concepts of caesarism/bonapartism and passive revolution which allowed the analysis of phenomena such as americanism and fascism from the perspective of a conservative modernisation, or revolution without a revolution. Still, and most of all, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, highlighting the importance of the moment of consensus in the fight for gaining and maintaining power. This drew Gramsci quite far from the marxism-leninism of his time, both from the political and theoretical point of view; for instance, he rejected the “ingenuous realism” of Lenin’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism in favour of a phenomenalism explicitly drawn by Kant.0529202611Antonini, F., 2020. Caesarism and Bonapartism in Gramsci: Hegemony and the Crisis of Modernity. Leiden & Boston: Brill.Bobbio, N., 1993. “Martinettismo” torinese. Rivista di Filosofia, 84(3), pp. 329-339.Boothman, D., 2019. Dizionario gramsciano / Gramsci Dictionary: Translatability. International Gramsci Journal, 3(3), 2019, pp. 72-76.Cospito, G., 2008. Il marxismo sovietico ed Engels. Il problema della scienza nel Quaderno 11. In: F. Giasi, ed., 2008. Gramsci nel suo tempo. Volume 2. Rome: Carocci, pp. 747-766.Cospito, G., 2012. “Che cos’è l’uomo?”. Motivi kantiani negli scritti di Antonio Gramsci. il cannocchiale, 3, pp. 57-76.Cospito, G., 2016a. The Rhythm of Thought in Gramsci. A Diachronic Interpretation of Prison Notebooks. Leiden & Boston: Brill.Cospito, G., 2016b. Dopo i Quaderni. Le ultime letture di Gramsci (agosto 1935 — aprile 1937). Critica marxista, 4/5, pp. 53-61.Cospito, G., 2021. Egemonia. Da Omero ai Gender Studies. Bologna: Il mulino.Cospito, G., Francioni, G. and Frosini, F., 2021. Crisi e rivoluzione passiva. Gramsci interprete del Novecento. Como-Pavia: Ibis.Di Giovanni, P., 1996. Kant ed Hegel in Italia. Alle origini del neoidealismo. Rome & Bari: Laterza.Engels, F., 1892. Introduction to the English Edition (1892) of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. In: K. Marx and F. Engels, 1990. Collected Works. Volume 27: Frederick Engels, Works: February 1890 — April 1895. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 278-302.Fonnesu, L., 2014. Il ritorno dell’autonomia. Kant e la filosofia classica tedesca. Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 43, pp. 25-61.Francioni, G., 2016. Un labirinto di carta (Introduzione alla filologia gramsciana). International Gramsci Journal, 2(1), pp. 7-48.Gramsci, A., 1971. Selection from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.Gramsci, A., 1975a. Notes on the Russian Revolution. In: A. Gramsci, 1975. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci. Edited and translated by P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone. St. Louis: Telos Press, pp. 126-128.Gramsci, A., 1975b. The Russian Maximalists. In: A. Gramsci, 1975. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci. Edited and translated by P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone. St. Louis: Telos Press, pp. 132-134.Gramsci, A., 1975c. Republic and Proletariat in France. In: A. Gramsci, 1975. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci. Edited and translated by P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone. St. Louis: Telos Press, pp. 81-86.Gramsci, A., 1975d. The Revolution Against Capital. In: A. Gramsci, 1975. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci. Edited and translated by P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone. St. Louis: Telos Press, pp. 123-126.Gramsci, A., 1975e. Our Marx. In: A. Gramsci, 1975. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci. Edited and translated by P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone. St. Louis: Telos Press, pp. 9-12.Gramsci, A., 1995. Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Translated and edited by D. Boothman. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.Gramsci, A., 2007. Quaderni di traduzioni. Edited by G. Cospito and G. Francioni. Volume 2. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana.Gramsci, A., 2011a. Prison Notebooks. In 3 Volumes. Volume 1. Edited with an Introduction by J. A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.Gramsci, A., 2011b. Prison Notebooks. In 3 Volumes. Volume 2. Edited with an Introduction by J. A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.Gramsci, A., 2011c. Prison Notebooks. In 3 Volumes. Volume 3. Edited with an Introduction by J. A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.Gramsci, A., 2014. A Great and Terrible World. The Pre-Prison Letters 1908-1926. Edited and translated by D. Boothman. London: Laurence & Wishart.Kant, I., 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2006. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Edited by R. B. Louden. New York: Cambridge University Press.La Porta, L., 1990. Etica e politica: Gramsci critico di Kant. Critica marxista, 28(2), pp. 119-126.Marx, K. 1845. Theses on Feuerbach. In: K. Marx and F. Engels, 1975. Collected Works. Volume 5: 1845-1847. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 3-5.Mordenti, R., 2007. Gramsci e la rivoluzione necessaria. Rome: Editori Riuniti.Plekhanov, G. V., 1898a. Conrad Schmidt versus Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. In: G. V. Plekhanov, 1976. Selected Philosophical Works. Volume 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 379-397.Plekhanov, G. V., 1898b. Materialism or Kantianism. In: G. V. Plekhanov, 1976. Selected Philosophical Works. Volume 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 398-414.Plekhanov, G. V., 1908. Ibsen, Petty Bourgeois Revolutionist. In: F. Engels, F. Mehring, G. V. Plekhanov and A. V. Lunacharski, 1937. Ibsen. Edited by A. Flores. New York: Critics Group, pp. 35-92.Rapone, L., 2011. Cinque anni che paiono secoli. Antonio Gramsci dal socialismo al comunismo (1914-1919). Rome: Carocci.S. L.KatrechkoThe 13th International Kant Congress was held on August 6-9, 2019 in Oslo, Norway. The main tasks of this review are to analyse the central theme of the Congress, “The Court of Reason”, the related spheres of philosophical inquiry such as metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology, as well as to reveal the main approaches and development trends of transcendental philosophy in “theoretical” and “practical” fields and modern Kant studies, notably transcendental philosophy of language and consciousness. The solution of these tasks will make it possible to raise the question of the prospects of Kantian transcendentalism in relation to the pressing problems of our time (especially political philosophy and the philosophy of law) and to chart the paths of such development.0529202611Allais, L., 2015. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Ameriks, К., 1982. Recent Work on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19(1), рр. 1-24.Ameriks, К., 2011. Kant’s Idealism on a Moderate Interpretation. In: Kant’s Idealism New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine. Edited by D. Schulting and J. Verburgt. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London & New York: Springer, pp. 29-54.Anderson, R. L., 2021. Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism: an Anti-Metaphysical Reading. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2021, pp. 49-67.Anderson, R. L., 2022. Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism. European Journal of Philosophy, [e-journal] pp. 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12753Buroker, J. V., 1981. Space and Incongruence: The Origin of Kant’s Idealism. Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media.Buroker, J. V., 2021. Thought and Language in the Critical Philosophy. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2021, pp. 69-83.Capozzi, M., 1987. Kant on Logic, Language and Thought. In: M. Ferrian and D. Buzzetti, eds. 1987. Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 97-148.Capozzi, M., 2011. Philosophy and Writing: The Philosophical Book According to Kant. Quaestio, 1, pp. 307-350.Capozzi, M., 2021. Why Language Matters to Kant’s Philosophy and Logic. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2021, pp. 97-115.Dmitrieva, N. A., 2021. Kant in Early Russian Neo-Kantianism: The Case of Vvedensky. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6—9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1247-1254.Forster, M. N., 2012. Kant’s Philosophy of Language? Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 485-511.Friebe, C., 2021. Inkongruente Gegenstücke und Ununterscheidbares: Wozu braucht es Anschauung? In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6—9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 707-715.Friedman, M., 1998. Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, MА: Harvard University Press.Friedman, M., 2021. The Court of Reason and its Authority. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 191-207.Heidemann, D., 2021. Kant’s Supposed Realism about Things-in-Themselves. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 515-524.Henrich, D., 1969. The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Review of Metaphysics, 22(4), pp. 640-659.Henrich, D., 1989. Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique. In: E. Förster, ed. 1989. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction; The Three ‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus Postumum’. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 29-46.Jurkiewicz, A., 2021. Kant and the Mereology of the Perceiver’s Body. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1237-1244.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.Katrechko, S. L., 2021. Kant’s “Idea [Project] of Transcendental Philosophy”. Studies in Transcendental Philosophy, 1(1), [online] Available at: [Accessed 01 August 2021].Katrechko, S. L., 2021. The Ambivalent Character of the Kantian Notion of Appearance: The Objective-Objectual (‘gegenständlich’) Nature of Appearances as ‘Objects of Experience’. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 319-327.Kornilaev, L., 2021. Kant’s Copernican Turn: Emil Lask’s Interpretation and Its Criticism in Russia. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1265-1273.Møller, S., 2020. Kant’s Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Rusnock, P., 2004. Was Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics Right for Its Time? Kant-Studien, 95, pp. 426-442.Serck-Hanssen, S. and Himmelmann, B., eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110701357Trevisan, D. K., 2018. Der Gerichtshof der Vernunft. Eine historische und systematische Untersuchung über die juridischen Metaphern der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.Trotsak, A. I., 2021. The Dispute over Universal Competences during a Pandemic. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1595-1604.Willaschek, M., 2021. The Structure of Normative Space: Kant’s System of Rational Principles. In: C. Serck-Hanssen and B. Himmelmann, eds. 2021. The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Oslo, 6-9 August 2019. Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 245-266.