<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<doi_batch xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.crossref.org/schema/5.3.1" xmlns:jats="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/JATS1" xmlns:fr="http://www.crossref.org/fundref.xsd" xmlns:ai="http://www.crossref.org/AccessIndicators.xsd" version="5.3.1"><head><doi_batch_id>NONE</doi_batch_id><timestamp>20260617132541355</timestamp><depositor><depositor_name>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University</depositor_name><email_address>no-reply@journals.kantiana.ru</email_address></depositor><registrant>Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University</registrant></head><body><journal><journal_metadata><full_title>Kantian Journal</full_title><issn media_type="print">0207-6918</issn><issn media_type="electronic">2310-3701</issn></journal_metadata><journal_issue><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>17</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><journal_volume><volume>37</volume></journal_volume><issue>4</issue></journal_issue><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>Vernunft und Glaube. Zu Kants Deduktion der Gnadenlehre</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>Seeberg</given_name><surname>U.</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>Kant’s deduction of the Christian doctrine of justification, respectively the doctrine of grace, leads to the question in what sense philosophy can deal with God’s grace without falsely replacing it with its own arguments. Kant’s answer (a) is that the imputation of evil without attempt to justify it by means of one’s own resources requires thinking of God as the external judge in the internal court of justice, respectively as one’s conscience. This reference to God implies that one makes oneself susceptive to the principle of the good instead of vainly trying to make it dependent on one’s own deeds and thoughts. The renunciation of the attempt to justify one’s evil disposition, i.e. the moral conversion to a good disposition, is thus enabled by the principle of the good. Thus one can reasonably hope to achieve goodness in one’s moral conduct because of God’s grace. A transcendental deduction (b) has to justify conditions that enable the acquisition of rational claims. The justification of the claim of practical reason that faith is a necessary precondition of one‘s moral conduct has now to be understood as complementary to the result of the transcendental deduction of the categories, namely the restriction of theoretical reason to the sensible world. Faith in God’s grace does not represent objective knowledge. As transcending objective knowledge, however, faith refers to the theoretically inexplicable awareness of moral obligation, and with it the idea of an intelligible world, as a necessary precondition of one’s moral conduct in the sensible world.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>17</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Bohatec, J., 1938. Die Religionsphilosophie Kants in der „Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer theologisch-dogmatischen Quellen. Hamburg: Hoffmann &amp; Campe.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Fischer, N. und Forschner, M., hg. 2010. Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Freiburg: Herder.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="3"><unstructured_citation>Fischer, N., 2010a. Vom Rang und Sinn der Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Kants. In: N. Fischer und M. Forschner, hg. 2010. Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Freiburg: Herder, S. 1-16.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="4"><unstructured_citation>Fischer, N., 2010b. Kants Philosophie und der Gottesglaube der biblischen Offenbarung. In: N. Fischer und M. Forschner, hg. 2010. Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Freiburg: Herder, S. 131-154.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="5"><unstructured_citation>Henrich, D., 1973. Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft. In: G. Prauss, hg. 1973. Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie vom Erkennen und Handeln. Köln: Kiepenheuer &amp; Witsch, S. 223-254.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="6"><unstructured_citation>Henrich, D. 1989. Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique. In: E. Förster, hg. 1989. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford: Stanford University Press, S. 29-46.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="7"><unstructured_citation>Heit, A., 2006. Versöhnte Vernunft. Eine Studie zur systematischen Bedeutung des Rechtfertigungsgedankens für Kants Religionsphilosophie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="8"><unstructured_citation>Kopper, J., 1955/56. Kants Gotteslehre. Kant-Studien, 47, S. 31-61.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="9"><unstructured_citation>Langthaler, R., 1991. Kants Ethik als “System der Zwecke”. Perspektiven einer modifizierten Idee der “moralischen Teleologie” und Ethikotheologie. Berlin und New York: de Gruyter.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="10"><unstructured_citation>Palmquist, S. R., 2016. Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="11"><unstructured_citation>Raffelt, A., 2005. Kant als Philosoph des Protestantismus — oder des Katholizismus? In: Fischer, N., hg. 2005. Kant und der Katholizismus. Freiburg: Herder, S. 139-159.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="12"><unstructured_citation>Sala, G. B., 1990. Kant und die Frage nach Gott. Gottesbeweise und Gottesbeweiskritik in den Schriften Kants. Berlin: de Gruyter.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="13"><unstructured_citation>Seeberg, U., 2006. Ursprung, Umfang und Grenzen der Erkenntnis. Eine Untersuchung zu Kants transzendentaler Deduktion der Kategorien. Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Philo &amp; Philo Fine Arts.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="14"><unstructured_citation>Seeberg, U., 2008. Der methodologische Hintergrund der Kategoriendeduktion. In: V. Rohden, V., Terra, R. R., Almeida de, G.; Ruffing, M., hg. 2008. Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin und New York: de Gruyter, S. 703-716.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="15"><unstructured_citation>Seeberg, U., 2012. Transzendentale Deduktionen und das Faktum der Vernunft. In: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, 11.-15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, [online] Available at: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12605/ [Accessed 20 August 2018]. https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.12605</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="16"><unstructured_citation>Seeberg, U., 2015. Deduktion. In: M. Willaschek, J. Stolzenberg, G. Mohr, S. Bacin, hg. 2015. Kant-Lexikon. Berlin: de Gruyter, S. 348-353.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="17"><unstructured_citation>Spieckermann, H., Kertelge, K., Dettloff, W. und Sauter, G., 1997. Rechtfertigung. In: H. Balz u. a., hg. 1997. Theologische Realenzyklopädie. Berlin und New York: de Gruyter, S. 282-364.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="18"><unstructured_citation>Tietz, C., Klaiber, W. und Jüngel, E., 2004. Rechtfertigung. In: H. D. Betz, hg. 2004. Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft. 4. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. S. 98-117.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="19"><unstructured_citation>Wimmer, R., 1990. Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie. Berlin und New York: de Gruyter.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="20"><unstructured_citation>Winter, A., 1975. Kant zwischen den Konfessionen. Theologie und Philosophie, 51, S. 1-37.</unstructured_citation></citation></citation_list></journal_article><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>Is Spinoza’s Ethics Heteronomous in the Kantian Sense of the Term?</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>Kozyra</given_name><surname>W.</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>The prevailing interpretations of Spinoza’s ethical theory view it as an example of heteronomy in the Kantian sense of the term. I make a case for the claim that is not in harmony with such interpretations. In the course of the argument I discuss Kant’s concepts of autonomy and heteronomy showing how they refer to will and to ethics. Then I describe a group of interpretations which portray Spinoza’s moral theory as heteronomous. My critique begins by presenting some textual evidence which vividly contradicts some of the boldest heteronomous renditions of Spinoza’s ethics. Then I move on to argue for the existence of conditions in Spinoza’s thought that make every heteronomous interpretation of his practical philosophy extremely unlikely. These are i) identification of moral value in the quality of an agent’s law-oriented motivation, ii) distinction between human nature as rational and affective, ascribing different sets of laws to each, iii) endowment of reason with moral content, iv) recognition of the non-subjective notion of goodness. Added to this is my discussion of freedom and necessity in Kant and Spinoza in which I show that Spinoza’s overarching determinism is not an impediment for autonomy in the Kantian sense of the term. I end the article by presenting possible explanations of the fact that Spinoza’s ethics is frequently seen as a case of heteronomy.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>17</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Allison, H., 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Beiser, F. C., 1987. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge &amp; London: Harvard University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="3"><unstructured_citation>Cohen, G. A., 2001. If You’re an Egalitarian How Come You’re so Rich? Cambridge &amp; London: Harvard University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="4"><unstructured_citation>Cohen, R. A., 2010. Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption and Kant. The Philosophical Forum, 41(1-2), pp. 73-98.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="5"><unstructured_citation>Deleuze, G., 1998. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Translated by R. Hurley. San Francisco: City Light Books.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="6"><unstructured_citation>Goodman, L. E., 2002. What Does Spinoza’s Ethics Contribute to Jewish Philosophy? In: H. M. Ravven, E. Lenn Goodman, eds. 2002. Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 17-93.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="7"><unstructured_citation>Graetz, H., 1998. Geschichte der Juden: von der dauernden Ansiedlung der Marranen in Holland bis zum Beginne der Mendelssohn’schen Zeit. Volume X. Berlin: Arani.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="8"><unstructured_citation>Israel, J. I., 2001. The Radical Enlightenment: The Philosophy and Making of Modernity 1650-1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="9"><unstructured_citation>Ivic, S., 2007. Spinoza and Kant on Suicide. Res Cogitans, 4(1), pp. 132-144.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="10"><unstructured_citation>Jura, G., 2003. Wstęp. In: B. Spinoza, 2003. Traktaty. Edited and translated by I. Halpern-Myślicki. Kęty: Antyk, pp. 5-73.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="11"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1987. Critique of Judgment. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis &amp; Cambridge: Hackett.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="12"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1996a. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis &amp; Cambridge: Hackett.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="13"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1996b. On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited by A. Wood, P. Guyer, J. M. Gregor. Translated by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 605-617.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="14"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1996c. Metaphysics of Morals. In: I. Kant, 1996. Practical Philosophy. Edited by A. Wood, P. Guyer, J. M. Gregor. Translated by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-605.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="15"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1998а. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by M. J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="16"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1998b. Religion within a Boundaries of Mere Reason. Translated by A. Wood, G. D. Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="17"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 1999. Correspondence. Translated and edited by A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="18"><unstructured_citation>Kant, I., 2002. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis &amp; Cambridge: Hackett.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="19"><unstructured_citation>Kinser, M., 2011. Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="20"><unstructured_citation>Klemme, H. F., 2003. Einleitung. In: I. Kant, 2003. Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Hg. von H. D. Brandt, H. F. Klemme. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, pp. IX-LXIII.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="21"><unstructured_citation>Klemme, H. F., 2006. Praktische Gründe und Moralische Motivation. Eine deontologische Perspektive. In: H. F. Klemme, M. Kühn, D. Schönecker, hg. 2006. Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, pp. 113-153.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="22"><unstructured_citation>Kloc-Konkołowicz, J., 2007. Rozum praktyczny w filozofii Kanta i Fichtego. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="23"><unstructured_citation>Kosch, M., 2006. Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard. Oxford: Calderon Press, Oxford University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="24"><unstructured_citation>Kozyra, W., 2018. Kant o woli i wolności. Edukacja Filozoficzna, 65(1), pp. 95-116.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="25"><unstructured_citation>Lord, B., 2011. Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze. London: Palgrave.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="26"><unstructured_citation>Ludwig, B., 2014. Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen: Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797. In: H. Puls, hg. 2014. Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 227-269.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="27"><unstructured_citation>Melamed, Y. Y., 2011. Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism: An Outline. In: C. Fraenkel, D. Perinetti, J. E. H. Smith, eds. 2011. The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation. Dordrecht &amp; Heidelberg &amp; London &amp; New York: Springer, pp. 147-167.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="28"><unstructured_citation>Melamed, Y. Y., 2013. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought. New York: Oxford University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="29"><unstructured_citation>Nadler, S., 2014. The Lives of Others: Spinoza on Benevolence and Rational Virtue. In: M. J. Kisner, A. Youpa, eds. Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-57.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="30"><unstructured_citation>Rawls, J., 2000. Kant. In: J. Rawls, 2000. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Edited by B. Hermann. Cambridge &amp; London: Harvard University Press, pp. 143-325.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="31"><unstructured_citation>Reath, A., 2006. Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination. In: A. Reath, 2006. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-33.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="32"><unstructured_citation>Romano, C., 2004. Eleutheria. In: B. Cassin, eds. 2004. Dictionary of Untranslatables: a Philosophical Lexicon. Translated by S. Rendall, C. Hubert, J. Mehlman, N. Stein, M. Syrotinski. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 250-256.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="33"><unstructured_citation>Spinoza, B., 1992. Ethics. In: B. Spinoza, 1992. Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters. Translated by S. Shirley. Edited, with Introductions, by S. Feldman. Indianapolis &amp; Cambridge: Hackett, pp. 31-223.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="34"><unstructured_citation>Spinoza, B., 2007a. Theological-Political Treatise. Translated by J. Israel, M. Silverthorne. New York: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="35"><unstructured_citation>Spinoza, B., 2007b. A Political Treatise. In: B. Spinoza, 2007. A Theologico-Political Treatise, and A Political Treatise. Translated by B. R. H. Elwes. New York: Cosimo, pp. 279-389.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="36"><unstructured_citation>Ware, O., 2014. Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason. Philosophers Imprint, 14(32), pp. 1-21.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="37"><unstructured_citation>Wood, A., 1999. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="38"><unstructured_citation>Yovel, Y., 1998. Kant’s Practical Reason as Will: Interest, Recognition, Judgment and Choice. The Review of Metaphysics, 52(2), pp. 267-294.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="39"><unstructured_citation>Zammito, J. H., 1992. The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. London &amp; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</unstructured_citation></citation></citation_list></journal_article><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>The Notion of Free Will in Sergey Hessen’s Conception of Culture</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>Yu. Zagirnyak</given_name><surname>M.</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>Sergey Hessen builds his philosophy of culture on Heinrich Rickert’s theory of values. Like Rickert, he believes that the individual plays a key role in the formation of culture. The individual exercises freedom only in creative activity and the degree to which he fulfils his creative potential depends not only on the cultural context in which it happens, but also on the regulation of the opportunities for self-actualisation in any given society. Accordingly, Hessen defines society as the sphere of communication among a multitude of individuals whose creative activities serve to continue the process of culture-structuring. Thus the effectiveness of the realisation of values in cultural reality depends directly on ensuring the conditions for the exercise of free will. There is potentially an unlimited number of ways of defining the concept of free will, each imposing certain limitations on the actualisation of the individual in culture. The question arises, how does each individual understand the possibility of creative activities within a concrete culture and what permits him to determine the vectors of self-actualisation? In seeking an answer to this question Hessen resorts to the dialectical method as a universal formal instrument for assessing the development of culture. What enables Hessen to overcome in theory the fragmentation of culture into a multitude of variations of actualisation of free will is the interpretation of the common will as a continuously renewed result of interaction among a multitude of individuals. An individual, according to Hessen, can understand his own past as a continuity only by comparing its component social practices to something that transcends his goals and that is not reduced to a fragment of personal being.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>17</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Bambach, C., 2009. Neo-Kantianism. In: A. Tucker, ed. 2009. A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 477-487.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Belov, V. N., 2016. (Book Review) Yu. Melikh. Irrational Expansion of Kant’s Philosophy in Russia. Kantian Journal, 4(35), pp. 103-105. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="3"><unstructured_citation>Crowe, B., 2010. Faith and Value: Heinrich Rickert’s Theory of Religion. Journal of the History of Ideas, 4(41), pp. 617-636.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="4"><unstructured_citation>Dmitrieva, N. A., 2013. The Concept of A priori in German and Russian Neo-Kantianism. Mnogoobrazie apriori. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii na filosofskom fakultete RGGU 19-20 Aprelya 2012 [The Variety of A Priori. Proceedings of the International Conference in the Faculty of Philosophy of the Russian State University for the Humanities on April 19-20, 2012]. M.: “Kanon+” ROOI “Rehabilitation”, pp. 129-147. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="5"><unstructured_citation>Dmitrieva, N. A., Vorobiev, M. V. and Mironova, K. Yu., 2017. Man in History and Culture: Forgotten Pages of Russian Neo-Kantianism. Russian Foundation for Basic Research Journal. Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(88), pp. 94-102. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="6"><unstructured_citation>Eco, U., 2002. Migration, Tolerance and Intolerance. In: U. Eco, 2002. Five Moral Pieces. Translated by A. McEwen. New York &amp; San Diego &amp; London: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, pp. 89-111.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="7"><unstructured_citation>Hans, N., 1950. Sergius Hessen. The Slavonic and East European Review, 72(29), pp. 296-298.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="8"><unstructured_citation>Hardtwig, W., 2009. Macht, Emotion und Geselligkeit. Studien zur Soziabilität in Deutschland 1500-1900. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="9"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1909. Herzen. In: R. Kroner, N. Bubnoff, G. Mehlis, S. Hessen, F. Steppuhn, 1909. Vom Messias: kulturphilosophische Essays. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, pp. 42-59.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="10"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1924. The Collapse of Utopianism. Sovremennye zapiski / Annales Contemporaines, 19, pp. 277-295. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="11"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1924—1927. The Problem of Legal Socialism (Evolution of Liberalism). Sovremennye zapiski / Annales contemporaines, 22, pp. 257-293; 23, pp. 313-342; 27, pp. 382-430; 28, pp. 299-345; 29, pp. 308-342; 30, pp. 380-409; 31, pp. 328-358. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="12"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1932. The Idea of Social Right. Sovremennye zapiski / Annales Contemporaines, 49, pp. 421-435.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="13"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1935. True about Democracy. Sovremennye zapiski / Annales Contemporaines, 58, pp. 361-377. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="14"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1948. The Rights of Man in Liberalism, Socialism and Communism. In: UNESCO, ed. 1948. Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations. A Symposium edited by UNESCO (Paris, 25 July 1948). Paris: UNESCO, pp. 99-130.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="15"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S., 1968. Studia z filozofii kultury, wybór i opracowanie. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="16"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1995. Osnovy pedagogiki. Vvedenie v prikladnuyu filosofiyu. [Principals of Pedagogy. Introduction to Applied Philosophy]. M: School-press. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="17"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1999a. The Idea of the Nation. In: S. I. Hessen, 1999. Izbrannye sochineniya [Selected Writings]. M: ROSSPEN, pp. 78-105. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="18"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1999b. My Biography. In: S. I. Hessen, 1999. Izbrannye sochineniya [Selected Writings]. M: ROSSPEN, pp. 723-782. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="19"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1999c. Political Freedom and Socialism. In: S. I. Hessen, 1999. Izbrannye sochineniya [Selected Writings]. M: ROSSPEN, pp. 106-144. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="20"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 1999d. State of Law and Socialism. In: S. I. Hessen, 1999. Izbrannye sochineniya [Selected Writings]. M: ROSSPEN, pp. 147-542. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="21"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 2011. Modern Democracy. Translated by N. V. Danilkina. Kantian Journal, 3(37), pp. 93-97. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="22"><unstructured_citation>Hessen, S. I., 2012. Modern Democracy. Translated by N. V. Danilkina. Kantian Journal, 1(39), pp. 75-84. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="23"><unstructured_citation>Masłowski, A., 1982. Sergiusz Hessen — filozof kultury. Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne. Filozofia, 6 (130), pp. 87-98.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="24"><unstructured_citation>Rickert, H., 1910—1911. Vom Begriff der Philosophie. Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur, 1, pp. 1-34.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="25"><unstructured_citation>Rickert, H., 1915. Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft. 3rd ed. rev. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="26"><unstructured_citation>Styczyński, M., 2004. Sergei Hessen, Neo-Kantian: Dedicated to Professor Andrzej Walicki. Studies in East European Thought, 1(56), pp. 55-71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:SO VI.0000007365.04004.5b.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="27"><unstructured_citation>Vorobiev, M. V., 2017. The Philosophical and Legal Content of Sergey Hessen’s Concept of Personality. Kantian Journal, 2(36), pp. 73-86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2017-2-6. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="28"><unstructured_citation>Walicki, A., 1987. The Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="29"><unstructured_citation>Withington, P., 2007. Company and Sociability in Early Modern England. Social History, 3(32), pp. 291-307.</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="30"><unstructured_citation>Zagirnyak, M. Yu., 2017. Hegel’s Dialectic in Political Philosophy of Sergius Hessen. Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy,</unstructured_citation></citation></citation_list></journal_article><journal_article publication_type="full_text"><titles><title>Kant and Solovyov: Convergences and Divergences. Report of the International Conference (Kaliningrad, 15-16 November 2018)</title></titles><contributors><person_name sequence="first" contributor_role="author"><given_name>V. Lugovoy</given_name><surname>S.</surname></person_name></contributors><jats:abstract><jats:p>his review sums up the main ideas presented at the international conference “Kant and Solovyov: Convergences and Divergences” held in Kaliningrad, Russia on 15-16 November 2018. The Conference was organised by the Academia Kantiana, a research unit of the Humanities Institute, Immanuel Kant Baltic University, in conjunction with the Department of the History of Russian Philo­sophy at the Philosophical Faculty of Lomonosov Moscow State University. The presentations were divided into two thematic blocks. The first was devoted to the perception of the ideas of Kant and Solovyov in the Russian philosophical tradition and the second to the perception and critique of Kant’s practical philosophy by Solovyov. The speakers also paid attention to historical-philosophical problems as well as to various aspects of Kant and Solovyov’s treatment of ethics, aesthetics, politics, law, religion and culture in general. The review sums up the presentations and discussions.</jats:p></jats:abstract><publication_date media_type="print"><month>06</month><day>17</day><year>2026</year></publication_date><pages><first_page>1</first_page><last_page>1</last_page></pages><citation_list><citation key="1"><unstructured_citation>Vvedensky, A. I., 1901. On Mysticism and Criticism in Solovyov’s Theory of Cognition. Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii [Problems of Philosophy and Psychology], 56(1), pp. 2-35. (In Russ.)</unstructured_citation></citation><citation key="2"><unstructured_citation>Kornilaev, L. Yu., 2018. Kant and the Problem of Revolution: A Report of the International Conference (Kaliningrad, November 9-10, 2017). Kantian Journal, 37(1), pp. 74-87. http://dx. doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2018-1-5.</unstructured_citation></citation></citation_list></journal_article></journal></body></doi_batch>
