NONE20260531062119671Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal Universityno-reply@journals.kantiana.ruImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityKantian Journal0207-69182310-370105312026364N. A.ShavekoThe article considers the first of the two principles of justice proposed by the American philosopher John Rawls as universal principles that would be chosen by every reasonable and rational person in an ‘original position’. The work analyses the problematic aspects of the principle’s formulation (the vagueness of the list of key rights and freedoms and the value criterion for ranking them) and of the methods used by Rawls to overcome them in the works published after the acclaimed book A theory of Justice. The author addresses the problem of the correlation between freedom and security and argues that it was not studied sufficiently by Rawls. It is stressed that the absolute priority of the first principles of justice over the second one, which was declared by Rawls, is debatable. Disparate variations of the relative priority rule seem more convincing. The author gives a generally positive assessment of the improved formulation of the first principle of justice and emphasises that the principles of justice must take into account moral principles. Moreover, rights and freedoms should include those relating to personal and family lifestyle, childbirth and parenting and priority should be given to those freedoms that contribute to the development of the feeling of justice and the realisation of the moral ideal. It is concluded that Rawls demonstrated convincingly the relative value of democratic institutions.05312026111. Alekseeva, Т. А. 1991, Spravedlivost’ kak dogovor (kriticheskii analiz teorii spravedlivosti Djona Roulsa) [Justice as contract (critical analysis of the John Rawls’ theory of justice)], in: Problemy politicheskoi filosofii [Issues of political philosophy]. Moscow. S. 69—85.2. Kuzmina, A. B. 1998, Ideya spravedlivosti v liberal’noi tradicii [Idea of justice in liberal tradition]. Moscow.3. Rawls, J. 2006, Spravedlivost’ kak chestnost’ [Justice as fairness] // Logos [Logos]. No. 1 (52). S. 35—60.4. Rawls, J. 2009, Teoriya spravedlivosti [A theory of justice]. Moscow.5. Sen А. 2016. Ideya spravedlivosti [The idea of justice]. Moscow.6. Frolova, Е. А. 2012, Kategorii spravedlivosti, neobhodimosti i dolzhenstvovaniya pri issledovanii sotsial'nyh otnoshenii v filosofii neokantianstva [Categories of justice, necessity and duty by the study of social relations in the neo-Kantian philosophy], in: Pravo i gosudarstvo: teorija i praktika [Law and State: Theory and Practice]. No. 10. Pp. 112—121.7. Frolova, Е. А. 2011, Pravovoi ideal v filosofii prava [Legal ideal in philosophy of law], in: Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 11. Pravo [Moscow State Univercity Bulletin. Part 11. Law]. No. 5. S. 68—81.8. Höffe, О. 1994, Politika. Pravo. Spravedlivost'. Osnovopolozheniya kriticheskoi filosofii prava i gosudarstv, [Policy. Right. Justice. Basic principle of the critical philosophy of law and state]. Мoscow.9. Bae, Y.-S. 2002, Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’s Theory of Justice. Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee.10. Barry, B. 1973, John Rawls and the Priority of Liberty, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 2. N 3. P. 274—290.11. Hart, H. L. A. 1973, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, in: University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 40. Iss. 3. P. 534—555.12. Höffe, O. 2015, Kritik der Freiheit. Das Grundproblem der Moderne. München.13. Koller, P. 2013, Die Grundsätze der Gerechtigkeit, in: John Rawls: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hrsg. von Otfried Höffe. Berlin. S. 41—64.14. Maihofer, W. 1976, Freiheit und Sicherheit im Rechtsstaat. BMI-Dokumentation, Nr. 19.15. Nickel, W. J. 1994, Rethinking Rawls's Theory of Liberty and Rights, in: Chicago-Kent Law Review. Vol. 69. P. 763—785.16. Oliveira, N. de 2007, Rawls’s Normative Conception of the Person: A Kantian Reinterpretation, in: VERITAS Porto Alegre, v. 52, n. 1. P. 171—183.17. Pogge, T. 2013, Gleiche Freiheit für alle? In: John Rawls: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hrsg. von Otfried Höffe. Berlin. S. 135—152.18. Rawls, J. 1981, The basic liberties and their priority (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values). Michigan.19. Sandel, M. 1994, Political liberalism (Book Review), in: Harvard Law Review. May 1994. P. 1765—1794.20. Taylor, R. S. 2003, Rawls’s Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 31. No. 3. P. 246—271.A. A.ShiyanThis article analyses one of the recent realist interpretations of Kant — the one proposed by S. L. Katrechko. This interpretation is compared with the modern realistic understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology. Defined as cognitive-semantic, the interpretation is developed in several of S. L. Katrechko’s recent publications. According to S. L. Katrechko, Kant’s phenomenon (object) is a sign, whose referent is the thing in itself in the subjective and objective modes. The article considers two variants of the cognitive-semantic interpretation. The first one is based on Kant’s famous question as to how synthetic judgments are possible a priori. The variant defines the objective thing in itself as an empirical object that affects our sensibility. The second variant is based on the question ‘On what ground rests the relation of what we call representation in us to the object?’, as Kant put it in his letter to Herz. The subjective thing in itself is defined as a transcendental object and/or phenomenon. It is emphasised that, in a certain sense, the second variant of S. L. Katrechko’s interpretation antecedes Husserl’s phenomenology, which introduced a substantive a priori justification of human experience. This is a realist interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. At its core is a fundamental principle of phenomenology — the validation of knowledge by a reflective examination of its premises and the everyday experience through which it is obtained. It is stressed that, unlike Kant, Husserl’s phenomenology rejects the existence of unknowable things in themselves and, unlike Katrechko, it rules out the interpretation of objects as signs. The latter makes it impossible to harmonise Husserl’s phenomenology with Katrechko’s semantic interpretation paradigm.05312026111. Husserl, E. 2009, Idei k chistoy phenomenology I phenomenologicheskoy philosophie, Kn. I [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Book I], Moscow.2. Husserl, E. 2011, Logisheskie issledovanija, t. 2 [Logical Investigations, vol. 2], Moscow.3. Inishev, I. N. 2010, Silnie storoni slabogo transzendentalizma [The strengths of weak transcendentalism], Praktizatziya philosophii: sovremennye tendentsii i strategii [Practice of philosophy: modern trends and strategies], Vilnus, pp. 165—178.4. Kant, I. 1994a, Izbrannye pis'ma [Selected Letters; letter’s to M. Herz] In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 8, S. 57—136.5. Kant, I. 1994b, Kritika chistogo razuma (1787) [Critique of Pure Reason (second edition)]. In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 3.6. Kant, I. 1994v, Prolegomeny ko vsiakoy budushey metafizike, kotoraia mozhet poiavit’sia kak nauka [Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics] In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 4, s. 5—133.7. Katrechko, S. L. 2014, Transcendentalizm Kanta kak transcendental’naja paradigma filosofstvovanija [Kant’s transcendentalism as transcendental paradigm of philosophizing]. In: Kantovskiiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], 2014, no. 2 48), s. 10—25.8. Katrechko, S. L. 2017a, Transcendentalizm Kanta kak realisticheskaja teorija opyta/poznanija (analiz struktury kantovskogo kopernikanskogo perevorota) [Does the Kant’s Copernican Revolution Lead to Idealism? (Structure and Dialectic of Kant’s Copernican Revolution] In: Filosofija i nauka: problemy sootnesenija, Kn.1, Moscow, s. 213—226.9. Katrechko, S. L. 2017b, Kantovskiiy transcendentalizm Kanta i ego koncept veshi samoiy po sebe [Kant’s transcendentalism and his concept ’thing-in-itself’]: https://www.academia.edu/33000510/10. Molchanov, V. I. 2007, Kantovskaya eksplikatziya apriorizma: analiz ili interpretatsiya [Kant’s explication of the a priori: analysis or interpretation], In: Immanuil Kant: nasledie I proekt [Immanuel Kant: heritage and project], Moscow, pp. 136—153.11. Shiyan, A. A. 2015, Transstendenziya suschnostey i zhiznenniy mir v phenomenologii Edmunda Husserlya [Transcendence of entities and life-world in phenomenology of Edmund Husserl]. In: Istoriya philosophii: istoriya ili philosophiya? [History of philosophy: history or philosophy?], Moscow, http://ff-rggu.ru/aleshinskie_chteniya_2015/, pp. 149—157.12. Abela, P. 2002, Kant’s Empirical Realism, Oxford, Clarendon Press.13. Allais, L. 2015, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, Oxford University Press Uk.14. Bernet, R. 1990, Huserls Begriff des Noema. In: Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung, Dorbrecht, S. 61—80.15. Collins, A. 1999, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, University of California Press.16. Gurwitsch, A. 2009, The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions of Consciousness. I The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901—1973), Vol. II. Springer. Pp. 149—174.17. Husserl, E. 1959, Erste Philosophie (1923/4). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion, Husserliana VIII, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.18. Gabriel, M. 2014, Der Neue Realismus, Frankfurt am Mein, Suhrkamp.19. Drummond J. J. 2003, The Structure of Intentionality, In: The new Husserl: a critical reader, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, pp. 65—92.20. Gabriel, M. 2016, Neutraler Realismus: Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 2, Freiburg, Alber Karl.21. Rang, B. 1977, Repräsentation und Selbstgegebenheit: Die Aporie der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung in den Frühschriften Husserls. In: Phänomenologische Forschungen, Vol. 1, pp. 105—137.22. Röd, W. 1991, Erfahrung und Reflexion. Theorien der Erfahrung in transzendentalphilosophischer Sicht, München, C. H. Beck.23. Smith, D. W. 2013, Husserl, 2 edition, London and New York, Routledge.24. Tengelyi, L. 2014, Welt und Unendlichkeit: Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik, Freiburg, Alber Karl.25. Wenzel, Ch. 2005, Spiele nach Kant die Kategorien schon beider Wahrnehmung eine Rolle? In: Kant-Studien 96, S. 407—426.R. (Translated from English by M.E. Soboleva)HowellThe article sketches the development of Kant interpretation in analytic philosophy. The author turns to Kant’s transcendental idealism and three well-known difficulties about things in themselves which Kant’s idealism generates: problems about unknowability, noumenal-affection and category-application, and the neglected-alternative. Building on the work “Things in Themselves: an Interim Report” (XI Kant Readings, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, 2014), the author questions how far Kant’s idealism can be accepted and these problems resolved in any way that (i) is reasonably faithful to Kant’s texts, (ii) renders his position consistent (and his major arguments valid), and (iii) does not rest on premises that are themselves philosophically implausible. The author argues that these three desiderata are not met in any strictly Kantian and philosophically satisfactory way in the interpretations given by P. F. Strawson, Rae Langton, Henry Allison, and Desmond Hogan, among other analytic Kant scholars. It is unlikely that one can find any strictly Kantian, philosophically satisfactory resolution of the above problems. However, looser but philosophically valuable reconstructions of Kant’s ideas are possible. The author also comments briefly on Robert Hanna’s, Maja Soboleva’s, and Sergey Katrechko’s views on things in themselves. Finally, the author suggests several avenues that Kant scholarship might take, given this discussion.05312026111. Katrechko, S. 2017, Specifika kantovskogo transcendentalizma i koncept «veshh'- sama-po-sebe» [The Specificity of Kant’s Transcendentalism and Its Concept of the Thing- It-Itself], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol. 36, no. 4, р. 68—87.2. Soboleva, M. 2017, Analiticheskoe kantovedenie, transcendental'nyj idealizm i veshh' v sebe [Analytical Kant-studies, transcendental idealism and thing in itself], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol 36, no. 4, p. 88—99.3. Hanna, R. 2017, Kant, radikal'nyj agnosticizm i metodologicheskij jeliminativizm otnositel'no veshhej v sebe [Kant, Radical Agnosticism, and Methodological Eliminativism about Things-in-Themselves], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol 36, no. 4, p. 51—67.4. Howell, R. 2008, Kantovskie ob’ekty — problemy i perspektivy issledovanija [Kantian Objects — problems and perspectives of analysis], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers], no. 27, p. 6—20.5. Allais, L. 2015, Manifest Reality, Oxford.6. Allison, H. 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, New Haven (1st ed. 1983).7. Brook, A. 1994, Kant and the Mind, Cambridge.8. Cleve, J. van, Problems from Kant, N. Y., 1999.9. Guyer, P. 1987, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, New York.10. Hanna, R. 2001, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, New York.11. Hogan, D. 2009a, How to Know Unknowable Things in Themselves, in: Noûs, 43, p. 49—63.12. Hogan, D. 2009b, Noumenal Affection, in: Philosophical Review, 118, p. 501—32.13. Hogan, D. 2009c, Three Kinds of Rationalism and the Non-Spatiality of Things in Themselves”, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47, p. 355—382.14. Howell, R. 1979, A Problem for Kant, in: E. Saarinen et al., eds., Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht, p. 331—349.15. Howell, R. 1992, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Dordrecht.16. Howell, R. 2004, The Conundrum of the Object and Other Problems from Kant, in: Kantian Review, vol. 8, p. 115—136.17. Howell, R. 2007, Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy — Recent Analytic Interpretations, in: Istoriko-Filosofskiy Almanach [History-of-Philosophy-Yearbook], vol. 2, p. 100—114.18. Howell, R. 2013, Kant and Kantian Themes in Recent Analytic Philosophy, in: Metaphilosophy, No. 44, Pp. 42—47.19. Howell, R. 2014, Things in Themselves: An Interim Report, in: XI Kantovskie chtenija: Materialy mezhdunarodnoj konferencii [XI Kant Readings. Proceedings of the International Kant Conference]. Kaliningrad, p. 18—32.20. Kant, I. 1997, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood, New York.21. Kitcher, P. 1990, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. New York.22. Kitcher, P. 2011, Kant’s Thinker. New York.23. Langton, R. 1998, Kantian Humility. New York.24. Parsons, C. 1964, Infinity and Kant’s Conception of the ‘Possibility of Experience’, in: Philosophical Review, no. 73, p. 183—197.25. Soboleva, M. 2016, Braucht man Anschauung um zu denken?, in: Das Denken des Denkens. Ein philosophischer Überblick. Hrsg. M. Soboleva. Bielefeld. S. 87—112.26. Strawson, P. F. 1966, The Bounds of Sense, London.27. Wolff, R. P. 1963, Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity, Cambridge (Mass.).R. (Translated from English by M.E. Soboleva)HannaIn his recent paper, “Things in Themselves: An Interim Report,” Robert Howell says that a philosophically satisfactory resolution of all-too-familiar problems about Kant’s views on the object of knowledge and the nature of things-in-themselves should meet three conditions: (1) it should be reasonably faithful to Kant’s views, (2) it must show that his views are internally consistent and his major arguments are valid, and (3) it must not rest on premises that are themselves philosophically implausible. Howell concludes that it would be philosophically good to find a satisfactory resolution of these problems, but also suspects that no such resolution will be found. The author fully agrees with Howell’s three conditions of adequacy on a philosophically satisfactory resolution of the problems, and holds that it would be philosophically good to find a resolution of them. However, the author sharply disagrees with the statement that no such resolution can be found. Indeed, he believes that such a resolution has been found. Kantian Radical Agnosticism (KRA) says that ‘we can and do know a priori that we cannot know either the nature of things in themselves or whether things in themselves exist or do not exist’. Kantian Methodological Eliminativism (KME) about things in themselves says that for the purposes of the theory of real (i. e., anthropocentric, “humanfaced”) transcendental idealism we can completely ignore things in themselves. In this paper the author unpacks and defends both KRA and KME.05312026111. Kant, I. 2006а, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1. Auflage, in: Kant I. Werke Zweisprachige deutsch-russische Ausgabe. Teilband. II.2. Мoskau.2. Kant, I. 2006b, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2-е Auflage, in: Kant I. Werke Zweisprachige deutsch-russische Ausgabe. Teilband. II.1. Мoskau.3. Howell, R. 2017, Analiticheskaja rabota nad Kantom — idealizm, veshhi v sebe i ob#ekt znanija [Analytic Work on Kant — Idealism, Things in Themselves, and the Object of Knowledge], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol 36. Issue 2.4. Hume, D. 1996, Issledovanija o chelovecheskom poznanii [An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]. Essay XII, Part III // Jum D. Sochinenija [Hume D. Works]. In 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Мoscow.5. Gödel, K. 1992, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And Related Systems. Transl. by B. Meltzer. N. Y.6. Hanna, R. 2001, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford.7. Hanna, R. 2006, Kant, Science, and Human Nature. Oxford.8. Hanna, R. 2015, Cognition, Content, and the a Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge. Oxford.9. Monk, R. 2016, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, 1872—1921. Volume 1. N. Y.10. Russell, B. 1959, My Philosophical Development. London.11. Russell, B. 1996, Principles of Mathematics. 2nd ed. N. Y.S. L.KatrechkoThis article analyses Kant’s transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) and its central concept — the thing in itself is the kind of concept without which it is impossible to enter Kant’s philosophy (a paraphrase of Jacobi’s maxim). Methodologically, transcendentalism implies a transcendental turn from studying [empirical] objects to analysing the [transcendental] conditions of their cognition. Metaphysically, Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the crucial distinction between the thing in itself and the appearance. To give a more precise definition of Kant’s thing in itself, this article considers three theses. Firstly, Kant’s thing in itself is not an object in the usual sense. It is a methodological notion rather than an actual object. There are several possible conceptualisations of Kant’s thing in itself [that use the apparatus of contemporary logic]. Secondly, the thing in itself has two modes — the empirical and noumenal ones (B306). This should be taken into account in analysing the concept of transcendentalism. Thirdly, Kant introduces the concept of the thing in itself through a negation. Being a notion of the ‘family resemblance’ type, the concept comprises three dynamically connected elements — the object in general, the transcendental object, and the noumenon (sometimes, Kant uses them interchangeably). Each element represents a phase of Reduction- Realisation (Buchdahl) in the cognition of empirical data (Kant defines such phases as thingness, using the concept of ‘transcendental object’). The data are obtained through the transcendental analysis (reflection) of the process of cognition. The thesis (2) about the dual nature of the thing in itself suggests a solution to Kant’s problem of causality. The thing in itself serves as the referent of the phenomenon, whereas the noumenal thing-in-itself (or the ‘negative noumenon) serves as its meaning (Frege’s semiotic triangle).05312026111. Abela, P. 2002, Kant’s Empirical Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.2. Adams, R. 1997, Things in Themselves, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 57, № 4 (Dec., 1997), p. 801—825.3. Adickes, E. 1924 Kant und das Ding an sich, Berlin: Pan Verlag.4. Aquila, R. 1979, Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 61 (1979), p. 293—308.5. Aquila, R. 1983, Representational Mind: A Study of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, Indiana University Press.6. Allais, L. 2010, Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Kant’s Commitment to Things in Themselves, Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics, vol.2/2010, Berlin : W. de Gruyter, pp. 1—32.7. Allais, L. 2015, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, Oxford University Press Uk.8. Allison, H. 1968, Kant’s concept of the transcendental object, Kant-Studien, vol. 59 (1—4), pp. 165—186.9. Allison, H. 1983, Transcendental Idealism: A Defense, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.10. Allison, H. 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, Revised and Enlarged Edition.11. Barker, S. F. 1967, Appearing and appearances in Kant, The Monist, vol. 51, n. 3, Kant Today: Part I (1967), pp. 426—441.12. Baum, M. 2001, Objects and Objectivity in Kant’s First Critique, in: Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine (ed. by D. Schulting & J. Verburgt), Dordrecht : Spinger, p. 55—70.13. Bird, G. 1962 (1974), Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.14. der Boer, K. 2014, Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves, Transcendental Objects, and Monads, Kant-Studien, vol.105(2), p. 221—260.15. Buchdahl, G. 1992, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason: Essays on the Structure of Kant's Philosophy, Oxford : Blackwell.16. Buchdahl, G. 1994, Science and God: The Topology of the Kantian World, Kant and Contemporary Epistemology (ed. Paolo Parrini), Dordrecht : Springer, pp. 1—25.17. Chisholm, R. 1950, The Theory of Appearing, in: Max black, ed. Philosophical Analysis, Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, p. 102—118.18. Gideon, A. 1903, Der Begriff Transscendental in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Marburgh : Friedrich.19. Herring, H. 1953, Das Problem der Affektion bei Kant, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungsheft, № 67. Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag.20. Hoffe, O. 2010, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: the Foundation of Modern Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.21. Hogan, D. 2009, How to Know Unknowable Things in Themselves, Noûs, vol. 43, n. 1, p. 49—63.22. Horstmann, R.-P. 1997, Bausteine kritischer Philosophie. Arbeiten zu Kant. Bodenheim: Philo.23. Howell, R. 1981, Kant’s First-Critique. Theory of the Transcendental Object, Dialectica, vol. 35, n.1, p. 85—125.24. Howell, R. 2008, Kantovskie predmety: problemy i perspektivy issledovanija, Kantovskiiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], № 1(27) p. 6—21.25. Jacobi, F. H. 2004 (1787), Ueber den transzendentalen Idealismus, Appendix to David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch, in: Jacobi F. H. Werke, Hamburg: Meiner, vol. 2, P. 291—310.26. Kant, I. 1994, Prolegomeny ko vsiakoy budushey metafizike, kotoraia mozhet poiavit'sia kak nauka [Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics] In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 4, p. 5—133.27. Kant, I. 1994, Izbrannye pis'ma [Selected Letters; letter’s to M. Herz] In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 8, P. 57—136.28. Kant, I. 1994, Kritika chistogo razuma (1787) [Critique of Pure Reason (second edition)]. In: Kant, I. Sobranie sochinenij v 8 tomah. [Works in 8 volumes], vol. 3.29. Katrechko, S. L. 2005, Kantovskaja koncepcija soznanija (poznanija) kak model' «iskusstvennogo intellekta» [Kant’s concept of consciousness (knowledge) as model of "artificial intelligence"], in: Novoe v iskusstvennom intellekte. Metodologicheskie i teoreticheskie voprosy. M. : IInteLL, P. 137—140.30. Katrechko, S. L. 2014a, Transcendentalizm Kanta kak transcendental'naja paradigma filosofstvovanija [Kant’s transcendentalism as transcendental paradigm of philosophizing], Kantovskiiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], no. 2 (48). P. 10—25.31. Katrechko, S. L. 2014b, Transcendental'nyiy analiz matematicheskoiy dejatel'nosti: abstraktnye (matematicheskie) ob"ekty, konstrukcii i dokazatel'stva [Transcendental analysis of mathematical activity: abstract (mathematical) objects, structures and proofs], in: Dokazatel'stvo: ochevidnost', dostovernost' i ubeditel'nost' v matematike (Proceedings of the Moscow Seminar on the Philosophy of Mathematics). M. : «LIBROKOM», P. 86—120.32. Katrechko, S. L. 2015, Transcendental Analysis of Mathematics: abstract nature of mathematics knowledge [Transcendental'nyiy analiz matematiki: abstraktnaja priroda matematicheskogo znanija], Kantovskiiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], № 2 (52). P. 16—31.33. Katrechko, S. L. 2016a, Transcendentalizm Kanta kak realisticheskaja teorija opyta/ poznanija (analiz struktury kantovskogo kopernikanskogo perevorota) [Does the Kant’s Copernican Revolution Lead to Idealism? (Structure and Dialectic of Kant’s Copernican Revolution], in: Filosofija i nauka: problemy sootnesenija. M.: RGGU, Kn. 1, P. 213—226.34. Katrechko, S. L. 2016b, O ponimanii koncepta «transcendental'nyiy» v kantovskoiy filosofii [About understanding of a concept "transcendental" in Kant philosophy], Ratio.ru, vol. 16. P. 34—58.35. Katrechko, S. 2017a, Transcendentalizm Kanta i ego koncept veshi samoiy po sebe [Kant’s transcendentalism, transcendental shift (turn) and the thing in itself], Proceedings of the International Workshop “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy: Metaphysics, Theory of Experience, Theory of Consciousness (?)” (Moscow, April 22—23, 2016). Moscow: Foundation for Humanities, p. 213—226.36. Katrechko, S. L. 2017b, Kantovskoe javlenie ob"ektivno-ob"ektnoe (predmetnoe) predstavlenie, Kantovskiiy sbornik [The Kantovsky sbornik], vol. 36, n. 3, pp. 10—11.37. Katrechko, S. 2017, On possible understanding of Kant’s transcendentalism, in: Proceedings of the International Workshop “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy: Metaphysics, Theory of Experience, Theory of Consciousness (?)” (Moscow, April 22—23, 2016), Moscow: Foundation for Humanities, p. 10—11.38. Marshall, C. 2013, Kant’s appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 63 (252), p. 520—545.39. Nitzan, L. 2014, Jacob Sigismund Beck’s Standpunctslehre and the Kantian Thing-initself Debate (The Relation Between a Representation and Its Object) [Studies in German Idealism № 16], Dordrecht: Springer.40. Prauss, G., 1974, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, Bonn : Bouvier.41. Prichard, H. A. 1909, Kant’s theory of knowledge, Oxford: Oxford Claredon Press.42. Rohlf, M. 2010, Immanuel Kant, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL: https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#TraIde.43. Robinson, H. 2001, The Disappearing X, Proceedings of the Ninth International Kant Congress, vol. 2. P. 418—428. Berlin : W. de Gruyter.44. Van Cleve, J. 1999, Problems From Kant, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.45. Westphal, K. R. 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.46. Zalta, Ed. 1999, The Theory of Abstract Objects, Metaphysics Research Lab. URL: https://mally.stanford.edu/theory.htmlM. E.SobolevaIn modern theoretical analytical philosophy, the interest in Kant is primarily due to discussions on the nature of sensory perceptions, on the epistemological status of experience, and on the so-called ‘constructivism’. The conflict of interpretations goes so far that some consider Kant to be a conceptualist, while others consider him an anti-conceptualist. For some, he is an internalist and, for others, an externalist. For some, he is a constructivist and, for others is a realist. This paper develops the main arguments pro and contra possible interpretations of Kant’s texts and presents the author’s interpretation of some key points of Kant’s theory of knowledge. Contrary to the analytical mainstream in Kant studies, the author argues that Kant’s ‘transcendental idealism’ in the field of the theoretical reason is completely compatible with epistemological realism. Hence, the term ‘thing in itself’ expresses neither ontological nor epistemological dualism. Rather it has a methodological function and it serves to indicate the possibility of different forms of discourses — religious, ethical, etc. The thesis is proven in three steps. First, the notion of ‘appearance’ is considered as ontologically identical to the thing in itself. Then, the author proposes her own reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental theory of experience and analyses the transcendental structure of experience to demonstrate the realistic status of Kant’s cognitive objects. In conclusion, the author stresses the significance of Kant’s project from the perspective of the contemporary theory of cognition.05312026111. Kant, I. 2006а, Kritika chistogo razuma. 2e izd. [The Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed.], in: Kant I. Sochinenija na nemeckom i russkom jazykah [Works. German-Russian-Edition]. T. 2, ch. 1. Moscow: Kanon-Plus.2. Kant, I. 2006b, Kritika chistogo razuma. 1e izd. [The Critique of Pure Reason. 1st ed.], in: Kant I. Sochinenija na nemeckom i russkom jazykah [Works. German- Russian-Edition] T. 2, ch. 2. Moscow: Kanon-Plus.3. Katrechko, S. L. (Ed.) 2017, Transcendental'nyj povorot v sovremennoj filosofii (1): metafizika, teorija opyta, teorija soznanija. Sbornik materialov mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo seminara [Proceedings of the International Workshop “Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy: Metaphysics, Theory of Experience, Theory of Consciousness”]. Moscow, 2017.4. Lektorskij, V. A., 2005, Kant, radikal’nyj epistemologicheskij konstruktivizm i konstruktivny realism, in: Voprosy filosofii [Voprosy filosofii], № 8, 11—21.5. Hanna, R. 2017, Kant, radikal'nyj agnosticizm i metodologicheskij jeliminativizm otnositel'no veshhej v sebe [Kant, Radical Agnosticism, and Methodological Eliminativism about Things-in-Themselves], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol. 36, iss. 4.6. Howell, R. 2017, Analiticheskaja rabota nad Kantom — idealizm, veshhi v sebe i ob’ekt znanija [Analytic Work on Kant—Idealism, Things in Themselves, and the Object of Knowledge], in: Kantovsky Sbornik [Kantian Papers]. Vol. 36, iss. 2.7. Allais, L. 2007, Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy, Journal of the History of Philosophy 45, 459—484.8. Allison, H. E. 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Hawen, London : Yale University Press.9. Boghossian, P. 2015, Angst vor der Wahrheit, Berlin : Suhrkamp.10. Griffith, A. 2012, Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, European Journal of Philosophy 20, 193—222.11. Heidemann, D. H. (Ed.) 2013, Kant and Non-Conceptual Concept, New York: Routledge.12. McDowell, J. 1994, Mind and World, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA.13. Mohr, G. 2004, Immanuel Kant. Theoretische Philosophie. Texte und Kommentar, Bd. III, Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp.14. Sellars, W. 1968, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.15. Willaschek, M. 2011, Affektion und Kontingenz in Kants transzendentalem Idealismus, in: Schumacher R. (Hg.), Idealismus als Theorie der Repräsentation, Paderborn : Mentis, 211—231.А. (translated from the German by V.Kh. Gilmanov)Schweizer0531202611L. Yu.Kornilaev05312026111. Brief von Emil Lask an Berta Lask, 15 Okt. 1910 // Heidelberg University Library. Heid. Hs. 3820, № 405. 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