

POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE PROGRAMMES OF RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PARTIES IN POLAND: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

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Received 28 May 2019
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2019-3-7
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Programmes of political parties are an important element of public discourse. In this article, I present the results of research aimed at defining the place of Russia and Polish-Russian relations in the programmes of several Polish right-wing political groups. I attempt an overview of the political programmes of the right-wing parties as regards their principal features, internal structure, and central postulates. Content analysis shows that relations with Russia are an important element in most political programmes proposed by Poland's major right-wing political groups. Based on a qualitative analysis, I distinguish between parties that postulate a determined and assertive policy towards Russia, parties committed to a neutral position on Russia, and those that seek the improvement and pragmatism of Polish-Russian relations. There are two important conclusions from the qualitative analysis. Firstly, international relations have a pronounced influence on the programmes of political parties. Secondly, as to the right-wing parties considered in the Polish political discourse as pro-Russian (the National Revival of Poland, the National Radical Camp), they are either far from being pro-Russian or Russia is quite low on their agenda.

Keywords:

Poland, political programmes, right-wing parties, Polish-Russian relations

Introduction

A major source of inspiration for public discourse on domestic and international policies of states is political programmes. Enshrined in official docu-

To cite this article: Żęgota, K. 2019, Polish-Russian relations as reflected in the programmes of right-wing political parties in Poland: a quantitative and qualitative analysis, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 11, no. 3, p. 125–141. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2019-3-7.

ments and ensuing from the pragmatics of the actions of political parties and their members, political programmes are a manifestation of the beliefs of parties and their voters. Political programmes are the foundation of political competition between groups both during election campaigns and between elections. The literature maintains that political reality generates abundant material on the beliefs and programmes of political parties. A potential object of political studies, this material can serve as a direct or indirect source of information on the programmes of political parties. Articulated political programmes (for instance, those prepared during election campaigns) are the most tangible and accurate sources of information on the beliefs and ideas of political groups. Moreover, those documents are reliable sources for comparative analyses in political studies [1, pp. 41–42].

A political programme has been defined as a harmonised list of goals and plans of political parties and groups, aimed to attract voters and to gain and keep power [2, p. 349]. According to Chmaj et al., political programmes express political, economic, and ideological interests by adapting political doctrines to the current situation and the current expectations of voters [3, p. 18]. David Robertson describes political (party) programmes as a ‘list of goals for achievement if elected to Office’. This approach reduces the significance of political programmes to their instrumental role of demands put forward to win elections [4, p. 361; 5, p. 91]. Irina Smirnova offers a similar interpretation, stressing that the goal of any party programme is to reach voters, to criticise the platforms of other parties, and, as a result, to come to power [6, p. 271].

A related term is ‘election programme’. It is a list of demands and plans of political parties prepared for an election campaign. Usually, an election programme is a document adopted by a qualified party department. The goal of the document is to present the platform of a party and describe what it will do once in power. An election programme, at least in the declarations of politicians, is a contract between a party and its voters: it binds the party to keep its manifesto promises in exchange for votes [7, p. 62]. According to Zoya Zotova, an election programme is a comprehensive document that introduces the agenda, goals, and objectives of a party and the methods and techniques to attain them [8, p. 11].

The literature emphasises the significance of the programmes of parties and political groups. In particular, it has been stressed that there is an increasing gap between party programmes and the beliefs and ideas shared by the voters of parties.¹

Peter Mair writes about a growing disparity between political parties and the mass public in today’s liberal democracies: party programmes are becoming divorced from the social expectations and beliefs of voters [9, pp. 361–367].

¹ See an overview prepared by Marek Tyrała [7, pp. 63–64].

Thus, the election process is increasingly identified with instrumental voting, which is aimed to form the parliamentary majority and the government rather than to represent voters. At the same time, the role of expressive voting, which is aimed at conveying the opinions of voters through political parties, is shrinking [7, p. 63].

There is a large body of commentary criticising political parties and their influence on political action. Jacek Raciborski emphasises that, in Polish political reality, parties disseminate their programmes not to implement them but rather to win elections [10, p. 208]. In the Polish party system, the left-right division is largely nominal: it is mostly a product of historical happenstance and an established ideological principle. This circumstance has a distorting effect on discourse about the programme concepts of parties [7, s. 64], which was taken into account when selecting right-wing parties for consideration in this study.

Although many researchers doubt the significance of political programmes for the formation of political reality, programmes remain a major source of knowledge about the intentions and plans of parties. Programmes are a reference point for forecasting political actions taken by a party when it gains power or political influence. Moreover, voters align themselves with a political party based on these documents. According to Herbert Kitschelt, political parties are bodies of ideas that allow voters to align with them and to make rational political choices. An important indicator is a correspondence between a programme and ideas supported by voters. Close correspondence translates into strong ties between a party and its voters and makes it possible for the former to represent the political beliefs of the mass public [11; 7, p. 63].

The literature stresses the significance of political programmes as a source of information on future and current actions of political parties. Ian Budge argues that political programmes are key documents casting light on a party's vision of social and economic order. They are an important source of information because they are thoroughly prepared documents, which have undergone an approval procedure by the party leadership. In this context, political programmes are a bridge linking parties to their voters and a key for differentiating between party platforms [12; 13, p. XVI; 1, p. 42]. Tim Rapley underscores the role of the political programmes that document changes in the intensity and content of public discourse. Programme documents may be used in comparative studies of social life agenda and in analysing whether political parties stand true to their promises once in power [14, pp. 37–48].

Methodology

The above considerations inspired me to attempt at assessing the role and significance of political programmes of prominent Polish right parties as regards their vision of Russia's influence on Poland's foreign economic policy and

security. In this article, I present findings of research into the role of Russia and Russian–Polish relations in the programmes of active Polish right parties. The programmes of Polish parties mention Russia in three contexts: the country’s effect on Poland’s foreign policy and security; European politics and problems of Euro-Atlantic integration; Poland’s trade relations with the East.

I consider the Russia agenda as an element of a larger body of declarations and manifestos associated with party programmes. In this vein, I carry out a comparative analysis of programmes of various political parties. I focus on the programmes of right-wing parties because they have recently put forward programme proposals to revise bilateral relations with Russia. The Russia agenda is an important element distinguishing extreme right parties in the Polish political arena.²

I aim to answer the following questions. What is the place of relations with Russia in the programmes of Polish political parties? How often does the Russian agenda appear in party programmes? How do references to the Russia agenda distinguish right parties? Were the programmes of political parties affected by external (growing competition and a changing economic and social situation in Poland) and domestic factors (Russia’s growing role in the international arena, cooling in relations between the EU and Russian and NATO and Russia) and if so how?

In analysing the programmes of right political parties from the perspective of Russian–Polish relations, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analysis of documents, which is the methodological framework of this study [18, pp. 98–104]. This approach is appropriate because it is suitable to achieve the above goals and objectives. I focused, firstly, on the frequency and, secondly, on the areas, of references to the Russia agenda in party programmes. This way, I could take advantage of mix methods to overcome the limitations of quantitative and qualitative approaches.³ I carried out a content analysis of election programmes in the context of Polish–Russian relations. Content analysis makes it possible to explore such programme elements as official manifestos and dec-

² I set out to analyse the role of relations with Russia in the programmes of right political parties rather than to explore the distribution of political parties on the classical left-right spectrum. Thus, I did not apply the methodology developed by Ian Budge and David Robertson within the *Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)* functioning since 1989. For more detail, see [1, pp. 44–45]. A similar methodology was used in a work focusing on other political parties in Poland (see [15, pp. 157–183]). *The Manifesto Data Collection* project has offered yet another methodology [16; 17, pp. 80–81].

³ A reason to employ mixed methods is the need to accommodate the use of quantitative findings in qualitative studies. The study focuses at first on the frequency of references to the Russia agenda in the programmes of right parties and later on a qualitative analysis of those party programmes that place emphasis on Russia-related problems (see [15, p. 163]).

larations of political leaders. My analysis focuses on the frequency and nature of Russia-related political declarations in Poland's domestic and international politics.

I carry out a comparative analysis. This method is instrumental in juxtaposing the intensity and frequency of phenomena and processes, and thus it makes it possible to identify the differences and similarities between them. Comparative analysis, in most cases, approaches phenomena from the perspective of quality [19, s. 125]. In this article, I compare the visibility of the Russia agenda in the programmes of right-wing political parties with the essence of demands concerning relations with Russia.

An important objective was to select political parties, programme documents, and the study timeframe. I aimed to cover all prominent right parties represented in the Sejm, the Senate, and the European Parliament.^{4,5} A major criterion for inclusion into the study was at least 3% of the vote won in the Sejm election of October 25, 2015.⁶ The list of parties was expanded to include non-parliamentary groups taking an active part in public discourse in order to demonstrate the variety of views on the Russia agenda.⁷

In this study, I focused on the political parties whose programmes declared their commitment to conservative, national, and catholic values.⁸ I did not divide party programmes by their position on the left-right spectrum. As a result, I carried out a quantitative analysis of the programmes of the following right parties and groups: the Congress of the New Right (*Kongres Nowej Prawicy*), Kukiz'15, the National Rebirth of Poland (*Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski*), the National Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*), the Camp of Great

⁴ Based on the List of parties included in the political party registry (according to final provisions on qualifications for entry to the registry submitted to the National Election Commission by the Warsaw District Court in pursuant to Article 15 of the Regulation on Political Parties). Quoted in: Wykaz partii wpisanych do ewidencji partii politycznych (na podstawie prawomocnych postanowień w sprawach o wpis do ewidencji przekazanych Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej przez Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie w trybie określonym art. 15 ustawy o partiach politycznych). URL: http://pkw.gov.pl/322_Wykaz_partii_politycznych (accessed 22.11.2018).

⁵ I considered the parties that had at least one seat in the 2015–2019 Sejm, even if its representation in the parliament was a result of a split in the party rather than an electoral victory.

⁶ *Obwieszczenie* Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 27 października 2015 r. o wynikach wyborów do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonych w dniu 25 października 2015 r. Dz. U. z dnia 28 października 2015 r. poz. 1731. URL: http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/pliki/1446212096_obwieszczenie_Sejm.pdf (accessed 26.11.2018).

⁷ The study included the political groups contribute to social life without enjoying the official political party status.

⁸ That is why I did not consider the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*), which is a liberal-conservative party.

Poland (*Obóz Wielkiej Polski*), the Republican Party (*Partia Republikańska*), Agreement (*Porozumienie*), the Right Wing of the Republic (*Prawica Rzeczypospolitej*), Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*), November 11 Movement (*Ruch 11 Listopada*), the National Movement (*Ruch Narodowy*), Solidary Poland (*Solidarna Polska*), the Real Politics Union (*Unia Polityki Realnej*), Free and Solidary (*Wolni i Solidarni*), and Liberty (*Wolność*).

I considered three types of official programme documents available on party websites: election programmes, programme and ideological declarations, and statements on issues relating to the Russia agenda. If available, I analysed programme documents of 2014–2018. If not, I explored earlier publications. This timeframe was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, in 2104, parties were publishing programmes with the parliamentary election of October 2015 in mind. Secondly, some parties and political groups included in the study created or framed their election programmes in 2016–2018⁹ before the municipal election of autumn 2018. Therefore, the study spans a considerable timeframe.

My analysis focused on the body of programme documents. I carried out a content analysis of the frequency of references to the Russia agenda in political party programmes. Further, I conducted a qualitative analysis of mentions of Russia in the contexts of foreign policy and security, economic policy, and social issues.

The frequency of references to the Russia agenda in the programmes of the parties

The Russia agenda appears with varying frequency in the programmes of right political parties and groups. My quantitative analysis covers over twenty programme documents of the parties under study. The analysis focused on the frequency of references to the Russia agenda. It returned four types of results: 1) no references; 2) low frequency (Russia is mentioned in relation to one or two issues); 3) medium frequency (three-five instances); 4) high frequency (six and more instances). Table 1 shows the frequency of references to the Russia agenda in the party programmes.

⁹ Suffice to recall the Republican Party, whose establishment was announced on September 20, 2017 (*Powstaje Partia Republikańska. Będzie współtworzyć Zjednoczoną Prawicę*. URL: <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/558616,partia-republikanska-zjednoczona-prawica-pis-siarkowska.html> (accessed 26.11.2018)).

Table 1

**The frequency of references to Polish–Russian relations
in the programmes of political parties and groups**

Party / group	Programme document (year of publication, if applicable)	Frequency of references to the Russian agenda
Congress of the New Right (<i>Kongres Nowej Prawicy</i>)	The programme of the Congress of the New Right; Political ABCs	Low (1 reference)
Kukiz'15	The Strategy of Change. Kukiz'15. You Can, Poland (2015)	Low (2)
National Rebirth of Poland (<i>Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski</i>)	NOP programme rules; Contemporary nationalism	Low (1)
National Radical Camp (<i>Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny</i>)	Poland tomorrow. The ideological declaration of the National Radical Camp	Low (2)
Camp of Great Poland (<i>Obóz Wielkiej Polski</i>)	Ideological assumptions ¹⁰	Low (2)
Republican Party (<i>Partia Republikańska</i>)	Declaration on the establishment of the Republican Party (2017)	No references
Agreement (<i>Porozumienie</i>)	Great Poland in the small European Union. A manifesto of Polish Euro-realism (2014), The road to wealth (2014) ¹¹	Low (2)
Right Wing of the Republic (<i>Prawica Rzeczypospolitej</i>)	A strong Poland for the civilisation of life (2009)	Low (2)
Law and Justice (<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i>)	Health, labour, family. The programme of the Law and Justice (2014), Thinking: Poland (2015)	High (22)
November 11 Movement (<i>Ruch 11 Listopada</i>)	Conservatism = anticommunism, or 3×P: strong passport, fat purse, loaded pistol	No references
National Movement (<i>Ruch Narodowy</i>)	A sovereign people in the 21 st century (2016)	High (13)
Solidary Poland (<i>Solidarna Polska</i>)	The European dialogue of Solidary Poland	No references
Real Politics Union (<i>Unia Polityki Realnej</i>)	Ideological declaration, The programme	No references
Free and Solidary (<i>Wolni i Solidarni</i>)	The programme signals of the Free and Solidary (2016)	No references
Liberty (<i>Wolność</i>)	Proud, rich Poland. KORWiN (2015) ¹² , The ideological declaration of the Liberty party (2016)	Low (2)

Source: prepared by the author based on the programme documents of parties and political groups.¹⁰

¹⁰ Although, the *Ideological assumptions* of the Camp of Great Poland are essentially a collection of a dozen loosely connected articles, they give an idea of the programme of that political group.

¹¹ Both documents were published by the party Poland Together (*Polska Razem*), which is the technical and political precursor of the Agreement (*Porozumienie*).

¹² In the 2015 election, the party took part as Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic — Liberty and Hope (KORWiN) (*KORWiN: Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja*).

The above results show that the programmes of right-wing political groups refer to the Russia agenda with a varying frequency. The programme documents differ significantly, and this circumstance cannot but affect the results of quantitative analysis. A peculiar feature is the coexistence of complex political programmes, which are usually prepared before parliamentary elections and contain a multitude of ideas (Law and Justice, Liberty, National Movement), with more concise documents (Free and Solidary, Congress of the New Right). All this complicates quantitative and qualitative analysis.

From the perspective of quantitative analysis, the party programmes can be divided into three major groups. The first one includes documents that do not mention relations with Russia. Most of them are concise programmes with a brief overview of foreign policy and international economic relations. The second group brings together documents with a low and medium frequency of references to the Russia agenda. In most cases, Russia is mentioned in the contexts of foreign policy, security, and relations with the EU and NATO. The third group of documents comprises programmes with frequent references to the Russia agenda. Remarkably, relations with Russia are a key element of the foreign policy and security agenda of Poland's most prominent right party — Law and Justice. The party has twice come to power over the past years. This circumstance may explain why the party feels that it has greater responsibility for its political programme. Moreover, the documents prepared by Law and Justice are the most voluminous among the programmes of the parties under study.

A quantitative analysis yielded two important observations. Firstly, the programmes of most right political groups that won seats in the Sejm in the 2015 election (Law and Justice, Agreement, the National Movement) mention Russia with a varying frequency; this means that the Russia agenda is an important element of the foreign policy vision of these parties. Secondly, despite the popular opinion, the far-right parties, which are usually considered pro-Russian, hardly mention Russia in their political programmes. Thus, these parties do not build their political programmes on commitment to stronger cooperation with Russia.

The international agenda and relations with Russia in the programmes of right parties

Further, I carried out a qualitative analysis of only those programmes of right parties and groups that focused on relations with Russia. At first, I considered issues relating to the international and security agenda. These are 1)

relations with Russia in a global and regional context (including the conflict in East Ukraine); 2) bilateral relations; 3) security policy including the vision of Russia as a potential threat. The attitudes of the parties in this study can be divided into three groups: negative attitudes stigmatising Russia's aggressive policy; neutral positions; commitment to better and more pragmatic relations with the country.

The most radical perceptions of Polish–Russian relations are found in the manifestos of Law and Justice (*PiS*), the National Rebirth of Poland (*NOP*), the Right Wing of the Republic, and Agreement. The *PiS* programme of 2014 spells out that any collaborations with Russia are inadvisable because of the country's neglect of the basic principles of international law.¹³ The document stresses that the foundation of Poland's security is its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the international interests of Poland and Russia are at odds when it comes to NATO's eastward enlargement: 'the concept of NATO's enlargement to Eastern Europe and South Caucasus is still relevant; it has to be developed within future scenarios'.¹⁴ An improvement in relations with Russia is possible, yet only on the basis of actual partnership. The programme states that, if Russia continues to support separatists in East Ukraine, it will be necessary to provide permanent assistance to Kyiv authorities, particularly, by taking necessary actions in the international arena [20, p. 85]. The central idea of the *PiS* programme is that of a persistent tough policy towards Russia. Although the document stresses the need to strengthen Poland's defence capacity, a conflict with Russia is not considered a likely scenario. The *PiS* programme recognises that there are unresolved issues in Polish–Ukrainian relations (those concerning the politics of memory play an important role in relations with Russia).

The *Contemporary nationalism* declaration of the National Rebirth of Poland puts forward the idea of a Europe of nations and freedoms committed to harmonious cooperation among sovereign states and peoples of Europe. The party, however, criticises Russia and Germany for revisionist tendencies and 'primitive and archaic 19th-century imperialism. A possible counterweight to Russian interests is the European National Front, which can neutralise Russia's advantage in Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁵

¹³ *Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*. Warszawa, 2014. P. 42.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 153.

¹⁵ *Nowoczesny nacjonalizm*. URL: <http://www.nop.org.pl/nowoczesny-nacjonalizm/> (accessed 26.11.2018).

The programme of the Right Wing of the Republic stresses that Poland is part of the Western civilisation. It is in the interest of the country to engage post-Soviet states in cooperation with the West and promote political freedoms in Eastern Europe. Thus, 'Poland should expect that Russia effectively abandons the policy of domination and intervention into the affairs of states in our region'. Relations with Russia and the rest of Europe should be based on equal and uniform principles of cooperation.¹⁶

The Agreement party supports (contrary to Russian interests) stronger cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with priority given to the states covered by the Eastern Partnership. The party promotes the idea of 'Europe whole and free', i.e. stronger integration of Eastern European countries in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Agreement insists on the establishment of an Eastern Partnership University and a Pontic College to develop social ties with Eastern European states.¹⁷

Some Polish right parties and groups hold a neutral position on relations with Russia. Their political programmes neither discuss the aggravation of political situation nor call for an equal and pragmatic policy towards Russia. The programme of Kukiz'15 points toward a more visible role of Poland in international relations. It identifies several sources of threats, including destabilisation of the current world order and the risk of a military conflict near Poland's borders. The party programme emphasises that 'the previous government failed to make Poland a leader in the region', whereas 'large states of Europe negotiate with Russia behind our backs'.¹⁸ At the same time Kukiz'15 insists that it does not put a stake on single international partner in the East-West relations in Europe: 'our government will guarantee the advancement of Polish national interests in foreign policy. Our government will further Poland's interests only, rather than those of Germany, Russia, Ukraine, or Europe in general'.¹⁹

Other right parties in the Polish political arena also think of foreign policy in the vein of achieving balance in relations with Central and Eastern Europe. The programme of the Congress of the New Right says that the party will rely solely on the benefit/loss ratio rather than ideology or sentiments.²⁰

¹⁶ *Silna Polska dla cywilizacji życia. Założenia polityki Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa, 2009.

¹⁷ *Wielka Polska w małej Unii. Manifest polskiego eurorealizmu*. Warszawa, 2014.

¹⁸ *Strategia zmiany. Potrafisz Polsko! Kukiz'15*. Warszawa, 2015. P. 26.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Program Kongresu Nowej Prawicy*. URL: <https://knp.org.pl/program/#1447702361157-49a62f8b-83fd> (accessed 02.12.2018).

The National Radical Camp argues for a foreign policy aimed at promoting correctly understood national interests. The programme reads, 'the location of Poland has been for centuries the symbol of the Nation's power. The location between two powers, Germany and Russia, has forced Poland to show an incredible will to live. The time has come to ensure political, economic, and military independence of Poland'.²¹

Stronger cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is on the agenda of Liberty. The party stresses the need to develop relations with Nordic countries to prevent the emergence of other powers in the area; this should be interpreted as a reference to the Russian threat.²² On the other hand, the programme of the party points toward equal relations with Eastern and Western Europe without bias in favour of certain neighbours: 'in foreign policy, one cannot ignore the geographical aspect. In the West, Poland borders on the continent's strongest economy and, in the north, on its strongest military power (Russia — K. Z.)'. Below, the document argues for a balanced and realistic approach to relations with the East and the West, based on a ratio between losses and benefits and the prevalence of national interests in foreign policy.²³

An improvement in relations with Russia is proposed by the National Movement. The party calls for abandoning the 'Jagiellonian myth', i.e. the belief that Poland should secure support from the states lying between Poland and Russia to build a successor to the Confederation of the era of the first Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The authors of the programme maintain that processes taking place in the new nation-states and their independence created a situation where Poland is not interested in promoting European values in Eastern Europe and creating a new federation of Central and Eastern European states. The document sees as a more promising avenue the development of bilateral relations with each state as the current situation requires. Another negative factor is that Europe is subordinate to economic and military powers: Germany and the US. Poland has to compensate for this circumstance by seeking deeper cooperation with China and Russia.²⁴ As to bilateral relations with Russia, the party places emphasis on the restoration of economic and political relations and admits that, given the current economic and military capacities, Russia is not a threat to Poland. Therefore, there is no actual clash of interests.²⁵

²¹ *Polska Jutra*. Deklaracja Ideowa Obozu Narodowo-Radykalnego. URL: <https://www.onr.com.pl/deklaracja-ideowa/> (accessed 02.12.2018).

²² *Dumna Bogata Polska*. Program Partii KORWiN. Warszawa, 2015. P. 20.

²³ *Ibid.* P. 22.

²⁴ *Suwerenny naród w XXI wieku*. Program Ruchu Narodowego. Warszawa, 2016. P. 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.* P. 25.

The Camp of Great Poland entertains similar ideas. The article ‘The Polish people has to become the master of its own state’ argues that, from both historical and contemporary perspective, Germany is the greatest enemy of Poland and all the things Polish. Until 1989, Poland’s protection was its membership in the Eastern Bloc and the Warsaw Pact. Today, there is nothing to put off the implementation of the German *Mittleuropa* concept. In this context, Russia is viewed as a potential protector of Poland from German expansion [21]. At the same time, the programme of the Camp of Great Poland condemns the permanent US military presence in Poland, including the siting of missile defence elements since the latter serve the interests of the US and Israel rather than Poland. Another argument against the missile defence complex is objections from France, Germany, and Russia.²⁶

Economic and social cooperation with Russia

The programmes of right-wing parties consider the economic and social aspects of relations with Russia. The documents take into account current developments in international relations. Most of them focus on bilateral trade with Russia, sanctions policy, and migration. Law and Justice voices the sharpest criticism of Russia. The *PiS* programme pays special attention to energy independence from the country. As to the security of natural gas supplies, the party calls for the expansion of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the development of gas imports from the Nordic countries. Although the party does not rule out cooperation with Russia, it believes that the issue of prolonging the Yamal contract should be postponed until the capacity of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście is expanded [22, p. 32]. As regards oil imports, the programme discusses the construction of the Odessa–Brody–Gdansk pipeline. All these points concerning bilateral trade with the northern neighbour seek to diversify energy supply and to gain energy independence from Russia.²⁷

The *PiS* programme stresses the need to restore the national maritime economy and develop international trade. The party supports the construction of a waterway through the Vistula Spit — an initiative strongly opposed by Russia. Moreover, Law and Justice insists on the introduction of safeguard measures to

²⁶ *Odezwa Przemysława Górnego*. Założenia ideowe. URL: <http://www.owp.org.pl/index.php/zalozenia/655-odezwa-przemyslawa-gornego> (accessed 11.12.2018).

²⁷ *Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina*. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Warszawa, 2014.

support the agricultural industry, which was denied access to the Russian market.²⁸ The central demand to Russia is that the country returns the wreckage of the Tu-154 plane that crashed in Smolensk in April 2010.

The Right Wing of the Republic argues for broader rights for Poland in bilateral relations with Russia and the overcoming of the current asymmetry. The party stresses that 'Russia's economic relations with Poland and Central Europe (particularly, the Baltics) should be organised on the principle of fair exchange, following the common rules for cooperation between Russia and Europe.'²⁹ In its turn, the European Union has to show solidarity in bilateral trade with Russia. The programme emphasises that a sign of lacking solidarity is German involvement in joint energy projects with Russia: the party strongly criticises those initiatives.³⁰

Among the parties seeking an improvement in relations with Russia, the one with the clearest goal is the National Movement. It calls for the resumption of trade relations with Russia and a search for new expansion opportunities in the Russian market'. According to the party programme, Poland should focus on strengthening the positions of its businesses in the Russian market rather than on promoting the economic interests of other actors, including the EU and Ukraine. In recognising energy dependence from Russia, the party points towards diversification of energy supply. As to social issues, the National Movement stresses the need to give a boost to the repatriation of the Poles living in the East.³¹

The National Radical Camp emphasises the importance of promoting Poland's cultural influence in the former *Kresy Wschodnie*, which are today parts of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. In particular, the party strongly objects to 'Poland abandoning its legacy in the East; we believe that this attitude, which is being advanced by the left and liberal forces, is national treason and betrayal'.³² Although this idea does not have a direct bearing on Russia, if it comes to fruition, it will weaken the independence and integrity of the post-Soviet states located between Poland and Russia.

²⁸ *Zdrowie, Praca, Rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*. Warszawa, 2014.

²⁹ *Silna Polska dla cywilizacji życia. Założenia polityki Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa, 2009. P. 11.

³⁰ *Ibid.* P. 14.

³¹ *Suwerenny naród w XXI wieku. Program Ruchu Narodowego*. Warszawa, 2016. P. 25, 37–49.

³² *Polska Jutra. Deklaracja Ideowa Obozu Narodowo-Radykalnego*. URL: <https://www.onr.com.pl/deklaracja-ideowa/> (accessed 02.12.2018).

Conclusion

My analysis emphasises that the programmes of Poland's right parties and political groups differ substantially in their vision of relations with Russia. An exploration of a wide spectrum of parliamentary and non-parliamentary groups made it possible to cover a variety of Russia-related beliefs and ideas of Polish political thought. The major criterion for including a party into the study was representation in the Sejm, the Senate, or the European Union. Parliament seats mean a possibility to affect Poland's foreign policy, including the country's relations with Russia. In the situation when the Polish political arena is divided, Law and Justice has recently been the most influential right power in terms of foreign policy.

To cover the full spectrum of right opinions and beliefs in Poland, I considered both parties and non-parliamentary groups. The principal result of content analysis and the answer to the first question of the study is the following. Russia has received the most attention from Law and Justice, which is, as a rule, sharp criticism. Polish–Russian relations have been ‘frozen’. Another important finding is the presence of the Russia agenda in the programmes of most right political parties that are active in Poland. Relations with Russia may have stalled, but parties view it necessary to mention the country in their programmes.³³

Qualitative analysis made it possible to compare the programmes of political parties as regards their views of relations with Russia. I identified the contexts in which Russia was mentioned. These are bilateral relations, international security, economic cooperation and bilateral trade, and cultural and social ties. Qualitative analysis showed that right-wing political parties fall into three distinct groups. The first group, which includes Law and Justice and the National Rebirth of Poland, is critical of Russia's foreign policy and the current form of Russian–Polish relations. The second group seeks impartiality and pragmatism in Polish–Russian relations. It both criticises Russia and stresses the need to improve relations with the country. This group comprises the following parties and associations: Kukiz'15, the Congress of the New Right, and Liberty. The third group brings together the National Movement, the National Radical Camp, and the Camp of Great Poland. These parties call for an improvement in Polish–Russian relations and closer cooperation with the country (at least in several areas) while both states should stay committed to their foreign policy priorities.

³³ This has little to do with Russia's geographical proximity: the other neighbours did not receive the same attention.

Qualitative analysis helped to establish a clear connection between international developments and the programmes of political parties. For instance, the Ukraine crisis provoked a considerable reaction. Some right parties levelled heavy criticism at Russia.³⁴ Another important conclusion is that the right groups that are considered as pro-Russian in Polish political discourse (the National Rebirth of Poland and the National Radical Camp) either are not such or pay little attention to the Russia agenda. The attitude to Russia held by some right groups is a result of domestic political struggle in Poland, particularly, of some right parties being accused of pro-Russian sentiment. Some Polish conservative and agrarian parties have faced similar accusations.³⁵

Another important element of political party programmes is the economic agenda. In particular, party documents consider the Russian factor in the context of energy security and the sanctions policy of the EU. All this proves that external factors affect party programmes. Tim Rapley was right to emphasise the role of party programmes as documents of their era [14, pp. 37–48]. My analysis proves that international factors affect the programmes of political parties as regards relations with Russia.

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³⁴ The 2014–2015 change in the views of the political parties (it coincided with the incorporation of Crimea by Russia and the beginning of warfare in the Donbass) mostly concerned the Law and Justice and the Agreement.

³⁵ An important element of the political programme of the agrarian conservative Polish People's Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL*) is the demand to lift economic sanctions against Russia, as a result of which Polish agrarians took a hit in revenues (see [15, p. 171–172]).

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