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MIGRATION AND ETHNIC ISSUES

THE 'HYBRID MODEL' OF NORWAY'S ETHNIC POLICY IN ITS NORTHERN COUNTIES: A KEY TO STABLE INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

M. Yu. Zadorin[1]
E. S. Kotlova[1]

In this article, we study the political and legal model currently used by Norway in its Northern counties. This work is a part of comprehensive research supported by the Russian Science Foundation. Our study aims to provide a historical perspective to the model of Norway's national ethnic policy in the Northern counties by identifying the operational capabilities and assessing the efficiency of these models amid increasing migration flows and changes in the country's socio-economic environment. The methods we use in this multidisciplinary study are situated at the interface of national and international law, political science, history, and sociology. They include the comparative historical method (the dynamics of ethno-political processes), the systemic method (ethic policy in the framework of target-based programme management), the comparative law method (a comparison of national legal systems and international contractual standards), the value and norm-driven method (ethnic policy viewed through the prism of public good), institutional method (the role of political institutions), and the secondary analysis of sociological data. We also rely on qualitative methods, namely, the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data on ethnic diasporas living in the North of Norway. As a result, we establish that the Kingdom of Norway has a unified approach to national ethnic policy, which rests on self-confessed multiculturalism. However, different ethnic political models are applied in the case of certain ethnic groups. Today, against the background of declared state multiculturalism and integration, the models of acculturation and non-violent assimilation are both operational in Norway. There are sporadic expressions of nationalism and voluntary segregation. We conclude that, despite a unified approach to ethnic policy and despite Norway's political and legal achieve-

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ments in the protection of indigenous peoples' rights, the country's government carries out a differentiated 'hybrid' ethnic policy towards ethnic groups living on its territory. The growing infighting between the right and the left parties in the Storting translates into unpopular and spur-of-the-moment political decisions as regards inter-ethnic relations.

Keywords: Norway, migration, ethnic policy, law, national question, acculturation, non-violent assimilation, voluntary segregation, nationalism, integration, multiculturalism

Introduction

To this day the 'national question' remains one of the most contentious issues of domestic policies of states. There are various reasons behind this. They range from historical grudges to the multi-ethnic makeup of a stage, from a collision of individual and group rights to doubts in the efficiency of the national ethnopolitical model.

A national ethnopolitical model aims to stabilise and regulate social relations affected by the phenomenon of ethnicity. Ultimately, these are the issues of the 'political identity' of a nation [1, p. 91].

Thus, an ethnic policy is the efforts of states aimed to regulate interethnic relations by creating a relevant system of institutions within a selected model, the features of which affect conceptual and strategic normative and legal regulations.

The establishment of an institutional structure of an ethnopolitical model has a direct bearing on relations between the actors involved, the authorities, non-profits, ethnic communities, etc.

The efficiency of a model is the product of its management system. This includes integrated indices measuring its stability.

Careful analysis of ethnic policies of various states shows a lack of clear criteria of intra-ethnic stability. Moreover, there are only a few indicators based on mathematical models. Thus, there is a need for large-scale sociological research.

The Arctic, as a region of political stability, is very attractive for migrants. This and the recent migrant crisis make this territory an interesting object for ethnonational process modelling. Our study focuses on three northern Norwegian counties (*fylke*): Finnmark, Troms, and Nordland. The relevance and urgency of the research lie in the possibility to extrapolate the experience of these areas to the Arctic regions of Russia.

Theoretical and practical approaches to ethnonational modelling

The development of modern society has been accompanied by the evolution of ethnopolitical models. After 1945, some of them were condemned as crimes against humanity (genocide and apartheid) [2, p. 151]. Seeking to ensure the dominance of a certain race or ethnic group over the others, these models went as far as exterminating the latter.

Most countries of the world, signatories of the1966 international human rights pacts and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, have proclaimed their official commitment to the multiculturalism model adopted in Europe and North America over 35 years ago. According to one of the most ardent advocates of this model, Will Kymlicka, the political model of multiculturalism does not seek to assimilate other cultures [3].

Multiculturalism and its variations were preceded by assimilation, segregation, and acculturation models, each having specific national and institutional features in every county adopting them.

The concept of assimilation was developed by the US sociologists Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. They distinguished four stages of the process: contact, conflict, accommodation, and, finally, assimilation by the host culture. In the late 1980s, Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut proposed the theory of segmented assimilation of those spheres of the lives of migrants that are crucial for social adaptation [4].

Assimilation does not always relate to migrants; sometimes it applies to the local population. Moreover, some countries are still bound by ILO Convention 107 (1957) on indigenous populations, which, unlike more recent ILO Convention 169 (1989), suggests gradual cultural assimilation and integration of aboriginals.

In the 20th century, a number of researchers considered acculturation to be the principal stage of assimilation. One of the advocates of this approach was Milton Gordon. Richard Thurnwald linked acculturation to the so-called cultural diffusion. This theory was further developed in the 1960s by Theodore Graves [4].

Alongside ethnopolitical models, there are ideological models initiated by ethnic groups themselves. These include voluntary segregation and nationalism.

Traditionally, political and legal science define segregation as forced separation of a nation, an ethnic or any other group from another group, usually accompanied by the discrimination of one them [5]. International law, particularly, Article 1(1) of the 1973 Apartheid Convention, bans such practices.

On the other hand, there is voluntary segregation. According to the conservative British periodical the *Daily Express*, in 2016 there were 900 administrative units across the EU where the norms of the host society barely prevailed due to huge levels of migration.[1] This is an indicator of voluntary segregation, which can lead to outbursts of nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment among the prevalent ethnic group.

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[1] *Mowat L.* Europe's no-go zones: List of 900 EU areas where police have 'lost control' to migrants // Express : [website]. URL: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/657520/Europe-no-go-900-EU-areas-police-lost-control (accessed 20.06.2017).

In this regard, R. M. Plankina argues that by emphasising the diversity of cultures and differences between them multiculturalism can result in an increase in nationalism [p, c. 109], including its radical manifestations (the case of Varg Vikernes).[2]

The Norwegian context of ethnonational modelling

In the Norwegian political system, there is no single institute responsible for ethnic policy. Related issues are addressed by all the ministries. Their joint efforts comprise Norway's ethnopolitical policy outlined by the ruling party and the prime minister and later calibrated by parliamentary and public discussion.

Research organisations and funds take part in developing ethnopolitical strategies and conduct studies into specific issues relating to migration and the indigenous population. There is a number of commissions comprising members of the parliament, members of the cabinet, and experts working in this field.

Norway's ethnic policy has two dimensions: policies towards the indigenous population (the Saami) and national minorities and immigrant-related policies.

Immigrants. Migration is essentially within the competency of the Ministry of Justice of Norway, which includes the Directory of Immigration (UDI)[3] – a body that has offices in each county. The system of authorities involved in the implementation of national migration policy is constructed by interaction among four ministries: the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Labour and Social Relations, the Ministry of Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Political and administrative responsibility lies with the Ministry of Justice, its directorates, and their services, whereas sectoral responsibility rests with three other ministries.

The horizontal distribution of competencies makes it possible to address all essential elements of ethnopolitics and link the problems of immigrants and the indigenous population to similar issues affecting Norwegians. Each link of the system is counterbalanced, which is crucial for attainting ethnic peace and concordance. At the same time, reduplication of functions is a common phenomenon slowing down the processes of political decision-making and policy implementation [7, pp. 34–65].

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[2] *Norway's* most notorious musician to be released from prison // The Guardian : [website]. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/mar/11/norwegian-black-metal-varg-vikernes (accessed 20.06.2017).

[3] *Om UDI.* Hvem gjør hva i utlendingsforvaltningen? // Utlendingsdirektoratet : [website]. URL: https://www.udi.no/om-udi/om-udi-og-utlendingsforvaltningen/hvem-gjor-hva-i-utlendingsfor valtningen/_(accessed 29.10.2017).

Remarkably, Norway did not face large-scale immigration until the mid-1970. Its society was homogeneous in cultural and ethnic terms. Moreover, Norwegians used to emigrate across the Atlantic [8, p. 4]. Having embraced the concept of the welfare state (Article 110c of the Constitution of Norway), the country started to attract large numbers of immigrants. A lack of proper socio-cultural adaptation [9, pp. 10–12] created a social layer of poorly integrated new citizens, primarily of Asian origin [9, p. 64].

Segregation in the real estate market led to the emergence of immigrant districts in big cities [9, p. 65].

To a degree, voluntary segregation can be a result of immigrants being apprehensive about the Norwegian system of family law and juvenile justice (*Barnevernet*).

A conspicuous case was the 2014 scandal when the Norwegian Child Welfare Services removed a child from Russian non-residents for accidentally yanking out a loose baby tooth.[4] The family have spent several years trying to bring their son back home. Norway has signed a number of agreements on child protection. Clause 1.4 of the *Guidelines for processing child welfare cases where children have ties to other countries* (Circular Q-42/2015) prepared by the Ministry of Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion of the Kingdom of Norway states that, according to sections 1 and 2 of the 1992 Child Welfare Act, the said Act applies to all children residing in Norway, regardless of their citizenship, residence status, or time of residence in the country.

Moreover, according to clause 1.3 of the *Guidelines*, which refers to paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the European Convention of 1950 (*ECHR 1950*), the public authorities may intervene in family life in the interest of the child. Such intervention must be necessary in a democratic society. The *Guidelines* clearly emphasise that issuing a care order for a child against the will of the parents can be justified if it is in the child's best interest. However, no further details follow.

Mass rallies of foreign citizens against children being removed from their own families and placed into Norwegian foster families did not go unnoticed. In 2015, the president of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman compared Norway's foster care system, Barnevernet, to Nazi Germany's Lebensborn adoption system.[5]

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[4] *Hundreds* protest 'kidnapping' in Norway's Child Welfare System // Russia Today : [website]. URL: https://www.rt.com/news/263625-norway-children-welfare-protest/ (accessed 20.06.2017).

[5] *Norway* care system 'like Nazis': Czech President // Thelocal.no : [website]. URL: http:// www.thelocal.no/20150210/norways-foster-care-system-like-nazi-programme (accessed 20.06.2017).

After a public outcry, the Norwegian authorities were forced to sign the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and protection of children. The document takes into account the rights of parents and establishes a procedure for redress for rights violation in cases of illegal removal of a child. The Convention has been in effect in Norway since July 1, 2016.

In summer 2016, the Norwegian parliament discussed a legislative proposal from the Conservative Party (Høyre) and the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) regarding amendments to the Law on foreigners. According to the proposal, to be entitled to family reunification, a refugee had to have spent three years in the Kingdom of Norway as a student or an employee and to meet the minimum financial requirements for sustaining a family. Moreover, it was proposed to permit refugees to marry in the Kingdom of Norway only if both prospective spouses have reached the age of 24.[6] The Parliament rejected that proposal.[7]

Migrants who have received an education in the Kingdom of Norway have employment preferences. The same applies to migrants with full-time contracts and a satisfactory command of the national language. Migrants are primarily employed in the sectors of the economy experiencing a lack of Norwegian specialists.[8]

According to a poll by the Central Bureau of Statistics, over 44 % of Norwegians want immigrants to be more like them, whereas 40 % do not consider it necessary and support cultural diversity in their country. However, most Norwegians (over 80 %) are against any discrimination in the labour market.[9]

Changes at the level of the political establishment may seem alarming for immigrants: right and centrist forces won the recent parliamentary election,[10] a fierce debate sparked off by the immigration issue in 2015 [10]. The horrid terrorist attack by Anders Breivik[11] revealed the acute problem of hidden intolerance to newcomers in the Kingdom.

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[6] *Slik* vil regjeringen stramme inn asylpolitikken // NRK : [website]. URL: www.nrk.no/norge/ slik-vil-regjeringen-stramme-inn-asylpolitikken-1.12885077 (accessed 20.06.2017).

[7] *Her* er fem innstramningsforslag Listhaug ikke fikk flertall for // Aftenposten : [website]. URL: www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/Her-er-fem-innstramningsforslag-Listhaug-ikke-fikk-flertall-for-330897b.html (accessed 20.06.2017).

[8] *Norway* wants more migrant workers // The Nordic Page: [website]. URL: http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/4207-norway-want-more-migrant-workers/ (accessed 20.06.2017).

[9] *Dataene* for den sociologiska meningsmåling // Statistisk sentralbyrå : [website]. URL: http:// www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selectvarval/saveselections.asp (accessed 20.06.2017).

[10] *Valgresultat* // Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementer : [website]. URL: http://valgresultat.no/?type=ko&%C3 %A5r=2015 (accessed 20.06.2017).

[11] *Oslo* District Court (Oslo tingrett) — Judgment // Lovdata : [website]. URL: https://lovdata.no/static/file/834/toslo-2011-188627-24e.pdf (accessed 20.06.2017).

Local populations – the Saami and national minorities. The Saami Act was adopted in 1987. Paragraph 2 – 1 of the document established the Saami Parliament (Norwegian: *Sametinget*, Northern Sami: *Sámediggi*) as the supreme representative body of the indigenous people. This raised the socio-legal and political status of the legislature. Norway is a signatory to ILO Convention 169, which guarantees the right of the Saami to self-determination and wide autonomy.

Most problems of the indigenous population are addressed by the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation of Norway, which includes the Department of Saami and Minority Affairs. An institution of the Norwegian state, the Saami Parliament deals with questions of culture, language, and the administration of the Saami territories, as well as with some legal issues.

The national minorities of Norway (Kvens, Swedes, Jews, and the Roma) enjoy a high degree of national and cultural autonomy. The only difference is that they do not have representative bodies. In legal terms, they are in an intermediate position between immigrants and the indigenous people.

The Saami can influence the political system of the Norwegian state both directly (through the participation in national elections and membership in national parties) and indirectly (via the Saami Parliament and international organisations, particularly, UN committees and various cultural and non-profit organisations) [11, pp. 6–23].

The Saami are among the leaders of the international movement for the rights of indigenous people. As early as in the 1970s, both the government and people of Norway supported their ambition to ‘revitalise’ and to enshrine their rights in law. Norway was the first country to go through such changes. However, there is only one indigenous nation living there. Thus, granting it rights beyond cultural autonomy was much easier in this country than it would have been in a multi-ethnic state, for instance, Russia – home to 160 nationalities, forty-seven of which are indigenous minorities. Moreover, in Norway, the problem of the indigenous population does not have a denominational aspect, for most of the Saami are Christians just as most Norwegians are.

The experience of northern counties

As conduits for national ethnic policy, counties, county councils and communes adapt it to local conditions and ethnic makeups. A developed system of local governments, the ideological foundations of which were laid in the 17th century by the Swedish statesman Axel Oxenstierna, solves ethnic issues at a municipal level.

However, the following factors add some complication to Norway's ethnonational policy in the North:

– different approaches should be applied to Norwegians, the Saami, and immigrants living in the region; these approaches should take into account the historical aspect: one minority group experienced colonisation and ‘Norwegisation’, whereas the other voluntarily chose Norway as a new place of residence;

– immigrants are a very diverse group; their degree of integration into Norwegian society varies; there has been an increase in immigrants engaging in anti-social behaviour [12, pp. 107–127];

– immigrants settle in sparsely populated territories, which is a requirement of the Norwegian immigrant adaptation programme;[12] this arrangement is psychologically hard for newcomers to endure [13, pp. 44–48].

On the other hand, a low population density and the remarkable tolerance of the residents of Northern counties made it possible to introduce a ‘hybrid’ ethnopolitical model. Finnmark has the highest immigrant rate across the Barents region: 111.7 immigrants per 1,000 population. Russians account for 38 % of all the immigrants [14]. The high proportion of Russians is explained by the historical vicinity of the border [14, pp. 71–84] and the long process of mutual acculturation [15, pp. 519–535]. Here, acculturation means the mutual exchange of cultural elements, whereas assimilation remains unidirectional.

Today assimilation is not what it used to be. Despite mild compulsion, the immigrant has a choice - to accept new elements of culture and to incorporate them into his or her system of cultural reference. Therefore, modern assimilation cannot be classified as coercive.

Different groups of migrants have different cultural backgrounds: what works for Russians in Kirkenes will not apply to the more exclusive cultures of the South and East.

The Thai diaspora in Tromsø positions itself as a rather open community: there are Thai restaurants and beauty salons. National festivals and other cultural events are held on a regular basis. However, a closer look reveals that the openness of the diaspora is limited to those interested in learning its culture and values.

On the contrary, the Kurdish diaspora in Bodø is very zealous in the preservation of its identity. However, in Norway, its members enjoy some 'preferences’.

Universities are another major source of immigrants.

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[12] *Lov* om introduksjonsordning og norskopplæring for nyankomne innvandrere (introduksjonsloven). URL: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2003-07-04-80?q=introduksjonsloven/ (accessed 20.06.2017).

According to the Norwegian Bureau of Statistics (*SSB*), 3,294 immigrants resided in Nordland, 2,654 in Troms, and 1,471 in Finnmark in 2016.[13]

Situations when acculturation and assimilation do not reach their goals or do so only partially reveal the segregation of poorly integrated groups, as it happened in the above case of Asian diasporas in Norway.

Thus, Norway's 'hybrid' ethnopolitical model is an instance of a differentiated approach towards the indigenous people, national minorities and immigrants depending on the extent to which they are integrated into the receiving society. Relations with the indigenous population are regulated by law, whereas dealings with immigrants are technically governed by the policy of multiculturalism. Toughened by amendments to migration law, the policy of multiculturalism combines elements of acculturation and non-coercive assimilation. The choice between these elements depends on the experience of relations with the ethnic group and its openness, i. e. the ability to embrace cultural elements of the receiving society and its immigrant communities. A low probability of ethnic conflicts in North Norwegian society and the absence of open ethnic tensions prove that the adopted model contributes to the stabilisation of intra-ethnic relations.

Norwegian experience for Russia

The Scandinavian countries, including Norway, are Russia's closest partners in the Arctic. This is explained by similarities in the legal frameworks both belonging to the Romano-Germanic system.

However, the Russian and Norwegian systems are not identical. There are several reasons why Norwegian practices cannot be used in Russia in full:

– Norway is not a federation; the problem of distributing powers across the public administration system is solved much easier in a unitary state;

– in Norway, the territorial and population structure makes it possible to solve all the arising issues promptly;

– ultra-conservative parties with a strong anti-immigrant sentiment may be elected to the Parliament of Norway, which is impossible in Russia in either legal or political terms;

– there is only one indigenous nation in Norway (the Saami), whereas in Russia there are forty-seven indigenous minorities, seventeen of them living in the Arctic;

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[13] *Immigrants* and Norwegian-born to migrant parents // Statistiks sentralbyrå. URL: http:// www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef (accessed 20.06. 2017).

– Norway ratified the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which imposes international obligations on the country, whereas Russia never did it.

These five factors suggest that the Norwegian ‘hybrid' model cannot be adopted in Russia in full.

Actually, Russia’s ethnopolitical model for the Arctic region and the country in general is classified as integration-driven rather than hybrid. This is accounted for by the vertical system of public administration as regards ethnopolitics. In Russia, priority is given to the Federation (under the supervision of the president, according to Article 80 of the Constitution) rather than regions and municipalities. The ethnic factor does not play a significant role in public policy [16, pp. 125–142].

The following solutions can be theoretically adopted in Russia:

– the use of the influx of migrants in populating and developing the Arctic;

– extending the powers of municipalities in the most developed Arctic regions (Yamal, the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region, and Yakutia) to test effective immigrant acculturation techniques;

– preferential granting of permanent residence permits to migrants with the host country university degree;

– the ratification of the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

Conclusions

Ethnopolitics comprises public measures designed to regulate intraethnic relations by creating an institutional system within a selected model, the features of which affect conceptual and strategic normative and legal regulations.

In obliging states to recognise the collective and group rights, international law gives priority to the multicultural model without taking into account the regional (geographical) and other factors.

Multiculturalism is an ideal model, which has to be calibrated to fit the actual ethnocultural landscape. Otherwise, the states will face the voluntary segregation of immigrant communities and nationalism of both ethnic majority and minorities. Analysis of the current Norwegian ethnopolitical model betrays the ‘hybridisation’ of the multiculturalism model. Despite the high tolerance of Norwegian society, the country is drifting towards tougher migration policy. The migration crisis of 2015 and economic problems in a number of industries added political weight to voices raised against immigration. The need for greater integration follows from the growing dissatisfaction of the Norwegian ethnic majority with the practices leading to the emergence of poorly integrated migrant groups and the fear of Norwegian culture dissipating in diverse immigrant cultures.

In the national context, Northern Norway is a major receptor of migration influxes. Here, the migration policy is aimed at the social and economic development of this sparsely populated territory. In this region, ethnopolitics seeks to support the stability of intra-ethnic relations in view of the interests of the indigenous population, national minorities, and diverse immigrant groups differing in their desire to integrate.

In the North, the country pursues acculturation as the most painless method of immigrant adaptation. The particular focus is on education migration, which is a conduit for the country's soft power. The overall aim is 'cultural inoculation' and encouraging immigrants to develop behaviour patterns, values, and habits similar to those of the ethnic majority.

The tough position on family relations and child welfare is a consequence of the government-supported policy of the left parliamentary majority. The state is trying to prevent parents from instilling in their children the values that contradict the emerging ethnopolitical model. This translates into the exclusiveness of ethnic communities with their strong family traditions and religious, including rather archaic, ideas of education and morality.

Apparently, as a process of attaining cultural symbiosis, acculturation produces synthetic cultural forms. Therefore, it seems to be the best solution for securing intra-ethnic concordance.

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FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE BALTIC: THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY IN THE EU AREA OF IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM

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The 2015 migration crisis significantly affected the EU's area of freedom, security, and justice and challenged the cohesion and solidarity of the European Union. Although the crisis is past its peak, it is not over yet: problems and challenges associated with it persist. One of them is the lack of a common approach among member states to the implementation of the principle of solidarity in the EU area of immigration and asylum. This work aims to consider the legal and political aspects of the implementation of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the area of immigration and asylum. This study relies on the works of Russian and international experts in European integration and European law and on the analysis of EU regulations. There are two dimensions to the implementation of the principle of solidarity: the political and legal ones. The legal perspective provides certain clarity to the issue. According to the European Court of Justice, this principle is binding: it is capable of imposing the legal obligation of solidarity. However, as to the political perspective, member states have not been able to reach compromise. Although it is possible to introduce a permanent relocation mechanism using qualified majority voting, the Council usually seeks consensus. In this situation, the goal of the EU is not to ensure the right decision but rather to create conditions for it to be implemented by all the member states.

Keywords: migration crisis, principle of solidarity, refugee relocation system, migration policy, Dublin Regulation, refugees

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Introduction

Border management, including the area of immigration and asylum, is the key component of the EU area of freedom, security, and justice. The legal framework for this policy is Chapter 2, Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (further, the TFEU). In the international literature, this legal framework is often referred to as the EU Immigration and Asylum Law [1; 2].

According to Article 80 of the TFEU, the EU area of immigration and asylum and its implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States.

Solidarity is the founding principle of the EU immigration policy, the EU system of Justice, and European unity [3]. In other words, solidarity can be interpreted as the general principle of the EU law [4, p. 179]. At the same time, solidarity is considered a basic value of European integration [5, p. 213].

Over a long time, the principle of solidarity stood strong, and it was strictly adhered to by the Union and its member states.

However, in the early 2010s, the situation in the EU changed dramatically. The economic and migrant crises challenged European unity and its founding principles, including that of solidarity.

Obviously, Brexit came as the most painful blow to the EU. One of the central causes of the UK's withdrawal from the Union was the reluctance of Britons to share responsibility and show solidarity with the other EU countries in the face of the migrant crisis.

Equally painful to the EU is the violation of the principles of solidarity within the EU immigration and asylum policy. Although in the case of Brexit, the Union accepted the decision of the UK, it took a tough stance over the area of immigration and asylum and resorted to enforcing compliance.

This article addresses the implementation of the principles of solidarity, and fair sharing of responsibility among EU member states in the are of immigration and asylum.

Solidarity amid the migrant crisis

The 2015 migrant crisis came as a serious challenge to the immigration policy and the Common European Asylum System (further, the CEAS). In particular, strong challenges to the EU were the uneven distribution of asylum seekers among EU member states and the inability of some of the countries to ensure prompt and effective identification of such persons [6, p. 2]. The situation is often referred to as the *refugee* crisis [7, p. 19], which gives a new shade meaning to the term and emphasises the problems of the CEAS implementation rather than an increase in the number of undocumented immigrants [8, p. 1196]. In other words, this is a crisis of the CEAS.

In 2015, the EU received over 1.8 million undocumented immigrants, which is six times the 2014 level.[1] Most immigrants found themselves in the countries lying on the central Mediterranean and Western Balkan migration routes: Italy, Greece, and Hungary. However, these countries were not the destination most migrants had in mind. Having entered the EU, they continued their way to the states they considered more attractive: Germany and other countries of Western and Northern Europe [9, p. 230]. The Dublin Regulation[2] requires the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU to examine his or her asylum application and thus bear the cost of the reception.

This situation required an appropriate response from the Union and an active contribution from the member states located at a distance from the migrant routes.

This brought to the fore the question of enforcing compliance with the principle of solidarity (Article 80 of the TFEU). Although the provisions of Article 80 of the TFEU have direct legal consequence, this rule remains abstract, since it lacks a clear and well-grounded implementation mechanism [10, p. 1550].

Technically, such situations should be resolved by giving to asylum seekers temporary protection, the legal framework for which is Council Directive 2001/55/EC.[3] According to the Directive, temporary protection is a special procedure used in exceptional circumstances, i. e. cases of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries.

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[1] *Frontex* Annual Risk analysis. 2016-04-05. URL: http:/frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf (accessed 20.03.2019).

[2] *Regulation* (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. Official Journal L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31—59.

[3] *Council* Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Official Journal L 212, 7.8.2001, pp. 12—23.

However, during the 2015 crisis, this mechanism was never used. Temporary protection is given when the influx of displaced persons is caused by a concrete conflict, a circumstance that is temporary by definition. The mass arrival of immigrants in 2015 was a result of unstable situations across many states. Moreover, the prospects for political and economic stabilisation were unclear [11, p. 272]. Directive 2001/55/EC did not provide a mechanism for resolving the situation, in which Italy and Greece found themselves at the time: the system of temporary protection suggests that the asylum seeker is given protection in the member state of the first arrival. The distribution of asylum seekers across the EU within the procedure of temporary protection is carried out in the spirit of Community solidarity, i. e. on a voluntary basis.

During the 2015 migrant crisis, the decision was made to invoke the mechanism described in Article 78(3) of the TFEU. According to this provision, 'in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned'. However, this Article does not specify the measures that can be taken in such a situation.

On May 13, 2015, the European Commission issued the communication 'A European agenda on migration',[4] which called for the institutions of the Union and its member states to respond to the migrant crisis by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In particular, the Commission prepared proposals on the use of the mechanism for relocation, i. e. the redistribution of potential asylum seekers who have already arrived in the EU.

The relocation and redistribution of immigrants who have arrived in the EU to seek asylum is a form of solidarity. For the first time, a proposal to enshrine a relocation mechanism in law was made in the early 1990s. It was a response to the migrant crisis in the Balkans. However, the proposal was not supported by the Council [12, p. 76]. Relocation schemes were voluntarily accepted by member states during the migration crisis of 2011 [13, p. 318].

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[4] *Communication* from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions A European Agenda on Migration. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migrationen.pdf (accessed 19.03.2019).

In September 2015, the Council adopted two decisions, 2015/1523[5] and 2015/1601,[6] on the relocation of 40,000 and 120,000 migrants respectively, who arrived in Italy and Greece and required international protection. Both decisions were to be in effect for two years until September 2017. Relocation (Article 3) was limited to individuals holding nationalities for which the EU-wide recognition rate of asylum claims was at least 75% (Syria, Iraq, Eritrea). In other words, this measure was applied to persons who had a considerable chance of acquiring refugee status in the EU. The asylum application was to be considered by the state, where the asylum seeker would be relocated and where he or she would live and receive social safety net support. Thus, asylum seekers were to be evenly distributed among all the EU member states from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea.

Initially, the draft decision on the relocation of 120,000 asylum-seekers applied the mechanism in question to three countries: Italy, Greece, and Hungary.[7] However, Hungary refused to participate as either a receiving country or a beneficiary of the mechanism. Finally, the country was excluded from the scope of the mechanism and included in the list of receiving states.

These were ad hoc measures. However, in line with the European agenda on migration, it was decided to consider the creation of a permanent automatic relocation system.

Today, the migrant crisis is past its peak; the EU is not under a strong migration pressure. Nevertheless, the crisis is not yet over. Firstly, it severely aggravated all the conflicts rooted in the multinational and multidenominational nature of European society' [14, c. 14]. Secondly, it led to a rift between member states, primarily, as regards the implementation of the principle of solidarity [15, p. 63]. In other words, the migration crisis moved from the outer boundaries towards the inside of the EU.

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[5] *Council* Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, p. 146—156.

[6] *Council* Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 80—94.

[7] *Proposal* for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary. COM/2015/0451 final. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52015PC0451 (accessed 20.03. 2019).

The principle of solidarity in the EU area of immigration and asylum suggests support from non-affected states for those under migration pressure.

However, many EU countries located at its eastern borders both rejected a permanent automatic relocation system and refused to abide by Council decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 on the redistribution of asylum seekers. According to the Report from the European Commission,[8] Hungary and Poland have not received a single asylum-seeker within the relocation procedure, whereas the Czech Republic ceased to receive immigrants in May 2016. According to Steve Peers, the proposed system failed [16].

Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are members of the Visegrád Group, which also includes Slovakia. These states took a tough stance over the plans of the Commission to put the solidarity principle in the area of immigration and asylum into effect, which resulted in a series of court cases.

Judicial control over the implementation of the solidarity principle

In 2015, Slovakia and Hungary brought a challenge against Decision 2015/1601 to the European Court of Justice. Poland intervened in support of the two countries. The Council was represented by Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and France. In effect, this court case revealed differences in the understanding of the solidarity principle by EU member states [17]. The claims of Slovakia (case C-643/15) and Hungary (case C-647/15) were joined. The final decision in the cases was reached on September 6, 2017.[9]

[8] *Report* from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement. Brussels, 6.9.2017 COM (2017) 465 final. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170906_fifteenth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf (accessed 22.03.2019).

[9] *Joined* Cases C 643/15 and C 647/15, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2017. Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union. Actions for annulment — Decision (EU) 2015/1601. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri= CELEX:62015CJ0643 (accessed 20.03.2019).

Only one of the two decisions on relocation was contested: the one adopted on September 22, 2015. The first decision of September 14, 2015, which was agreed by consensus, was not contested. The claimants, the Czech Republic, and Romania voted against Council Decision 2015/1601 of September 22, 2015.

Slovakia supported its claim with six and Hungary with ten pleas. All of them can be divided into three groups. Firstly, according to the claimants, Article 78(3) of the TFEU lacks a legal basis for the contested decision. Secondly, the claimants alleged a breach of procedural requirements. Thirdly, they entered substantial pleas.

The court rejected all the arguments of the claimants and dismissed all the claims.

Particularly, the Court ruled that the provisional measure could have been adopted in a non-legislative procedure and had to be regarded as a non-legislative act (point 66). The Court emphasised that the contested decision did entail derogations from the Dublin Regulation, which has greater legal force than Council Decisions do. However, these circumstances do not involve a breach of the Union law, since such derogations are of temporary and exclusive nature (points 79, 82).

The Court rejected all the arguments relating to procedural breaches. In particular, the Court dismissed as unfounded the claim that the contested decision had to be adopted by unanimous vote. According to the Court, Article 78(3) TFEU allows the Council to use a qualified majority procedure (point 148). Moreover, the Court did not find either a breach in the procedure in relation to consultations with the European Parliament (points 166, 167) or violations of the rights of national parliaments (point 193).

The substantial pleas concerned the principles of proportionality and legal certainty. In particular, the claimants stressed that there was no actual need for the adoption of a decision impinging on national sovereignties. Moreover, they questioned the efficiency of the measures given the actual number of asylum-seekers. As to the latter argument, the Court emphasised that the legality of an EU act could not depend on retrospective assessments of its efficacy (point 221). The Court acknowledged that the decision corresponded to the proportionality principle and that the Council was fully entitled to take the view that the distribution of the persons to be relocated had to be mandatory (point 246). The Court ruled that, when adopting the contested decision, the Council had given effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility (points 252, 253). The Court clarified the central idea of the principle of solidarity in the EU area of immigration and asylum. Solidarity, according to the

Court, means that, if one member state faces an emergency, the burdens entailed by the provisional measures for the benefit of that member states must be divided between all the other member states (point 291).

The Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 is of immense significance since the Court both reaffirmed the mandatory nature of the principle of solidarity and emphasised the possibility of enforcing compliance. In other words, the Court confirmed the legal obligation of solidarity among member states in the EU area of immigration and asylum [18]. The Court rejected the idea about the voluntary nature of the principle of solidarity among member states. Moreover, based on a systemic analysis of the provision of Article 80 of the TFEU and Article 78(3) of the TFEU, the Court acknowledged the right of the Council to determine how the principle of solidarity should be implemented into concrete measures in the area of immigration and asylum.

The above court judgment is the very first step towards enforcing compliance with the solidarity principle.

According to Article 258 of the TFEU, if a member state does not comply with its obligations, the Commission may bring the matter before the European Court of Justice. If the state in question fails to comply with the judgment of the Court, the Commission may once again bring the case before the Court. If the Court finds that the member state has not complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it (Article 260 of the TFEU).

Following the procedure described above, the Commission brought an action before the European Court of Justice regarding the failure of Poland,[10] Hungary,[11] and the Czech Republic[12] to comply with Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 on the relocation of asylum seekers. Given the Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, one might suspect that the Court will satisfy the claim of the Commission. However, the objective of the Commission is not to impose a penalty on the member states but to ensure that these countries comply with the Union law [19, p. 10]. In this situation, the recognition by the Court of the failure of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to comply with the Council Decision is very unlikely to change the position of these states regarding the matter in question.

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[10] *Case* C-715/17: Action brought on 21 December 2017 — European Commission v Republic of Poland. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 18—18.
[11] *Case* C-718/17: Action brought on 22 December 2017 — European Commission v Hungary. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 19—19.
[12] *Case* C-719/17: Action brought on 22 December 2017 — European Commission v Czech Republic. OJ C 112, 26.3.2018, pp. 19—20.

The Dublin Regulation reform

The discussion about the implementation of the solidarity principle in the EU area of immigration and asylum was taking place not only in court but also in the political arena.

In May 2016, the Commission prepared a new version of the Dublin Regulation,[13] which proposed a permanent corrective allocation mechanism. As mentioned above, by default, the Dublin Regulation imposes responsibility for examining asylum application on the country of the first entry. However, this seems to be at odds with the solidarity principle enshrined in Article 80 of the TFEU [20, p. 454], since, in this case, front-line countries find themselves in an inferior position to the countries that do not have either land or sea borders.

The corrective allocation mechanism is to be invoked if a significant and disproportional increase in the number of asylum applications is observed in a single EU member state. In this case, EU-based immigrants entitled to international protection should be relocated from one member state to other member states according to the quotas. The hierarchy of the Dublin criteria remains intact [21, p. 158]. This mechanism can be considered a means to preserve the EU's legal framework [22, p. 26].

However, this proposal was not supported by the Visegrád Group. The objections of its members repeated word for word their arguments in the case against Council Decision 2015/1601. Particularly, they stressed, the form of solidarity should not be imposed by the Union but rather determined by each state with its available resources taken into account. Thus, discussions on the Dublin Regulation sparked the conflict between southern member states and the Visergrád Group: the former demanded solidarity among all the EU member states and the latter strongly opposed the idea [23, p. 66].

Before the Court judgment in joint cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 was taken, the governments of the Visegrád Group issued a communication emphasising that migration policy should rely on flexible solidarity,

[13] *Proposal* for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Mem-ber State responsible for examining an application for international protec-tion lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person COM/2016/0270 final/2—2016/0133 (COD). URL: https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0270 (accessed 21.03.2019).

which would enable member states to decide on specific forms of assistance to member states under disproportionate migration pressure in view of their own experience and potential.[14] The central idea behind this proposal was that immigrant relocation should be voluntary. Moreover, states themselves should determine the form of solidarity: some states may receive immigrants, and some provide financial or expert support instead [24, p. 7]. However, this vision of solidarity was shared neither by the Commission nor by the other member states [25, p. 46].

In April 2018, during Bulgaria's presidency of the Council, an alternative to the corrective allocation mechanism was proposed in order to respond to disproportionate increases in the number of asylum applications submitted in a single EU member state.[15] The new mechanism suggested a three-tier system for managing crises. Each tier was associated with a set of tools, including the redistribution (relocation) of asylum seekers. However, this proposal was also rejected by member states.

Thus, despite a clear position of the Court regarding the obligation of solidarity and the possibility of enforcing compliance, the Union could not reach a political decision on a permanent relocation mechanism.

Note that the legal acts in the area of asylum shall be adopted by ordinary legislative procedure with qualified majority in the Council. The current system of distribution of voting power prevents the Visegrád Group from vetoing Council decisions. However, the Council urgently needs consensus, since, otherwise, the very possibility of implementing the regulation will be sabotaged [26, p. 33]. A decision on the distribution of asylum seekers among member states can be adopted. However, it is very difficult to put it into practice against the will of member states: solidarity is hard to impose [27, p. 399].

As of March 2019, the reform of the Dublin Regulation and the CEAS was at a standstill, and its prospects were unclear. Solidarity became a serious obstacle to the reform of the Dublin system [28, p. 8].

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[14] *Joint* Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries. 16.09.2016. URL: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-the-160919 (accessed 20.03.2019).

[15] *EU* Council, Presidency Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) — New Dublin: Reversing the Dynamics, Document 7674/18 of 9.4.2018. URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/ apr/eu-council-dublin-state-of-play-7674-18.pdf (accessed 20.03.2019).

Probably, a new Dublin system will require an enhanced cooperation mechanism, the use of which will testify to a serious crisis of solidarity and trust among member states.

In effect, the states of the Viesgrád group were unwilling to sacrifice their interest in the resolution of the migrant crisis. As Sandra Lavenex stresses, during the 2015/2016 migration crisis, opinion polls showed that most respondents approved of stronger support for refugees, yet not in their own country [8, p. 1201]. This attitude towards asylum seekers is typical of residents of many EU countries. However, at the governmental level, this position is supported by the Visegrád states only. According to Philomena Murray and Michael Longo, this response is unprecedented ‘in its breadth and depth, given that it constitutes not only contestation but direct opposition to the EU’s authority and legal framework’ [29, p. 4].

The unwillingness of the Visegrád Group to express solidarity in the relocation of asylum seekers has many reasons, economic considerations being less important ones. Apparently, each country of the Visegrád Group has its reason to avoid receiving asylum seekers from the other EU countries. Their common cause is mere opposition to the solidarity imposed by the Union.

A mono-ethnic country, Poland is apprehensive of Muslim immigrants undermining its established national and cultural traditions. Poland keeps stressing that it has received over one million Ukrainians, who, in effect, are economic immigrants rather than asylum seekers. Of course, it would be naïve to believe that five thousand Muslim immigrants coming to Poland within the relocation mechanism will be able to threaten Polish culture and language. Nevertheless, the Polish authorities are avoiding any potential harm, no matter how minor it may seem. This draws attention to one of the arguments of Poland in joint case C-643/15 and C-647/15: relocation of immigrants into an ethnically homogenous state translates into a considerable cost of adaptation of immigrants with a different cultural and linguistic background. The Court rejected this argument due to procedural reasons and emphasised that it was impossible to take into account the cultural and linguistic background of asylum-seekers when relocating them (point 304). Moreover, the Court stressed that making relocation decisions based on the ethnicity of asylum-seekers contradicted the Union law, in particular, Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (point 305).

Although one might sympathise with the position of the Polish authorities trying to protect their culture and keep immigrants away from the Baltic Sea coast, this position is very much at odds with the EU values. Moreover, it contradicts the founding principle of the Union, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination.

The countries of the Visegrád Group acceded to the EU of their own will, having assumed all the rights and obligations associated with such membership. Obviously, in 2004, the EU was a successful integration association, free of crises or any other problems. Few could have expected back then that, in ten years, the Union would face a serious challenge demanding an active contribution from all the member states, including the newly acceded ones.

Conclusion

In the EU area of immigration and asylum, the principle of solidarity is both a common value and a legal obligation enshrined in the TFEU and reaffirmed by Court. Solidarity is inseparable from responsibility [30]. Thus, primary law contains the necessary legal basis for the implementation of the principle of solidarity.

However, the problem of implementation of the principle of solidarity in the EU area of immigration and asylum is not yet resolved. Despite the clear position of the Court, the European Union will have to search for a political decision that would satisfy all the countries concerned. This decision will affect both the resolution of the migrant crisis and the prospects of the entire European integration project.

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MIGRATION IN THE KALININGRAD REGION REFLECTED IN THE 1989—2015 CENSUSES AND MICROCENSUSES

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V. S. Sazin[2]

The Kaliningrad region stands out for its history and geographical location. In the post-war period, the region was completely repopulated. People from many parts of Russia and other republics of the former USSR were recruited to develop the new territory. Although demographic processes and migration in the Kaliningrad region have been studied in detail, we believe that census and micro-census data can significantly advance the current knowledge of this unique region. This holds true for the data relating to the results of pre-survey migration. This approach differs markedly from traditional migration studies in Russia, which rely on migration flow data, in both data sources and migration criteria employed. Our study uses the place of birth data from the 1989, 2002, and 2010 censuses and the 1994 and 2015 microcensuses. We conclude that the proportions of residents born locally and in post-Soviet Asian countries have been increasing in recent decades. At the same time, the contribution of the natives of Belarus and Ukraine to the region's population is rapidly declining, largely due to the change of generations having a different migration history.

Keywords: migration flows, migrant stock, migration, census, microcensus, repatriation programme

Introduction

In the postwar period, the Kaliningrad region was settled by Soviet citizens from other parts of the Soviet Union. The process of settling the Kaliningrad region has been the subject of research since the 1960s [1]. In these works, the economic aspects of the region's development are given more importance than the demographic ones [2; 3]. Basic data on the scale of relocations were contained in classified and unpublished sources of in-

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formation. This was the main problem of obtaining information for analysis. Y. Kostyashov systematized archival sources and conducted a complete study on the database, after data and information on the scale of resettlement had been declassified [4]. Other authors — G. Fedorov, Yu. Zverev and V. Korneevets also published works on the peculiarities of the region [5].

In the post-Soviet period, the scientific work on migration processes in the Kaliningrad region can be divided into two groups. In the first group, on the basis of statistical sources, the population size is analyzed, and its dynamics is projected [6] and migration processes in the region are considered [7]. In the second group, qualitative research methods are used, the society of the region and its features are studied [8; 9]. The migration intentions of the residents of the region to move to other regions and countries are also analyzed [10]. Studies are carried out to determine their trajectories through qualitative and quantitative methods, the relations of the host society to immigrants are also considered [11].

The Prussian Statistical Office conducted the first full-scale Population Census in 1816. It showed that the total population of East Prussia was approximately 860 thousand people, and in the second census of 1871, there lived 1.8 million people. In 1919, after the First World War, the population was 2.2 million people in East Prussia, and by the beginning of the Second World War, there were approximately 2.49 million people [12]. At that time, 1.3 million people lived on the territory of the Kaliningrad region within its present borders. Until the end of the 1940s, the German-speaking population that remained after the war was deported to Germany almost entirely.

The first document determining the order of mass resettlement of families of Soviet citizens to new Soviet territories was the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1522 of July 9, 1946. Resettlement to the Kaliningrad region was supposed to be voluntary, using the mechanisms of the state resettlement programme. Since the 1950s, the population of the region has been characterized by constant growth, which was caused by positive values of migration and natural growth. In 1950, the population of the Kaliningrad region was about 400 thousand people. According to the census of 1959, the population was more than 600 thousand people. The 1989 census showed a twofold increase in population. Nevertheless, the population of the region is still less than that before the Second World War.

Not all settlers moving to the area remained to live there in a new place. In the Russian-language literature, the process of the immigrants not taking root in the new territory was named “obratnichestvo” (Back-Resettling) [13]. The share of people who left the territory of the Kaliningrad region was about 38 % of the total number of incoming migrants.

A large number of military units of the Soviet army in the region influenced the nature of migration and spelled the increase in the male population aged 18—55 years. This property of the formation of the population of the region by sex and age is preserved even now.

The Kaliningrad region is a unique, but well-studied territory in terms of migration. Domestic researchers pay insufficient attention to population censuses, which are sources of information on migratory contingents. Usually, Russian researchers use current data on migration flows from publicly available sources. Data on migration contingents helps clearly determine how many migrants (interregional and international) live in the territory at the time of the census. Also, with a certain degree of error, this makes it possible to get data of microcensus (this type of survey is limited to a sample of the population, usually large in size). Data on migration flows does not allow this. In this regard, the results of migration processes that emerged at the time of the censuses are identified, and it is estimated how people from other regions and countries contribute to the formation of the region's population.

Summarizing, an attempt was made to determine the results of applying two approaches to the study of migration: the first with the help of information about flows and the second approach about migration contingents in the Kaliningrad region. Studying the indicators of international migration and the results of the programme of resettlement of compatriots is an important task of determining the characteristics of the region. The selected approach allows determining the ratio of local and non-native natives who came from other regions of the Russian Federation and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and abroad. In this paper, it was studied for the period of 1989—2015 year.

Methods and materials

The main sources of statistical information on migration in Russia are population censuses, microcensuses, and current statistical accounting and statistics provided by government agencies. Each of these sources has its own characteristics and limitations, both in terms of completeness of coverage, and in the very criteria for the identification of migrants and migration flows [14]. In this work, we used the current statistical accounting of migration[1], and departmental sources from government agencies. Also, census and microcensus data for the years 1989—2015 were used, including unpublished materials of the 1989 census, microcensuses of 1994, as well as the databases of the 2002 and 2010 censuses and the microcensus 2015[2].

In the periods between censuses, current statistical accounting is the main source of migration information. It allows to receive operational information about migration flows since events are recorded immediately

[1] *United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia*. URL: https://fedstat.ru/ (accessed 15 June 2019).

[2] *Database* of censuses of the population of Russia 2002 and 2010. URL: http://vpnmicrodata.gks.ru/webapi/opendatabase?id=VPN2002_2010L (accessed 15 January 2019); *Database* of censuses of the population of Russia 2015. URL: http://vpnmicrodata.gks.ru/webapi/jsf/tableView/tableView.xhtml (accessed 15 January 2019).

by government agencies. It takes into account only registered migrants who have arrived for permanent residence (a person with such status is known as a permanent resident). It is possible that many migrants who live without registration at the place of residence are not considered. Also, the problem is that during this period the same person can register several times, because of this, the rates of migration flows increase.

The magnitude of migration flows is also affected by changes in the criteria and parameters of accounting for migration. In 2011, for example, the method of registering migrants was changed. After receiving the results of the population census, the error in the difference in accounting for migrants is calculated through changes in annual migration flows, while the natural movement of the population (mortality and fertility) remains according to the registration data, because the natural movement of the population is considered more accurately than the mechanical movement of the population [15].

Statistics provided by the government is usually used to study certain categories of migrants, and they are carried out by such agencies as the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Federal Migration Service (the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs), etc. For example, data on participants in the Programme of Resettlement of Compatriots to the Russian Federation refers to this type of statistics.

In difference from the sources listed, population census data relate to a specific point in time. This is a kind of "snapshot", which is the result of past demographic events lasting for a long time before the census. Russian researchers did not sufficiently use information from the population census to estimate migration processes. There were no questions about migration in the census questionnaire of 1937, 1939 and 1959, but they were in 1897 and 1926. In the 1970 and 1979 censuses, there was no question about the place of birth, which was very important.

In the post-1989 censuses, the question of the place of birth was included in the questionnaire. Also, this question appeared in the microcensuses of the population of 1994 and 2015. Based on this information, it is possible to determine the composition of the population by the place of birth of residents of each region of Russia at the moment of the census. Migration, identified on the basis of the discrepancy between the place of birth and place of residence, is called lifetime migration because it is impossible to establish the time when a move took place throughout life. Migrant flows data accounts for the number of migrants entering or leaving during a specified time period. Population census allows one to get information about the data on migrant stocks [16].

Indicators characterizing the aggregate of migrants as an object of statistical research are thus data on migrant contingents and on migration flows. At the same time, the figures on contingents take into account the movements of people who were not registered, and this method also allows you to avoid the mistake of re-recording the same person. Thus, the positive aspects of this approach constitute a more accurate assessment and do not affect changes in the methodology of current statistical accounting.

The long intervals between censuses are a disadvantage. Typically, censuses are conducted every 10 years. Microcensuses are conducted between censuses.

The study of population migration using data from population censuses is common in international research, less so in Russia [17].

Results

The population in 2015 exceeded the figures for 1989 only in three regions of the Northwestern Federal District of Russia. These are the Kaliningrad region, the Leningrad region and the city of St. Petersburg (Fig. 1). These regions have a positive balance of migration growth during the study period since these regions are most attractive to migrants. From 1989 to 2015, the population of the Kaliningrad region increased by 11 %. It is important to look at which components of the population grew, but also what are the structural changes during this period.



Fig. 1. The change in the population of the regions of the Northwestern Federal District of Russia in relation to 1989 (%)

Source: United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia, The Demographic Yearbook of Russia.

From 1997 to 2007 there was a negative rate of natural increase (RNI) in the Kaliningrad region, which was partially offset by migration growth (Fig. 2). Since 2007, there has been a decrease in the difference between mortality and fertility in the region, which, with a migration increase, has led to an overall increase in the population.



Fig. 2. The components of population growth for the period 1989—2016, the Kaliningrad region, (thousands)

* TPC — Total Population Change

Source: United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia, the Demographic Yearbook of Russia.

The method of accounting for migrants changed in 2011. The number of migrants by place of residence now included persons registered for a period of 9 months or more. These migrants could be temporary. From that point on, an increase in migration rates was recorded for this reason. The composition of such migrants, for example, included foreign students, whose registration at the place of their stay is possible for one calendar year. Thus, the increase in the number of arrivals and migrants deregistered is associated with a change in methodology, since now in the number of migrants de-registered also includes migrants whose tenure has ended. Since 2011 in Russia, the proportion of such persons has averaged about half of the number of persons registered at the place of residence. For the Kaliningrad region, these changes in the method of statistical accounting of migrants were very significant. In 2010, the net migration was equal to 3.3 thousand people, then in 2011 it was twice as large and amounted to 6.4 thousand people, and by 2014 it reached 10 thousand people.

Consider the migration components of the Kaliningrad region by countries of exchange (Fig. 3). Mainly, those who arrived in the Kaliningrad region were residents of neighbouring countries (The Commonwealth of Independent States) and inhabitants of other regions of Russia [18]. At the same time, the outflow of the population for a long time occurred in the far-abroad countries from the Kaliningrad region.



Fig. 3. The migration components of the Kaliningrad region by countries of exchange, (thousands)

Source: United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia, he Federal State Statistics Service in the Kaliningrad region.

The net migration indicator of the Kaliningrad region has three pronounced periods. In the 1990s there were high rates, which decreased from 1999 to 2010. Since 2011, this indicator increased again. The reason for the decline from 1999 to 2010 remains unknown, as the reduction may have been associated with changes in accounting methods [19].

A special feature for the Kaliningrad region is high net migration for international migration per 1000 inhabitants of the region. This feature is especially visible in comparison with other regions of the Northwestern Federal District of Russia (Fig. 4). In 2012—2015, a sharp increase was observed in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region with a further decline in migration rates, perhaps these were statistical errors. In this case, perhaps the true values are close to the average annual indicators.

Migration of the population not only allows solving the problem of labor shortage but also demographic problems. For this reason, a special programme is operating in Russia — The Programme of Resettlement of Compatriots to the Russian Federation. This Programme was adopted by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated June 28, 2008 No. 637 and involves the resettlement of foreign citizens who belong to the category of compatriots to a permanent place of residence in a specific subject of the Russian Federation [20]. According to the programme, participants received basic rights of residents of the Russian Federation in terms of medical care, employment, benefits for temporary disability.



Fig. 4. The international net migration per 1,000 inhabitants, ‰, 1993—2016

Source: United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia.

The Kaliningrad region is the territory where this programme has been operating since the very beginning in 2007. Under this programme, it was planned to resettle 300,000 compatriots from other countries to the Kaliningrad region in the period 2007—2012. However, the plan was completed by less than 5 %. Even with low rates of implementation of the plan, the region has become one of the leaders in attracting compatriots in the Northwestern Federal District of Russia regions and throughout the country as a whole (Table 1).

Table 1

The number of participants of the Programme of Resettlement of Compatriots to the Russian Federation by regions of the Russian Federation in 2007—2016, people

Region	2007—2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Kaluga Region	9814	4462	10 168	12 543	12 530	49 517
Lipetsk Region	10 814	3322	5416	11 820	9786	41 158
Voronezh Region	2118	2692	5666	13 751	15 877	40 104
Kaliningrad Region	13 302	3246	5381	5213	4368	31 510
Tula Region	243	833	7662	12 030	9684	30 452
Russian Federation	57 990	34 697	106 319	183 146	142 935	525 087

Source: data received on request from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service.

The goals and objectives of this programme were initially determined at the federal level. Since 2013, its goals and objectives have been determined by regions. Each region participating in the programme develops its own subroutines. In the Kaliningrad region, there is the Programme of the Resettlement of Compatriots to the Kaliningrad region[3]. In 2012, the number of participants in the programme decreased sharply (Fig. 5). This is due to the fact that the federal programme operated for six months.



Fig. 5. The Programme of Resettlement of Compatriots to the Russian Federation (2005—2016), thousand people

Source: United Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System of Russia. Data received on request from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service.

Given the experience of the implementation of the federal level programme, the regional programme has lower targets. According to the new plan, the region was to attract about 4,000 participants a year. This plan is quite feasible, given the statistics of past years. Since 2008, the main part of the arriving international migrants are participants in the resettlement programme in the Kaliningrad region.

Most of the residents of the Kaliningrad region were those born in mainland Russia, according to the 1989—2010 censuses and the microcensuses of 1994 and 2015. The ratio of the number of those born in the Kaliningrad region and those who came from other regions of Russia varied greatly over time. In 1989, residents who were born in the Kalinin-

[3] Subprogramme "The programme of compatriots to the Kaliningrad region", for 2018—2020".

grad region accounted for about 40 % of the population of the region (359.2 thousand people), in 2002—48.2 % (460.1 thousand people), and by 2010 they were more than 50 % (478.7 thousand people) (Fig. 6). According to the census in 2010, there was an abnormal increase in the number of people who did not indicate the place of birth. In order to be able to compare the data of the 1989 census and other censuses, the proportion of persons who did not indicate the place of birth was merged with a group of persons who indicated the birthplace of foreign countries. According to 1989 census, there were 12.8 thousands of such people, in 2002—17.6 thousand, and in 2010 — 46.4 thousand people (38.2 thousand of them arrived from unspecified territories).



Fig. 6. Structure of the population of the Kaliningrad region by place of birth, %, (data — thousands of people)

* Western republics of the former USSR: Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova;
** Eastern republics of the former USSR: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia (together with the autonomies), Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan

Source: based on the results of the census in Russia.

The proportion of those born in the region annually increases (Fig. 7). The reason is that the first inhabitants born in the region were born only after 1945. In the 1973 generation, according to the 1994 microcensus, those born in the Kaliningrad Region were 73 % of the region’s population, 82 % in the 1983 generation, and 97 % in the 1993 generation.



Fig. 7. The share of persons born in the Kaliningrad region among the inhabitants of the region, by year of birth (in 1994),%

Source: based on the results of the microcensus of 1994 year in Russia.

In Russia as a whole, the data obtained during the micro-census of the population in 2015 is representative[4], but in the Kaliningrad region a sample shift was possible. According to the results of this micro-census of the population in the region, there was an increase in the proportion of people born in the region from 50.8 to 60.4 % (Fig. 6). The microcensus of the population in 2015 was conducted on a sample of 1.5 % of the country's total population, and the 1994 microcensus covered 5 % of Russians.

In shaping the population structure of the Kaliningrad region, people from the central part of Russia have a greater role than those from the neighbouring Northwestern Federal District of Russia. In 1989, almost 20 % of the residents of the Kaliningrad region came from the regions whose territory now belongs to the Central Federal District of the Russian Federation, primarily from the Smolensk region, the Bryansk region and the Nizhny Novgorod region. Information on the number of those born in other regions of the Russian Federation, but permanently residing in the Kaliningrad region, and those born in the Kaliningrad region but permanently residing in other regions of the Russian Federation is shown in Table 2.

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[4] *Methodological* explanations of the microcensuses of 2015. URL: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/micro-perepis/finish/metod2.html (accessed 15 June 2019).

Table 2

Interregional migration of the Kaliningrad region in 2010 (thousands of people)

Region	Arrived	Region	Left the territory
Smolensk region	9,942	Moscow	15,153
Bryansk region	9,572	Moscow region	11,316
Moscow region	6,213	St. Petersburg	9,989
Nizhny Novgorod Region	6,151	Krasnodar region	5,160
Krasnodar region	5,648	Leningrad region	3,855
Kirov region	5,186	Rostov region	3,181
Pskov region	5,064	Samara Region	2,771
Voronezh region	4,879	Murmansk region	2,749
Primorsky Krai	4,848	Tyumen region	2,673
Altai region	4,742	Nizhny Novgorod Region	2,615
Tambov Region	4,680	Sverdlovsk region	2,471
Leningrad region	4,657	Smolensk region	2,420
Tver region	4,495	Volgograd region	2,244
Sverdlovsk region	4,320	Voronezh region	2,058
Rostov region	4,220	Pskov region	1,842
Other regions	136, 636	Other regions	52, 614

Source: based on the results of the census in Russia (2010).

Moscow, Moscow Region and St. Petersburg are the most attractive for resettlement from the Kaliningrad region. Regions of southern Russia also attract migrants from the Kaliningrad region. Approximately twice as many people arrived in the region, but they were born outside it, compared to the number of those who left the region (221,2 thousand and 123,1 thousand people respectively).

In 1989, almost every seventh resident of the Kaliningrad region was born in the Belorussian SSR or the Ukrainian SSR. In 2010, the number of Belorussian- or Ukranian-born residents halved, while there was a large increase in the number of those born in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (Fig. 8). The total number Kaliningrad residents born in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was only 2.6% of the total population of the region in 1989. According to the latest data, their share fell to 1.6—1.8%. The share of immigrants from non-CIS countries, with the exception of Germany, Poland and Hungary (for the most part immigrants from military families, stationed in these countries [21]), is insignificant.

The reason for the decline in the proportion of people who were born in Belarus and Ukraine in the population of the Kaliningrad region is the age structure of the population with a large number of people of older age. Another reason is people moving to other regions of the Russian Federation and other countries, including countries of birth [22]. Figures No. 9 and No. 10 show a comparison of the age structure of people who were born in Belarus and Kazakhstan, but who lived in the Kaliningrad region at the time of the 1994 and 2015 microcensuses.



Fig. 8. Distribution of foreign-born
in the population of the Kaliningrad region,%

* Georgia including territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Source: based on the results of the census and microcensus in Russia.



Fig. 9. Comparison of the age structure of people who were born
in Belarus and Kazakhstan, but who lived in the Kaliningrad region
at the time of the 1994 microcensuses,%

Source: based on the results of the microcensus 1994 in Russia.



Fig. 10. Comparison of the age structure of people who were born in Belarus and Kazakhstan, but who lived in the Kaliningrad region at the time of the 2015 microcensuses,%

Source: based on the results of the microcensus 2015 in Russia.

People from the Belorussian SSR were among the first to migrate to the Kaliningrad region after its accession to the USSR. Their share for the generations of 1920—1940 in the entire population was about 20% according to the 1994 microcensus data. Since then, the number of arrivals from the territory of Belarus has decreased. In 1994, the peak in the age structure of the Kaliningrad region was in the group of 55—59 years. Among those who moved from Kazakhstan to the Kaliningrad region, this peak was in the group of 30—34 years, this indicates a younger age structure. This situation was preserved in 2015, the age profile of those who moved from Belarus shifted to older ages, and those who moved from Kazakhstan had a relatively uniform age profile.

The ethnic composition of the population can be considered conditionally as an indicator of migration processes. According to the results of the population censuses of 1959—1989, 78% of the population of the region were ethnic Russians, 78.1% in 2002, and 86.4% in 2010. After the end of the USSR period, the majority (65.6%, or 75 thousand people) of those who moved to the Kaliningrad region of people who were born in other countries were ethnic Russians. This is above average for Russia, where 57% of the population identify as ethnic Russians (or 3 million 233 thousand people). From 2007 to 2010 (since the beginning of the Programme of Resettlement of Compatriots to the Russian Federation until the last census), ethnic Russians made up 61.7% of all those who moved to the region.

Ethnic Russians and nationalities who traditionally live in Russia, who were born outside Russia and arrived after 1991, should be considered 'repatriates' rather than 'international migrants' [23]. The predominance of ethnic Russians in migration flows from the former Soviet republics was known on the basis of current statistics from the beginning of the 2000s. But since 2008, comparable information has not been collected, and population censuses data on the ethnic composition of migrants have become unique.

From 1989 to 2010, there was a decline in ethnic Belorussians among residents of the Kaliningrad region (from 8.5% to 3.6% of the region's population) from 73.9 thousand to 32.5 thousand people. Ethnic Ukrainians have also recorded a large decline (from 7.2% to 3.7% of the oblast population) from 62.8 thousand to 32.8 thousand people. Perhaps the reason is not only in the migration process. The reason may be the natural population decline of the older ages in these groups. Another reason is the change of ethnic identity, especially in ethnically mixed families. It was recorded for other regions of Russia [24—26], but the criterion of the place of birth is unchanged throughout life.

In the post-Soviet period, the number of the following ethnicities living in the region has increased: ethnic Armenians (from 1.6 thousand to 9.2 thousand), Germans (from 1.3 thousand to 7.3 thousand people), Azerbaijanis (from 1.9 thousand to 3.3 thousand people) and Uzbeks (from 0.5 to 2.2 thousand people).

Discussion

The census results can be used to analyse migration processes. Migrant stocks in the country and regions can be analyzed based on the results of population censuses. Most of those born in foreign countries, but who have moved to Russia, have Russian citizenship. As a rule, these persons received citizenship according to the special order. There is a simplified procedure in Russia for the naturalization of former Soviet citizens living in the territory of the Russian Federation [27]. Thus, the study of migration based on the criterion of citizenship is not effective. The question to respondents about previous place of residence in population censuses is an effective tool for analyzing migration processes. This question is successfully applied, for example, in India [28], but it was not provided for in the census programme in Russia. The study of international and internal migrations for permanent residence using the question of place of birth is the most widely used method worldwide [29; 30], but at present it is little used by Russian researchers.

The analysis of the results of censuses and microcensuses of the population of 1989—2015 (according to data on the place of birth) showed an increase in the role of those born in the region in the formation of the population of the Kaliningrad region. The analysis also showed a weakening of migration links with other territories (with the exception of Kazakhstan, Central Asian countries and the Caucasus). The reason for this is the decrease in the number of people who migrated to the territory of the former Königsberg region, who were born outside this region.

A large flow of migrants from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia was registered before the start of the program of resettlement of compatriots to the Russian Federation. The proportion of those born in Belarus and Ukraine who moved to the region is decreasing in the population of the Kaliningrad region, since they are characterized by an age structure that is biased towards older ages. In the event of an aggravation of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, a short-term surge in the number of migrants from Ukraine to the Kaliningrad region is possible.

Gradually, the share of generations born in other regions and countries decreases (new resettlements, as a rule, are more easily transferred when there is already migration experience). On the other hand, the special territorial position (the region is an exclave, so residents may only move visa-free to the rest of Russia via sea or air) and the increasing role of those born in the region in the population structure can cause a transformation of regional identity, its strengthening, the emergence of a sense of isolation from the rest of the country.

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ECONOMY

SCENARIOS OF INCREASING THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF THE KALININGRAD REGIONAL TRANSPORT SYSTEM

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The development of the considerable transport and logistics potential of the Kaliningrad region is hampered by several factors. This problem, to which we will refer to as a transport deadlock effect, translates into the limited contribution of transport to the regional economy. Particularly, it manifests itself at the level of regional gross value added, where the contribution of transport is much smaller than one might expect given the significant role the industry plays in the economy of the region. In this study, we examine major ways of increasing the economic efficiency of the regional transport system from the value added perspective. We posit that the structure of cargo handled and the redistribution of value added in favour of regional actors have the dominant influence on economic efficiency. Using our own simulation model and the earlier developed system of transport tariffs and value added calculation for the Kaliningrad region, we produce scenarios and consider changes in value added in the case of selected cargoes carrying intermediate, investment, and consumer goods (as defined in the International Classification for Broad Economic Categories ICT BEC-4). Our calculations show that higher value added and greater economic efficiency of a regional transport system are associated with re-orientation towards investment and consumer goods. The most visible effect is associated with rail and road transport. As to sea transport, the decisive role is played by an increase in the physical volume of cargo handled. The results of this study and its modelling tools can be applied in the

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analysis of the current situation and in the assessment of the efficiency of transport systems in other regions. Another possible application is the identification of growth conditions for an industry, particularly, when developing projects and proposals for increasing the efficiency of transport services.

Keywords: transport system, regional economy, Kaliningrad region, value added, simulation modelling

Introduction

The economic and geographical location of some Russian regions has led to transport becoming an essential element of their economies. The Kaliningrad region falls into this category. John Friedmann's theoretical typology [1] classifies these territories as 'development corridors'. These regions handle the major international trade flows of their mother countries and ensure effective cooperation with neighbouring counties and macroregional economic associations. The Russian territories traditionally classified as 'development corridors' are the Primorsky and Khabarovsk regions (access to China and Asia Pacific), the Rostov and Krasnodar regions (Turkey and the other Black Sea states), the Leningrad region (the Baltic region and the EU), and the Kaliningrad region (the Baltic region).

The focus of our study is the Kaliningrad region, the geography of which translates into a high potential in transport and logistics. On the one hand, one of the manifestations of this potential is the capacity to handle Russia's international trade operations. On the other hand, it is the maintenance of global transit flows.

The typology of regions, which we use in this study, is one of many known approaches. However, in considering the Kaliningrad region as a 'development corridor', we can identify and describe the effect of the geopolitical and exclave factor on the development of the regional transport industry. The existing typologies of regional transport industries [2—4] do not provide a full account of their features. They are usually based on evaluating the development of regional transport industries. Taking into account various factors, transport industry typologies focus on the infrastructural and functional rather than economic components.

In comparison to other 'development corridors', the Kaliningrad region has rather low economic efficiency. At the systemic level, this is manifested in the macroeconomic indicator of regional gross value added. Over the past fifteen years, the contribution of transport and communications to the GRP of the Kaliningrad region has been the national average, which is well below the performance of other 'development corridors'. However, in view of the region's potential involvement in international transport corridors and integration projects and initiatives in logistics, transport infrastructure, and intermodal traffic, this contribution should be much more substantial. This relates to agreements in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Space, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asia—Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Belt and Road Initiative, and projects to support the development of transport corridors in Asia—Pacific.

Earlier studies [5; 6] suggest that the factors and circumstances leading to the low efficiency of transport in the Kaliningrad region have geopolitical, institutional, and infrastructural components and nature. The regional transport system can develop along several different strands. The first one is an increase in cargo and passenger traffic. Extensive in its essence, this variant has an immediate bearing on unlocking the transit potential of the Kaliningrad region. The second, intensive, variant suggests creating extra value added by switching to high-paying freight and greater involvement of regional businesses in the supply chain (shipping, storage, customs clearance, insurance provision, etc.), alongside a reduction in prime costs, particularly, cargo and passenger shipping times.

The transport system of the Kaliningrad region should develop along either strand. However, in this study, we will focus on the necessary conditions for attaining greater economic efficiency of transport by increasing value added. We evaluate the influence of change in the cargo structure and greater involvement of regional companies and organisations in the growth in value added. As source materials, we used our findings on value chains in the Kaliningrad regional transport network obtained from a 2014—2016 project for the creation of a datadase for regional studies at the IKBFU. In this article, we present the output of a simulation of value added for several types of cargoes carrying intermediate, investment, and consumer goods following an increase in the involvement of regional companies and organisations in value chains. To perform the calculations, we employed our own simulation model and an earlier developed system of transport tariffs and value-added calculations for the Kaliningrad region (SOTTKO). Using the calculation results, we make proposals for improving the Kaliningrad region transport industry by increasing its economic efficiency and its contribution to the development of the regional economy.

The transport industry of the region: its development and an increase in its economic efficiency

Academic evaluations of the development of transport industries and proposals on increasing its efficiency at a regional level can be divided into two groups. The first one analyses the role of individual elements of a regional transport system: port facilities [7], railway transport [8], and aviation [9]. The second considers transport as a territorial system component and links the possibilities for its development to an increase in the efficiency of its selected functional elements [10—14]. Researchers often reduce their proposals to the need for developing or modernising regional transport infrastructures. Much less often they provide a rationale for the introduction of new forms of organising and managing transport processes (for instance, cluster forms [15]) or elements of intelligent or information communications-based transport industries [16].

Few studies have focused on the practical and theoretical problems of economic efficiency and value added creation in a regional transport industry. In most cases, these issues are examined within the concept of logistics, supply chain management (see, for instance, [17—19]), and in the context of the involvement of countries, clusters, sectors, and manufacturing businesses in global value chains [20—22]. At the same time, value chain formation in a regional transport industry should be studied in view of the following. Firstly, transport chains are becoming increasingly integrated into production systems: cargo carriers offer a whole range of services meeting costs, time, and reliability priorities. Thus, transport chains are playing a growing role in value chains. The geography of value chains is merging with the geography of transport industries [23]. Secondly, the highest profits along the value chain, which is represented by a smiling curve [24], are concentrated in its final segments (logistics, sales and after-sales services) [25]. This provides additional arguments in favour of an increase in value added by the regional transport industry through switching to high-paying freight and end products. Thirdly, an increase in value added by the regional transport industries suggests a search for optimal proportions in the process of its creation. This will make it possible to estimate what percentage of value added can be created at the level of regional transport companies and organisations in the course of cargo transport, and what percentage can be accounted for by national and international transport companies and organisations.

Studies into the economic efficiency and development problems of the Kaliningrad regional transport industry remain a priority for both public authorities dealing with regional matters and the academic community [26—28]. The reason for this is the persistent transport deadlock effect: the situation when a regional transport industry is affected by various internal and external factors. In our case, the dominant ones are the federal policy of supporting the other ports of North-West Russia, the exclave position of the region, small volume of potential cargoes, and limited involvement in transboundary transport industries. Taken individually, each of these factors has a negative yet not critical impact.

However, the cumulative effect of all these factors prevents the unlocking of the considerable transport potential of the region, which owes it to its geographical location. Thus, the region is becoming another 'transport deadlock' in the structure of modern national and global transport corridors.

At first glance, the Kaliningrad regional transport industry is improving its economic performance. In 2007—2018, the proportion of transport companies increased from 5.9 to 8.2 % of all the regional companies. The contribution of the industry to the regional value added was 28.7 % of the total capital investment in the regional economy. However, as it was mentioned above, the Kaliningrad regional transport industry is outstripped by its counterparts in other Russian development corridors in terms of their contribution to, and involvement in, the creation of value added (table 1). Although Kaliningrad has employment and capital investment rates comparable to other regions and the proportion of transport companies and organisations higher than in other regions, the industry accounted for a mere 10.6 % of the gross regional product. A leading sector of the Kaliningrad regional economy, transport creates value added at a rate slightly above the national average. At the same time, in other development corridor regions (with the exception of the Rostov region), its contribution is much more substantial. Our analysis shows that the performance of the region in 2005—2016 followed a similar pattern. All other things being equal, this testifies to the low economic efficiency of the industry.

The economic efficiency of the regional transport complex requires the following [29]:

— the construction and modernisation of the regional transport infrastructure;

— procedural, legal, and institutional support for the transport industry, aimed to ensure equal opportunities in competition with other regional transport industries for Russian exports and imports;

— more effective integration of the region in transnational and interregional transport systems, primarily, those in the Baltic region;

— new methods for organising and managing the regional transport industry, expecially those using modern digital and intelligent systems.

Today the problem of increasing the economic efficiency of the Kaliningrad regional transport industry can be solved by targeting selected aspects of growth in value added. To this end, it is necessary to attain the following research objectives:

— to identify the conditions for increasing value added by changing the volume and makeup of cargoes by classes of goods in favour of high-paying freight and end products and by redistribution of value added by favour of regional companies and organisations;

— to develop mechanisms and to select measures and projects contributing to an increase in the cargo traffic and thus to ensure value-added growth in the industry. Moreover, the region can benefit from its transit function, whereas extra value added can be created by changing the structure and increasing the volume of transit cargoes. This aspect deserves particular attention;

— constructing extensive and intensive scenarios of the development of the regional transport industry from the perspective of an increase in economic efficiency, i. e. the creation of value added.

Table 1

Evaluation of the transport industry performance in development corridors

Region	Contribution of transport and communications to the economic performance of the region,%											
	Average annual employment			Gross value added			Capital investment			Number of companies and organisations		
	2005	2010	2016	2005	2010	2016	2005	2010	2016	2005	2010	2016
National total	7.1	7.9	7.3	10.6	10.5	9.5	25.9	26.7	18.6	3.9	5.5	5.6
Kaliningrad region	10.5	8.7	8.3	11.6	10.7	10.6	21.0	29.3	22.6	5.9	7.9	8.2
Leningrad region	6.9	7.1	8.3	17.0	12.8	14.3	41.2	56.3	27.0	5.4	6.1	5.4
Rostov region	7.4	7.5	7.4	10.2	10.1	8.3	25.6	20.0	30.5	3.8	5.6	5.6
Krasnodar region	8.7	8.2	7.8	19.3	15.5	17.9	35.5	47.7	45.2	4.4	5.8	5.4
Primorsky region	10.9	11.6	10.2	22.0	21.1	24.1	40.3	46.3	23.2	9.2	10.9	11.6
Khabarovsk region	10.3	9.7	9.0	19.1	16.7	20.2	41.0	64.5	45.5	6.5	8.7	8.3

Calculated by the authors based on: Rosstat. *Regiony Rossii. Sotsiaklno-ekonomicheskie pokazatekli, 2018: stat. sb.* [*Russian regions. Socio-economic performance, 2018: statistical digest*]. Moscow, 2018; Rosstat. *Investitsii v Rossii. 2017: stat. sb.* [*Investment in Russia, 2017: statistical digest*]. Moscow, 2017; Rosstat. *Regiony Rossii. Sotsiaklno-ekonomicheskie pokazatekli, 2011: stat. sb.* [*Russian regions. Socio-economic performance, 2011: statistical digest*]. Moscow, 2011; Rosstat. *Regiony Rossii. Sotsiaklno-ekonomicheskie pokazatekli, 2006: stat. sb.* [*Russian regions. Socio-economic performance, 2006: statistical digest*]. Moscow, 2006.

In this study, we will focus on the first and partly the second objective. Alongside the discussion of earlier proposals, we will provide a rationale for increasing the economic efficiency of the regional transport industry by redistributing the value added, which is created along the chain, in favour of regional companies and organisations, depending on the structure and types of cargoes, i. e. the class of goods. In analysing these scenarios, we examine possible measures and projects contributing to an increase in the regional cargo traffic and thus the creation of extra value added.

A regional transport industry simulation: methodology and data

We used simulation modelling as a major method for evaluating changes in value added that is created by Kaliningrad regional transport companies and organisations. We employed the simulation model for the Kaliningrad region transport industry, which we developed and tested as a part of the family of regional industry-specific models within a 2014—2016 project for the creation of a database for regional studies at the IKBFU. Simulation models were built of the agricultural industry, transport, manufacturing, and tourism and recreation [30]. Industry-specific simulation models help to estimate the influence of various regulatory and control impacts on changes in value added across industries and companies and in the regional economy as a whole. Using our simulation model, we measure changes in value added brought about by an increase in the proportion of cargoes carrying intermediate, investment, or consumer goods identified according to the International classification by broad economic categories (BEC rev. 4).[1]

This way, we solve the problem of calculated value added by transport services against the background of increased involvement of regional companies in the chain. Their operating costs relating to cargo transport are taken into account. The model makes it possible to estimate value added at different stages of its creation in the industry: legal services, insurance, storage (both emergency and contract-based), loading and packaging, transport rental and shipping. Simulation modelling of value added reveals the factors behind its growth. We rely on the traditional concept of value chain [31] and more recent studies into the phenomenon [33—38].

[1] United Nations. *Classification by Broad Economic Categories (Rev. 4).* New York, 2002. Available from: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_53rev4r.pdf (accessed 13.03.2019).

The factors affecting the cost of shipping operations are included in the model as dimensionless coefficients. Most of these factors relate to the quality of services rendered. In their turn, the costs incorporated in the model are based on actual independent dimensionless components and can be considered as fixed. This means that factors affecting the costs are external to the system studied. Our model helps to identify what proportion of value added by shipping remains in the region (i. e. is created by regional transport organisation) and what proportion leaves the region (i. e. is created by Russian and international transport organisations). Based on the practices characteristic of the Kaliningrad transport industry, we made the following assumptions: 1) a single transport company covers the whole range of shipping and auxiliary operations at all stages of freight transport; 2) within freight transport operations, one can identify values describing costs and value added created during freight transport; 3) factors affecting the cost of transport operations, which is expressed as dimensionless coefficients, are known.

Without specific features of different modes of transport taken into account, our model is as follows:[2]

$$V = (V_o^j \prod_{n=1}^{N_o^j} \varepsilon_n + V_a^j \prod_{n=1}^{N_a^j} \varepsilon_n) + (V_o^i \prod_{n=1}^{N_o^i} \varepsilon_n + V_a^i \prod_{n=1}^{N_a^i} \varepsilon_n) + (V_o^k \prod_{n=1}^{N_o^k} \varepsilon_n + V_a^k \prod_{n=1}^{N_a^k} \varepsilon_n) +$$

$$+(V_o^{l+p} \prod_{n=1}^{N_o^{l+p}} \varepsilon_n + V_a^{l+p} \prod_{n=1}^{N_a^{l+p}} \varepsilon_n) + (V_o^{r+t} \prod_{n=1}^{N_o^{r+t}} \varepsilon_n + V_a^{r+t} \prod_{n=1}^{N_a^{r+t}} \varepsilon_n),$$

where V is the total cost across all shipping stages;

V_o is the costs a transport company bears in rendering the service;

V_a is value added at a certain transport stage;

Index values:

j is legal services;

i is insurance;

k is storage (both emergency and contract-based);

l + p is loading and packaging;

r + t is rental and transport;

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[2] D.A. Malyi, an analyst of the IKBFU's Centre for Modelling Regional Socio-Eonomic Development, contributed to the development of a model of the Kaliningrad regional transport network within a project for creating an information and analytical system for regional studies support. The IKBFU was running the project tin 2014–2016.

n is the number of the factors affecting the cost element of the transport process;

N_a is the maximum number of the factors affecting value added at the selected stage;

N_o is the maximum number of the factors affecting the costs borne at the selected stage;

ε_n is the indicators of factors affecting value added at a certain stage of the transport process.

In constructing value-added scenarios for certain modes of transport, we calibrate the model to incorporate auxiliary operations.

The model takes into account the structure of freight transport. We evaluate opportunities for creating extra value added by 1) an increase in the contribution of local companies and organisations to cargo traffic through performing a larger number of operations along the chain; 2) an increase in the number of small companies and organisations providing full-cycle transport services; 3) performing more complicated operations along the chain to increase value added by local companies and organisations.

When solving the problem of increasing the proportion of value added by the Kaliningrad regional transport sectors, we take into account two possible ways to create extra value added:

a) an increase in the number of transport services provided by regional companies and organisations (cargo transport services proper, storage, customs clearance, insurance, etc.). This translates into higher transport costs and, thus, the proportion of value added by the region;

b) a reduction in the costs borne by regional transport companies and organisations, whereas the transport costs borne by the consignor remain the same. In this case, extra value added is created by optimising various types of costs.

The analysis of data from Kaliningrad demonstrated that there are opportunities to increase value added along both strands. However, in view of the current state of affairs in the regional transport industry, the first variant has a greater potential for attaining the desired result.

We used customs and regional statistics and the results of in-depth interviewing and surveying representatives of transport and logistics companies as source materials. Qualitative methods were used to construct and evaluate value chains. We identified possible variants of creating extra value added by the transport and logistics industry of the Kaliningrad region (fig. 1).



Fig 1. Value chain scenarios

Prepared by the authors based on interviews with representatives of transport companies.

In modelling value added and performing scenario calculations, we used the system of transport tariffs and value-added calculations for the Kaliningrad region (SOTTKO), which was developed by A. A. Novikova, one of the authors of this research. Based on the simulation model described above, the system was created to suit the conditions of the Kaliningrad region.

The system makes it possible to calculate both the transport cost and the complex shipping cost. The transport cost is the cost of moving cargoes with the shipping distance, the cargo weight, the mode of transport, the class of hazard, and the type of cargo taken into account. The complex shipping cost includes the transport cost and the cost of additional services provided during shipping. Additional services are cargo storage in the warehouse of the carrier, crating, palletising, picking up the cargo, delivering the cargo to the final destination, legal services, and the preparation of shipping and customs documents.

The system for calculating the transport cost and the complex shipping cost by types of cargo and by modes of transport in view of changes in regulatory impacts makes it possible:

— to select the optimum shipping variant based on the transport cost or the complex shipping cost;

— to evaluate the influences of additional transport services on the transport cost or the complex shipping cost;

— to select the mode of transport in view of the cargo transport parameters: the transport cost and the complex shipping cost;

— to evaluate the influence of external factors on the transport cost for each mode of transport (these factors include exchange rates and transit tariffs).

The system helps to analyse the conditions of switching between different modes of transport and examine the created value added for selected types of cargoes.

We used the simulation model and SOTTKO to construct scenarios relying on different configurations of factors and to simulate changes in value added for cargoes carrying intermediate, investment, and consumer goods.

Scenarios of the transport industry development

We consider three major scenarios of an increase in value added by the transport industry of the Kaliningrad region. The number of scenarios can be greater if the aims and objectives of a study require it. However, in this study, the number of scenarios is limited to variants that differ in the essence of central processes affecting the development of the Kaliningrad regional transport industry.

The extensive scenario. It suggests heavier cargo traffic. This may be attained in the future by an increase in the volume of transit cargoes. We assume that the basic conditions of the creation of value added (the contribution of regional companies and organisations to the chain and the number of operations within complex shipping) would remain the same. Transit increases by 150—200 % above the current level. According to our estimates obtained using customs statistics and the software package for situation forecasting and strategy development for the socioeconomic development of the Kaliningrad region',[3] the cost of transit cargoes reached USD 3.831 billion in 2018 (2.691 in 2017; 1.708 in 2016; 5.256 in 2015; 9.746 in 2014), or 23 % of the total cargo handled in the region (exports, imports, and interregional operations taken into account). The extensive scenario can be considered as the baseline scenario of the creation of value added by cargo shipping in the region.

[3] Software registration certificate No. 2016617454 of July 6, 2016 'Software package for situation forecasting and strategy development for the socioeconomic development of the Kaliningrad region'. Authors: K.Yu. Voloshenko, V.A. Tsybatov, L.P. Pavlov. Copyright holder: IKBFU.

The target scenario. It suggests an increase in value added by the industry through greater involvement of regional transport companies and organisations in the chains. In this case, most value added remains in the region and only a small part, which is created by national and international companies, leaves its territory. The scenario takes into account the current situation, the potential of the regional transport industry, limitations to capacities expansion, the effect of geopolitical factors, and the involvement of the Kaliningrad region in the integration initiatives for the development of international transport corridors.

The intensive scenario. Complex shipping translates into the maximum increase in value added (see fig. 1, p. c.59) at the link level. Although this scenario is unlikely, it demonstrates possibilities for creating extra value added.

In our study, complex shipping costs are modelled, whereas transport costs are calculated. This is explained by the lack of reliable data on the structure of transport costs, which can be obtained only by surveying major carriers working with each mode of transport. In constructing scenarios of value added by complex shipping, we rely on its difference from the baseline computed using the results of interviewing regional transport companies and studying value chains [30]. According to our calculations, it reaches 43—45 % across the region for all modes of transport. The resultant values were verified using regional statistics on the transport and communication industry. We obtained acceptable convergence between expert evaluation and calculations. The error did not exceed 5 %. At the same time, regional companies and organisations account for a mere 40 % of the total value added by cargo transport. The rest is created by national and international companies. Our scenarios take into account the following initial ratios between 'regional' and 'external' value added: 40 and 60 % in the extensive scenario, 60 and 40 % in the target scenario, and 65 and 35 % in the intensive scenario.

We performed calculations for three categories of cargoes: 1) construction materials; 2) machines and equipment; 3) furniture and its components. According to the international classification by broad economic categories (BEC rev. 4), these are intermediate, investment, and customer goods. Cargo categories correlating to classes of goods make it possible to evaluate possibilities for an increase in value added and to analyse their features. To simplify our calculations, we assumed that each cargo is carried a distance of 1,600 km and its weight is 17,000 kg. It is kept in the warehouse of the carrier for one day due to emergency and for three days within a contract. Table 2 shows the calculation results.

Table 2

Calculations of cargo shipping costs, thousand roubles

Indicator	Type and values		
Type of goods	Intermediate	Investment	Customer
Cargo	Construction materials	Machines and equipment	Furniture and components
Transport costs by:			
Road	64.3	67.1	69.8
Rail	72.4	157.0	125.1
Sea[4]	74.4	75.1	73.6

As to investment and customer goods, the lowest costs are associated with shipping by road and the highest — with railway transport.

The cost of shipping by rail is almost twice as high as that by road and sea. Overall, it exceeds the cost of shipping intermediate goods. This is explained by the fact that railways charge different classes of cargoes differently.

Table 3 shows scenario calculations of value added for complex shipping. Figure 2 shows the structure of value added by providing additional services.

Table 3

Value added by cargo transport under the three scenarios, thousand roubles

Mode of transport	Scenario								
	Extensive			Target			Intensive		
	m	k	c	m	k	c	m	k	c
Road									
Cargo shipping	34.2	39.4	40.2	35.5	42.8	43.7	36.8	44.8	45.8
Additional services	13.6	21.5	24.8	14.5	23.3	27.5	16.2	26.9	31.2
Rail									
Cargo shipping	17.2	47.1	35.4	17.7	54.2	38.2	18.6	57.4	39.7
Additional services	10.2	16.4	13.7	10.6	17.3	14.3	11.3	19.4	15.4
Sea									
Cargo shipping	32.6	35.2	34.6	34.5	39.0	37.5	35.9	41.2	39.2
Additional services	20.8	27.7	17.5	21.9	29.1	18.2	24.7	33.4	20.4

Comment: m is construction materials (intermediate goods), k is machines and equipment (investment goods), and c is furniture and components (customer goods).

[4] As to maritime transport, we used hypothetical rates for the Baltiysk–Ust-Luga route.

For maritime transport, loading and unloading require intra-port movements and cargo aggregation following the ‘vehicle — warehouse — vehicle’ pattern.



	Extensive scenario			Target scenario			Intensive scenario		
	m	k	c	m	k	c	m	k	c
Other	2,1	2,9	2,8	2,2	3,0	3,0	2,5	3,6	3,5
Delivery to destination	2,2	3,8	3,8	2,2	3,8	3,8	2,2	3,8	3,8
Picking up	1,5	2,5	2,7	1,5	2,5	2,7	1,5	2,5	2,7
Crating	4,0	5,6	8,0	4,0	5,6	8,0	4,0	5,6	8,0
Palletising	1,5	3,1	3,7	1,5	3,1	3,7	1,5	3,1	3,7
Customs clearance	1,4	2,1	2,3	1,7	2,7	3,4	2,5	4,4	5,2
Insurance	1,0	1,6	1,6	1,5	2,6	3,0	2,1	4,0	4,3

a



	Extensive scenario			Target scenario			Intensive scenario		
	m	k	c	m	k	c	m	k	c
Other	1,1	1,8	1,4	1,2	2,1	1,6	1,2	2,4	1,7
Delivery to the final destination	1,3	2,3	1,7	1,3	2,3	1,7	1,3	2,3	1,7
Picking up	1,3	2,3	1,7	1,3	2,3	1,7	1,3	2,3	1,7
Robust packaging	1,0	2,0	2,1	1,0	2,0	2,1	1,0	2,0	2,1
Loading and unloading	1,3	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5	1,4
Customs clearance fee	0,8	1,5	1,1	1,0	1,9	1,4	1,3	3,1	2,0
Insurance	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,6	0,9	0,7	0,8	1,4	1,0
Reconsignment fee	1,5	1,6	1,5	1,5	1,6	1,5	1,5	1,6	1,5
Cargo escorting	1,7	2,7	2,2	1,7	2,7	2,2	1,7	2,7	2,2

b



Other	3,3	3,6	2,4	3,3	3,6	2,4	3,3	3,6	2,4
Delivery to the final destination	3,2	3,5	1,6	3,2	3,5	1,6	3,2	3,5	1,6
Picking up	2,3	2,5	1,1	2,3	2,5	1,1	2,3	2,5	1,1
Survey services	2,3	2,8	2,8	2,5	3,0	2,8	3,2	4,1	3,5
Crating	4,1	8,2	4,9	4,1	8,2	4,9	4,1	8,2	4,9
Customs clearance fee	1,7	2,4	1,4	2,2	3,1	1,7	3,5	5,4	2,7
Insurance	0,8	0,8	0,7	1,2	1,4	1,0	1,9	2,2	1,5
Loading and unloading	3,3	4,0	2,7	3,3	4,0	2,7	3,3	4,0	2,7

c

Fig. 2. The structure of value added according to additional services provided, thousand roubles

a — transport by road; *b* — transport by rail; *c* — transport by sea

In figure 2, the 'other' costs include: a) legal support, machine loading, emergency and contractual storage in the warehouse of the carrier (transport by road); b) contractual and emergency storage in the warehouse of the carrier, weighing fees (transport by rail); c) emergency and contractual storage in the warehouse of the carrier (transport by sea).

The transport cost accounts for most of the complex shipping cost. Thus, changes in the value added by the transport cost have the most considerable effect on the calculation results. Greater involvement of regional companies and organisations in value chains and the most significant increase in the latter are associated with investment and customer goods transported by road and rail. Investment goods transported by rail account for the most dramatic change. Value added increases by 15 % and 20 % under the target and intensive scenarios respectively, as compared to the extensive variant. Slower growth is observed when this type of goods is carried by sea (10 % and 17 %). A significant effect on value added by railway transport is attributed to differences in railway rates for different classes of cargoes. Construction materials are class 1 cargoes, whereas machines and furniture are class 3 cargoes. The rates for the latter are higher, which explains the significant increase in the cost of shipping investment goods. The higher rates for class 3 cargoes are accounted for by the need to reduce the contribution of the transport component to the final cost of the 'cheapest' cargoes (class 1). An increase in the transport cost does not have a significant effect on the final cost of 'expensive' cargoes [39; 40]. This way, the carrier is compensated for missed earnings.

Our scenario calculations show that the mode of transport has little effect on consumer goods: value added increases almost uniformly. Ate the same time, the rate of changes in the indicator is lower than it is in the case of investment goods, reaching 8 % under the target and 12—14 % under the intensive scenario. As to intermediate goods, value added by shipping also increases rather uniformly for all the modes of transport. However, it is significantly below the performance of the other categories of goods. As compared to the extensive scenario, it grows by 4—6 % under the target scenario, and by 8—10 % under the intensive one.

Our scenario calculation of value added by additional services shows the following:

— under all the scenarios, the most significant increase in value added is associated with road transport. Higher growth rates are observed in the case of investment and customer goods (within 20—25 % under the target and intensive scenario);

— as to maritime transport, the most dramatic increase in value added by additional services is accounted for by intermediate and investment goods (within 18—20 %);

— as to railway transport, investment goods ensure growth by 18 % and intermediate and customer goods by 10—12 %.

The maximum increase in value added by complex shipping is associated with investment goods. The indicator increases by over 120 % when carried by rail, about 119 % when carried by sea, and by 118 % when carried by road (customer goods demonstrate a similar performance in this case) (fig. 4).



Fig. 4. Value added by complex shipping under the three scenarios, thousand roubles

Our calculations prove that, in a mid-term perspective, the regional transport industry should seek a change in the structure of cargoes to ensure an increase in the proportion of investment and customer goods. This will have the most considerable influence on the efficiency of railway and road transport, whereas an increase in the physical volume of cargoes handled is of major significance to maritime transport.

Conclusion

In our article, we presented the results of modelling the scenario of enhancing the economic efficiency of the Kaliningrad regional transport industry, measured using value added. We evaluated how changes in the structure of cargo traffic and redistribution of value added along the chain in favour of regional companies and organisations affect an increase in value added in the transport industry. The simulation modelling was performed using our simulation model and the SOTTKO software package. To take into account how value added is created in the production of intermediate, investment, and customer goods, we selected three corresponding cargo categories: construction materials, machines and equipment, and furniture and components. Our calculations showed that, in a mid-term perspective, the most considerable potential for increasing the economic efficiency of the Kaliningrad regional transport complex is associated with the transport of investment and customer goods. Change in the structure of cargo traffic by classes of goods has the greatest effect on railway and road transport, whereas, for maritime transport, a major factor is an increase in the volume of cargoes. Thus, change in the structure of cargoes does not translate in greater economic efficiency as long as maritime transport is considered. Of more importance are the testing of measures and the creation of conditions for ensuring greater volumes of cargoes handled. For all the modes of transport, the most promising avenue is to incorporate the interest of the Kaliningrad region into international integration initiatives and to redirect national export and import flows to the region.

A major limitation of this study results from the need to verify and re-evaluate the efficiency of the transport industry if the necessary measures are approved and new investment projects and initiatives are launched.

A promising line for future research is to study the effect of transit on the development of the regional economy and thus the creation of extra value added. The problems of value added creation within the transport rather than the complex shipping cost merits special attention. This research objective requires surveys of key players in the regional transport services market.

Our findings and approach to simulating and evaluating conditions for attaining greater efficiency of the transport industry can be extrapolated to other regions, particularly, those classified as development corridors. This can be done, firstly, to evaluate the current efficiency and the potential for an increase in value added and, secondly, to develop projects, measures, and proposals aimed at the intensification of transport services by expanding the contribution of regional companies and ensuring growth in the volumes of cargoes handled.

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TOURISM

TOURISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE BALTIC REGION METROPOLISES

A. B. Rakhmanov[1]

International tourism is playing an increasingly important part in the life of all the nine countries of the Baltic region. In this contribution, I analyse the statistical data for 2010—2017 regarding the numbers of arrivals of international tourists and international tourism revenues in the Baltic region. Regional metropolises, which include nine capitals and Saint Petersburg, have a pivotal role in the tourism space of the region. I propose a methodology for empirical research into the attractiveness of ten Baltic cities as perceived by international tourists. This methodology distinguishes three major components in the tourism industry of the Baltic metropolises: hotels, restaurants, and sights. I estimate the attractiveness of these tourism infrastructure components in each of the ten cities using special indicators. Based on the data obtained, I calculate the integrated indicator of city attractiveness. The empirical study shows that, in the Baltic region, international tourists appreciate the most the hotels of Berlin, Warsaw, and Copenhagen, the restaurants of Tallinn, Riga, and Copenhagen, and the sights of Berlin, Stockholm, and Saint Petersburg. The most attractive Baltic cities for international tourists are Berlin, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. Although the sights of Moscow and Saint Petersburg are competitive in the tourist space of the Baltic region, Moscow and Saint Petersburg hotels and restaurants are noticeably inferior to those in other countries of the region.

Keywords: tourism, structure of attractiveness, metropolis, TripAdvisor, hotel, restaurant, sights, sociology of city, Baltic region

Introduction. Tourism as a Social Phenomenon and Its Study

Tourism has become one of the most important attributes of modern life. Travels of individuals for the purpose of

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gaining knowledge, recreation, entertainment, as well as for business purposes are known from Antiquity. I. Kant [1, p. 352] and G. W. F. Hegel [2, p. 56; 3, p. 458] reflected on various aspects of tourism.

What is tourism? In 1995, the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) defined the concept of 'tourism' quite broadly as 'the activities of people traveling and staying outside their normal environment for a period of not more than one year to spend free time, do business and for other purposes'[1]. American scientist C. Goeldner and Canadian researcher J. Brent-Ritchie wrote, "When we think of tourism, we think primarily of people who are visiting a particular place for sightseeing, visiting friends and relatives, taking a vacation, and having a good time. They might spend their leisure time engaging in various sports, sunbathing, talking, singing, taking rides, touring, reading, or simply enjoying the environment. If we consider the subject further, we may include in our definition of tourism people who are participating in a convention, a business conference, or some other kind of business or professional activity, as well as those who are taking a study tour under an expert guide or doing some kind of scientific research or study" [4, p. 3]. So, international tourism is a short visit to other countries for the purpose of recreation, getting acquainted with the natural and cultural and historical sights of these countries, customs and mores of different nations, their national cuisine, various kinds of entertainment, shopping, and also for the purpose of receiving education, scientific research, attending professional and business meetings, commercial activities, treatment, religious pilgrimages, etc. Tourism does not include travel for the purpose of temporary employment.

In the modern era tourism performs three functions: first, it contributes to the balanced and harmonious development of a person as an individual, supplying them not only with recreation opportunities, but also opening new horizons of nature and society, history and today's world, as well as contributing to the development of world cultural heritage; secondly, by offering specific goods and services, it forms a special branch of the national and global economy, a profit-oriented business, and finally, thirdly, it is a means of perception by the individual of themselves, as an integral part of the emerging united humanity and thus contributes to the formation of a global society, serving as one of the most important types of migrations of people within and outside of their countries. Tourism has acquired the latter function only recently: at the beginning of the XXI century, tourist routes have contributed to the creation of the actual unity of the world.

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[1] *Collection* of Tourism Expenditure Statistics. World Tourism Organization. P. 1. URL: http://pub.unwto.org/WebRoot/Store/Shops/Infoshop/Products/1034/1034—1.pdf (access date: 12.12.2018).

Various aspects of the transformation of tourism into a mass phenomenon of the current world are discussed in the scientific literature worldwide. One can speak of the emergence of a special interdisciplinary field of knowledge, which English-speaking researchers brand under the name of *tourism studies*. In particular, I would point out two authors who considered tourism as a social phenomenon.

Back in 1984, the Israeli scholar E. Cohen proposed eight sociological approaches to understanding tourism as: 1) commercialized hospitality (commercialization and industrialization of traditional relationships that have long since connected the guest / wanderer and their host); 2) democratized journey (travels that were previously available only to the members of aristocracy and the rich were made possible for many); 3) modern leisure activity; 4) modern version of pilgrimage; 5) implementation of basic cultural orientations characteristic of people from different countries; 6) process of acculturation (tourists have a diverse impact on the host countries); 7) a sort of inter-ethnic relations (tourists and the host countries are representatives of different ethnic groups); 8) a form of neocolonialism (metropolitan countries produce tourist flows, while peripheral countries accept them) [5, p. 373—376].

The works of the prominent British social theorist J. Urry are classic for the study of tourism. When analyzing tourism, he considered the concept of *tourist gaze* — a socially organized and systematic view of the one who seeks to extract pleasure from travelling — as key. Tourism acts as the embodiment and phenomenology of such a gaze [6, p. 2—3]. Urry and Larsen believed that mass tourism first appeared in the north of Great Britain in the second half of the 19th century, and was associated with the leisure of the industrial working class [7, p. 31—36]. For Urry, who viewed society as a system of mobilities, tourism was one of the most important forms of mobility [8, p. 67—70].

Baltic region scholars have made substantial contributions to the study of tourism in this part of the world.

The attractiveness of Russian regions for international tourists is being studied [9]. Special attention is paid to the specifics of tourism in the border regions on the example of Kaliningrad, Smolensk, Pskov and Amur regions, the Republic of Karelia [10—12], prospects for the development of cross-border tourism over the southern coast of the Baltic Sea [13], and prospects for tourism in different parts of the German coast of the Baltic Sea [14].

The paper of L. Matoga (on the example of Nowa Huta, one of the districts of Krakow) [15] is devoted to studying the preferences of tourists. K. Jakosuo studied the attractiveness of the hospitality industry and attractions of Finnish Karelia for tourists from Russia [16].

Estonian researchers A. Kuusik, K. Nilbe, T. Mehine and R. Ahas conducted a study of the Estonian tourism market on the basis of empirical data on the positioning of mobile phones, considering the ways in which the nature of events (music festivals, sports events, fairs, exhibitions, scientific conferences, etc.) within the country, together with their regularity, are capable of causing repeated visits by international tourists [17].

The author of this paper, based on the statistics of restaurants in the capitals of the Baltic region, analysed the hierarchy of national cuisines in these countries in the context of the global culinary space [18]. The purpose of the present study is to analyse the attractiveness of the Baltic region to international tourists. This is needed to clarify the range of opportunities for the revitalization of the tourism industry in these countries. In particular, we, of course, are interested in assessing the tourist attractiveness of Russia. To reach this goal, we first consider the relative numbers of international tourists globally and in the Baltic region.

International tourism in the world and in the Baltic Region

We can estimate the growth of international tourism in the world from statistics. According to the UNWTO, in 1950 there were 25 million international tourists in the world, 674 million in 2000, and 1.323 billion in 2017[2]. By 2030, their number will reach 1.8 billion people[3]. The tourism industry is among the leading sectors of the global economy. In the tourism industry, 10% of world gross domestic product is produced, 7% of world exports are formed, and one in ten jobs is created in the global economy[4]. A global tourist space arises as a result of the tourist flow growth, within which hundreds of millions of people cross the borders of their own and foreign countries every year, and separate nations, countries and continents are sewn together with the threads of tourist routes.

The most important indicator of the international tourism development in a particular country is the number of international tourist arrivals. Thus, in 2017, the top ten countries of the world included France, Spain, the USA, China, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany and Thailand. One may characterize the first five countries as the great tourist powers (by international tourist arrivals). Another important indicator of international tourism is the revenues it generates. In terms of international tourism revenues in 2017, the top ten countries in the world included the USA, Spain, France, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, Germany, Macau, and Japan. Let us name the first five the great tourist powers (by income from international tourism). Due to the

[2] *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2017 Edition. P. 2. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/ 10.18111/9789284419029 (access date: 13.12.2018); *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2018 Edition. P. 5. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419876 (access date: 15.12.2018).

[3] *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2017 Edition. P. 3. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/ 10.18111/9789284419029 (access date: 13.12.2018).

[4] *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2018 Edition. P. 3. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/ 10.18111/9789284419876 (access date: 15.12.2018).

fact that France, Spain and the United States are among the five great tourist powers both in terms of the number of tourists received and in terms of tourism revenues, we qualify them as three tourist superpowers.

What is the degree of international tourism development in the Baltic countries? In order to assess its scale in the region, let us turn to the analysis of UNWTO statistics related to the recent period of time (the most recent data as of 2017). We consider the number of international tourists received and total revenues from international tourism in the Baltic Sea countries. In addition, we introduce another indicator of the international tourism development, namely, the indicator of international tourism density, equal to the ratio of the number of international tourist arrivals to the country's population in a certain year. This indicator will show the place the international tourism takes in the public life of a country. In order to carry out a comparative analysis, we present the data relating not only to the countries of the Baltic region, but also to the world as a whole, as well as to the great tourist powers by international tourist arrivals (Table 1). The countries are ranked by number of international tourist arrivals in 2017.

Table 1

International tourist arrivals and international tourism density by country of destination, 2010—2017

Country	International tourists arrivals			Population in 2017 (million)	International tourism density indicator
	2010 (million)	2017 (million)	Change (%)		
World	952	1323	38.97	7,750262	0.17
France	77,648	86,918	11.94	64,980	1.34
Spain	52,677	81786	55.26	46,354	1.76
USA	60,010	75,868	26.43	324,459	0.23
China	55,665	60,740	9.12	1409,517	0.04
Italy	43,626	58,253	33.53	59,360	0.98
Countries of the Baltic region					
Germany	26,875	37,452	39.36	82.114	0.46
Russia	22,281	24,390	9.47	143,990	0.17
Poland	12,470	18,400	47.55	38,171	0.48
Denmark	8,744	10,781*	23.30	5,734	1.88
Sweden	4,951	6,865	38.66	9,911	0.69
Estonia	2,511	3,245	29.23	1,310	2.45
Finland	2,319	3,181	37.17	5,523	0.58
Lithuania	1,507	2,523	67.42	2,890	0.87
Latvia	1.373	1,950	42.02	1,950	1.00

* Data for 2016.

Complied and calculated by the author from: *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2018 Edition. P. 5, 15—17. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419876 (accessed: 15.12.2018).

All countries of the Baltic region, except Germany being among the top ten tourist countries of the world, are significantly inferior in terms of international tourist reception to the indicators of great tourist powers. Germany is the undisputed leader of the Baltic region in this respect, and Russia and Poland, which occupy the second and third places, respectively, are far behind. We can also see that in 1999—2001, 2006, and 2012—2015, Russia was among the ten leading tourist powers in the world in terms of tourist arrivals, but in recent years it dropped out of this top ten. Russia's lag could be caused by the political complications surrounding the country's international relations. Table 1 shows that a relatively large number of international tourists visited Estonia, which outperformed Finland.

Almost all countries of the Baltic region showed a significant increase in the reception of international tourists in the period from 2010 to 2017. Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Spain, exceeded the average growth rate in the number of international tourists. The modest growth rate of reception of international tourists in Russia is close to that of France or China.

The values of the international tourism density indicator are quite important, too, since they show the degree of the influx of large masses of tourists as a systemic factor in the development of a given society. They also demonstrate the extent to which the presence of a large number of multilingual and multicultural tourists in the territory of a given country affects all spheres of its public life — from economy to everyday life. Let us assume that if the indicator value is equal to or greater than 1, that is, the number of received international tourists is equal to or exceeds the number of local residents, then we speak of a tourism society, that is, of a society for which the reception of international tourists is very important. A tourism society is a society formed by the autochthonous population and the permanent presence of a significant number of international tourists at the same time. Tourism societies that emerge in our era are obviously a product of globalization.

We see that the tourism society exists in Estonia (2.45), Denmark (1.88) and Latvia (1.00). By the indicator of the international tourism density, the first two countries surpass Spain (1.76) and France (1.34), which we described above as tourist superpowers. Italy is approaching the status of a tourism society (0.98). So, we have reasons to believe that in the social and cultural (but, of course, not legal) respect, Estonia is no longer a country of Estonians, but a country of Estonians and international tourists, and Denmark is not a country of Danes, but a country of Danes and international tourists. A similar characterization may be given to Spain and France, and to Latvia and Italy to a lesser extent. At the same time, Germany, Russia, Poland, Finland, Sweden and Lithuania, as well as the USA and China are still the countries of their citizens. According to the indicator of the international tourism density, Russia, while occupying the last place in the Baltic region, is at the same level as the world average.

Let us consider the data on international tourism revenues in the world, the great tourist powers by international tourism revenues and the countries of the Baltic region in 2010—2017 (Table 2). The countries are ranked by international tourism revenues in 2017.

Table 2

International tourism revenues by country of destination, 2010—2017

Country	2010 (US$ billion)	2017 (US$ billion)	Change (%)
World	927	1340	44.55
The great tourist powers			
USA	137,010	210,747	53,82
Spain	54,641	67,964	24,38
France	57,059	60,681	6.35
Thailand	20,104	57,477	18,590
United Kingdom	33,978	51,211	50.72
Countries of the Baltic region			
Germany	34,679	39,823	14.83
Sweden	8,366	14,142	69.04
Poland	9,576	12,772	33.38
Russia	8,830	8,945	1.30
Denmark	5,853	7,394	26.33
Finland	3,051	2,982	-2.3
Estonia	1,073	1,628	51.72
Luthuania	0,967	1,299	34.33
Latvia	0,642	0,885	37.85

Complied and calculated by the author from: *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2018 Edition. P. 7, 15—17. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419876 (accessed: 15.12.2018).

Germany is the absolute leader in revenues from international tourism among the countries of the Baltic region. Its indicators are comparable to those of great tourist powers. With a huge margin, Germany is followed by Sweden and Poland. Russia and Denmark occupy middle positions, ahead of small tourist markets: Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

Sweden and Estonia lead in terms of growth in revenues from international tourism in the Baltic region, and their figures are higher than the world average, while being comparable to those of the United States and United Kingdom. The titleholder among the great tourist powers, and perhaps in the world as a whole, is Thailand. Russia showed a barely noticeable increase in revenues from international tourism (within the statistical error), while the figures actually fell to a degree in Finland.

Based on the data on the number of international tourist arrivals and international tourism revenues, we are able to calculate the amount that an average international tourist would bring globally, to the five great tourist powers (by the number of international tourist arrivals) and to the countries of the Baltic region in 2010—2017 (Table 3).

Table 3

The average international tourism revenues by country of destination, 2010—2017

Country	2010 (US$)	2017 (US$)	Change (%)
World	973.74	1012.85	4.02
The great tourist powers			
France	734.84	698.14	– 4.99
USA	2283.11	2727.13*	19.45
Spain	1037.28	831.00	– 19.89
China	823.03	536.99	– 34.75
Italy	889.06	759.33	– 4.59
Countries of the Baltic region			
Germany	1290.38	1063.31	– 17.60
Sweden	1689.76	2060.01	21.91
Finland	1315.65	937.44	– 28.75
Denmark	669.37	653.65*	– 2.35
Poland	767.92	694.13	– 9.61
Lithuania	641.67	514.86	– 19.76
Estonia	427.32	501.69	17.40
Latvia	467.59	453.85	– 2.94
Russia	396.30	366.75	– 7.46

* Data for 2016.

Calculated by the author from: *UNWTO*. Tourism Highlights. 2018 Edition. P. 5—7. 15—17. URL: https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419876 (accessed: 15.12.2018).

We see that an average international tourist in the Baltic region generates the most money for Sweden. Germany ranked second (close to the world average), and Finland came third. But the three Baltic countries are very far behind the United States. The average international tourist gave the least money to Russia, and the figures for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are also low. In all likelihood, this is due to the low cost services of the tourism industry in these countries.

It is noteworthy that from 2010 to 2017, the most countries of the Baltic region (except for Sweden and Estonia) suffered a drop in the amount of revenues generated by the average tourist. The same thing happened among the great tourist powers, and the USA became an exception. At the same time, revenues from international tourism in the world as a whole, grew, albeit slowly.

Thus, in the course of the statistical analysis of the international tourism development in the Baltic region in 2010—2017, we identified four key indicators: 1) the number of international tourist arrivals, 2) the revenues generated by international tourism, 3) the density of international tourism and 4) the revenues generated by an average international tourist. The leader of the Baltic region is Germany by the first two indicators, Denmark by the third one, Sweden by the fourth one. Therefore, these three countries can be considered centers of tourism in the region.

The attractiveness of the Baltic Region's metropolises and its structure: Methodology of empirical research

International tourism considerably, and sometimes primarily involves international tourists visiting major cities in the host countries. These cities are either the purpose of tourism, or tourist hubs, that is, hub stations in the network of tourist routes. In the latter case, even if a tourist visits the country, for example, intending to enjoy the views of its wildlife or the pleasures of recreation in small resort towns, to contemplate the historical and cultural sights far from major cities, they are bound to travel through megacities, which is accompanied by staying in hotels, going to restaurants, consuming tourist services, visiting sights, etc. Thus, large cities become the centers of the tourism industry and carriers of the respective infrastructure, and act as centers of production and consumption of tourism services, centers of tourism as a social phenomenon. In this regard, the above task of studying the attractiveness of the Baltic region countries in the perception of international tourists is detailed as the task of studying the tourist attractiveness of the megacities in the region.

In all 9 countries of the Baltic region, the largest cities are their capitals: Moscow, Berlin, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Warsaw, Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, which attract a significant or, in most cases, the largest proportion of international tourists visiting these countries. The metropolis, which has the informal status of the second capital of Russia, St. Petersburg, is also of great importance. Thus, the focus of our attention will be 10 capitals of the Baltic region.

The tourism potential of the capital cities of the Baltic region may be viewed from an objective point of view, with analyzing such characteristics as population, urban GDP, average income per capita, standards of living, average life expectancy, number and star rating of hotels, number of restaurants, prices for goods and services, environmental situation, crime rate, traffic jams, etc. All these objective characteristics contribute to the formation of the attractiveness of these megacities for international tourists.

However, studying the subjective side of the tourist potential of the capital cities of the Baltic region is also is of great interest, that is, how attractive they look in the eyes of international tourists. Let us characterize this subjective side as the attractiveness of a city and attempt to quantify it on the basis of objective data, that is, transform it into a subjective-objective category. How can we do this, that is, how do we objectively calculate the attractiveness of the megacities of the Baltic region in the perception of international tourists?

To study the attractiveness of the capital cities of the Baltic region, we apply the original author's methodology. It assumes the use of information provided by the world's largest travel portal TripAdvisor. com as an empirical database[5]. It was created in the early 2000s and gained the widest fame worldwide in a short time, becoming a companion and consultant to tourists from all countries of the world. This website contains data on the tourist infrastructure of almost all cities in the world, namely, on the three main types of tourist sites — hotels, restaurants and attractions, as well as reviews of tourists about them. In addition to the more or less detailed text message, each review implies an assessment of the said tourist infrastructure objects on a 5-point scale, including the options "excellent", "very good", "average", "poor" and "terrible".

It is beyond argument that the attractiveness is a subjective category, but when it comes to analyzing the feedback from large masses of people who evaluate the various components of the tourist infrastructure of cities (oftentimes constituting hundreds and even thousands of reviews on the same site), then we bring quite objective grounds for this subjective category. This creates the possibility of an impartial, sober and objective assessment of the attractiveness of the main components of the tourist infrastructure of the megalopolises in the Baltic region.

We can throw off the possible concerns that many positive reviews on TripAdvisor. com are inspired by the PR and marketing departments of the respective institutions, pointing out that, firstly, the reviews are written in many different languages, secondly, there is a fair amount of "bad" and "terrible" reviews in a number of cases; thirdly, the TripAdvisor. com administration has an effective policy for removing unfair reviews.

Among the countless reviews left on TripAdvisor. com, we select only those that were left by international tourists from all over the world, who visited the capital cities of the Baltic region, and not the citizens of these countries, who evaluate their capitals, that is, we exclude the subjects of domestic tourism. TripAdvisor. com allows you to classify re-

[5] *TripAdvisor*. Latest reviews. Lowest prices. URL: https://www.tripadvisor.com/ (access date: 16.12.2018).

views by linguistic criteria. We will take only those reviews that were posted in English, which is not a state or official in any country in the Baltic region, into account. Of course, the reviews in English, which has long acquired the status of a global language, a language of world communication, are posted by tourists from all over the world, and not just by the guests from English-speaking countries. This will allow us to select reviews that were made specifically by international tourists with a high level of confidence, including, of course, tourists from the Baltic region who came from a country other than the one in which the metropolitan city is located. Say that, for example, Swedes, Poles, Brazilians or Chinese who write reviews of the city's hotels on TripAdvisor. com in English serve as international tourists in St. Petersburg. At the same time, we digress from the analysis of the fact that, probably, some of the reviews in English were written by citizens of the Baltic region countries who evaluate the objects of the national tourism industry of their own countries. Most likely, there are very few of them, and therefore, we will still assume that all the reviews in English were left by international tourists to simplify our analysis.

The data from the TripAdvisor. com portal has come into use in world tourism research fairly recently — since the beginning of the 2010s. The scientists who are working in this direction are mainly foreign. The issue of the credibility of the reviews of tourist sites that are posted on this site is addressed in the works of British scholars I. Jickle and K. Carter [19], R. Filieri [20]. Hong Kong researchers H. Lee, R. Lo and J. Murphy [21] analyze the community of TripAdvisor. com users (sociodemographic features, behavioral patterns, etc.). Hong Kong authors J. Ei, N. Ou and R. Lo consider the impact of TripAdvisor. com data on planning trips by tourists from different countries [22]. A researcher from the USA, L. Vazquez, focuses on the study of negative reviews posted on this portal [23]. Indian scholars P. Bhardwai, S. Gautam and P. Pahwa analyzed the emotions that Delhi, Bangalore, Mumbai and other metropolitan areas of India caused in tourists relying on the reviews of TripAdvisor. com visitors [24]. Chinese authors H. Zhang, J. Pu, C. Wang and H. Chen offer a model for analyzing restaurant reviews posted on TripAdvisor. com to independent tourists [25]. A Croatian researcher, H. Jakopovic studied the perception of the work of restaurants in the city of Dubrovnik by tourists based on TripAdvisor. com data [26]. A joint study by Australian and Malaysian researchers A. Akhani, M. Nilashi, O. Ibrahim, L. Sanzoni and S. Weaven is dedicated to the principles of segmentation of the market of consumers of medical and hotel services (spa hotels) based on reviews posted on TripAdvisor. com [27].

The originality of the empirical study of the attractiveness of the capital cities in the Baltic region, proposed in this article, lies in the specificity of the analysis of reviews posted by international tourists on TripAdvisor. com, and this study applies to all countries in the region. First of all, we produce a quantitative description of the attractiveness of hotels, restaurants and attractions separately. The quantitative expression of the attractiveness of every component of the tourist infrastructure of cities is the average number of reviews with "excellent" rating received by each site of the corresponding type in the city, selected in the sample of the top 30 — according to reviews on TripAdvisor. com[6] — that is, the arithmetic average of 30 best hotels, 30 best restaurants and 30 best attractions. Then we take the values obtained as indicators of the attractiveness of hotels, restaurants and sights of the Baltic metropolitan areas (in points). Further, based on the results of the above statistical analysis, we calculate the values of the indicator of integral attractiveness of 10 capital cities of the Baltic region using the formula of $A = \sqrt[3]{A1 \cdot A2 \cdot A3}$, where A1 — indicator of attractiveness of hotels, A2 — indicator of attractiveness of restaurants and A3 — indicator of attractiveness of sights, that is, taking the indicator of integral attractiveness equal to the cubic root of the product of the values of three private indicators of attractiveness.

Two important reservations should be made. First, when analyzing the attractiveness of large cities in the Baltic region, we proceed from an important epistemological premise — the assumption that this region (and the world) has an isomorphic tourist space, within which tourist flows circulate with an equal intensity and degree of successful overcoming of various obstacles (legal, financial, political, etc.). In fact, this is an idealization, and without doubt, the actual situation looks somewhat more complicated. For example, the deterioration of international relations in recent years has led to a reduction in the influx of international tourists to Russia. Still, it seems that this assumption is quite legitimate as it does not contain excessive error, and it is necessary to accept this premise to carry out our research. Secondly, in such a study, we deflect our attention from taking into account relatively minor factors that form or destroy the charm of the major cities in the Baltic region: the environmental situation, the state of the transport system, traffic jams, crime rates, etc. We are not aware of the sources that allow assessing the perception of these issues of major cities in the Baltic region by international tourists. In the opinion of the author, the content of these two reservations does not affect the effectiveness of the study significantly.

The attractiveness of the Baltic Region hotels

The attractiveness of a hotel in the eyes of its customers is determined by a number of factors: location, room and other facilities' characteristics, price, service, quality of food offered by hotel restaurants, hospitali-

[6] TripAdvisor.com allows to rank hotels, restaurants and sights of cities depending on the ratings given to them by consumers of their services and spectators.

ty, atmosphere, etc. Let us calculate the values of the attractiveness indicator of hotels in 10 megacities of the Baltic region. They are ranked by the indicator of the attractiveness of hotels in the perception of international tourists (Table 4).

Table 4

The indicator of the attractiveness of Baltic region hotels

City	The indicator of the attractiveness of hotels, points
Berlin	827
Warsaw	462
Copenhagen	442
Stockholm	392
Tallinn	368
Helsinki	357
Moscow	302
Saint Petersburg	229
Riga	220
Vilnius	191

Calculated by the author from the data for December 15th 2018.

The study showed that Berlin is the most attractive city of all countries of the Baltic region in the eyes of international tourists. Berlin hotels are the best in the Baltic region. Berlin leads with a colossal margin, way ahead of Warsaw and Copenhagen, which have risen to second and third positions. The second place in the hotel service is occupied by the Polish capital, which surpassed almost all the capitals of the Baltic region, which is came as a surprise. Tallinn rounds out the top five, ahead of half the megacities of the Baltic region. Moscow and St. Petersburg entered only the second half of the rating — the benefits of the hospitality industry provided by the hotels of the two Russian capitals are rated by international tourists lower than those offered by hotels in many other Baltic capitals.

The attractiveness of the Baltic Region restaurants

The attractiveness of a restaurant is determined by the quality of the food offered, price, quality of service, training and amiable disposition of staff, location, atmosphere, etc. We calculate the values of the indicator of the attractiveness of restaurants in 10 capitals of the Baltic region. Megacities are ranked by the indicator of the attractiveness of restaurants in the perception of international tourists (Table 5).

Table 5

The indicator of attractiveness of the Baltic Region restaurants

City	The indicator of attractiveness of restaurants, Points
Tallinn	360
Riga	247
Copenhagen	209
Berlin	187
Vilnius	184
Warsaw	153
Stockholm	147
Helsinki	131
Saint Petersburg	49
Moscow	28

Calculated by the author from the data for December 16th 2018.

The take-off of Tallinn's restaurants to the first place in the Baltic region is sensational. The superiority of Estonian capital over other Baltic metropolitan areas in the perception of international tourists, according to our research, is indisputable. Other major cities in the Baltic region lag far behind the capital of Estonia by the attractiveness of restaurants. We might put forward the assumption that the success of Tallinn is due to the combination of high quality food, service culture and relatively low prices of restaurants in the Estonian capital as a working hypothesis. The restaurants of St. Petersburg and Moscow gave way to their counterparts from all the Baltic cities, and their lag even from the restaurants of Helsinki, located on the 7th place, is very significant.

The hierarchy of the attractiveness of restaurants in megacities in the Baltic region, established in Table 5, is most likely due to the ratio of local (Estonian, Latvian, Danish, Russian, etc.) and the world's great (Italian, Japanese, American, etc.) cuisines, and other characteristics: food quality, service, prices, etc. In other words, in the restaurants of megacities of the Baltic region, international tourists are mostly attracted not by the national and culinary genesis of food, but by the level of operation of these institutions. The culinary tradition of the country to which the food belongs is not as important as how skillfully it was cooked, how tasty, cheap, cordially and hospitably it was served, in what atmosphere the act of its consumption was carried out. In a global society, of which the Baltic region is an integral part, both gastronomic tastes and service canons are being globalized.

The attractiveness of the Baltic Region sights

An exceptional role in attracting tourists is played by the sights of megacities. The distinguished German philosopher A. Schopenhauer noted the peculiarities of the sightseeing of cities by international tourists, namely the freshness of their gaze, quite accurately. Describing the peculiarities of contemplation of the pure subject of knowledge in his work "The World as Will and Representation", he writes: "Further, since the novelty and the complete lack of knowledge of objects favors their unselfish, purely objective perception, this also explains that a foreigner or an ordinary tourist is impressed with the objects considered by them as picturesque or poetic, that are not capable of exerting a similar action on original residents; for example, an entirely unfamiliar city often produces a surprisingly pleasant impression on other people, and it fails to do so with its permanent residents, for this impression has its source in that the traveler, not having any relation to this city and its inhabitants, contemplates it quite objectively. That is part of the pleasure that travel is connected with" [28, p. 310]. The significance of the sights of a city is twofold: on the one hand, acquaintance with them, their contemplation enriches the personality of a tourist, and they give impetus to the development of the tourism industry on the other. Contemplation of the sights is often not worth even a euro cent or a penny for tourists, but cause attendant expenses while attracting tourists — purchase of the services of travel companies, guides, hotels, restaurants, etc. The exceptions are museums and other similar objects, the visit to which is usually paid.

TripAdvisor. com identifies objects of all types that may be of interest to tourists: architectural structures (unique historical and modern buildings, temples, fortresses, monasteries, etc.), monuments, sculptures, museums, art galleries, exhibitions, theaters, urban complexes (historical centers of cities, squares, public gardens, streets, fountains, etc.), urban and natural complexes (parks, zoos, water parks, embankments, etc.), observation platforms, economic objects of cultural interest (ports, markets, etc.), transport systems (stations, subways, canals, etc.), stadiums, cemeteries, etc. In the TripAdvisor. com classification, all of them are covered by two subject headings: 1) architectural, sculptural and town-planning sights in the broadest sense of these words[7] and 2) museums. Let us cal-

[7] In the original version, the expression "Sights&Landmarks" is used, and in the Russian version — "Landmarks and cultural objects". This refers to all of the above urban attractions, with the exception of museums, which are displayed in a separate section ("Museums"). In some cases, the same object appears twice in these two rubrics on TripAdvisor. com, but with the same set of tourist reviews. We are referring to the cases where a museum is located in a unique building, in which case this object is taken into account both as an architectural structure and

culate the arithmetic average of the indicators of attractiveness of the 30 most highly rated tourist sites falling under each of these two headings and determine the resulting value as an indicator of the attractiveness of the city's sights. In addition, we identify the number of sights of the Baltic region megacities under consideration, which have received over 1000 reviews from international tourists with an "excellent" rating. We summarize the data obtained (Table 6). The cities are ranked according to the indicator of attractiveness. It is calculated by the author according to the data as of December 16, 2018.

Table 6

The indicator of attractiveness of Baltic region sights

City	The indicator of attractiveness of sights, points	The number of sights that received more than 1000 reviews "excellent"
Berlin	1173	13
Stockholm	560	7
Saint Petersburg	534	6
Copenhagen	437	9
Moscow	360	5
Warsaw	292	5
Tallinn	222	2
Helsinki	183	2
Riga	137	1
Vilnius	118	1

Calculated by the author from the data for December 16th 2018.

Among all the megacities of the Baltic region, international tourists are most interested in the sights, memorials and museums in Berlin. In this respect, the capital of Germany is far ahead of Stockholm. St. Petersburg and Moscow took the third and fifth positions respectively, and the backlog of St. Petersburg from Stockholm is insignificant. The Danish capital unexpectedly surpassed the capital of Russia in the eyes of international tourists. Riga and Vilnius round out the top ten megacities of the Baltic region in this rating, as in the case with the hotel attractiveness rating.

It is quite logical that Berlin it turned out to have the largest number of attractions and memorial places, which received over 1000 "excellent" reviews. Copenhagen is second, and Stockholm third. Thus, Copenhagen

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as a set of exhibits. For example, St. Isaac's Cathedral, which is an architectural masterpiece that is admired from the outside, the streets of St. Petersburg, and a museum at the same time, that is, a collection of exhibits that are contemplated while inside the building of the cathedral. In such cases, each object was included in the analysis just once.

is inferior to Stockholm and St. Petersburg by the general attractiveness of the sights, and the Danish capital is ahead of the Swedish and northern capital of Russia in the number of sight-seeing masterpieces (in the perception of international tourists). Here, Moscow is in fifth place.

Let us list the sights of the megalopolises of the Baltic region, which attracted the greatest interest among international tourists. We mean attractions that have received over 3000 reviews rated "excellent". This list includes (we list the cities according to the number of sights mentioned and the number of excellent reviews): Berlin — Holocaust Memorial (10 174 reviews), Brandenburg Gate (10 093), Reichstag (10 067), Topography of Terror Museum (6367), Berlin Wall Memorial (4918), Museum of Pergamon (4438), East Side Gallery (3188); St. Petersburg — the State Hermitage Museum (8395), the Church of the Savior on Blood (6597), the Grand Palace in Peterhof (3410); Moscow — Red Square (4348), Moscow Metro (4133), St. Basil's Cathedral (3366); Stockholm — the Vasa Museum (12,541), Old Town (5874); Copenhagen — the Nyhavn port and channel (7550); Tallinn — the Old Town (5058); Warsaw — the Old Town (3446).

Therefore, the top ten of the most interesting sights and memorial places in the perception of international tourists of the megacities in the Baltic region considered (the number of "excellent" reviews from highest to lowest) looks like this: Vasa Museum (Stockholm), Holocaust Memorial, Brandenburg Gate, Reichstag (all three in Berlin), the State Hermitage Museum (St. Petersburg), Nyhavn (Copenhagen), the Church of the Savior on Blood (St. Petersburg), the Topography of Terror Museum (Berlin), the Old Town (Stockholm), the Old Town (Tallinn).

Thus, a large number of the most popular tourist attractions among international tourists turned out to be located in Berlin, but the major attraction of the Baltic region is still Stockholm — it is the Vasa Museum, in which the Swedish Vasa sailing ship is exhibited, built at the beginning of the 17th century and sunken immediately after launching, which determined its unique preservation. The sights of Moscow and, especially, St. Petersburg occupy quite decent positions in the tourist area of the Baltic region. The most outstanding attraction of Russia for international tourists is the State Hermitage Museum. If we proceed from the pragmatic spirit and language of the tourism industry, it should be emphasized that the beauty of both Russian capitals have excellent competitiveness in the Baltic and global tourist markets.

Integral attractiveness of the megacities in the Baltic Region

Based on the indicators of the attractiveness of hotels, restaurants and sights of the capital cities of the Baltic region, we are able to calculate the integral attractiveness from the point of view of international tourists using the above formula (Table 7).

Table 7

The indicator of integral attractiveness of megacities in the Baltic region

City	The indicator of integral attractiveness, Points
Berlin	566
Copenhagen	343
Stockholm	318
Tallinn	309
Warsaw	274
Helsinki	205
Riga	195
Saint Petersburg	182
Vilnius	161
Moscow	145

As a result of the study, we found that the most attractive metropolis of the Baltic countries in the perception of international tourists is Berlin. It overcomes other capitals by a colossal margin. The capital of Germany is made absolute leader by its excellent hotels and outstanding attractions. The second and third places are occupied by Copenhagen and Stockholm, respectively. In this regard, these three metropolises should be qualified as the three tourism capitals in the Baltic region. It was noted above that Germany, Denmark and Sweden are leaders in international tourism in the Baltic region. Our study of the attractiveness of the capital cities in the region suggests that the contribution they make to the potential attractiveness of these cities is enormous. Tallinn is only slightly behind Copenhagen and Stockholm, and we can confidently characterize the capital city of Estonia as a tourist subcapital of the Baltic region. Tallinn is ahead of both Russian capitals, Warsaw and Helsinki in attractiveness for international tourists. The capital of Estonia owes this primarily to its highly ranked restaurants.

St. Petersburg is of more interest to international tourists than Moscow. Yet, unfortunately, both Moscow and St. Petersburg took modest positions in the rating of the integral attractiveness of the Baltic metropolitan areas, which is due to the low attractiveness of their restaurants and hotels in the eyes of international tourists. Sights of two Russian capitals have a high level of attractiveness in the tourist area of the Baltic region (and the world).

Conclusion

In this article, the author made an attempt to study the attractiveness of 10 megacities of 9 countries in the Baltic region in the eyes of international tourists using their original method. The results of the study are by no means definitive and indisputable.

It was found that, in the perception of international tourists, the best hotels in the Baltic region are located in Berlin, Warsaw and Copenhagen, the best restaurants in Tallinn, Riga and Copenhagen, the best sights in Berlin, Stockholm and St. Petersburg. The most prominent cities of the region in terms of their integral tourism appeal are Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm, and this triangle forms the heart of international tourism in the Baltic region. A very remarkable result of our research was that Tallinn turned out to be the tourist sub-center of the Baltic region, ahead of many other regional capitals. Based on the results obtained, we have reason to believe that the three tenets of a practical tourist's mind in the Baltic region should be the following: spend the night in Berlin, Warsaw or Copenhagen, walk around Berlin, Stockholm or St. Petersburg, eat and drink in Tallinn, Riga or Copenhagen.

The research has shown that, as of today, Moscow and St. Petersburg occupy relatively modest positions in the tourist area of the Baltic region in general. International tourists admire the sights of both Russian capitals, yet Moscow and St. Petersburg hotels and restaurants are not as highly valued. Therefore, in order to strengthen Russia's position on the Baltic and world tourist maps, to develop the Russian tourism industry, it is necessary to improve the standards of Moscow and St. Petersburg hotels and restaurants, in addition to further cultivation of the tourist practices related to landmarks. For this, it would be entirely appropriate to study the achievements and experience of Russia's neighbours in the Baltic region, who have achieved remarkable success in the development of the tourism industry.

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TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN BORDER AREAS: A BENEFIT OR A BURDEN? THE CASE OF KARELIA

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Border regions are expected to benefit from their position when it comes to tourism development. In this article, I propose a new approach to interpreting the connection between an area's proximity to the national border and the development of tourism at the municipal level. The aim of this study is to identify the strengths and limitations of borderlands as regards the development of tourism in seven municipalities of Karelia. I examine summarised data available from online and other resources, as well as my own observations. Using median values, I rely on the method of content analysis of strategic documents on the development of cross-border municipalities of Karelia. My research focuses on the tourism and recreation potential of borderlands and analyses the development of local tourism infrastructure. I describe the major types of tourism, examine tourist flows, and consider the strategic aspects of tourism at the municipal level. I identify the strengths and limitations of the development of tourism in border areas by comparing the data on border and inland municipalities of Karelia and investigate the role of international border crossing points in the development of tourism in borderlands.

Keywords: borderlands, tourism, municipal districts, tourism infrastructure, tourist flow, road border crossing point, Republic of Karelia

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Introduction

As a tool to boost regional development, tourism has become the focus of borderland studies. A border location is considered beneficial for the development of regional tourism. Thus, it is logical to assume that border territories have a more considerable competitive advantage in terms of tourism promotion than the inland parts of a region. Although the presence of a border has a positive effect on the development of regional tourism (provided bordering territories have good neighbourly relations), one may ask whether this holds true at a municipal level. The article puts this question into the context of tourism development practices in the Karelian borderlands.

Tourism development in borderlands: theoretical overview

There is a considerable body of research on different aspects of tourism in borderlands and the contribution of the industry to regional development.

Recent transformations in the global community stimulated discussion on the effect of national borders on the tourism industry.

Proposed by J. Matznetter as early as 1979 [1], the typology of spatial effects of national borders on tourism was further developed in the 2000s by D.J. Timothy [2]. Both Russian and international researchers have addressed the impact of the emergence and disappearance of national borders on the tourism industry [3—6] and cross-border cooperation in tourism [7—9]. Studies focusing on transboundary tourist routes as a tool for tourism collaborations between border regions of neighbouring countries [10, 11], as well as on transboundary tourist mobility as a factor in the development of borderlands merit special attention [12, 13].

Socio-economic transformations and change in Russia's geopolitical standing in the international arena at the turn of the 21st century encouraged regional studies of Russian borderlands. At the time, the Republic of Karelia came to be considered a periphery region [14—16]. Since the 2000s, the research community have focused on both the industrial and tourism-recreational development of the territory [17; 18]. Researchers have also addressed transboundary relations in tourism, the development of tourism infrastructure, and the management of tourism development [19—23].

However, the current body of research provides only a general picture of tourism development and the benefits the Republic of Karelia enjoys due to its geographical location and geopolitical standing. There are few municipal-level studies into individual aspects of the tourism industry. This article attempts to fill this gap by identifying the advantages of and limitations to tourism development in borderlands in the case of Karelia, particularly, its border districts.

The methodological aspects of studying the Karelian borderlands

To examine the cause-effect relationship between tourism development and the border location of a territory, the following aspects were considered: tourism and recreation resources, the level of tourism infrastructure development, inbound tourism, types of tourism, and strategic management of tourism development. The study identifies the strengths and limitations of tourism development in borderlands by comparing data on the development of the industry in seven Karelian border municipalities and in ten inland districts. The capital district of Petrozavodsk is not taken into account.

The study relies on the analysis of integrated data from official online resources: websites of the administrations of border municipalities, the website of the Republic of Karelia, the republican Visitor Centre, booking. com, TripAdvisor, and the Unified Federal Registry of Russian Tour Operators. In addition, it presents summarised data on the standardised tourism passports of Karelian border districts obtained through literature study, observations, and median values. The content analysis of strategies for socio-economic development of border municipal regions was used to study the strategic management of tourism development.

The location of the Loukhi district (fig. 1) prevents from using municipality-level data and necessitates recalculations. Additionally, most tourism businesses, tourism infrastructure, and tourism and recreation resources in the district are concentrated in the eastern part of the area on the coast of the White Sea and along federal route R21. Thus, the data used in this article apply to the border area of the Loukhi district only.

Border municipalities in the Republic of Karelia: an overview

There are eighteen districts in the Republic of Karelia (fig. 1), four of them are located at the national border.

Fig. 1. The administrative division of the Republic of Karelia

The border districts differ significantly in size, population size and density, types of economic activities, and tourism and recreation resources. Their common feature differentiating them from the inland districts, alongside the access to the Russian — Finnish border, is the significant distance to the regional capital — the city of Petrozavodsk (on average, 464 km) (table 1).

Table 1

Overview of the border districts of the Republic of Karelia

Municipality (north-south)	Area, 1,000 km^2	Population as of 01.01.2018, people	Population change 2009—2018,%	Distance from the district centre to, km	
				Petrozavodsk	Nearest border checkpoint
Loukhi district*	22.55	11459	– 33	600	Suoperya-Kuusamo, 60
Kalevala district	13.26	6774	– 29.4	582	Lyuttya—Vartius, 170
Kostomuksha city district	4.04	29906	– 1.3	518	Lyuttya—Vartius, 30
Muyezersky district	17.66	10064	– 31.5	464	Lyuttya —Vartius, 180
Suoyarvi district	13.74	15867	– 25.5	128	Vyartsilya-Niirala, 190
Sortavala distrcit	2.19	31039	– 6.2	289	Vyartsilya-Niirala, 57
Lahdenpohja district	2.21	12892	– 16.3	302	Vyartsilya-Niirala,180
Borderland average	13.26	12892	– 25.5	464	—
Inland district average	7.21	19340	– 19.8	246	—

Prepared and calculated based on: *Respublika Kareliya v tsifrakh 2012* [*The Republic of Karelia in digits, 2012*]. Petrozavodsk, 2012; *Respublika Kareliya v tsifrakh 2018* [*The Republic of Karelia in digits, 2018*]. Petrozavodsk, 2018.

* In view of the specific features of the district, the distance was calculated from the village of Pyaozersky

The border municipalities have larger areas and sparser population comparing to the inland districts. A negative trend observed in the Republic of Karelia and its border districts is population decline accompanied by the growing proportion of the senior population. The rate of population decline in the borderlands is above the regional average: 25.5 % against 19.8 % in 2009—2018. The most affected areas are the Loukhi, Muyezersky, and Kalevala municipalities (–30 %). To some degree, the exceptions are the Kostomuksha city district and the Sortavala district, where the decline rate is lower. This is explained by broader employment opportunities in the areas.

It is important to take into account how the borderlands were developing in the Soviet period when due to ideological reasons access to these areas was restricted even for the country's nationals [24]. The vicinity to the capitalist state of Finland reinforced the barrier function of the border and resulted in poor development of transport infrastructure as compared to other northwestern regions [14]. The past still hampers the socio-economic development of the border municipalities and imposes limitations on various economic activities, including tourism.

At the turn of the 21st century, socio-economic changes affected relations between Russia and its neighbours, creating a framework for new political, economic, and cultural dialogue between countries on either side of the border. The contact function of the border came to prevail over the barrier one [25; 26].

In most Karelian border districts, principal economic activities rely heavily on the local natural resources. These municipalities specialise in logging, woodworking and mining. The largest local enterprise is the mining facility in Kostamuksha. There are metallurgic, food processing, agricultural, and service companies, as well as pulp mills, in the border districts. In recent years, tourism and recreation services have become a priority in the socio-economic development of the areas.

Tourism and recreation resources of the Karelian borderlands

The tourism industry cannot develop without tourism and recreation resources. Border municipalities of the Republic of Karelia have unique natural and manmade resources. The existence of most of them is attributed to the vicinity to the border. Some local tourist attractions are of national and even international significance.

The Green Belt of Fennoscandia, a unique natural complex, stretches along the national border from the Barents to the Baltic Sea. The tight border regime made it possible to preserve large areas of natural ecosystems along the border between the capitalist and the socialist blocs. Later, international projects helped to create a system of federal and regional conservation areas along the Karelian section of the border. Eighty per cent of the territory spanning 1/3 million ha is Russian. The belt has many potential tourist attractions unrivalled by those in any other border region of the country. The most important conservation areas are the Paanajarvi national park (1992, 104,000 ha) in the Loukhi district, the Kostomuksha national reserve (1983, 49,000 ha), and the Valaam archipelago national park (1999, 24,000 ha) [27—29]. Regulation of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1684 of December 28, 2017, established a new national park, the Ladoga Skerries, of an area of 122,000 ha within the system of the conservation areas.

The border municipalities also have unique cultural and historical heritage:

— the rune-song villages that have preserved their ancient traditions (the village of Kestenga in the Loukhi district, the village of Kalevala in the Kalevala national district, the village of Voknavolok in the Kostamuksha city district). At the turn of the 20th century, when the Grand Duchy of Finland was a part of the Russian Empire, there was significant interest in the tourist routes crossing the rune-song territories of today's Karelia. This wave of enthusiasm was attributed to the publication of the Karelian-Finnish epic *Kalevala*;

— the border town of Sortavala included in the List of the Historical Cities of Russia. It was founded by Swedes in the mid-17th century. Having changed its allegiance many times, it has retained its unique architecture. The town is justly famed as the jewel of the Northern Ladoga region (the area includes the Sortavala, Lahdenpohja and Pitkyarana districts, the latter being an inland municipality);

— historical (Kollasyarvi in the Suoyarvi district) and military (the Owl Mountain, a command and communications bunker of the Finnish Army in 1943—1945, one of the largest underground museums of Northern Europe, 2016) memorials telling the military history of the borderlands.

Overall, the seven border municipalities are home to 42 % of the Karelian cultural heritage sites included in the Unified State Registry. Sixteen per cent is located in the Sortavala district,[1] the most significant sights being the Valaam Monastery and the Rusekala mountain park. A considerable proportion of the cultural sites has been identified but not yet included in the registry.

The development of tourism infrastructure

Tourism infrastructure is a prerequisite for the development of tourism and recreation. A comparison of the integrated indicator and the structural element indicator values helps to identify territorial disparities across the Republic of Karelia and the standing of its borderlands in terms of tourism infrastructure development (table 2, for more detail on the calculation methodology, see [30]).

[1] The Republican Centre for the Publication Protection of Cultural Heritage. *Obyekty kulturnogo naslediya [Cultural heritage]*. Available at: http://monuments.karelia.ru/ob-ekty-kul-turnogo-nasledija/ (accessed 19.03.2019).

Table 2

The methodology for calculating the level of tourism infrastructure development in municipalities

Formula	Comment
$i_{dj} = \frac{F_{dj}}{m}$	i_{dj} is the index of the j^{th} indicator of the d^{th} district F_{dj} is the actual value of the j^{th} indicator of the d^{th} district m j — the median of the j^{th} indicatorof the district
$I_{dk} = \frac{1}{x} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{x} i_{dj}$	I_{dk} is the indicator of the development of the k^{th} structural element of the tourism infrastructure of the d^{th} district x is the number of the selected indicators of the structural element of tourism infrastructure
$I_d = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{k=1}^{n} i_{dk}$	I_d is the integrated indicator of tourism infrastructure development in the d^{th} district n is the number of the structural elements of the tourist infrastructure

To identify the cause-effect relationship between the development of tourism infrastructure and the vicinity of a municipality to the state border, it seems logical and sufficient to analyse the following measures associated with the structural elements:

1) accommodation infrastructure: the number of accommodation facilities (units); the number of beds, including those at campsites and health resorts (units);

2) the food services infrastructure: the number of restaurants, cafes, and bars (units); the number of seats in them (units);

3) the entertainment infrastructure: the number of museums, exhibition halls (units) and outdoor activity centres, including boating clubs, skiing facilities, horse riding arenas, etc. (units).

According to the integrated indicator calculations, the level of the development of tourism infrastructure in the border municipalities is below that in the inland districts (0.85 against 1.08). Four of the border municipalities are classified as areas of moderate (<1) and poor (<0.5) development of tourism infrastructure. These are the Kalevala national district (0.85), the Loukhi district (0.51), the Suoyarvi district (0.48), and the Muyezersky district (0.23). The areas of developed tourism infrastructure (1.4—2.8) are the Sortavala district, Kostomuksha city district, and the Lahdenpohja district.

The distribution of municipalities by the level of development of the structural elements of tourism infrastructure (fig. 2) shows that the high ranking of the Lahdenpohja municipality is attributed to the significant number of entertainment facilities, whereas its food services infrastructure is relatively sparse.

The median values of the structural element indicators of tourism infrastructure in the border districts are rather low, ranging from 0.75 for the accommodation infrastructure (1.22 in the inland districts) and <0.5 for the food services infrastructure (1.02). The only exception is the entertainment infrastructure, where the median value us 1.4 (0.86 for the inland municipalities), although the Loukhi, Suoyarvi, and Muyezersky districts underperform in this respect.



Fig. 2. The Karelian municipalities by the level
of tourism infrastructure development, 2017:
X (accommodation infrastructure); Y (food services infrastructure):
Z (the size of the circles corresponds to the level
of the entertainment infrastructure development)

Spatial disparities in the distribution of tourism infrastructure are a national trend. They are accounted for by the features of local tourism and recreation resources and prospects for the development of the corresponding industries. In the Karelian borderlands, the accommodation infrastructure is concentrated along the shorelines of lakes (primarily, that of Lake Ladoga, the largest lake in Europe) and in popular tourist destinations (for example, the village of Voknavolok). The food services infrastructure is gravitating towards the centres of municipalities.

The quality of services provided by the regional tourism industry was evaluated based on customer reviews and expert opinions voiced at the annual Karelian Tourism Industry competition held in the region for eighteen years. Every year, companies from the Sortavala district win awards in several categories. However, recently they have been joined by their counterparts from the Kostomuksha city district.[2]

According to the Standardised Federal Register of Tour Operators, out of sixty Karelian organisations working in the field, only eleven are located in the border municipalities. Four of them are in the Sortavala district and three are in the Kostomuksha district. There are no registered tour operators in the Lahdenpohja district or in the part of the Loukhi district covered in this study. This reduces the possibilities for both the promotion of the area and tourism development. However, a chain of travel agencies works in these districts and the tourism services rendered by the border districts are included in the offers of tour operators from other municipalities, including companies from Petrozavodsk and Moscow. Moreover, the republican Visitor Centre located in Petrozavodsk makes a significant contribution to the promotion of the borderlands as tourist destinations. The districts of the Northern Ladoga region have a significant advantage over the other border municipalities, namely, a Visit Centre that has opened in the town of Sortalva.

Incoming tourism and types of tourism

The border municipalities account for a third of inbound tourism in the Republic of Karelia (35 %).[3] A typical tourist comes from Saint Petersburg, the Leningrad region, or Moscow, booking accommodation and organising entertainment himself or herself. Such visitors account for 50—85 % of total inbound tourism. Most tourists come to the Karelian borderlands in summer. The Sortavala district receives the most significant proportion of tourists (fig. 3). In 2018, about 100,000 tourists and pilgrims from across the world visited Valaam, whereas the first Russian mountain park, Rusekala, attracted over 300,000 people (the number of visitors increased fortyfold in 2006—2017 [21]).

[2] Karelia. The tourist portal. *Lidery karelskogo turbiznesa [The leaders of the Karelian tourism industry]*. Available at: http://www.ticrk.ru/useful/konkurs-lidery-karelskogo-turbiznesa/ (accessed 19.03.2019).

[3] Tourism Department. *Unifitsirovannyu turistiskiy passport Respubliki Kareliya [The standardised tourism passport of the Republic of Karelia]*. Petrozavodsk, 2018.



Fig. 3. Inbound tourism in the border municipalities
of the Republic of Karelia

The popularity of the Sortavala district is explained by its considerable tourism and recreation resources, the history of the conquest of the Northern Ladoga region, and the favourable economic and geographical location (border checkpoints, regular road and rail links to Saint Petersburg).

Border checkpoints play an important role in the development of tourism and recreation in border regions. This is particularly true of transboundary tourism. The busiest checkpoint is Vyartsilya-Niirala. On average, it was crossed by 1.5 million people per year in 2012—2017, which is 74 % of the total traffic across the Karelian section of the Russian—Finnish national border.

In the 1990s, a major impetus for the development of regional tourism came from 'nostalgic' Finnish tourists coming to the Northern Ladoga region. Most of them visited the Sortavala district. Major socio-economic changes in the country, accompanied by the opening of the border checkpoints and the simplification of visa regime attracted international tourists and encouraged the development of private entrepreneurship. During that period, tourism was emerging as a sector of the regional economy. It ensured tax revenues and created jobs: this was very much at odds with the Soviet interpretation of tourism as leisure and socialising. The number of Finnish tourists reached 700,000 people per year. About one hundred private travel companies opened in the region [15; 17; 26]. For example, in the 1990s, an increase in transboundary travel to the Sortavala district encouraged a local resident to open a small café called Kolmas in the village of Vyartsilya, two kilometres away from the border checkpoint. The establishment is operating to this day. Later, inbound nostalgic tourism was gradually replaced by shopping tourism. According to I. Bjorn, the 'fill up trips' from Finland to the Republic of Karelia last only several hours, and three out four Finnish citizens never go any further than the village of Vyartsilya [31]. It is worth mentioning that the distance from Joensuu, the capital of the Finnish region of North Karelia, to Sortavala is 120 km, which means a three-hour journey by bus (there is a regular bus link). Businesspeople are another source of income for the residents of border municipalities on either side of the border [26].

The other border municipalities also entertain the idea of developing transboundary tourism and attracting Finnish tourists. According to strategy documents, the 'prospects of the further development of tourism in the Loukhi district are associated with international tourism'[4], whereas the Suoyarvi district is expected to 'maintain transboundary traffic'.[5]

[4] The administration of the Louhi municipality. *The programme for the comprehensive socio-economic development of the Louhi municipality for 2016—2020.* Available at: http://louhiadm.ru/munitsipalnie_programmi/1284031004.html (accessed 19.03.2019).

[5] The Administration of the Suojarvi municipality. *The municipal programme for tourism development in the Suojarvi municipality for 2018—2023: resolution of the Administration of the Suojarvi municipality of March 30, 2018 No. 217a.* Available at: suojarvi. ru/end/ (accessed 19.03.2019).

Today, the most popular types of tourism in the Karelian borderlands are educational tourism, ecotourism, and event tourism. The borderlands are unlocking their potential to hold international events, the most significant of them being:

— the international chamber music festival, the Nordsession rock festival, and the Kanteletar folk festival in Kostomuskha; the Enlightener orthodox singing festival and Ruskeala Symphony in the Sortavala district;

— a round of the Russian Rally cup, the White Nights and Jaakkia rallies, the 'Karelia' Russian classical rally championship, the world's only snow-and-ice rally, and 'Russia — Northern Forest' Baja — a round of the FIA World Cup (the Sortavala and Lahdenpohja districts);

— military-historical festivals.

Strategic approaches to tourism development

Since the 1990s, when the benefits of tourism development became apparent, the Republic of Karelia has been devising and improving a system of strategic management in the industry. The 2007 General Layout of Tourist Sights and Tourism Infrastructure in the Republic of Karelia identified twelve tourism zones, five of which were located in the border districts [18]: the Pyaozersky zone (Loukhi district), the Kalevala, Muyezersky, and Suoyarvi zones in the districts of the same name, and the Ladoga zone spanning the Sortavala, Lahdenpohja, and Pitkyaranta districts.

At the national level, the federal target programme for the development of the Republic of Karelia until 2020 mentions among the other competitive advantages of the region its economic-geographical location (border checkpoints, simplified checkpoints, border crossing infrastructure) and strong commercial and economic ties (successful completion of cross-border cooperation programmes).[6] All this is of special importance for tourism development in the border municipalities. The federal target programme includes the reconstruction and re-equipment of the border checkpoint in the Lahdenpohja district, particularly, for developing inbound tourism.

At the regional level, resolution of the Republic of Karelia of December 24, 2015, No. 814r-P on implementing the Investment Strategy of the Republic of Karelia until 2025 introduced regular monitoring of investment projects, including those in tourism. About thirteen investment projects have been (or will be) launched in the region. Five of them deal with three border municipalities: the Kostomuksha city district and the Sort-

[6] The Government of the Russian Federation. *The federal target programme for the development of the Republic of Karelia until 2020: resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 9, 2015 Np. 570*. Available at: government.ru/docs/all/102226/ (accessed 19.03.2019).

avala and Lahdenpohja districts (as of January 1, 2019). These projects are expected to attract about 3.4 billion roubles and create about 350 jobs in the districts by 2020—2025.[7]

At the municipal level, the significance of tourism development has been emphasised in programmes and strategies for the socio-economic development of the border districts. In general, the implementation of municipal programmes for tourism development will increase the contribution of the industry to the socio-economic development of the borderlands, enhance their investment attractiveness, improve tourism infrastructure, which caters to both visitors and local residents, and create a competitive tourism product. Historically, the border districts were the first municipalities to embrace strategic planning and tourism management (including the devising and approval of municipal target programmes). This happened as early as 1999—2000.

According to municipal strategic documents, obstacles to tourism development in the borderlands are as follows:

- poor development of tourism infrastructure;
- the absence or poor condition of transport systems;
- the insufficient employment of local resources;
- insufficient promotion;
- the poor condition of sights.

In recent decades, the border location of the Republic of Karelia has encouraged several projects co-financed by the European Union, Russia, and Finland. The border municipalities of the Republic of Karelia are highly interested in launching international projects in tourism.

Conclusion

Tourism is a priority and a promising area of the socio-economic development of the Republic of Karelia and its municipalities. In the 1990s, the border location of the region gave a major impetus for the emergence of tourism as an economic activity.

Significant research groundwork and experience in tourism development in the border municipalities may lead one to interpret the border location of the region as a considerable advantage in terms of tourism development. However, this assumption does not seem to be completely true at a municipal level. The study made it possible to identify both the strengths and limitations of the border municipalities of the Republic of Karelia.

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[7] The investment portal of the Republic of Karelia. *Monitoring realizatsii investitsionnykh proketov [Investment project monitoring]*. Available at: http://kareliainvest.ru/republic-for-investors/investitsionnye-proekty-i-predlozheniya/monitoring-realizatsii-investitsionnykh-proektov/ (accessed 19.03.2019).

The strength of the Karelian borderlands is their natural and manmade tourism and recreation resources, which have survived to this day partly due to their vicinity to the border. At the same time, there are several limitations to tourism development in the border areas. Firstly, it is the significant distance from the centres of the municipalities to Petrozavodsk, which is the regional hub (the median value is 464 km, whereas the Republic of Karelia measures 660 km from north to south and 424 km from west to east). Secondly, it is the rapid rate of population decline across all the border municipalities. Thirdly, the national border both gives transboundary cooperation and mobility opportunities and imposes limitations on the movement of people and capital in the border areas.[8] Fourthly, the poor condition of transport infrastructure prevents the development of tourism and recreation (this problem is partly rooted in the past). Fifthly, the development of tourism infrastructure is insufficient in the Karelian borderlands with the exception of the Sortavala district, the Kostamuksha city district, and the Lahdenpohja district.

Tourism has been developing in the republic as an economic activity for only a few decades. Additionally, the border municipalities were suffering from much more serious restrictions than the inland ones in the past. Therefore, one must acknowledge that the borderlands have done a lot to integrate into the regional tourism and recreation system and that they have achieved considerable success.

Overall, the experience of the Karelian borderlands shows that the border location of a district is not an immediate benefit when it comes to tourism development. The history of the borderlands and recent restrictions prevent the tourism and recreation resources of the Karelian border municipalities from being used to their full extent. The most impressive results in tourism development were obtained by the areas that boast a developed transport infrastructure, considerable social capital, good-neighbourly relations with territories on the other side of the border, and unique tourism and recreation resources of national and international renown, the latter being a product of joint efforts of authorities, businesses, and local communities. At the same time, well-functioning border checkpoints play an important role in tourism development.

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[8] Federal Security Service of Russia. *On the approval of the border regime: order of the Federal Security Service of Russia of August 7, 2017 No. 454 (version of June 19, 2018). Accessed via the Garant legal information service.*

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GEOPOLITICAL RESEARCH

MODERN GEOPOLITICAL RESEARCH IN RUSSIA

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In this article, we present the results of our study into the contribution of geography to modern geopolitics in Russia. We stress the interdisciplinary nature of geopolitical studies and identify ensuing problems. Using content analysis of the eLIBRARY bibliography database and Elsevier's abstract and citation database Scopus, we conclude that geography has considerably affected the development of modern geopolitics in Russia. The contribution of geographers is rather modest considering the number of PhD theses and research publications. However, it becomes more visible when textbooks only are taken into account. Geographical studies are an indispensable part of geopolitical research, which we identified using the object-subject criteria reflecting the effect that properties of territories have on the policies of states located within them. This relates to marine geopolitics, ethnic geopolitics, geoeconomics, ecopolitics, political geoconflict studies, and mediageopolitics. We consider geopolitics and ethnic geopolitics to be priority areas of geographical and geopolitical studies. Geography plays a major role in the comprehensive geopolitical studies into territories of different size. Geopolitics of post-Soviet space, geopolitics of Russia, domestic geopolitics, and critical geopolitics examine the combined effect of the properties of territories on the policies of states implemented in them. We stress that most geographical and geopolitical works focus on analysing the geopolitical location of territories, the geopolitical interests of states, and the identification of mechanisms behind the geopolitical vision of the population.

Keywords: geography, geopolitics, content-analysis, geopolitical location of territory, geopolitical interests of states,

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eLIBRARY, Scopus, academic database, scientometics

Although in Russia, geopolitics is a young research area with quite an ambiguous history, it has merited the attention of academia, the political community, and a wider audience. Geopolitics is a product of political geography and military science. Today, it is developed in Russia by political scientists, philosophers, historians, economists, sociologists, lawyers, and other researchers. Their texts often state that the geographical foundation of the theoretical framework of geopolitics is becoming eroded. The science of geopolitics studies how the properties of a territory affect the politics of the states located within it. In other words, a geopolitical study requires deep knowledge of the properties of a territory. This is a natural skill for geographers and a conditional skill for other experts.

The young age of the science, its ambiguous history, and the interdisciplinary nature of the studies translate in Russia into the absence of a single universally accepted methodology and conceptual framework. When solving research problems, each expert uses the tools of the science of his or her specialisation. Moreover, the popularity of geopolitics with non-specialists oversimplifies geopolitical texts, supplements everyday lexis with scientific terms, and gives the reader the wrong idea that geopolitics equals the foreign policy of a state. Taken together, these features of the science both prevent non-geographers from a correct understanding and a sound discussion of geopolitical studies and make geopolitical texts less comprehensible. Today's politicised society emphases the political aspect of geopolitics and ignores its geographical component. The question of how geography and geopolitics correlate in the modern world (if they do at all) is left hanging in mid-air. In this study, we will look for an answer to this question.

Methods

To understand the contribution of modern geography to Russian geopolitical studies, we conducted content analysis of two abstract and citation databases. The first one is eLIBRARY, one of the most open and comprehensive bibliographic databases that index geopolitical literature. The second is Scopus, the world's largest abstract and citation database. Today, visitors of eLIBRARY. RU have access to the abstracts and full texts of over 26 million research articles and publications, including over 5,300 Russian journals in science and technology. Over 24,000 journals in science, technology, and medicine from about 5,000 international publishers are indexed in Scopus.

We searched the eLIBRARY database for titles, abstracts, and keywords containing the word *geopolitics*. The search covered three types of publications: dissertations, books, and journal articles. Conference proceedings, reports, patents, and deposited manuscripts were not analysed. We did not take into account references and full-text matches.

As to Scopus, we used the following search strings: *TITLE-ABS-KEY (geopolitic*)* and *AFFILCOUNTRY (russia*).* That is, we searched the database for titles, abstracts, and keywords containing the English term *geopolitics*, whereas our search was restricted to publications by authors with a Russian affiliation.

Our analysis of Scopus covered the most popular types of publications available through the database: articles (454), reviews (69), conference papers (41), book chapters (18), books (11), articles in press (3), editorials (1), notes (1).[1]

Below we will detail the technical aspects of our analysis and thus provide a better understanding of the results obtained. Firstly, in eLIBRARY, the research field of a publication is determined by the database operator, using the system's classifier of the subject category of the journal, whereas the author's field of inquiry is not taken into account (this does not apply to dissertations). In Scopus, the subject area of a publication is the category of the journal. Secondly, a study can span several disciplines (for instance, geography, politics, philosophy, etc.). Thirdly, the decision on whether the subject area of a publication is geopolitics is made by the author when he or she uses this term in the abstract, the title, or keywords.

Results and discussion

Our study demonstrated that out of 46 eLIBRARY-indexed *dissertations* on geopolitics defended in Russia in 1991—2015, only 2 % is for a degree in geography (table 1). In absolute figures, it is one dissertation (authored by A. B. Elatskov). This is quite surprising since the community of economic geographers includes many researchers who defended works with greater or lesser relevance to geopolitics during this period. The reason for that is quite simple. Most dissertations submitted for a degree in geography are studies in political geography, which considers geopolitics as its constituent subject area. Out of 1,500 dissertations prepared during the study period for a degree in economic, social, political, and recreational geography, one hundred mentioned geopolitics as a keyword. Twelve of them have a direct bearing on the subject. Apparently, the authors (including the authors of this article) did not deem it necessary to articulate the connection of their works to geopolitics in either

[1] *For more* detail on this publication typology, see the Scopus Content Coverage Guide. URL: https://www.elsevier.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/69451/0597-Scopus-Content-Coverage-Guide-US-LETTER-v4-HI-singles-no-ticks.pdf (accessed: 18.06.2019).

abstract or keywords, thus classifying them as contributions to political geography.

Table 1

The subject areas of eLIBRARY-indexed dissertations, books, and articles in geopolitics (1991—2015), items /%

Discipline code	*eLIBRARY* subject category	Dissertations (46 total)	Books (869 total)	Journal articles (3949 total)
11.00.00	Politics. Political sciences	33 / 72	558 / 25	2457 / 29
02.00.00	Philosophy	6 / 13	717 / 32	580 / 7
03.00.00	History. Historical sciences	5 / 11	184 / 8	1016 / 12
10.00.00	State and law. Legal sciences	1 / 2	123 / 5	813 / 10
39.00.00	Geography	1 / 2	65 / 3	213 / 2
06.00.00	Economics. Economic sciences	—	263 / 12	1516 / 18
04.00.00	Sociology	—	237 / 11	1272 / 15
14.00.00	Popular education. Pedagogy	—	39 / 2	261 / 3
13.00.00	Culture. Cultural studies	—	29 / 1	247 / 3
21.00.00	Religion. Atheism	—	16 / 1	68 / 1
19.00.00	Mass communications, Journalism, Mass media	—	8 / 0.4	88 / 1
	Total	46	2239	8531

Prepared and calculated by the authors using eLIBRARY data.

As to *books,* the situation is very similar: only 3 % are classified as works in geography by the eLIBRARY system, which fully conforms to the State Classifier of Research and Engineering Information (SCREI). Moreover, not all of the authors are geographers. Alongside prominent economic geographers focusing to a greater or lesser degree on geopolitical aspects (V. L. Baburin, P. Ya. Baklanov, L. A. Bezrukov, Yu. N. Gladky, A. G. Druzhinin, A. B. Elatskov, D. N. Zamyatin, Yu. M. Zverev, N. V. Kaledin, V. A. Kolosov, N. S. Mionenko, A. I. Treyvish, R. F. Turovsky, G. M. Fedorov, V. A. Shuper, and others), the database returns the names of eminent historians (K. S. Gadzhiev, Yu. F. Lukin, A. S. Makaychev), philosophers (A. G. Dugin, V. M. Rusakov, N. A. Vailyeva), political scientists (M. V. Bratersky, A. B. Volynchuk, I.Yu. Okunev), and experts in other fields. Easily associating their geopolitical studies with geography, they are not apprehensive of playing on a 'foreign turf'.

Obviously, the research field of dissertations and books in geopolitics does not provide full and objective information that could help us understand what place geography holds in geopolitical studies. The reason for that is that most findings are published in journal articles.

At first glance, the situation seems to be more optimistic when periodicals are considered. Out of 121 eLIBRARY-indexed journals, in which geographers published their works on geopolitics, 25 (21 %), according to the SCREI are assigned to geography and 7 (6 %) to the subject area referred to as 'comprehensive study of territories'. In other words, about a third of journals in which geographers published their geopolitical works have a direct bearing on geography.

Despite the wide popularity of geopolitics and the resultant (quite regrettable) abundance of populist texts, most journals publishing geographers' contributions to the field are respectable academic periodicals. Eighty-seven per cent are indexed by the Russian Science Citation Index (RSCI). Sixty-seven per cent are included in the list of peer-reviewed periodicals entitled to publish the findings of dissertations submitted for a research degree (the list of the Higher Attestation Committee [HAC]). Six per cent are indexed in the Scopus abstract and citation database (table 2). Similarly to dissertations and books, most of the journals focus on economics, history, and political science. To a degree, this is explained by the interdisciplinary nature of political science. However, the proportion of geographical journals in the eLIBRARY database is extremely low (journals assigned to geography account for 1.2 % of all the periodicals and those assigned to the category 'comprehensive study of countries and regions' for 0.4 %).[2]

Table 2

The status and research field of major journals publishing geographers' contributions in geopolitics

Code	eLIBRARY subject area classifier	HAC	RSCI	SCOPUS[3]
06.00.00	Economics. Economic sciences	35	40	3
03.00.00	History. Historical sciences	30	35	2
11.00.00	Politics. Political science	30	34	3
39.00.00	Geography	12	17	2
04.00.00	Sociology	16	21	1
23.00.00	Comprehensive study of territories	3	6	1

Prepared and calculated by the authors using eLIBRARY data (numbers stand for the number of journals with a respective status).

[2] Data on eLIBRARY journals. URL: https://elibrary.ru/rubrics.asp (accessed 15.01.2019).

[3] Information on Scopus-indexed journals presented in table 2 was obtained using eLIBRARY data.

The same journal can be assigned to more than one category. This is proven by analysis of the subject areas of HAC journals where geographer's geopolitical works have appeared. Our analysis shows that, out of 81 journals, nine are assigned to the 'geography' category (although this assignment is non-exclusive). Three journals are purely geographical: geography being their only subject area. These are the *Izvestiya* of the Russian Academy of Sciences (geography series), the *Vestnik* of Moscow State University (Series 5: geography), and, with some reservations, the *Uchenye zapiski* of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University (the journal is assigned to the categories 'geology', and 'geography'). However, having published only one or two geopolitical publications, these journals rank lowest as regards the number of such contributions (fig. 1). For obvious reasons, the leaders in this respects are journals in political science: the *Izvestsiya* of Irkutsk State University (political and religious studies series [five publications]), the *Politicheskaya nauka* (five publications), the *Sravnitelnaya politika* (three), and the *Geopolitika and bezopasnost* (three). A noticeable number of geopolitical articles has been published in periodicals specialising in social issues (history, philosophy, sociology) or multidisciplinary journals.



Fig. 1. The ranking of HAC journal as regards the number of geographers' publications in geopolitics, 1995—2017 (journals assigned to the category 'geography' are in grey)

Prepared by the authors using eLIBRARY data.

In 1995—2017, 539 geopolitical publications by Russian authors were indexed in Scopus. These articles were published in 244 periodicals assigned to eight subject areas:[4] social sciences (36.1 %), economics, econometrics, and finance (18.3 %), arts and humanities (13.9 %), business and management (5.6 %), Earth sciences (5.4 %), and others.

The SCREI categories of 'geography' and 'comprehensive study of territories' correspond to subject area 3305 'Geography, Planning and Development', which is assigned to social sciences (table 3). This area accounts for slightly above 11 % of all the publications.

Table 3

The subject areas of Scopus-indexed publications in geopolitics, 1995—2017

Code[5]	Scopus classification	Articles	
		items	%
3320	Political science and international relations	98	27
3312	Sociology and political science	48	13.2
3300	Social sciences (all)	43	11.8
3305	Geography, planning, and development	41	11.3
3316	Cultural studies	31	8.5
3303	Development	30	8.3
3308	Law	11	3.0
3310	Linguistics	11	3.0
	Other	25	20.6

Source: prepared by the authors based on Scopus data.

As to Scopus[6]- and eLIBRARY-indexed periodicals, Russian authors of geopolitical studies prefer journals in political science (30 %) to those in geography (11 %). This fact may be considered as a positive phenomenon, an instance of cooperation among specialists in allied sciences studying the same object. The *World Economy and International Relations*, a bilingual journal at the interface of economics and political science, ranks first (table 4) for the number of geopolitical publications that appeared in 1995—2017 (26).

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[4] In the Scopus database, the subject areas of a publication is that of the journal in which it appeared.

[5] *Scopus* uses the *ASJC Code*.

[6] In this case, we consider Scopus-indexed journals in the 'social sciences' subject area.

Table 4

The top 10 Scopus-indexed journals publishing geopolitical articles by Russian authors

ISSN	Source	Number of publications	Max. quartile	Country	Publisher (according to *Scopus*)	Years when indexed in Scopus	Scopus subject area	eLIBRARY subject area	Original (Russian) version
1312227	World Economy and International Relations	26	Q3	Russia	Primakov National Research Institute	2016—	Economics and Econometrics (Q3); Political Science and International Relations (Q3)	06.00.00 Economics. Economic sciences; 11.00.00 Politics. Political science	Мировая экономика и международные отношения
14037068, 14046091	Central Asia and the Caucasus	22	Q3	Sweden *(Azerbaijan[1])*	CA and CC Press AB	2013—	Engineering — Ocean Engineering; Social Sciences — Development; Political Science and International Relations	23.00.00 Comprehensive study of countries and regions	Центральная Азия и Кавказ
251569	Man in India	18	Q3	India	Man In India	1971, 1973, 1976—1984, 1986—1988, 1991—1998, 2000—2017 (исключен)	Arts and Humanities — History; Social Sciences — Cultural Studies	03.00.00 History. Historical sciences; 13.00.00 Culture. Cultural studies	

[1] An outlet for social and political research, the *Central Asia and Caucasus* journal is collaboration between the Swedish Institute for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies and the Institute for Strategic Caucasian Studies of the Republic of Azerbaijan. It is published in Russian and English.

Continuation of table 4

ISSN	Source	Number of publications	Max. quartile	Country	Publisher (according to *Scopus*)	Years when indexed in Scopus	Scopus subject area	eLIBRARY subject area	Original (Russian) version
20739745	Bylye Gody	13	Q2	Russia	State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Training, Sochi State University	2012—	Arts and Humanities — History (Q2); Social Sciences — Political Science and International Relations (Q3)	03.00.00 History. Historical sciences; 03.23.00 History of Russia	Былые годы. Российский исторический журнал
21464138	International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues	12	Q3	Turkey	EconJournals	2011—2016 (excluded)	Economics, Econometrics and Finance — Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)	06.00.00 Economics. Economic sciences	
20799713, 20799705	Regional Research of Russia	11	Q3	US *(Russia[1])*	Springer Science + Business Media	2011—	Earth and Planetary Sciences — Earth and Planetary Sciences (miscellaneous); Social Sciences — Geography, Planning and Development	04.00.00 Sociology; 06.00.00 Economics. Economic sciences; 39.00.00 Geography	Известия Российской академии наук. Серия географическая; Регион: Экономика и социология; Известия Русского географического общества

[1] Although Scopus classifies this journal as published in the US (*Springer*), in effect, it is issued by the Russian publishing group MAIK/Interperiodika. This periodical offers translations for the English-speaking audience of the best articles from three Russian journals: the *Izvestiya* of the Russian Academy of Sciences (geography series), the *Region: ekonomika i sotsiologiya (Region: Economics and Sociology),* and the *Izvestya* of the Russian Geographical society. Thus, in terms of geography, it is a Russian periodical.

End of table 4

ISSN	Source	Number of publications	Max. quartile	Country	Publisher (according to *Scopus*)	Years when indexed in Scopus	Scopus subject area	eLIBRARY subject area	Original (Russian) version
10757007	Studies on Russian Economic Develop-ment	9	Q3	Russia	Maik Nauka/Interperiodica Publishing	1993, 1995, 2006—	Economics, Economet-rics and Finance — Economics and Econo-metrics	06.91.00 National economies	Проблемы про-гнозирования
20729286	Novyj Istoriceskij Vestnik	9	Q4	Russia	Izd-vo Ippolitova	2012—	Arts and Humanities — History	03.23.00 History of Russia	Новый истори-ческий вестник
10269487, 16840070	Polis (Russian Federation)	9	Q3	Russia	Noncommercial Partnership Editorial Board Polis	2016—	Social Sciences — So-ciology and Political Science	11.00.00 Politics. Political science	Полис. Полити-ческие иссле-дования
2017083	Sovremen-naya Evropa	9	Q3	Russia	Institute of Eu-rope of Russian Academy of Sciences	2016—	Economics, Economet-rics and Finance — Economics and Econo-metrics (Q4); Social Sciences — Polit-ical Science and Interna-tional Relations (Q3)	04.00.00 Sociology; 06.00.00 Economics. Econom-ic sciences; 11.00.00 Politics. Political science; 13.00.00 Culture. Cultural studies; 21.00. 00 Religion Atheism; 23.00.00 Comprehensive study of countries and regions	Современная Европа

Source: prepared by the authors based on Scopus-indexed geopolitical publications of Russian scientists, 1995—2017.

We believe that there is another reason for such publication behaviour, i. e. preference for journals in economics and political science; it is the fact that geographical journals are underrepresented in Scopus and eLIBRARY (2.6 %). At the same time, about 4 % of economic journals and 6 % of periodicals in political science are indexed in the databases. Table 4 clearly shows that most Russian authors publish their articles in national periodicals (80 % of the top 10 journals are of Russian origin). As of today, only eight Russian geographical journals are indexed in the database.[1]

The analysis of Scopus-indexed *geographical journals* reveals a similar behaviour by Russian authors (fig. 2). The *Regional Research of Russia* geographical journal accounts for the absolsute majority of the publications. The periodical acquaints the English-speaking audience with the best articles from three Russian journals: the *Izvestiya* of the Russian Academy of Science (geography series), the *Region: ekonomika i sotsiologiya*, and the *Izvestsiya* of the Russian Geographical Society.



Fig. 2. Major Scopus-indexed journals publishing geopolitical articles by Russian authors

Source: prepared by the authors based on Scopus-indexed publications from 1995—2017.

[1] *Geography, Environment, Sustainability*, *Vestnik Moskovskogo Unviersiteta, Seriya Geografiya*, *Geography and Natural Resources*, *Sustainable Development of Mountain Territories*, *Economy of Region*, *Izvestiya* of the Russian Academy of Sciences (geography series), *Izvestiya* of the Russian Geographical Society; *Regional Research of Russia*, *Baltic Region*. The *Baltic Region* journal is not included in the analysis, since its first indexed issue (1, 2018) is beyond the study period (1995—2017).

A major *qualitative* characteristic of journals in geography is their high quality of research. The very fact that Russian experts publish their works in Scopus-indexed journals, i. e. those meeting international publishing standards, testifies to this. Moreover, most articles by Russian authors are published in quartile-ranked journals (table), which increases the chance of the articles of Russian researchers to be read and cited.

Table 5

Ranking of Scopus-indexed journals in geopolitics, 1995—2017

Quartile	Articles		Journals	
	units	%	units	%
Q1	20	26.0	6	26.1
Q2	18	23.4	5	21.7
Q3	28	36.4	8	34.8
Q4	9	11.7	3	13.0
No quartile	2	2.6	1	4.3

Source: prepared by the authors based on Scopus data.

The commonness of geopolitical articles in economic and political science journals may be explained by a large representation of these periodicals in Scopus. It is more difficult to account for the absence of geopolitical works in geographical journals.

When analysing bibliography in geopolitics, one cannot but notice that its diversity may be reduced to several areas used as barometers of the state of research.

Geopolitical publications have considerable applied significance. In particular, there is a plethora of *educational resources* in the field. In Russia only, there are about one hundred textbooks and series of lectures in geopolitics (reprints excluded). These resources have considerable differences in structure and content. Moreover, there are numerous readers, anthologies, dictionaries, etc. In this case, we searched the databases for titles and books only. Abstracts, keywords, full-text mentions and references matches were not taken into account.

No other area of geography is so well equipped with educational resources. However, similarly to research publications, historians (26 %), political scientists (21 %), and philosophers (17 %) account for most publications, whereas the works of geographers and sociologists comprise 9 % each — a significant yet let impressive proportion (table 6).

Table 6

The field of expertise of the authors of educational resources in geopolitics

Subject area	Textbooks	Series of lectures	Readers	All educational resources
Political science	14	4	—	18
History	10	7	—	17
Sociology	7	—	6	13
Philosophy	7	—	—	7
Geography	7	—	—	7
Economics	1	—	—	1
Other	12	4	5	21
Multi-author works	21	1	5	27
Total	79	16	16	111

Prepared and calculated by the authors using eLIBRARY data.

In being non-research literature, textbooks were filling the gap in concrete geopolitical knowledge, which was attributed to the initial absence of geopolitical texts, by introducing authors' visions of certain situations into the process of education. In this sense, the most comprehensive and interesting textbooks can be divided into two categories. Those of the first category focus on the influence of a certain geopolitical factor on the system of international relations. For instance, the textbook by K. V. Simonov pays attention to the impact of the oil and gas factor on the system of international relations; that by Sh. S. Suleymanov considers how the mass media affect national foreign policies. The second category examines the geopolitical processes characteristic of certain countries and regions. Among them are N. S. Rozov's *The position and prospects of Russia in the context of Eurasian geopolitics*, V. V. Sovasteev's *The geopolitics of Japan from antiquity to the present*, O. M. and N. V. Panasenkos' *Geopolitics and Russian diasporas in the Baltic region: lessons of compatibility and the present,* T. I. Pototskaya's *the geopolitics of Russia in the post-Soviet space* [1], and others. Although all of them are monographs focusing on the titular geopolitical issue, they contain didactic sections (questions for discussions, tests, topics for essays, recommended reading lists, etc.), which simplify grasping the material. A prominent work in this context is the multi-author and multi-volume textbook prepared by the staff of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation [2]. The work is a lucky combination of a study into the factors affecting the system of global relations and an examination of the countries and regions where it is at work. Probably, it will act as a factor restricting the appearance of new textbooks on geopolitics.

The abundance of educational resources on geopolitics complicated the choice of an optimal one. Major players are textbooks from large publishing houses. They appear in many copies and many editions. These works contain the most systematised geopolitical knowledge. Although all Russian geopolitical education is usually traced to the works of E. A. Pozdnyakov [63], K. S. Gadzhiev [64], and A. G. Dugin [65], today there are academically recognised textbooks on geopolitics in each discipline. For geographers, these are works by V. A. Kolosov and N. S. Mirnoneko [3], and V. A. Dergachev [4]. Philosophers prefer textbooks by V. V. Zheltov and N. M. Sirota; political scientists by A. G. Dugin and I. A. Vasilenko; historians by K. S. Gadzhiev; sociologists by B. A. Isaev. Leaders in their subject areas, these researchers are holders of postdoctoral degrees and authors of famous monographs on geopolitics. Thus, the textbooks mentioned boast the sought-after combination of a wealthiness of information and a high level of generalisation.

The second area is the *history and theory of geopolitics.* It both helps students of geopolitics by giving an opportunity to read the originals (or high-quality translations) of classical and modern geopolitical texts and contributes to the development of a geographical vision. The most significant works in this area are the studies by Yu. N. Gladky and S. V. Pisarenko [5], P. Ya. Baklanov [6], L. A. Bezrukov [7], A. B. Elatskov [8], M. Yu. Elsukov [9], and others.

The third area brings together works focusing on the influence of a single property of a territory on the politics of the state located within it. Within the academic geographical community, such studies have been carried out by D. V. Zhitin [10], A. B. Elatskov [11], M. Yu. Elsukov [9], and others. However, the contribution of geographers to the development of the above areas of geopolitical studies has never been emphasised. Obviously, few geographers have addressed the effect of the environment on the system of international relations. At the same time, such investigations remain relevant for experts in other sciences. For instance, the influence of soil has been examined by T. A. Zubkova and L. O. Karpachevsky [12] and that of climate by E. P. Borisenkov [13]. Geographers are interested in studying how foreign policy is affected by the geographical location, the ethnic/demographic makeup, the level and structure of economic development, the strategic significance of the territory, the local mass media, etc. The following areas of geographical geopolitical studies can be identified based on the above factors of influence.

1. *Marine geopolitics* studies the influence of the marine environment on national foreign policies. In Russia, a country bordering three oceans, as well as waters that lack internationally recognised national borders (the Caspian Sea, the Arctic borders), this area of geopolitical thought has special relevance. Although the geographical academic community has, for obvious reasons, always paid attention to the neighbouring territorial waters, this connection has been emphasised only by A. P. Alkhimenko [14] and V. A. Brylev [15].

2. *Ethnic geopolitics* investigates the effect of the ethnic and religious makeup on public policies and, by extension, world politics. In Russia, the most acute ethnicity-related geopolitical problems are observed in border regions with a high proportion of Muslim believers. Therefore, such geographical studies focus on post-Soviet states (D. Teurtrie [16]) and the South of Russia (A. S. Gevondyan [17], D. I. Isamutdinov [18], and others). An emerging area of geographical studies is research into the national language as a mechanism for creating a sphere of influence. In the context of Russia, this issue has been approached by V. N. Kholina [19] and others.

3. The considerable effect of the economic factors on foreign policy spurred the development of the *geoeconomic* area of geopolitical studies. Although in Russia it emerged within economics, geoeconomic ideas have become a natural part of geographical research. They have been promoted by Yu. N. Gladky [20], S. S. Lachininsky [21], L. A. Bezrukov [22], and others. At the same time, the economic factors affecting the foreign policies of many states include the energy component. Here, Russia is no exception. This gives rise to *energy geopolitics*, which investigates the effect of energy resources on public policies and world politics. M. G. Zhuglinsky [23], A. V. Kramarenko, and other researchers have contributed to this field of research. The influence of the transport of energy on relations between neighbouring states is in the focus of *transport geopolitics*. Studying the role of transport in the formation of the system of international relations, this area is relevant for post-Soviet countries. This aspect has been addressed by V. L. Baburin [25], L. A. Bezrukov [22], N. A. Grudtsyn [26], T. I. Pototskaya [27], B. L. Radnaev [28], and others. Recent works by A. G. Druzhinin and N. V. Gontar [29], A. B. Shvets, and others have investigated the mutual effect of the tourism and recreation industry on relations between Russia and other countries.

4. The ecological factor has a significant effect on relations between states. Therefore, the relevant area of *ecopolitics* is not to be ignored. However, the territorial scope of these studies is often reduced to the eco-

logical policy of the Russian Federation and its regions. An important work in this area is the monograph by D. A. Markelov, B. I. Kochurov, Yu. N. Golubchikova et al. [31].

5. Beyond geographical studies lies research in the *geopolitics of conflicts*. It is among the most popular areas of geopolitics since any analysis of conflicts is perceived as geopolitical. Geopolitics of conflicts focuses on the most conflict-ridden regions of the world. Most Russian works in this area are dedicated to conflict zones in Eurasia: the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, the Arctic, and the post-Soviet space. Conflicts have always been an important part of political geographical research in Russia. Particularly, they have been addressed by D. V. Zayats [32], A. V. Krotov [33], and A Yu. Erkov [34]. An attempt to systematise all Russian studies into political conflicts inspired N. S. Mironenko [35] to identify a new research area — political geoconflict studies.

6. *Media geopolitics* is the youngest area of geopolitics. It considers the mass media as the central factor affecting public policies. In Russia, it is being developed by sociologists and political scientists. The geographic community has made the very first steps so far towards grasping this phenomenon. The article by V. N. Egoshin [36] testifies to this fact.

The fourth area comprises comprehensive geopolitical studies of territories of different levels. As a rule, these works take into account the effect of the properties of a territory on the policies of the state located within it. These studies analyse either the geopolitical location of a territory or the geopolitical interests of a state. Based on the territorial scope of these works, they can be grouped as follows.

Global geopolitics is, traditionally, the most developed area of geopolitics in the national schools of thought in ‘great powers’. Russia is no exception. This area shapes the national worldview (ideology), which, in its turn, affects the foreign and domestic policy of a state and the development of geopolitics in general. In Russia, the first works of this kind appeared in the mid-1990s. They relied on a generalised ‘geopolitical worldview’, popularised geopolitical knowledge, and made it available to a wider audience. All this made those books bestsellers. However, there were no geographical works among them.

The first area of geopolitical thought to develop in modern Russia immediately after the disintegration of the USSR was the *geopolitics of the post-Soviet space*. Despite a variety of approaches to identifying the boundaries of this region, most studies into its constituent countries are carried out in view of their common history, close economic and social ties, connections among the political elites, similar political, economic, and social problems of transition, Russia’s leading role as the successor state to the USSR and the related integration and disintegration processes in the regions, the strategic importance of the territory for the security of Russia's borders, etc. Alongside works examining the post-Soviet space as a single geopolitical entity, there are many studies into individual geopolitical regions within this territory. Particularly, the Baltic region has been investigated by V. A. Kolosov and N. A. Brodulina [37], the Western region by I. V. Mitrofanova and L. A. Kotova [38], and the Central Asian region by Yu. V. Dvornikov [39].

There is comprehensive bibliography on the *geopolitics of Russia*. This area brings together experts in all the sciences studying geopolitical phenomena, on the one hand, and politicians and public figures striving to identify the place of Russia in world politics and Eurasia, on the other. This research area accounts for most geographical works. They focus, firstly, on the effect of the geographical location of Russia on its foreign policy. The most significant works (those by A. G. Druzhinin [40], L. M. Korytny [42], N. S. Mironenko [42]) scrutinise the idea of Eurasianism. Secondly, they investigate the formation and evolution of the geopolitical position of Russia. Here, the most prominent authors are V. L. Baburin [43], Yu. N. Gladkiy [44], V. A. Kolosov and R. F. Turovsky [45], N. S. Mironenko, P Yu. Fomichev [46], T. I. Pototskaya [1], A. I. Treivish [47], V. A. Shuper [48]. Thirdly, works on the geopolitics of Russia address relations between this country and the states of neighbouring regions. It is worth noting the works by A. B. Andreev [49], S. V. Artemenko and I. L. Fedorov [50], E. E. Borichevskaya [51], and A. G. Druzhinin [52].

The domestic geopolitics of Russia is among the least methodologically developed areas of Russian geopolitics. At first, the most interesting theoretical ideas were proposed in the works of A. G. Dugin. However, they were not developed further. Most works in the field focus either on practical efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of the state or on the geopolitical position of various, primarily border, regions of Russia (once again, this is the domain of geography). The Kaliningrad region has been studied by I. S. Gumenyuk and Yu. M. Zverev [53] and G. M. Fedorov [54], the western regions of Russia by A. G. Manakov [55], the South of Russia by A. G. Druzhinin [56], A. S. Gevondyan [17], D. I. Isamutdinov [18], V. A. Kolosov, A. B. Sebentsov [57], L. A. Kotova [58], Siberia and the Far East by A. B. Andreev, P. Ya. Baklanov, M. T. Romanov [59], S. V. Pisarenko [60].

Comprehensive geopolitical studies include the recent area of *critical geopolitics*. It focuses on the mechanism for the formation of a global geopolitical vision by the population of territories of any (from local to global) level, which may once become a foundation for the foreign policy of their state. This school of thought is being developed at the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences by V. A. Kolosov, M. V. Zotov, N. A. Brodulina, A. B. Sebentsov [37; 57; 61; 62], at MGIMO University by I.Yu. Okunev, and at Moscow State University by R. Yu. Batishchev. O. I. Lyakhovenko, and others. Having emerged at the interface with cultural geography and media geopolitics, critical geopolitics often employs the techniques that originated in these fields.

Although the above division of academic geopolitical studies into categories is objective, it remains notional. Obviously, almost any monograph on global geopolitics includes sections on the geopolitics of different world regions (including Russia and the post-Soviet space). As a rule, these territories are the most conflict-ridden, i. e. they are the domain of the geopolitics of conflicts. Since the determination of any, especially geopolitical, conflict is a multi-faceted process, such a study may be classified as a work in military geopolitics, ethnic geopolitics, etc. Vice versa, a research work focusing on industry-specific geopolitical areas (media geopolitics, marine geopolitics, etc.) may include sections dedicated to concrete territories of different levels: global, district, or local ones.

Conclusion

Our analysis suggests the following.

— In Russia, the body of modern geopolitics literature comprises works by political scientists, philosophers, historians, economists, sociologists, lawyers, geographers, and other experts.

— Geography is making a very modest contribution to Russian geopolitics. Geographers have authored only 3 % of works in geopolitics (dissertations, books, journal articles).

— Russian scientists tend to publish their geopolitics studies in economic and political science rather than geographical eLIBRARY- and Scopus-indexed journals. The selected Scopus-indexed journals in geography outperform those in political science and economics in scientometric terms.

— The most visible contribution of geographers is to educational resources (9 % of the total number of textbooks on geopolitics published in Russia).

— Geographical geopolitical studies rely both on a geographical understanding of the classical theoretical legacy of geopolitics and on recent methodological frameworks.

— Geographical works are present in all areas of geopolitics identified based on the effect of a certain territorial feature on the foreign policy of the corresponding states. These are marine geopolitics, ethnic geopolitics, geoeconomics, ecopolitics, the geopolitics of conflicts, and media geopolitics. Geoeconomics and ethnic geopolitics account for most of these works.

— Geography focuses on comprehensive geopolitical studies into territories of different levels. These works examine the aggregate effect of the properties of a territory on the policies of the state located within it. Most of these contributions consider the geopolitical position of a territory and the geopolitical interests of states and identify the mechanisms behind the geopolitical vision of the population.

We would like to stress that, regardless of the selected territorial level or factor, geopolitics should be part of academic economic and geographical mainstream rather than its underground. However, this will require geographers to articulate the connection of their works with not only political geography but also geopolitics.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS AS AN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH DISCIPLINE IN THE BALTIC REGION: THE HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTION OF SAINT PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY

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In this article, we address the little-researched and complicated problems of the genesis, periodisation, and development of political geography and geopolitics as academic and research disciplines across the Baltic region in general and the contribution of Saint Petersburg University in particular. The terms 'political geography,' 'geopolitics' and the corresponding academic disciplines, as well as the first concepts of political geography and geopolitics, emerged in the Baltic. The Russian and German schools of thought made a valuable contribution to these fields of research. Using the historical, structural-genetic, and activity-geospace approaches, we identify and analyse the major historical, research, and academic paradigms in the development of political geography. In doing so, we consider the case of Saint Petersburg University. These paradigms (state-descriptive, anthropogeographical, state-geopolitical, and activity-societal) differ in their methodological frameworks and thematic priorities. We demonstrate that the term 'political geography' and the science it denotes are of Russian origin, having been developed by German scientists during their academic service for Russia. Further, we analyse the contribution of German and Russian researches to the development of the Saint Petersburg school of political geographic and geopolitical thought and describe its current state.

Keywords: Baltic region, school of thought, political geography, geopolitics, academic and research paradigm, educational programme

Introduction

Recent years (2015—2019) have been rich in anniversaries and other reminders of the historical landmarks

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in the development of *political geography* and *geopolitics* — sister academic and research disciplines. This is a good time to address the periodisation of the genesis and development of these popular subject areas and the contribution of the Baltic region and Saint Petersburg State University to their evolution.

Let us begin with the dates memorable to political geography. Two hundred eighty years ago, in 1738, Georg Wolfgang Kraft, a German professor, who was working at the time at Saint Petersburg Imperial Academy of Sciences and the Academic University, introduced the term *politische Geographie* to refer to a new science in the structure of geography. His work on the matter appeared in German that year and the Russian version was published a year later [1, p. 464]. In 1745, his colleague Christian Nicolaus von Winsheim issued the very first textbook on political geography [2]. Almost 265 years ago, in 1754, in Hamburg, Anton Friedrich Büsching, Professor at the University of Göttingen, launched the publication of a multi-volume work on political geography of the world, which cemented him as the founder and the classic of political geography [3; 4, p. 24]. Two hundred fifty years ago, Immanuel Kant first taught a course in political geography 'according to Büsching' [4, p. 25; 5]. Two hundred years ago, Evdokim F. Zyablovsky, Professor at Saint Petersburg State University, provided the most comprehensive picture of the essential elements of this science [4, p. 26; 6, p. 182]. Thirty years later, in 1848, his colleague Prof. Konstantin I. Arsenyev issued a unique work on the political geography of Russia [7].

Of major importance for further development of international political geography and the emergence of geopolitics were the following academic events.

In 1897, 120 years ago, Friedrich Ratzel, Professor at Leipzig University published his *Politische Geographie*. Having appeared in Russian [8] a year later, this book marked the beginning of a new era in the development of political geography, which, in Ratzel's own words, supplanted the earlier dominant 'non-scientific' political geography according to Büsching. Over a hundred years ago, in 1916, Ratzel's follower, professor at Uppsala University and the University of Gothenburg Johan Rudolf Kjellén, who was later dubbed the father of geopolitics, issued one of his major books. Published in 1917, the German translation of the book achieved remarkable popularity [9]. Kjellén coined the term *geopolitics* as early as 1899. This year is the 120th anniversary of the concept [10].

An equally important date was the centennial of the fundamental 1915 work written by the founder of Russian political philosophy, the Petrograd professor Veniamin P. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky [11].

Remarkable dates were the 90th anniversary of a series of groundbreaking works by German political geographers, which appeared in 1927—1928. One of them is the 'catechism' of German geopolitics, which was prepared by its founding fathers led by Prof. Karl Haushofer from the University of Munich [12; 13, p. 303].

These historical landmarks are closely connected to the countries and universities of the Baltic region, which became breeding grounds for political and geopolitical sciences, their *alma mater*, or *mestorazvitie*[1] in the terminology of Eurasianists. Researchers from the Baltic region states coined the terms *political geography* (the Academic University of Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences, Saint Petersburg, Russia) and *geopolitics* (Uppsala University Sweden) and popularised the first key notions and concepts of political geography and geopolitics. The region is home to the oldest national schools of political geographical thought in Russia and Germany, which worked in close collaboration.

The 'pioneering role' of the region in the genesis of the two research areas has multiple causes, which cannot be reduced to the impact of the era of great geographical discoveries, which stimulated the development of geographical sciences (primarily, the anthropogeography) and social sciences. Of much greater importance were the intensifying struggle between the leading powers for the division and re-division of the world, the completion in the region among leading European powers — Germany and Russia, and the dynamics of territorially-driven political processes between these countries and in each of them, particularly, in the last third of the 19th/early 20th century. Other factors include the devastation of these countries by the First World War and the revolutions and the resultant emergence of a bipolar Europe and a bipolar world, which could not but affect the Baltic region.

During the genesis and development of political geography and geopolitics, the major role was played by university science. In particular, the Saint Petersburg University school of thought is the oldest in Russia and the Baltic region. Having gone through similar stages as other university schools of thought had done, it had its own distinctive features. The historical fates of the national and university schools of thought were very different. However, their pioneering contribution to international political geography and geopolitics remains unquestioned.

The methodological framework for our analysis of the genesis and evolution of the research areas shaping the academic political-geographical vision is a classification of the historical types of political geographical knowledge. We distinguish the following research or, more precisely, *research and academic, paradigms*: state-descriptive, anthropogeographical, state-geopolitical, and activity-societal [4, pp. 22—23]. Each of them, as we will show below differs from its counterparts in the research form, the methodological framework, the scope, the thematic priorities, the correlation between empirical and theoretical knowledge, and practical significance.

[1] Translator's note: this term is rendered into English as both 'the place of development' and 'the place that develops'.

The state-descriptive paradigm

This paradigm is associated with the emergence of political geography as a science providing comprehensive descriptions of countries. Its central methodological principle for selecting and systematising empirical material is the state-descriptive approach. This is explained by the fact that this information is located at the political (in Aristotle's understanding) or public level. The state-descriptive paradigm was a product of the social strand of the late 19th-century geography. Relying on the principles of geographical determinism, state descriptions competed with cameralistic and political statistics.

The emergence of political geography in Saint Petersburg, the capital of the Russian Empire, in the 1730s—1740s was a logical development. It had both political and academic causes, which have a direct bearing on Peter the Great's reforms and the Europeanisation of Russia, particularly, in science and education. In 1724, he issued a decree founding the Imperial Academy of Sciences and the Academic University, which marked the beginning of the history of Saint Petersburg State University — the oldest higher education institution in Russia. Scientists from the Netherlands, England, France, and German states were invited to teach at these new establishments.

We demonstrated the pioneering role of Russia, represented by German scientists, in the genesis of political geography in our earlier works [4, pp. 23—28], having refuted the once dominant (and still occurring) idea that the 'founders' of political geography were Büsching, Kant, Tatishchev, Turgot, and Ratzel. In 1738 and 1739, the Academy published Kraft's *Kurze Anleitung zur Mathematischen und Natürlichen Geographie (Short introduction to mathematical and natural geography)*, first in German and later in Russian. The work was meant as a student textbook [1, p. 464; 14]. This book was the first to mention the term *political geography* to refer to an area of geographical science [14, p. 2]. In 1745, the Academy published Winsheim's *Short political geography*, which considered a division of 'land' states by types of governance and provided descriptions of the largest ones [2].

Another German, the theologian, geographer, and statistician Prof. Büsching, whose political geography, according to Ratzel, was dominant over all other political geographers until the late 19th century [15, p. 47], first used the term *political geography* not earlier than the mid-1750s [4, p. 23—28; 16, p. 24—25]. The appearance of the eleven-volume political geographical work, which for many decades became a foundation for reference materials and textbooks published across the world and thus in Russia, started in 1754, nine years after Winsheim's book was issued [ibid.]. In 1748, Büsching paid his first visit to the Imperial Academy in

Saint Petersburg to write a history of Russia in the German language. There, he collaborated with his German colleagues, the innovators of political geography [17].

The state-descriptive paradigm in political geography reached its zenith in the first half of the 19th century in competition with political statistics. This period is associated with the names of Carl Hermann, Evdokim Zyablovsky, and Konstantin Arsenyev, who worked at the Department of Geography and Statistics, which was established in 1819 at the Faculty of History of Saint Petersburg University [18, p. 35]. Zyablovsky distinguished four essential elements of political geography: 1) the internal division of parts of the world into states and the concept of the state and its acts; 2) the image of governance, differences in governance, administrative division; 3) a general account of the population of the world by its number, language, nature, faith, and education; 4) the patterns of 'popular nourishment', which cover all the known types of human economic activities [6, p. 182].

Arsenyev's *Statistical Essays of Russia* was yet another pinnacle of the paradigm in question in Russian political geography. However, this work had purely national significance. The *Review* describes Russia using the then statistical precepts and Arsenyev's ten agroclimatic and economic types of provinces, or 'spaces'. This typology established him as a classic of economic geography. An equally important and interesting aspect from the perspective of the further development of political geography is his summation of knowledge on the territorial and political structure of the Russian state [7, pp. 1—160]. It includes: 1) a comprehensive evaluation of the established borders and the location of Russia in the world as compared to the British Empire; 2) the history of the spatial expansion of Russia illustrated with ample reference materials and statistics; 3) the development of the administrative division of Russia supplied with detailed reference materials and statistics. In effect, Arsenyev proposed a geopolitical vision of the radial structure of the power of the Russian Empire from the 'centre — colonised periphery' perspective. He considers colonial dominions as auxiliary forces of the radial power of the 'great circle' — a 'major and great power lying in the Russian lands proper' [7, p. 25—26].

The anthropogeographical paradigm

The reasons behind the ensuing crisis and political geography falling into oblivion (although its state-descriptive paradigm dominated educational resources) are both the intense competition from statistics and the differentiation of geography, the emergence of its new structure. These novelties are usually traced back to the works of the German 19th-century geographers of the anthropogeographical school of thought: Carl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel. Anthropogeography and, in particular, special geography (the geography of individual countries, country studies) essentially linked social phenomena on the surface of the earth to natural factors. Within the new structure of geography, the object of the 'old' political geography was 'disassembled' to give rise to three new areas of country studies: population studies, state studies, and economic geography [19, pp. 49—50].

In Europe, the end of the transition to the anthropogeographic paradigm of political geography was marked by Ratzel's work of the late 19th/early 20th century. He argued, referring to his *Politische Geographie* of 1897, that he made the first attempt to make Büsching's geography, which was considered non-scientific and obsolete at the time, a scientific discipline [15, p. 47]. His new version was able to explain the development of and relations between states from a geographical perspective.

In Russia, the transition to the new paradigm was completed on the eve of World War I when Veniamin P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky published *On the powerful territorial possession in relation to Russia: Essay on political geography,* [11]. In 1915, in acknowledging the absence of scientific political geography in Russia, he made an exception of the 'splendid treatises' published in the late 19th/early 20th century by three professors affiliated with Saint Petersburg University. These were the works by Vladimir I. Lamansky on the triune nature of the historical-cultural and territorial-political structure of Eurasia and the place of the Russian-Eurasian Middle World in it, by Aleksandr I. Voyekov's on the anthropo-political and geographical zoning of the most intensively occupied part of the world, and by Pyotr P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky on the patterns and features of colonisation movement in Russia and the world [4, p. 29].

This list should be extended to include two more contributions by prominent university figures of the time. The first one is the essentially anthropo-geopolitical civilizational (in today's terminology) concept of local cultural-historical types, which was proposed by Nikolai Ya. Danilevsky in his 1869 book *Russia and Europe* [20]. The second one is Leo Metchnikoff's most important work *Civilisation and great historical rivers*, which he wrote when living as an émigré. In that work, he presented a principally geopolitical concept of the connection between the development of civilization and the largest river and sea basins [21]. The year 2019 is the anniversary of the two outstanding works.

Combining these ideas with a critical perception of the views of international anthropogeographers allowed Semenov-Tyan-Shansky to develop a logically sound concept of the science with a clear historical-geopolitical and Russian-centred 'bias'. He presented this concept, which he deemed necessary for Russia and other states to understand their goals, in the book *On the powerful territorial possession in relation to Russia: Essay on political geography* [11, p. 33].

Veniamin P. Semenov Tyan-Shansky viewed political geography as the 'ultimate' synthetic and multi-tier knowledge, as the geography of the 'territorial and spiritual dominions of human communities, and as 'the country-specific studies of territorial dominion' [22, p. 40, 117]. Moreover, he introduced the factor of human activities (the development of productive forces) into the deterministic geographical principle of Ratzel's political geography. He perceived human activities as an important intermediate link in the establishment of territorial dominion. He distinguished between the Mediterranean, patchy, and trans-continental historical forms of 'great power territorial dominion', all of them being the products of environmental, historical, economic, and cultural factors affecting the territory. His analysis of the 'trans-continental' form of Russia's territorial-political power, its advantages, disadvantages, and prospects relied on the constructive idea of historical and emerging 'cultural-economic colonisation grounds' as 'generators and upholders of territorial-political power' [11, p. 18].

These principles underpin Veniamin P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky's final work *The district and the country* [22]. At the time a professor at the Department of Country Studies of the Faculty of Geography of Leningrad State University, he gradually abandoned in the changed circumstances the problems of political geography. Although the USSR paid little heed to this concept, the territorial power of the country developed very much in line with it.

A variant of the anthropogeographic paradigm is *Eurasianism* — a historical-philosophical and political-geographical concept of Russia's special *mestorazvitie* and historical mission, of a 'Russian world' characterised by a unique (Eurasian) historical-cultural unity rooted in the geographical and ethnographic territorial integrity. This concept was developed in Europe in the 1920s—1930s by Russian émigré researchers under the spiritual leadership of the geographer and historian Pyotr N. Savitski. Among the advocates of Eurasianism were prominent university figures, including the professor of Petrograd University, historian and religion scholar Lev P. Karsavin [23].

The 1960s—1980s marked the final page of the Russian anthropogeographic paradigm of political geography. It was the ethno-geopolitical concept devised by Lev N. Gumilev, Professor at Leningrad State University, a prominent Russian ethnologist, historian, and geographer. Closely linked to Eurasianism, his ideas on the genesis and development of ethnic groups gave a new ethnocentric perspective on the ever-changing territorial-political and cultural-historical communities [24].

The state-geopolitical paradigm

The dramatic territorial-political changes that concluded World War I and the socialist revolution in Russia caused the anthropogeographic paradigm of political geography proposed by Ratzel and Veniamin P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky to transform into a narrower state-geopolitical paradigm. Initially, it had diverse academic forms, which, nevertheless, shared a common conceptual core. This commonality was fortunately described in one of the last definitions of political geography given by Veniamin P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky. He called it ‘the examination of spatial relations of territorial powers of individual human communities-states’ [22, p. 168]. However, examinations of these relations relied on a wide variety of methodological frameworks.

Kjellén, who was a follower of Ratzel, coined the term *geopolitics* this area of political-geographical knowledge. This new area became the key to the new paradigm of political geography. It gradually developed into an independent interdisciplinary research field, which was evolving in Europe within geographical and biodeterministic frameworks.

A follow-up to Ratzel’s political geography, the ‘Western’ branch of the state-geopolitical paradigm was represented by ‘classical’ geopolitics striving to approach the political practices of the leading states (Germany, the UK, the US, and others). This strand of research was led by the followers of Ratzel and Kjellén, German geopoliticians, particularly, Karl Haushofer, and the founding father of British and, to an even greater extent, American geopolitics Halford John Mackinder.

A very different, Marxism-Leninism-driven methodological framework for studying the territorial-political system emerged in the USSR. It interpreted socio-political processes, including territorial-political ones, through the prism of an anti-capitalist class ideology. The key features of the new state-geopolitical, political-geographical knowledge, which developed within that framework at Leningrad University are as follows (for more detail, see [4]).

For decades, political geography and geopolitics were denied the status of research and academic disciplines (Soviet encyclopaedias and reference books did not mention the terms from the 1930s until the 1960s). This led political geographical and geopolitical problems to migrate to other sciences: military geography, social sciences, Oriental studies, and, primarily, the economic geography of foreign countries. Turning into ‘auxiliary’ knowledge, they got ‘dissolved’ within these disciplines. The USSR was studied in terms of its administrative structure and changes in its international standing.

University-affiliated authors had a monopoly on publishing research literature and educational resources. Their primary focus was on five state-geopolitical topics: the political map of the world, the typology of countries, the geography of intra-imperialist competition, the politicisation of economic-geographical descriptions of countries, and the criticism of Western political geography and geopolitics. At Leningrad University, these problems were studied in the Faculty of Geography and the Faculty of Oriental Studies and at the Research Institute for Geography and Economics.

The political map of the world evolved into the object of a research and academic discipline in the works of the first head of the Department of Economic Geography Prof. Vladimir E. Dehn and the research fellows of the Research Institute for Geography and Economics of Leningrad State University (see [25; 26]). It was featured in references on the economic geography of capitalist countries, which were continuously reprinted from the 1920s. Among their authors were professors from the Department: V. E. Dehn, G. A. Mebus, M. B. Wolf, and V. S. Klupt [27]. The geopolitical context of their contributions was praised by the classic of German geopolitics Haushofer [12, p. 42].

Later geopolitical interpretations of political geography, Semenov-Tyan-Shansky's studies into the historical forms of the territorial-political and spiritual power of states [22] and his 1940s publication on changes in the borders and the geopolitical standing of the USSR at the beginning of World War II went along the same line. In a more comprehensive conceptual form, the problem of the political map of the world was developed in the 1950s—early 1970s in the educational materials authored by B. N. Semevsky. He focused on the historical stages of the development of the world map, the formation of the world socialist system, and the dissolution of the colonial system [28]. Semevsky made a major contribution to political geography and geopolitics coming to the fore at the Department of Economic Geography, particularly, in its optional courses.

Typologies of the countries of the world and intra-imperialist competition were examined from the perspective of bipolarity and struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems, much in line with the 1934 resolutions of the Comintern. Countries were grouped according to their system affiliation, the degree of capitalism, and colonial development. These issues were considered from a conspicuously anti-capitalist perspective in the 1920s—1930s works of I. B. Bogdanchikov, I. G. Bolshakov, V. M. Volpe, and A. G. Mileykovskogo and from a milder position in the educational materials authored by B. N. Semevsky [28].

The politicised economic-geographical description of capitalist countries included reviews of their colonies, the development of territories and the effect of territorial changes on the geography of industrial production and agriculture, the social (class) makeup of the population, capital flows, national political systems, the general crisis of capitalism, etc. [29].

The criticism of Western political geography and geopolitics was a persistent research area at Leningrad State University in the 1920s—1970s. However, the study of the works of Western geopoliticians by Dehn (he visited Germany in 1928) and his colleagues had dire consequences: they were accused of counter-revolutionary activities in a special NKVD report and other documents. Dehn's article analysing and developing Kjellén's geopolitical ideas was first published in the *Izvestiya* of the Russian Geographical Society only 69 years later (for more detail, see [13; 30; 31]).

Later, in the 1960s—1970s, the Marxism-Leninism-driven criticism of Western political geography and geopolitics was developed in the lectures and research works of B. N. Semevsky [32; 33]. He approved of political geography as part of the subsystem of sciences studying the effect of superstructure phenomena on industrial production and economic zoning. Although, at the time, he could not but refer to geopolitics as a 'reactionary science', he was the first Soviet geographer to provide a comprehensive picture of Western geopolitical concepts. He revived the long-lost interest in the two sciences at Leningrad University. However, they were approached from a peculiar objective-historical perspective.

The development of geopolitical ideas went beyond the confines of economic geography. The 1925 concept of great surges (supercycles) in the world economy, which was devised by Nikolai D. Kondratiev, a graduate and doctoral student of Petrograd University, achieved international recognition. Note that the concept was given a geopolitical interpretation [34]. However, Kondratiev's ideas connecting dramatic military and political changes to ascendant phases are more compatible with the next historical paradigm.

The activity-societal paradigm

It was no surprise that the politicisation trend in economic geography became particularly pronounced after World War II. The expansion of the socialist camp and the dissolution of the colonial system extended the scope of political geography and geopolitics and led to the 'ripening' of the new, activity-societal paradigm, which has been pursued at Leningrad/Saint Petersburg State University since the late 1970s.

The paradigm suggests that not only the states but also other activities of society should be studied from the perspective of their territorial-political aspects. The agents in the focus of the paradigm are parties, ethnic groups, religious denominations, etc. Studies along this line concern the economic, social, ethnic, and cultural spheres and their integrated manifestations, for instance, political-geographical zones. In the 1980s, political-geographical country studies replaced state-focused geopolitics to become the core of the new paradigm, which examined the territorial aspects of political landscapes in different countries, regions, and centres (electoral geography), regional socio-political and cultural-political differences, political-geographical zoning, the methodology for political-geographical descriptions of countries and regions, etc. [4, pp. 48—49].

Just as in the previous case, the driver of the new paradigm was the Department of Economic Geography of Leningrad/Saint Petersburg State University. A major contribution to both research and practical politics was made by Prof. Sergey B. Lavrov, who headed the Department for over twenty years. His efforts and successful collaborations with Moscow colleagues led political geography to become independent from economic geography, thus turning into a full-fledged socio-geographical science in the USSR. His principal achievements were as follows:

1) he launched a series of lectures on political geography for students of economic geography in the mid-1980s to establish this science as a relevant and practically significant area of socio-geographical sciences; the results of his efforts were growing interest in political geography from undergraduate and postgraduate students and an increase in the number of research publications;

2) the staff and doctoral students of the Department of Economic geography defended the first dissertations in political geography before the Dissertation Committee headed by Lavrov (A. L. Belov defended a dissertation on Canada, V. V. Lavrukhin on France, V. A. Lachininsky and K. E. Aksyonov on the US, A. N. Zhuravlev on the Pskov region [that was one of the first works on Russian political geography]. M. Yu. Elsukov on geopolitics, A. B. Elatskov on Russian geopolitical thought [4, p. 44—55]);

3) in 1986, Lavrov organised the first All-Union Conference on the Problems of Political Geography in Baku. The conference proceedings [35] were the first Soviet publication in which geopolitics received a positive evaluation;

4) he edited the volumes of *Political geography today*, which brought together contributions from scientists from across different universities, as well as one of the first Russian monographs on the history and theory of political geography [4; 36; 37];

5) as the president of the Russian Geographical Society, Lavrov organised the ‘Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Problems of Russia’ international research conference in 1994 [38];

6) in the late 1980s—early 1990s, he was a people’s deputy of the USSR. His political activities both benefitted from his political-geographical and geopolitical expertise (Lavrov specialised in ethnopolitical regional conflicts and electoral processes) and contributed to the applied function of political geography;

7) Lavrov revived interest in Eurasianism from academia and a wide audience and examined the potential of neo-Eurasianism in understanding the geopolitical prospects of new Russia;

8) he studied the political-geographical aspects of the global problems of humanity;

9) Lavrov published the first Russian textbook on economic, social, and political geography. The publication contained a large section on the

geopolitical worldview. It investigated geopolitical ideas of humanity, the political map of the world, and the typology of countries from a new conceptual perspective [39].

Dramatic social and territorial-political changes in the world and the USSR caused geopolitics to evolve from ideology-driven criticism of Western geopolitics to its objective scientific perception and studies into the history of both Western geopolitics (K. E. Aksenov, M. Yu. Elsukov) and Russian geopolitical thought (A. B. Elatskov).

Alongside economic geography, Saint Petersburg introduced courses in political geography and geopolitics into bachelor and master programmes in history, conflict studies, political science, international relations, regional studies, journalism, and public relations. Major contributions to political geography and geopolitics were made by experts from the Faculty of International Relations and Oriental studies: Vatanayar S. Yagya (the political geography of developing countries and Africa), Nikolai M. Mezhevich (the political geography of the post-Soviet space and the Baltic region), Yuri V. Kosov (the problems of the Eurasian region), Evgeny I. Zelenev (the geopolitics of the Arab-Islamic world, Asian countries, the history of geopolitics), Aleksandr A. Sotnichenko (the geopolitics of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey), and others.

The expanding scope of the science and new methodological principles built up its theoretical component and resulted in a better understanding of its object and central concepts. Particularly, in relying on an activity-geospace approach, Nikolai V. Kaledin from the Department of Regional Politics and Political Geography developed a theoretical concept of political geography as a science of geopolitical relations and geopolitical self-organisation of society [4]. It is closely related to Kaledin's other concept — that of the political map of the world as a global geopolitical system with pronounced historical stages of self-organisation (geopolitical periods and eras) [39]. Using a similar methodological framework, Aleksei B. Elatskov examines the theory and methodology of geopolitics in its geographical interpretation. His findings were published in the very first Russian monograph on the theory of geopolitics [40].

The major conclusions of our study area as follows:

1) Russia, represented by Saint Petersburg University and the countries of the Baltic region, made a principal contribution to the evolution of political geography and geopolitics;

2) there were four major paradigms in the development of the two sciences;

3) Russia's oldest school of political geographical and geopolitical thought emerged at Saint Petersburg State University, its most prominent members being V. P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, V. E. Dehn, B. N. Semevsky, and S. B. Lavrov (see fig.).



Fig. Members of the Saint Petersburg University research and academic school of political geographical and geopolitical thought and key members of university schools of the Baltic region. Dominant paradigms: *I* — state-descriptive; *II* — anthropogeographic; *III* — state-geopolitical; *IV* — activity-societal

A landmark in the preservation and development of the traditions of the school was the establishment of the Department of Regional Politics and Political Geography by Lavrov's students and followers in 2002. This new division was the first in the country to specialise in political geography and geopolitics as both research and academic disciplines. The staff of the Department teach allied disciplines in various faculties of the university. A logical continuation was the creation and launch of the first national master programme in political geography and geopolitics, which is popular with holders of various, including non-geographical, degrees.

The most recent achievements of the staff testifying to the viability of the school of political geographical and geopolitical school, include:

– A. B. Elatskov's monograph *General geopolitics: theory and methodology as interpreted in geography* [40];

– digital atlases *The political landscapes of the Leningrad region, The geopolitical atlas of the Islamic world, The conflict potential of the post-Soviet space, The conflict potential of the urban space of Saint Petersburg,* etc., which were prepared by the Department's master students under the supervision of K. E. Aksyonov (some of the atlases are available on the website of the Association of Russian Social Geographers at http://argorussia. ru);

– the national textbook *Geography of the world. Volume 1. Political geography and geopolitics* for bachelor and master programmes. The publication was prepared by Lavrov's students and followers [41].

The politico-geographical interests of the Department span studies into the history and theory of science (including the development of the activity-geospace concept of political geography and geopolitics), the political map of the world, the typology of countries, political-geographical country studies (Europe, the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, unrecognised states), limology, electoral geography, political regional studies, including the transformation of territorial-political system of the post-Soviet space, the history, theory, and ideology of geopolitics, and the problems of federalism, secessionism, and separatism. All these research areas have become traditional to the Department. Graduate and postgraduate students are taking an active part in the research.

The expertise of the staff has applied relevance. They are often recruited to monitor electoral and geopolitical processes across the post-Soviet space, particularly, within the Department's collaborations with the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and the Centre for Socio-Economic and Geopolitical Studies, which was established by the graduates of the department. Political geographical and geopolitical issues are addressed in undergraduate essays and dissertations, as well as doctoral and post-doctoral theses. The experts of the department carry out research both individually and as part of research teams. Their studies are supported by the university, the Russian Foundation for the Humanities, the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, and agreements with the Presidential Administration of Russia.

A growing need for political-geographical and geopolitical expertise in today's globalising world translates into a social mandate for basic and applied research and educational programmes, which facilitate the further development of the Saint Petersburg University school of political-geographical and geopolitical thought.

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