NONE20260530172856822Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal Universityno-reply@journals.kantiana.ruImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityKantian Journal0207-69182310-370105302026372N. KrouglovA.n this article, which completes a two-part series on the problem of optimism in Kant’s works, I explore in detail the arguments advanced by the Crusians A. F. Reinhard and D. Weymann against the actual world as the best of all possible worlds and in favour of the actual world as one of the good worlds, Kant’s counterarguments put forward in the mid-1750s drafts and in An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism (1759), and further polemical attacks on this topic against Kant by D. Weymann in his works of 1759—1760. I trace the evolution of Kant’s views on optimism from the mid- to the late-1750s, when this concept — once characteristic of the partly unacceptable position that G. W. Leibniz defended in the Theodicy — came to describe Kant’s own views. Leaving aside Voltaire’s resonating works on the Lisbon earthquake, the generic opponent to Kant’s position is an amalgam of Crusians (C. A. Crusius, A. F. Reinhard, D. Weymann, and others), reduced to a caricature with regards to certain theses. I address Weymann’s polemic with Kant to show that, in the pre-critical period, the early Kant advocated beliefs in sphere of practical philosophy that he later radically changed in the critical period, in particular those with regards to freedom and human dignity. The obvious bias of most Kantian scholars against Kant’s opponents prevented researchers from seeing the validity of Weymann’s criticism of Kant for ignoring the problem of freedom. To prove his point, Weymann addressed the difference between the freedom of contradiction (libertas contradictionis) and the freedom of contrariety (libertas contrarietatis). Apparently, Kant himself noticed to a certain degree the validity of Weymann’s criticism, since, after 1759, he abandoned the term “optimism” and, in his later years, distanced himself from his early work An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism.0530202611Anonym., 1759. Königsberg. Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen (Leipzig), XCIX, 10 Dec., pp. 883-885.Anonym., 1760. III. Philosophische Schriften: Königsberg. Beytrag zu den Erlangischen gelehrten Anmerkungen, III. Woche, Sonnabends, 19 Jan., pp. 37-39.Borowski, L. E., 1993. Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kant’s. In: F. Gross, ed. 1993, Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen. Die Biographien von L. E. Borowski, R. B. Jachmann und E. A. Ch. Wasianski, mit einer Einleitung von R. Malter, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp. 1-102.Buck, F. J., (Praeses), Segers, J. L. (Resp.), Hart, A. (Opp.), Schultz, J. (Opp.) and Sperber, W. (Opp.), 1758. Q.D.F.F.E.I. Disputatio cosmologica, mundum adspectabilem finitum molis esse evincens, quam annuente deo amplissimae facultatis philosophicae consensu Oelmanniani stipendii legibus exigentibus, praeside Friderico Johanne Buck, philosoph. et utr. jur. doct. mathem. prof. publ. senat. civit. Regiom. bibliothec. II. societ. cosmolog. Norimberg. teuton. Viadrin. membr. publice defendet Johannes Ludovicus Segers, p. S. theol. et phil. cult. Opponentibus, [...] Anno MDCC LVIII. D. 25. Julii in auditorio maximo horis consuetis. Königsberg: Hartung.Chmelnitzki, J., 1766. Gedanken über die Frage: Ob Gott mehr als eine einzige unendliche Grundkraft besitze? entworfen und der gelehrten Welt zur genaueren Prüfung übergeben. Sine loco.Crusius, C. A., 1753. Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie zu den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden [1745]. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Gleditschens Buchhandlung.Götzen, J. G., 1761. Beweis: Daß diese gegenwärtige Welt, unter allen möglichen, die Beste sey, nebst einem Gedicht von der aus dieser ewigen Wahrheit entspringenden Gemüthsruhe, wider den Herrn Conrector Weymann, zu Königsberg. Coburg & Leipzig: Findeisen.Groethuysen, B., 1906. Ein Brief Kants. In: Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin: Verlag der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Tl. I, pp. 158-163.Hamann, J. G., 1955, Brief an J. G. Lindner vom 26. Oktober 1759. In: Briefwechsel, hg. von W. Ziesemer, A. Henkel, Bd. 1. Wiesbaden: Insel-Verlag, pp. 424-433.Herder, J. G., 1883, Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität (1. Sammlung. Brief 21. 1792). In: Sämmtliche Werke, hg. von B. Suphan, Bd. 18. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, pp. 324-327.Hinske, N., 2011. Kants Glaube an die macht der Methode. Zum Zusammenhang von dogmatischer, polemischer, skeptischer und kritischer Methode im Denken Kants. In: Ch. Böhr, H. P. Delfosse, eds. 2011. Facetten der Kantforschung. Ein internationaler Querschnitt. Festschrift für Norbert Hinske zum 80. Geburtstag. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 25-36.Hübener, W., 1978. Sinn und Grenzen des Leibnizschen Optimismus. Studia Leibnitiana, 10(2), pp. 222-246.Kant, I., 1992. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755—1770. Translated and edited by D. Walford and R. Meerbote. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 1997. Lectures on Ethics. Edited by P. Heath and J. B. Schneewind. Translated by P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by P. Guyer, A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 1999. Correspondence. Translated and edited by A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kuehn, M., 2001. Kant. A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Krouglov, A. N., 2015. Die Wahrheit der Welt in Meiers Kosmologie. In: F. Grunert, G. Stiening, eds. 2015. Georg Friedrich Meier (1718—1777). Philosophie als „wahre Weltweisheit“. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 123-142.Leibniz, G. W., 1951. Theodicy. Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. Translated by E. M. Huggard. Edited by A. Farrer. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.Lorenz, S., 1997. De mundo optimo. Studien zu Leibniz Theodizee und ihrer Rezeption in Deutschland (1710—1791). Stuttgart: Steiner.Meier, G. F., 1756. Metaphysik, Tl. 2. Halle: Gebauer.Meier, G. F., 1759. Metaphysik, Tl. 4. Halle: Gebauer.Menzer, P., 1912. Sachliche Erläuterungen. In: I. Kant, 1912. Gesammelte Schriften [Akademie-Ausgabe], Bd. II. Berlin: Akademie.Reinhard, A. F., 1755. Le système de Mr. Pope sur la perfection de monde, comparé à celui de Mr. de Leibnitz, avec un examen de l’optimisme, pour satisfaire au problème proposé par l’Académie Royale des sciences et belles-lettres de Berlin, pour le Prix de l’Année 1755. In: Dissertation qui a remporté le prix proposé par l’Académie Royale des sciences et belles-lettres de Prusse, sur l’optimisme, avec les pièces qui ont concouru. Berlin: Haude et Spener, №VII, pp. 1-48.Reinhard, A. F., 1757. Abhandlung Von der Beßten Welt. Welche den von der Königlich-Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin für das 1755 Jahr ausgesetzten Preiß erhalten, aus dem Französischen übersetzt von J. A. F. v. G.[entzkow]. Greifswald: Struck.Rink, F. T., 1805. Ansichten aus Immanuel Kants Leben, Königsberg: Göbbels und Unzer.Schlemüller, J. B., 1759. Die Aufnahme eines Fremdlings. Bey der Inaugural-Disputation des Herrn Magister Daniel Weymann, Conrektors der Löbenichtschen Stadschule. Den 6ten October, 1759. Königsberg: Driest.Stark, W., 1999. Hinweise zu Kants Kollegen vor 1770. In: R. Brandt, W. Euler, W., eds. 1999. Studien zur Entwicklung preußischer Universitäten. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, pp. 113-162.Theis, R., 2001. Gottes Spur in der Welt? Kant über den Optimismus um die Mitte der 1750er Jahre. In: M. Oberhausen, H. P. Delfosse, R. Pozzo, eds. 2001. Vernunftkritik und Aufklärung: Studien zur Philosophie Kants und seines Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, pp. 351-363.Wendland, W., 1910. Ludwig Ernst von Borowski, Erzbischof der evangelischen Kirche in Preußen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ostpreußischen Kirche im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Königsberg: Beyer.Weymann, D., 1759a. Beantwortung des Versuchs Einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus. Den 14. October. Königsberg: Driest.Weymann, D., 1759b. Dissertatio philosophica de mundo non optimo quam consentiente amplissimo philosophorum ordine pro receptione in eundem defendet in auditorio philosophico M. Daniel Weymann, respondente Joanne Christiano Granow, Stolp. pom. S. S. T. stud. opponentibus, Joanne Bernhardo Schlemüller, Doerschk. lith. U. I. C. Ernesto Christophoro Schultz, Reg. prusso. theol. stud. et Joanne Jacobo Kaeyser, Reg. prusso, philos. et theol. stud. die vito octobris A. MDCC LIX. Königsberg: Stanno regiae aulicae et academicae typographiae.Weymann, D., 1760a. Betrachtung über den Unterschied der Crusianischen und Wolffianischen Weltweißheit. Den 20. April, 1760. Königsberg: Driest.Weymann, D., 1760b. Zweytes Stück des Unterschiedes der Wolf. und Crus. Weltweisheit. Königsberg: Kanter.Weymann, D., 1763. Bedenklichkeiten über den einzig möglichen Beweisgrund des Herrn M. Kants zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes. Zweiter Theil der philos. Labyrinthe. Königsberg: Kanter.Wolff, Ch., 1751. Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, Auch allen Dingen überhaupt. Halle: Regnerische Buchhandlung.Wüstemann, J. E., 1757. Einleitung in das philosophische Lehrgebäude Herrn D. Crusius zum Gebrauche seiner akademischen Vorlesungen. Wittenberg: Zimmermann.A. SmirnovM.The expression “linguistic Kantianism” is widely used to refer to ideas about thought and cognition being determined by language — a conception characteristic of 20th century analytic philosophy. In this article, I conduct a comparative analysis of Kant’s philosophy and views falling under the umbrella expression “linguistic Kantianism.” First, I show that “linguistic Kantianism” usually presupposes a relativistic conception that is alien to Kant’s philosophy (although Kant’s philosophy itself may be perceived as relativistic from a certain point of view). Second, I analyse Kant’s treatment of linguistic determinism and the place of his ideas in the 18th century intellectual milieu and provide an overview of relevant contemporary literature. Third, I show that authentic Kantianism and “linguistic Kantianism” belong to two different types of transcendentalism, to which I respectively refer as the “transcendentalism of the subject” and the “transcendentalism of the medium.” The transcendentalism of the subject assigns a central role to the faculties of the cognising subject (according to Kant, cognition is not the conforming of a subject’s intuitions and understanding to objects, but rather the application of a subject’s cognitive faculties to them). The transcendentalism of the medium assigns the role of an “active” element neither to the external world nor to the faculties of the cognising subject, but to something in between — language, in the case of “linguistic Kantianism.” I conclude that the expression “linguistic Kantianism” can be misleading when it comes to the origins of this theory. It would be more appropriate to refer to this theory by the expression “linguistic transcendentalism,” thus avoiding an incorrect reference to Kant.0530202611Aarsleff, H., 1974. The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the Eighteenth Century and the Debate in the Berlin Academy before Herder. In: D. Hymes, ed. 1974. Studies in the History of Linguistics: Traditions and Paradigms. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 93-156.Anonymous, 1757. Prix proposé par l’Académie Royale des Sciences & Belles-Lettres de Prusse pour l’année 1759. Nouvelle bibliothèque germanique, ou histoire littéraire de l’Allemagne, de la Suisse, & des Pays du Nord, 21(1), pp. 201-204.Berlin, I., 2013. Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Devitt, M., Sterelny, K., 1999. Language and Reality, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G., 2018. Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic. Kantian Journal, 37(1), pp. 25-39.Dragalina-Chernaya, E., 2016. Kant’s Dynamic Hylomorphism in Logic. Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy, 4, pp. 127-137.Forster, M., 2012. Kant’s Philosophy of Language? Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 485-511.Gale, R., 1963. Some Metaphysical Statements about Time. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(9), pp. 225-237.Hamann, J. G., 1995. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. In: G. G. Dickson, 1995. Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 517-525.Heijenoort, J., 1967. Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language. Synthese, 17(3), pp. 324-330.Hintikka, J., 1997. Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer.Kant, I., 1992. The Jäsche Logic. In: I. Kant. Lectures on Logic. Translated by J. M. Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 521-644.Kant, I., 1996. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? In: I. Kant, Practical Philosophy. Translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 11-22.Kant, I., 2000. Critique of Pure Reason (Unified Edition). Translated and edited by A. W. Wood and P. Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kant, I., 2002. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. Translated by G. Hatfield. In: I. Kant, 2002. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Edited by H. Allison and P. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 29-170.Koerner, K. E. F., 2000. Towards a ‘Full Pedigree’ of the ‘Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’: From Locke to Lucy. In: M. Pütz, M. Verspoor, eds. 2000. Explorations in Linguistic Relativity. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 1-25.Kuhn, T., 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Kusch, M., 1988. Husserl and Heidegger on Meaning. Synthese, 77(1), pp. 99-127.Lynch, M. P., 2001. Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity, Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press.Makeeva, L. B., 2006. Language and Reality. Logos, 57(6), pp. 3-20. (In Russ.)Peckhaus, V., 2004. Schröder’s Logic. In: D. M. Gabbay, J. Woods, eds. 2004. Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 3: The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Penn, J., 1972. Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas. The Origins of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in German Thought. The Hague: Mouton.Romanos, G., 1983. Quine and Analytic Philosophy: The Language of Language. Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press.Serck-Hanssen, C., 2003. Kant’s Critical Debut: The Idea of the Transcendental in Kant’s Early Thought. In: J. Malpas, ed. 2003. From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 7-21.Smith, B., 2005. Against Fantology. In: J. Marek, E. M. Reicher, eds. 2005, Experience and Analysis. Vienna: ÖBV & HPT, pp. 153-170.Soboleva, M. E., 2018. How to Read Kant, or Kant in the Context of Contemporary Epistemological Discussions in Western Analytic Kant-Studies. Voprosy filosofii, 3, pp. 129-140. (In Russ.)Stroll, A., 1995. Transcendentalism or Naturalism: The Only Alternatives? Dialectica, 49(2/4), pp. 95-111.Stroud, B., 1972. “Ludwig Wittgenstein” by David Pears (Review). The Journal of Philosophy, 69(1), pp. 16-26.Whorf, B., 1956. Language, Thought, and Reality, Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press.Wolff, M., 1995. Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. Mit einem Essay über Freges „Begriffsschrift“, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.V. VorobievM.In this study, I investigate the philosophico-pedagogical concepts developed by German and Russian Neo-Kantians, namely P. Natorp, S. I. Hessen, M. M. Rubinstein. In order to identify the peculiarities of the approaches of the Neo-Kantians to legal consciousness in children, I show that the widely accepted view that Hessen borrowed Natorp’s hierarchical triad of moral development — anomie, heteronomy, and autonomy — lacks a solid ground. Moreover, Natorp generally does not use the concept of anomie to characterise the state of morality and legal consciousness during early childhood, and Rubinstein’s position on this issue is closer to the position of Natorp than to that of Hessen. Furthermore, I examine the differences in the views of the Russian Neo-Kantians on play as an activity crucial for the understanding of human childhood. According to Hessen, play is anomic, whereas Rubinstein sees it as a collaborative activity that can engender respect for other people and their rights, i.e., to legal consciousness. In conclusion, I address Hessen’s and Rubinstein’s understandings of the phenomena of law and legal consciousness, which determined their definitions of legal consciousness in children. Unlike Hessen, who insists that anomie is innate in early childhood, since children of that age are unfamiliar with ethical categories, Rubinstein introduces the concept of “legal psychology,” which contains the germs of legal consciousness.05302026111. Abramova, L. G., 2008. The Pedagogy of Culture: the Origin of S. Hessen’s Applied Philosophy. Vestnik RGU im. I. Kanta, Pedagogicheskie i psihologicheskie nauki [Immanuel Kant Russian State University’s Vestnik. Ser. Philology, Pedagogy, and Psychology], 4, pp. 24-29. (In Russ.)2. Deryuga, V. E., 2017. S. I. Hessen’s Philosophical Theory of Education. Problemy sovremennogo obrazovaniya [Problems of Modern Education], [e-journal] 5, pp. 26-32. (In Russ.)3. Dmitrieva, N. A., 2016. Around the “Social Pedagogy” of Paul Natorp: Vladimir Dinze in the Debates on National Upbringing. Part 1. Kantovsky sbornik [Kantian Journal], 35(4), pp. 38-55. (In Russ.)4. Dmitrieva, N. A., 2017. Around the “Social Pedagogy” of Paul Natorp: Vladimir Dinze in the Debates on National Upbringing. Part 2. Kantovsky sbornik [Kantian Journal], 36(1), pp. 66-89. (In Russ.)5. Faradzhev, K. V., 2008. Philosophy and Life of Moses Rubinstein. In: M. M. Rubinstein, 2008. O smysle zhizni. T. 1: Trudy po filosofii tsennosti, teorii obrazovaniya i universitetskomu voprosu. [On Meaning of Life. Volume 1: Works on Philosophy of Value, Theory of Education and Subject of University], edited by N. V. Plotnikov, K. V. Faradzhev, Moscow : Territoriya budushchego, pp. 7-41. (In Russ.)6. Faradzhev, K. V., 2010. Alternative Failed: Neo-Kantian Pedagogy in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th Century. In: I. N. Griftsova, N. A. Dmitrieva, eds. 2010. Neokantianstvo nemetskoe i russkoe: mezhdu teoriei poznaniya i kritikoi kul’tury [German and Russian Neo-Kantianism: Between Epistemology and the Critique of Culture]. Moscow: ROSSPEN, pp. 400-413. (In Russ.)7. Hessen, S. I., 1995. Osnovy pedagogiki. Vvedenie v prikladnuyu filosofiyu [Foundations of Pedagogy. Introduction to Applied Philosophy]. Moscow: Shkola-Press. (In Russ.)8. Hessen, S. I., 2004. Russian Pedagogy in the 20th Century. In: E. G. Osovsky, ed. 2004. Hessen. Moscow: Izdatel’skiy dom Shalvy Amonashvili, pp. 183-211. (In Russ.)9. Kant, I., 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgement, edited by P. Guyer, translated by P. Guyer, E. Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10. Natorp, P., 1911. Volkskultur und Persönlichkeitskultur: sechs Vorträge. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.11. Natorp, P., 1899. Sozialpädagogik. Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann.12. Osovsky, E. G., 2004. Sergey Hessen: Pedagogy of Humanism — Humanism of Pedagogy. In: E. G. Osovsky, ed. 2004. Hessen. Moscow: Izdatel’skiy dom Shalvy Amonashvili, pp. 5-18. (In Russ.)13. Rubinstein, M. M., 1920. Ocherk pedagogicheskoi psikhologii v svyazi s obshchei pedagogikoi [Outline of Pedagogical Psychology in Relation to General Pedagogy]. Moscow: Zadruga. (In Russ.)14. Rubinstein, M. M., 1925. Sotsial’no-pravovye predstavleniya i samoupravlenie u detei [Social-Legal Representations and Self-Governing in Children]. Moscow: Pravo i Zhizn’. (In Russ.)15. Walicki, A., 1987. Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.16. Zhilyaeva, E. I., 2012. Problema cheloveka v sotsial’noi filosofii S. I. Gessena [The Problem of Man in the Social Philosophy of S. I. Hessen]. Dissertation of Candidate of Sciences (Philosophy). Arkhangelsk. (In Russ.)A. KolerovM.0530202611PorchedduR.Heiko Puls’ work Sittliches Bewusstsein und Kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung: Ein Kommentar zum dritten Abschnitt, presents an attempt to show that, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s argumentation for the objective value of the categorical imperative is almost based upon the same principle as the one presented in the second Critique. More precisely, Puls claims that, like in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Groundwork operates with some kind of fact of reason-theory, which means that our consciousness of the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of our freedom of will. Accordingly, there is no conclusion from a kind of non-moral consciousness of freedom to the freedom of will and from here to the objective value of the categorical imperative, as many interpreters assume. Due to the ambitiousness of his main thesis and his detailed and subtle way of arguing, Puls’ work represents an important and innovative contribution to recent research on Kant’s Groundwork. Nevertheless, his interpretations sometimes seem to favour analysis of loose philological relationships over closer looks on the contexts of passages. Or he focuses excessively on isolated textual evidences for his readings without appropriately recognising the various other evidences against it. In what follows, I give examples for this criticism.05302026111. Beck, L. W., 1995. Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. 3. Aufl. München: Wilhelm Fink.2. Bittner, R., 1986. Moralisches Gebot und Autonomie. Freiburg & München: Alber.3. Brandt, R., 1988. Der Zirkel im dritten Abschnitt von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. In: H. Oberer, G. Seel, hg. 1988. Kant. Analysen — Probleme — Kritik. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, S. 169-191.4. Henrich, D., 1960. Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft. In: D. Henrich, W. Schulz, K. H. Volkmann-Schluck, hg. 1960. Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken. Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, S. 77-115.5. Henrich, D., 1975. Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes. In: A. Schwan, hg. 1975. Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus. Festschrift für Wilhelm Weischedel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, S. 55-112.6. Hill, T., 1992. Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.7. Kaulbach, F., 1988. Immanuel Kants „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“. Berlin & New York: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.8. Meier, G. F., 1752. Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer.9. O’Neil, O., 1989. Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung II. In: O. Höffe, hg. 1989. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, S. 282-298.10. O’Neil, O., 2002. Autonomy and the Fact of Reason in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Ch. 30-41. In: O. Höffe, hg. 2002. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Berlin: De Gruyter, S. 81-97. (Klassiker Auslegen, 26).11. Paton, H. J., 1962. Der kategorische Imperativ. Eine Untersuchung über Kants Moralphilosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter.12. Porcheddu, R., 2013. Das Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Freiheit in der Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs. In: F. Rush, J. Stolzenberg, hg. 2013. Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus / International Yearbook of German Idealism 2011, vol. 9. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, S. 79-99.13. Porcheddu, R., 2016a. Der Begriff des Zwecks an sich selbst in Kants „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“. Berlin und New York: De Gruyter. (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, 186).14. Porcheddu, R., 2016b. Wie argumentiert Kant in den Sektionen 2 und 3 des Deduktionskapitels der Grundlegung? Directory of Open Access Journals. Con-Textos Kantianos, 3, S. 231-252.15. Prauss, G., 1983. Kant über Freiheit und Autonomie. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.16. Puls, H., 2016. Sittliches Bewusstsein und Kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung: Ein Kommentar zum dritten Abschnitt. Berlin und Boston: De Gruyter.17. Quarfood, M., 2006. The Circle and the Two Standpoints (GMS III, 3). In: C. Horn, D. Schönecker, hg. 2006. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 285-300.18. Schönecker, D., 1999. Kant: Grundlegung III. Die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs. Freiburg und München: Alber.19. Schönecker, D., 2005. Kants Begriff transzendentaler und praktischer Freiheit. Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Studie. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter. (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, 149).20. Schönecker, D., 2006. How is a Categorical Imperative Possible? Kant’s Deduction of the Categorical Imperative (GMS III, 4). In: C. Horn, D. Schönecker, hg. 2006. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. 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St. Petersburg: Gumanitarnaya Akademiya.BoardEditorialNovember 15—16, 2018Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, RussiaThe Academia Kantiana at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University organizes a series of conferences on the theme of “Immanuel Kant and Russian Philo­sophers: Convergences and Divergences.” The first conference, co-organized with the Department of the History of Russian Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, is devoted to the reception and criticism of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant by the Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov.The aim of the gathering is to examine diverse aspects of Solovyov’s philosophical works — epistemological, philosophico-political, philosophico-religious, aesthetic, etc. — in which an intellectual influence from Kant is discernible or in which a polemical stance is taken against him. But the prevailing theme of the conference will be the practical philosophy of the German and Russian philosophers: in 2018, 230 years have passed since the publication of Kant’s main ethical work, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and, in 2019, 120 years will have passed since the publication of Solovyov’s final version of The Justification of the Good (1899). Both of these works are the apexes of two different, yet closely related, traditions of moral philosophy — the German and the Russian.The conference will be devoted to the study of overlaps and influences between currently relevant aspects of the legacies of Kant and Solovyov. These aspects will also be examined in light of the views of Solovyov’s contemporaries: K. D. Kavelin, L. N. Tolstoy, B. N. Chicherin, the brothers Trubetskoy, L. M. Lopatin, N. I. Grot, N. I. Kareev, and others in connection with their polemics around the philosophy of Kant and Solovyov. We also intend to pay attention to the influence of Solovyov on Russian Neo-Kantianism.0530202611