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<doi_batch xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.crossref.org/schema/5.3.1" xmlns:jats="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/JATS1" xmlns:fr="http://www.crossref.org/fundref.xsd" xmlns:ai="http://www.crossref.org/AccessIndicators.xsd" version="5.3.1"><head><doi_batch_id>NONE</doi_batch_id><timestamp>20260604071523194</timestamp><depositor><depositor_name>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University</depositor_name><email_address>no-reply@journals.kantiana.ru</email_address></depositor><registrant>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University</registrant></head><body><journal><journal_metadata><full_title>Kantian Journal</full_title><issn media_type="print">0207-6918</issn><issn media_type="electronic">2310-3701</issn></journal_metadata><journal_issue><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>04</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><journal_volume><volume>39</volume></journal_volume><issue>3</issue></journal_issue><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>Kant über Sein und Zeit und Denken und Sein. Selbsterkenntnis durch Selbstaffektion</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>R.</given_name><surname>Enskat</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>In the Cartesian tradition of discussing the structure of the micro-judgement “I think” Kant‘s treatment deserves extraordinary attention. Under the idiomatic heading of self-affection he delivers a micro-analysis of this judgment, contributing in a unique way to the clarification of a singular case of self-knowledge: In this case the thinking subject 1. thematises the act of judging “I think” by conferring on this act the specific logical, categorical form, 2. intuits this act under the temporal form of successively using “I ...” as subject and “… think” as predicate, 3. identifies him-/herself — at the same time — with the subject logically structuring this act as well as with the subject intuiting the successively existing subject of this judging act, and 4. recognises him-/herself as identical in these two different cognitive roles. By this very analysis Kant shows that the eminent micro-judgement-act “I think” has the complex, though paradigmatic substructure of each human subject recog­nising his/her identity as thinking / judging and temporally existing while thinking / judging.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>04</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Caimi, M., 2002. Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis in Kants transzendentaler Deduktion. In: D. H. Heidemann, Hg. 2002. Probleme der Subjektivität in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Stuttgart und Bad Cannstatt: fromann-holzboog, S. 85-106.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Carl, W., 2008. The Highest Point of Transcendental Philosophy. In: J. Stolzenberg und K. Ameriks, Hg. 2008. Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism 2007. Band 5: Metaphysik / Metaphysics. Berin und Boston: De Gruyter, S. 33-46. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110192438.1.33.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="3"><unstructured_citation>Düsing, K., 1987. Cogito, ergo sum? Untersuchungen zu Descartes und Kant. In: H.-D. Klein, Hg. 1987. Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie 19, Wien: New Academic Press, S. 95-106.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="4"><unstructured_citation>Enskat, R., 2015. Urteil und Erfahrung. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Erster Teil. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="5"><unstructured_citation>Enskat, R., 2020. Urteil und Erfahrung. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Zweiter Teil. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="6"><unstructured_citation>Heidegger, M., 1976. Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Wintersemester 1925/26). In: M. Heidegger, 1976. Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung II, Band 21. Herausgegeben von W. Biemel. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="7"><unstructured_citation>Heidegger, M., 1977. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Wintersemester 1927/28). In: M. Heidegger, 1977. Gesamtausgebabe, Abteilung II, Band 25. Herausgegeben von I. Görland. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="8"><unstructured_citation>Hintikka, J., 1962. Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance? Philosophical Review, 71, pp. 3-32.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="9"><unstructured_citation>Kemmerling, A., 1987. Eine reflexive Deutung des Cogito. In: K. Cramer, H.-F. Fulda, R.-P. Horstmann und U. Pothast, Hg. 1987. Theorie der Reflexivität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, S. 115-140.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="10"><unstructured_citation>Klemme, H., 1996. Kants Philosophie des Subjekts. Systematische und entwicklungs-geschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis. Hamburg: Meiner.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="11"><unstructured_citation>Reich, K., 1948. Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. 2. Auflage. Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung von R. Schoetz.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="12"><unstructured_citation>Rosefeldt, T., 2000. Das logische Ich. Kant über den Gehalt des Begriffes von sich selbst. Berlin: Philo.</unstructured_citation></citation></citation_list></journal_article><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>The Problem of the Relationship between Apperception, Self-Consciousness and Consciousness in Kant’s Critical Philosophy</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>I. E.</given_name><surname>Andriianov</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks of transcendental philosophy. The prime task is to discover the categories of understanding and to prove the legitimacy of their use, a task that is further complicated by the difference between the editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the argumentation in the section on the deduction of categories and Kant’s concept of apperception. Accordingly, the author seeks to clarify the purpose of each of the above-mentioned faculties and to establish their inter-relationship. To this end the author analyses the functional roles of consciousness, self-consciousness and apperception in solving the main tasks of the first Critique. It turns out that consciousness is a reflexive cognitive capacity which provides access to representations in our soul and allows us to distinguish them and to connect them. Self-consciousness is the mode of the functioning of consciousness which makes it possible to study three objects of consciousness: internal and external representations of the subject, the synthetic activity of understanding and our soul. Apperception is the Latin synonym of the concept of Selbstbewußtsein and is aimed at studying the unity of our representations. Because Kant distinguishes multiple kinds of unity, there are different names for apperception. Kant uses the concept of Apperzeption as a synonym of self-consciousness because his concept of consciousness follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>04</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Allison, H., 1983. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. 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N.</given_name><surname>Belov</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>The philosophy of religion as presented by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, the founders and main representatives of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, is an important and at the same time controversial part of their philosophical systems. The discussion around the problems of religion began within the Marburg School and still continues among those who study that School. The reason for this is that “fitting” philosophical thinking about the phenomenon of religion into the classical triad of any system of philosophy, i. e. effectively formulating that phenomenon in logical concepts, ethical postulates and aesthetic principles touched the very foundations of that system. Drawing mainly on the rough notes and correspondence of Cohen and Natorp I argue that, in spite of internal and quite important differences over the problems of religion and its place in philosophical constructions, Cohen and Natorp, first, retained their commitment to critical idealism and remained loyal to their philosophical school to the end and, second, followed the principle of mutual respect, preserving their professional and human sympathy for each other. Besides, I substantiate my assertion that Marburg Neo-Kantians had different concepts of the special place of religion in the system of philosophy. The specific nature of this difference warrants the discussion not only of the boundary of reason and rationality but adds new dimensions to that boundary, filling it with content and thus broadening the very sphere of critical idealism. In the course of the discussion of the problems of religion, Paul Natorp (in a more immediate and extended fashion) and Hermann Cohen (largely potentially) stake a claim to projects for the serious transformation of philosophy which they tried to implement in their later works.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>04</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Adelmann, D., 2010. “Reinige dein Denken”. Über den jüdischen Hintergrund der Philosophie von Hermann Cohen. Würzburg: Königshausen &amp; Neumann.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Andriaanse, H., 1998. ‘Menschheit’ und ‘Individuum’. Cohen und Herrmann über die Religion. In: Ch. Krijnen and E. W. Orth, eds. 1998. Sinn, Geltung, Wert: neukantianische Motive in der modernen Kulturphilosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen &amp; Neumann, pp. 121-137.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="3"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2015a. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Judaica Petropolitana. Research on Jewish philosophy and intellectual traditions of Judaism, 3, pp. 211-218. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="4"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2015b. Is Hermann Cohen a Neo-Kantian? Kantian Journal, 3(53), pp. 38-46. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="5"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2018a. Autonomy of Reason and the Religion of Revelation in the Philosophy of the Religion of Hermann Cohen. Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Researches, 2(2), pp. 51-64. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="6"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2018b. Concept of Religion in the System of Philosophy of Hermann Cohen. Judaica Petropolitana. Research on Jewish philosophy and intellectual traditions of Judaism, 9, pp. 97-102. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="7"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2018c. The Philosophy of the Religion of Hermann Cohen and Its Evaluation by Russian-Jewish Thinkers. In: J. Dobieszewski, S. Krajewski and J. Mach, eds. 2018. Epistemologia doświadczenia religijnego w XX-wiecznej filozofii rosyjskiej i żydowskiej. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, pp. 219-237. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="8"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2019. Modern Jewish Philosophy in Search of a (Self-)Definition. RUDN Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), pp. 391-398. (In Rus.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="9"><unstructured_citation>Cohen, H., 1910. Die Bedeutung des Judentums für den religiösen Fortschritt der Menschheit. Vortrag von Dr. Hermann Cohen. Sonderausgabe aus dem Protokoll des 5. Weltkongresses für Freies Christentum und Religiösen Fortschritt. Zweite Auflage. Berlin: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="10"><unstructured_citation>Cohen, H., 1972. Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism. Translated, with an Introduction, by S. Kaplan. Introductory Essay by L. Strauss. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="11"><unstructured_citation>Cohen, H., 1996. Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. In: H. Cohen. Werke. Band 10. Hildesheim: Olms, pp. 1-164.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="12"><unstructured_citation>Dmitrieva, N. A., 2008. Religion within the Limits of Humanity. On the History of the Problem of Religion in the Philosophy of Paul Natorp. In: D. N. Razeev, ed. 2008. Vera i znanie. K sootnosheniyu ponyatij v klassicheskoj nemeckoj filosofii [Faith and Knowledge. On the Relation of Concepts in Classical German Philosophy]. 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Sergey Hessen and Georges Gurvitch base their conceptions of social law on the sociology of law in the 1920s and 1930s. They start a polemic in the pages of the journal Sovremenniye zapiski (Contemporary Notes). Although they differ radically in their definitions of the status of the state they concur in defining society as a set of social institutions and communities existing as instruments for expressing personal freedom. The social regulations they propose are already legal situations. Hessen and Gurvitch believe that the individual can fully exercise his/her freedom only in conditions of such legal pluralism. However, the concept of legal pluralism involves an inherent problem of preserving social unity: why is it that society does not fall into a range of autonomous social entities, each offering the individual its own legal order for actualising freedom? To solve this problem the philosophers use the concept of “the general will”. 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