This article proves that Kant’s philosophical system is a system of transcendental anthropology, which acts as a method in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. The essence of transcendental anthropology is the metaphysics of morals. This role of morals manifests itself in the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The humanity owes its development and existence to practical reason. In Kant’s system, morality is the essence of humanity.

Key words: transcendental anthropology, moral law, teleological method, postulates of practical reason, morals, thing-in-itself.

A final end is that end which needs no other as the condition of its possibility.

I. Kant. Critique of Teleological Power of Judgement

The logical interest of reason (viz., to extend its insights) is never immediate, but presupposes purposes for which reason might be used.

I. Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Kant’s philosophical system is a system of transcendental anthropology. It is well-known that the three famous questions of pure reason in its unity (i.e. interpreted in the simultaneous unity of both practical and speculative reasons), which were formulated by Kant in the Canon of Pure Reason, are an analytic division of a single question: what is a human being?

1. I. Kant as the founder of transcendental anthropology and anthropology as a science about human beings

The most important object in the world… is man, because he is his own ultimate end.

I. Kant. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View

According to the system of transcendental idealism, a human being is the only object in the world that combines all beginnings and all ends of metaphysics. No other object fascinates Kant on itself; he is inter-

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ested in it only as a condition of the being of humans, a condition of the active existence of humans. If anthropology from the pragmatic point of view "deserves to be called knowledge of the world", "even though [the human being] constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth" [19, p.3], we have all the rights to reverse this proposition and say that philosophy, which embraces research of the relations of humanity pertaining to activity together with that part of the world, which is manifested by human beings in relation to the world as it is in itself and on its own, justly deserves to be called transcendental anthropology.

The system proposed in the three Critiques is constructed in accordance with the structure of human activity, which can be defined as transformation of the realm of objects (part of the world of things-in-themselves singled out by humans) according to the goal set in advance with the help of adequate means to achieve this goal, i.e. means of activity. Thus, activity as a system includes three elements:

1) purpose of activity,
2) means of activity, means to achieve the purpose,
3) object of activity or that, which has to be transformed, so that it meets the purpose.

However, activity is a way of being of a sentient creature, as a result of which it occurs on two levels: initially, this process unfolds in the human consciousness and, later, it materialises, becomes a fact of objective reality. At first, the spiritual model of activity is built, and only then the model is implemented. It means that the spiritual model also consists of three elements serving as sub-models: we need a model of the purpose, a model of means, and a model of the object. The first model is a value representing our need (or interest); the second model is a rule, an idea of the algorithm of actions, the result of which is the achieved goal; finally, the third model is the knowledge of the object, a representation of its structure and capacities.

Kant calls these procedures of our consciousness aimed at the formation of the three models faculties of the soul:

1) the modelling of values — the sensation of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, which is determined by purposiveness and finds its highest expression in art, since art is a specialised activity aimed at creating values;
2) the modelling of norms — the faculty of desire expressed in practical reason and oriented towards the final end manifested in moral freedom;
3) the modelling of knowledge — the faculty of cognition searching for the purposiveness of nature and implemented in a special kind of cognitive activity, i.e. science (see [6, p. 152—154; 7, p. 199]).

The three faculties of the human soul are the topics of Kant's three great Critiques incorporating the content of transcendental anthropology, which his other works only expand and revise.

The answer to the question "what is a human being?" reads on the pages of Kant's major works as follows: a human being is an active agent, who shapes the environment according to their needs, relying on their knowledge of the objective world while satisfying them, this knowledge helping them find necessary means.

Those pages acquaint us with the transcendental ideal of a human being as a creator of themselves through the creation of their own world, as a creature that forms the world of values, where artistic and aesthetic values play an increasingly important role, and that aspires to adapt the initial objective world to these values.
with the help of science, to which end they use the world of technologies guided by moral and legal technology as the basic condition of self-creation. Kant defines the faculty of desire (which corresponds to practical reason) as “the faculty for being through one’s representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations” [21, p. 65].

Here one can recite and expand the lines given in the epigraph: “This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always included the idea — and in an especial manner — of moralist in that of philosopher” [B 868; A 840]. Of course, it is not a coincidence, since philosophy first emerged as moral philosophy. In ancient India, philosophy almost exclusively played that very role; the philosophy of ancient China was also moral; in ancient Greece, philosophy begins with sages, who had profound knowledge of human soul and human morals.

Akin to the ancients, Kant was a brilliant moral philosopher.

In the light of transcendental anthropology, the core of which is philosophy of morals, of special interests is one of the last Kant’s works — Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), prepared to be published by the philosopher himself and considered by him a textbook on pragmatic anthropology, on which he lectured in winter terms since 1772. The significance of this Kant’s work is assessed differently, but mostly highly. It is considered the empirical basis of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and especially practical philosophy, his interest in which had increasing since the 60s, after being manifested in his famous essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764). This interest soon became prevalent. However, one can also come across assessments akin to that given to the anthropological ideas of the Königsberg moralist by P. S. Gurevich in his work Philosophical Anthropology. Obviously referring to the content of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and without troubling himself with analysing the role of this work in the general context of the philosopher’s heritage, he writes: “When Kant addresses a new (italics mine. — L. K.) area of philosophical reflection — the sovereign status of a human being — he deserves the philosophical rank of an anthropologist in the eyes of his followers. As to concrete insights about humans, his own considerations — despite the gravity of Kant’s thought — seem to apply only to particular cases and turn out to be marginalia. Kant left a lot of valuable notes on cognition of the human being: about selfishness, frankness and lies, about fantasy, about clairvoyance and reverie, about mental illnesses and jokes. However, one cannot but note that the human wholeness did not develop from all these insights. Thus, Kant can be considered a philosophical anthropologist only because he emphasised the significance of this topic and not because he gave answers to the fundamental questions of human being or, at least, made a considerable contribution to the actual understanding of human being” [2, p. 45].

Such assessment of Kant’s practical anthropology is erroneous. It takes into account neither the philosopher’s intentions in establishing anthropology as a special science of human beings, nor the state of affairs in the field at the time. One can state that Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View did surpass in its level of solutions to anthropological problems not only similar attempts of 18th century but also those of 19th, at least the first half of the 19th century. Kant perfectly
understood the strength of his book, when he wrote: “General knowledge always precedes local knowledge here, if the latter is to be ordered and directed through philosophy: in the absence of which all acquired knowledge can yield nothing more than fragmentary groping around and no science” [19, p. 4]. One can compare Anthropology… with the famous book by H. A. Helvétius A Treatise on Man, which was concluded in 1779, and see that the latter contains a conglomerate of pieces of information from different fields of knowledge: historical, political, social, ethical, legal, aesthetic, pedagogical, psychological, etc. If there is a hint at a system in this treatise, it is only due to its general pedagogical attitude taken by Helvétius. One can also draw comparison with the study of the German anthropologist, F.-J. Gall (1758–1828), which was published in the first quarter of the 19th century. F.-J. Gall structures his work as a list of 27 primal faculties of a human being, 19 of which he considered common to animals and humans, and the rest solely human. The list itself suggests a lack of any system or, at least, logical order. Here as these primal faculties as Gall lists them: 1) reproductive instinct; 2) love of one’s offsprings; 3) affection; 4) self-defence and property defence instinct; 5) sense of property; 6) pride; 7) vanity; 10) circumspection; 11) memory for things; 12) a sense of inhabited places; 13) memory for faces; 14) a sense of words; 15) a sense of language and speech; 16) a sense of colours; 17) a sense of music; 18) a sense of numbers; 19) mechanical abilities. Alongside these faculties common to humans and animals (?), he identified purely human faculties: 20) comparative sagacity; 21) spirit of metaphysics; 22) spirit of mocking; 23) poetical talent; 24) kindness; 25) faculty of imitation; 26) religious feeling; 27) firmness [26]. What would P. S. Gurevich say about such anthropological concept?

Kant always emphasised that a set of empirical knowledge of certain kind can become science only in case there is a theoretical component to it built on an a priori foundation. One can see that the system of transcendental anthropology underlies pragmatic anthropology; it includes all three components correspondent to transcendental anthropology: 1) the faculty of cognition, 2) feeling of pleasure and displeasure; and 3) the faculty of desire. However, in comparison to the order these three components of transcendental anthropology were presented in the three Critiques, in pragmatic anthropology, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (i.e. values and assessments) was moved to the second position.

In Kant’s system, anthropology from a pragmatic point of view is inseparable from history; a philosopher understands the physical nature of a human being as developing in pre-history; the framework of human essence humans develop in the course of history proper. In the treatise Idea toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), Kant addresses the same problems as in the Anthropology. He analyses the human nature as a whole, i.e. as that of a living (in their individual and empirical essence) and sentient (in their transcendental and generic essence) creature. The former aspect relates to the prehistory of humanity, the latter to its history proper.

Among Kant’s works, pre-history becomes the topic of two treatises on the origin of races (1775 and 1785), the treatise Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786), a review of Moscati’s work Of the corporeal essential differences between the structure of animals and humans (1771). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View focuses on the history proper.
Kant believes that the history of humanity is subject to metaphysical and theoretical calculation, since there are facts, on which one can firmly rely on when considering both the past and the future of the historical being of humanity. How should one interpret in this framework the idea of scientific revolutions experienced by humanity in the course of scientific development as a factor affecting moral and political processes? Moral and political processes are the leading vector of history. “And this gives rise to the hope that, finally, after many revolutions of reform, nature’s supreme objective — a universal cosmopolitan state, the womb in which all of the human species’ original capacities will be developed—will at last come to be realized” [24, p. 38], Kant writes in 1784. The recent victorious war of the independence of North American colonies (1775—1788) resulted in the foundation of the USA as a democratic republic. This historical event was the very revolution of reform, which gave the philosopher hope for the rightfulness of his views; when another — and more dramatic — revolution of reform took place, Kant came to a conclusion that he can be optimistic about his theoretical forecasts. The Great French Revolution was accompanied by undesirable excesses; thus, the form of such processes should be changed. He believed that these cases will teach humanity to curb their passions and take them under control of practical reason. In the end, the historical progress of humanity consists only in its moral progress.

2. The determinative role of morals in human nature or the Problem of the primacy of practical reason

This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy

I. Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason

It is not a coincidence that Kant constructs empirical anthropology as practical anthropology. It considers the faculties of human soul in terms of their significance for a human being and their maximum value and feasibility; and such function is practical reason. The philosopher emphasised more than once that practical anthropology should be preceded by “a metaphysics of morals, which would have to be carefully cleansed of everything empirical” [23, p. 4]. Of course, it does not mean that there cannot be any mediating link between empirical anthropology and pure practical reason or that they are not required — on the contrary, there is a need to deal not only with pure practical reason, but practical reason in general [22]. From the perspective of transcendental anthropology, the fundamental, underlying idea of Kant’s system about the primacy of practical reason in relation to its other faculties seems natural. It (practical reason) has primacy over both theoretical and axiological reason, since, when ensuring the active existence of a human being, theoretical reason with its knowledge and axiological reason with its values are conditions necessary for any activity, but

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1 Kant gives this assessment in his treatise The Conflict of the Faculties in the section The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law, which was initially intended as an independent work entitled An Old Question Raised Again: is the Human Race constantly Progressing?
they become sufficient only because of practical reason. Only practical reason is immediately active — only when will is activated, the transition from acts of axiological and theoretical reflexion to practice takes place.

Only here and only accompanied by the activity of an acting person, a supranatural reality emerges, an intelligible reality manifests itself; now metaphysical reality can reach physical reality, transforming and enriching the latter. In effect, the transformation of nature and the adjustment of it so that it satisfies the needs of humanity take place only because the immediate relation to nature is mediated by relations between humans — which in the extreme case are interpreted as “a whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (though on the other side we are also members of the world of sense)” [23, p. 71]. The essence of these relations is the moral relations between people, which constitute the essence of social relations.

Kant elucidates this idea in Prolegomena, where he emphasised that “metaphysics as a science”, i.e. metaphysics that can be linked to actual experience and, moreover, potential experience, become such only on the basis of practical reason. At the same time, dogmatic metaphysics, being limited to theoretical reason, deprives itself of any reality and has to abide in the fantasised empyrean, in beautiful thoughts. “Visionary idealism” [25, p. 44] — that is how Kant calls dogmatic metaphysics for its irreality.

It is well known that according to Kant practical reason is constitutive rather than regulative (which is characteristic of theoretical reason). He is responsible for the development of a special substance, which is supranatural, endowed with reason; the ideas of theoretical reason resting on practical reason become postulates: the immortal soul and God, filled with transcendental sense, become concepts of philosophy of history (see [3, p. 12—26], as well as [18, S. 327—331]), ensuring the very existence of not natural, but social history, the history of humanity. The essence of this historical process is the progress in moral development of society, the moral perfection of an increasing number of people and nations. The development of technical culture on the basis of scientific revolutions is only a means on human beings’ passage to the realm of ends. “The relation of reason in general to the whole of all ends … can only be practical” [20, p. 217], Kant writes defining morals as pure practical teleology “destined to realize its ends in the world” [ibid].

A human being emerges together with consciousness, whereas the latter is born as practical consciousness: practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason since the emergence of reason. Morality leads to the development of cognitive faculty of reason rather than vice versa. It is thanks to morals as a special form of relations that our ancestors got the opportunity to use the environment more effectively. The attitude towards kinsmen is left at the discretion of individual members of the clan, unlike the attitude to the phenomena of the environment. Morals are the seeds of the kind, which, having prevailed over the seeds of the animal-like and evil, ensured the transition from the animal state to the human one. Kant dedicated to this topic most of the treatise Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (1793), which has paramount importance in his anthropology — both transcendental and empirical. The anthropological essence of this seminal treatise is hidden; however, Kant insisted that the treatise answers the question as to what a human being is. It develops the idea of independence of a human being.

The development of humanity concludes as a teleological act, which, according to Kant, is coincidental. Coincidence is immediately linked to the emergence of
the new in the world of not only human activity, but the world in general. One can state that Kant uses his teleology to enter the path of developing the ideas of synergy. Coincidence plays the determinative role under the conditions of uncertainty and strained non-equilibrium. Coincidence is creative and innovative.

The idea of primacy of practical reason is developed by Kant in the teaching of teleology and the teleological method. A true system that offers purposes, a system that is purposive and fulfills purposes is the human activity; whereas the systems of nature, even biological ones, should be considered as quasiteleological — as if teleological. Nature, especially non-organic nature, is mechanistic in most of its manifestations and is dominated by mechanistic relations and laws. In this sense, it is subject to the method of mechanism. One can identify quasiteleological or teleonomic relations in the natural world only through using an analogy with themselves, their capacity to be consciously guided by purposes.

I will not consider Kant’s teleological methodology in its length and breadth, I will only focus on the principle of teleological determinism. According to mechanistic determinism, the cause precedes consequence in time and necessitates the effect. According to teleological determinism, “a thing exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself (although in a twofold sense)” [21, p. 243], or “if a thing... is to be possible only as a natural end..., then it is required... that its parts be combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form” [21, p. 245]. It means that teleological determinism considers the relation between the cause and effect as a process of their interaction. Kant shrewdly included this category into the group of categories of relation in the system of categories of reason in the Transcendental Analytic, although he addressed it specifically only in the Analytic of Teleological Power of Judgement.

For my purposes, of special importance is Kant’s fundamental idea concerning mechanism and its principle being a particular case of the teleological methods as a universal method of exploring the world. For example, within the principle of teleological determinism, one should only abstract from the reverse influence of effect on cause and one comes to mechanism. In general, within all processes of cognition, it is more important that the outer world is cognised by analogy with the human being rather than the human being by analogy with the world, although it seems to be a paradox in view of the aspiration of social sciences to mimic natural ones. In effect, the relation of teleological method to mechanism in Kant’s system is the first case of theoretical cognition through the correspondence principle in history.

Mechanical laws underlie the interaction of natural bodies, where the state of the system is determined by the impact of the environment. Teleological laws are the laws of self-determination of system entailing the ability to change the state of the environment. The relations, as we see, a directly opposite: it is not the environment that determines the state of the system, but the system determines that of the environment. It is what takes place in the human activity: in its course, the environment changes so that it meets the needs of the human being, the environment is humanised, anthropomorphised.

In a general case, since teleological laws are the laws of interaction; the system-environment relations that correspond to it look as follows: it is rather the system that determines the state of the environment than the environment that determines the state of the system; the interaction between the cause and the

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2 This problem is addressed in my work entitled “The categorical imperative and the teleological method” — see [4].
effect is similar: it is rather the effect that determines the cause than the cause that determines the effect. All other methodological principles are, of course, also similar: the correlation between the end and the means, the singular and the whole, an element and the system, an individual and the society, etc.

However, it is only in the sphere of pure practical reason, which is intelligible by its nature — the sphere of morals — that teleological laws take their strict, absolute form, that the interacting parties become identical: there is a cause and an effect, an end and a means, the general, and the singular...

Natural systems are quasipurposive systems, thus teleological principles play a regulative role in relation to them, serve as regulative principles; we apply them conditionally. The als ob principle applies here, as if these systems pursue a certain goal. As to the sphere of moral, teleological laws are constitutive. In their strict form, they serve as the laws of morals. The categorical imperatives, these “impeccable and final formulae of the moral principle”, as V.S. Solovyov put it [17, p. 478], are constructed teleologically — and they cannot be different. The moral law is at the same time the law of teleology. “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law” [22, p. 28] (italics mine — L. K.). Your individual, personal will is the expression of universal will, whereas universal will is the expression of you individual, personal will — the individual is the universal, the universal is the individual. Interaction of the opposites leads to identity.

“So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” [23, p. 41]. A means must always be an end, and an end a means at the same time.

The primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason becomes certain in relation to these specific features of teleology, for it constitutes a special — social — reality, which theoretical reason is not capable of: “a reason, which always became extravagant when it wanted to proceed speculatively with ideas, and changes its transcendent use into an immanent use (in which reason is by means of ideas itself an efficient cause in the field of experience)” [22, p. 42]. It is the social, moral and practical, active reality that distinguishes transcendental anthropology from dogmatic metaphysics.

3. Morals as the essence of humanity

Now of the human being (and thus of every rational being in the world), as a moral being, it cannot be further asked why (quem in finem) it exists.

I. Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgement

The core of practical reason is morals, pure practical reason, which penetrates the whole sphere of morals and illuminates it. However the customs of tribes and peoples differ in their traditions and norms of natural and, moreover, positive law, their morals are identical. They are universally human and absolute, and, in this sense, they are characterised by universality, categorical necessity. In the system of customs, morals play the role of the ultimate end; in the course of evolution of customs, it assimilates all kinds of moral rules, first of all, legal rules. Kant believes, the process of this evolution, must be eternal, since the human being cannot turn into a bodiless angel. Of importance are the continuity and certainty of these processes in their progress towards the goal.
The features of moral rules are as follows:

1) the subjective absoluteness, i.e. responsibility towards all agents in general, both physical and legal ones;

2) attitude to nature (potentially to the world in general, i.e. nature as sum total of appearances (natura materiater spectata)), as a whole;

3) chronotopic absoluteness, i.e. omnitimeness and omnispaceness;

4) auto-motivation: morals are at the same time the goal and the means of achieving itself. It means that the human being is ultimately free when doing a moral deed;

5) auto-authorisation; it means that a moral person rewards and punishes themselves through the acts of easy or troubled conscience.

Morals are the most important feature that makes a human being human, since only it can ensure the possibility of interaction between people as the determinative condition of activity. For Kant, morals equal sociality; the philosopher formulates a series of equations: morals = sociality = humanity = reason = activity. Morals embrace all these features.

What is the ontological nature of morals? What are its foundations? What do “Good” and “Evil” represent as categories of morals? How can one define them?

Kant gives convincing answers to all of these questions! For example, V. S. Solovyov heeded Kant’s arguments; thus, he wrote in the beginning of his article entitled “Kant” that “the decisive role in the field of ethics (in its “pure” or formal part) belongs to Kant” [17, p. 441]; at the end of the article, he comments on this “decisiveness”: “…he established the unconditional primacy of practical reason, or moral will, as the initial condition of due reality; he provided the moral principle with impeccable and final formulae and created pure and formal ethics as a science as reliable as pure mathematics” [17, p. 478]. However, not everyone is convinced by Kant’s perspective on the given problems, which is quite natural. The consciousness of interpreter casts its shadow on Kant’s texts: sometimes this shadow is thicker, sometimes lighter, it changes; every interpreter casts its own shadow. It seems, no one can avoid it.

How does Kant answer the question about the being of morals, about the special kind of this being?

Morals are a system of relations between people that makes human beings human. They are relations, within which a human being treats other human beings — including themselves (hence, in the person of anyone as the humanity in general) — as one’s own highest value. There is no higher value for a human being than another human being, other people — regardless of whether they understand it. Only the existence of other people makes me, makes everyone human; only because of relations with other people, one can exist humanly, i.e. actively. Beyond such relations, it is impossible to be human.

3 See [B 163]. Above, Kant writes about a possible, potential “sum of all reality” [B 610; A 582]: “as that which constitutes the thing itself — the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing – the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole” [B609 — 610; A 581 — 582].

4 I carried out an analysis of the features of moral rules (in their distinction from legal ones) in the article entitled “I. Kant on the features of morals and its role in the system of morals” — see [5]. But this feature supplements the list. Of course, law relates not to nature as a whole, but to its individual phenomena — the Moon, for example — fragments, and artefacts.
An analysis of the features of moral rules, the features of categorical imperatives manifested in these rules suggest that the system of moral relations is characterised by fractality, morals are fractal. Fractality as a property of a system lies in that a part of such system is analogous to the system as a whole. The morality of an individual person does not differ from the morality of humanity. Thus, morals ensure the unity of humanity — both synchronic and diachronic. Being the guiding element in the system of morals as a whole, morals serve as a factor of the development of the fractality of the system of morals. Assimilating ritual rules, the rules of tradition and law, morals brings together the customs of different peoples, contributes to the elimination of differences. It is morals that make a person a world citizen, which paves the way towards a federative union of states as a guarantee of perpetual peace on Earth.

Moral relations, akin to any ties or relations, are intelligible. Apart from the synthetic a priori procedures of consciousness, there is no other way towards understanding these relations. Moral motives — in their pure form — are seldom manifested in human behaviour; they are always veiled in a cloud of pragmatic, hypothetical relative motives. Nikolai Hartmann, when addressing the problem of the ways of manifestation of values, writes in his fundamental work *Ethik* that different values live in human hearts, emphasising that they are not apprehended through thinking, which consciously looks for values; their structure is not even analysed. However, he continues, such apprehension (italics mine — L.K.; obviously Hartmann addresses Kant’s idea of synthesis of apprehension [B 160] as the awareness of a phenomenon) and analysis take place, and they can be implemented only by philosophy [1, p. 123]. Since moral relations are manifested in the being of a person as a human being, for philosophy, they are still difficult to apprehend.

I. Kant showed that morals are not only the innate natural features of a human being as a living creature. Naturalism is powerless to explain anything in the field of morals, since it is a supranatural phenomenon existing only as a condition of sensible and active existence, as a manifestation of intelligible reality, but not as a transcendental reality, but a reality immanent to the natural world as an absolute whole. Morals oppose corporeal nature in its being, it is a manifestation of incorporeal nature.

More than a century later, G.E. Moore, having reproduced Kant’s analysis, called the attempts to justify morals through reducing them to nature, as well as the deduction of them as a consequence of transcendent reality, a “naturalistic fallacy” [16, p. 72]. However, erroneously understanding Kant’s philosophy of religion, he believed that Kant himself commits a naturalistic fallacy of the second type, i.e. justifies morals theologically; and, in order to avoid both types of the fallacy, he introduced the idea of a special extra-theological transcendence — the axiological, transcendent world of values; Kant’s justification of morals was free from such fictitious points.

The problem of the foundations of morals leads to a complex entanglement relating to the principle of determinism and the principle of freedom of moral deed, which is expressed in the third antinomy of the cosmological idea of pure reason. When analysing this antinomy of Kant’s system, as a rule, one does not pay attention to the fact that the antinomy is resolved by the great thinker with the help of the teleological method and spontaneous teleological acts. To prove this thesis, Kant uses Spinoza’s idea of substance as causa sui (the principle of
teleological causality), without referring to its author: “for, if it [previous condition] has always been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time, but would likewise have always existed” [B 473; A 445]. He continues: “therefore — if all causality is possible only in accordance with the laws of nature — is, when stated in this unlimited and general manner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only kind of causality” [B 475; A 447]. When proving the antithesis, he mentions that nature (understood as a world of phenomena or in aggregate with all possible phenomena — things-in-themselves) does not allow freedom as transcendental choice, as a “lawless faculty of freedom” [B 479; A 451], but does not exclude laws of freedom, freedom with its special laws — laws of teleology, which become constitutive in this context.

The problem of the foundations of morals is expressed in a special antinomy of practical reason. The thesis of this antinomy can be expressed in the following proposition:

In the world as a whole, the law of determinism is rigorous, and morals belong to this world.

The antithesis to this antinomy emerges from the correlation of the following propositions:
1) no natural factor is the foundation of morals;
2) God (as a transcendent being) is not the foundation of morals.

If we combine these propositions, we will obtain the antithesis:

Morals have neither natural, nor transcendent cause; morals do not have any external cause at all.

The synthesis of the thesis and antithesis can read only as follows:

Morals are the cause of itself, morals are causa sui: it is autonomous rather than heteronomous.

It means that the emergence of morals in a teleological act marks the emergence of a human being, the emergence of a metaphysical reality that does not result from the world of phenomena.

As we can see, here, one cannot avoid addressing the central concept of Kant’s system — thing-in-itself. V. A. Zhuchkov is absolutely right that, without this concept, one can neither enter, nor exit the system built by the great professor of Albertina.

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