SOCIETY

MODELS FOR COUNTERING THE SEGREGATION OF ETHNORELIGIOUS IMMIGRANT AREAS IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN

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The article explores the immigration and integration strategies of Denmark and Sweden while assessing their efficacy. The two countries, sharing historical, cultural, social and economic similarities, face a common challenge: the formation of ethnoreligious enclaves primarily inhabited by individuals with a Muslim background. Due to the recent European migrant crises, there has been a notable increase in the number of migrants, leading to stricter integration policies in the Scandinavian countries. Yet, governmental approaches to address the segregation of immigrant areas vary between Denmark and Sweden. Denmark has adopted a stringent immigration policy promoting cultural assimilation of immigrants from non-Western countries, whilst Sweden follows a liberal approach advocating cultural and ethnic diversity within society. The evolution of immigration and integration initiatives in Denmark and Sweden has been reconstructed through the analysis of official documents and critical examination of political discourses. It is noted that Swedish authorities are increasingly incorporating Denmark's more radical approaches to address migration issues within their political programmes. Despite the results of Denmark's anti-immigration policies and the reduction in the number of segregated immigrant areas, a myriad of issues persist due to EU immigration policies. The problem of forging a new civic identity rooted in the linguistic, religious and cultural homogeneity of Danish society amidst its multiculturalism remains relevant. Thus, Sweden is formulating its own anti-segregation programme, taking into account both the successes and shortcomings of Danish immigration and integration policies. Another important conclusion is that these nations have started to pay special attention to ethnic and religious criteria when identifying 'parallel societies'.

Keywords:

migrant crisis, segregation, immigrant areas, immigration and integration policy, immigrants with Muslim background, ethnoreligious parallel society, Denmark, Sweden

Introduction

The Scandinavian 'welfare states'[1] of Denmark and Sweden have the common problem of the segregation of immigrant areas. Despite this, the immigration and integration policies of the two countries have differed significantly over the past two decades. While Denmark's immigration policy is the toughest among European countries, Sweden is the most liberal in this regard. This situation can be illustrated by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) of 2020. According to MIPEX, Sweden is in the top three in the world for the effectiveness of immigration policy with 86 points,[2] while Denmark's position in this system is the lowest among Western European countries with only 49 points.[3] If in Sweden all index indicators are 'favourable' — over 80 points, except for the 'family reunion' indicator which is 71 points, then in Denmark none of the indicators reaches the highest sector of the Index scale and they remain 'slightly favourable' or 'semi favourable' — for example, the 'family reunion' indicator is only 25 points. At the same time, non-Western migrants[4] are the most limited in their civil rights and the least provided with security — this indicator in Denmark is only 17 points.

The European migration crisis of 2015 became an "exogenous shock" [1] for European national models of immigration control. Faced with the prospect of hosting an unprecedentedly high number of refugees, states sought to reduce their "attractiveness" by tightening entry conditions and reducing social security. At the same time, the situation with the number of immigrants in Denmark has again become the opposite of Sweden. This is illustrated by the difference in asylum rates in both countries due to the increase in migration flows in the autumn of 2015. In Sweden, there were approximately 163,000 asylum claims (mostly from refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq), while in Denmark their number

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[1] The welfare state is a typical model of the social state of the Scandinavian countries, which is based on the historically established ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural "homogeneity" of society.

[2] The Migrant Integration Policy Index. Sweden, 2020, *Migrant Integration Policy Index*, URL: https://www.mipex.eu/sweden (accessed 10.04.2023).

[3] The Migrant Integration Policy Index. Denmark, 2020, *Migrant Integration Policy Index*, URL: https://www.mipex.eu/denmark (accessed 10.04.2023).

[4] According to Statistic Denmark's definition of Western and non-Western countries, Western countries include EU member states, Andorra, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, and the Vatican State. Non-Western countries include all other countries: International Migration — Denmark, p. 15, 2022, *Ministry of Immigration and Integration*, URL: https://uim.dk/media/11385/international-migration-denmark-2022.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

was only 20,825.[1] Due to the new migration crisis in 2022 provoked by armed actions in Ukraine, European countries accepted about 6 million Ukrainian refugees: 56,165 of them were accepted by Sweden, and 41,155 — by Denmark.[2] As a result, according to the latest published estimates, 25.9 % of the population of Sweden are people with a 'foreign background' (*utländsk bakgrund*) — who were born abroad or whose parents are of foreign origin.[3] At the same time, in Denmark the share of "immigrants and their descendants"[4] of the population is 15.4 %; 9.7 % of which are of "non-Western" origin (the largest diasporas come from Turkey, Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq).[5] The Muslim migration background of a significant part of the population of Denmark and Sweden had a significant impact on the formation of civic identity. At the same time, a number of socio-economic, religious and value-cultural factors hinder the effective integration of residents of ethnic enclaves, which are predominantly represented by immigrants with "Muslim background".

Despite the cultural and historical commonality and the similarity of models of socio-economic development, there is a significant difference in the approaches to the implementation of immigration policies in Denmark and Sweden. Karin Borevi, a professor at Södertörn University, explains this through the different approaches of the ruling political elite to achieving social cohesion [2, p. 364—388]. According to the Danish political system, especially the centre-right party coalition, national unity is based on social homogeneity. On the contrary, according to the Swedish authorities, the state must ensure effective cultural and socio-economic integration of representatives of various ethnic groups into a single society.

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[1] Asylum in the EU Member States, 2016, *Eurostat*, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7921609/3-16032017-BP-EN.pdf/e5fa98bb-5d9d-4297-9168-d07c-67d1c9e1 (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] Ukraine Refugee Situation, 2023, *The Operational Data Portal*, URL: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed 20.06.2023).

[3] Befolkningsstatistik helåret, 2021, *Statistiska centralbyrån,* URL: https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/pong/statistiknyhet/befolkningsstatistik-helaret-20202/ (accessed 10.04.2023).

[4] An immigrant is defined as a person born abroad. A descendant is defined as a person born in Denmark. None of the parents are both born in Denmark and has Danish nationality: International Migration — Denmark, p. 15, 2022, *Ministry of Immigration and Integration.*

[5] Hvor mange og hvem er indvandrere i Danmark? 2023, *Det nationale Integrationsbarometeret*, URL: https://integrationsbarometer.dk/tal-og-analyser/INTEGRATION-STATUS-OG-UDVIKLING (accessed 10.04.2023).

Theory and Method

The theoretical basis of the research is the papers focused on various aspects of immigration and integration policies of Denmark [3; 4] and Sweden [5; 6]. This review allows us to analyze the political models of interaction between the state and "non-Western" immigrants and the processes of segregation of ethnic enclaves in these two countries. A special role in this context belongs to the religious aspect of public attitude towards immigrants with Muslim background [7; 8]. To reveal this aspect, the researchers rely on critical discourse analysis of Danish socio-political discourse about Muslim ghettos [9—11] and broad discussions about discrimination against Muslims in Swedish society [12—14]. In accordance with the theories of N. Fairclough and M. Foucault, these discourses are an effect and a way to interpret social practices that reflect the evolution of immigration policy. As modern researchers note, migration processes of recent decades have largely influenced the ethnic and religious composition of the population of the Scandinavian countries, as well as the Danish [15; 16] and Swedish [17; 20] civic identities. Despite this, there are a small number of comparative studies of the state integration strategies of Denmark and Sweden [21—27]. They mainly analyze the transformation of the immigration policy of the Scandinavian countries against the backdrop of migration crises.

The study is based on government strategies and state programs of Denmark and Sweden that contain various measures and initiatives to counter the segregation of immigrant areas, as well as statistical data on the composition and religious affiliation of the population of these countries.

As a result, this study compares Danish and Swedish models for countering the processes of segregation of immigrant areas. The article pays special attention to ethnic and religious factors in the formation of immigrant enclaves as a threat to national cohesion and territorial integrity of welfare states. The study examines the prospects for the continuity of the radical Danish approach to countering the ghettoization by the Swedish liberal political system based on the cultural diversity of modern society.

Ethnic criteria of Danish ghettos

In 2001—2011, the Danish People's Party (DPP) played a significant role in a Venstre-Conservative coalition government. One of the main areas of the Danish government's activities during this period was the tightening of immigration policy and the regulation of mechanisms for the integration of non-Western immigrants into Danish society. At the same time, the public and political reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks largely contributed to the escalation of xeno-

phobic rhetoric. Muslim immigrant enclaves began to be opposed by society to 'Danish cultural values' [9, p. 319], such as respect for the laws of a democratic society, equal rights of citizens and responsibility for public welfare.

In 2004, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen openly announced the fight against 'immigrant ghettos' as a result of the long-term unsuccessful immigration policy of Denmark [29]. This preceded the publication of the first comprehensive government plan to eliminate ghettos — "The Government's Strategy against Ghettoisation". The strategy included a list of measures to prevent the emergence of ghettos and recommendations for solving a number of social problems in eight immigrant areas.[1] It also characterized a ghetto as an area that isolated from society and prevented the successful integration of immigrants. The Danish government was concerned that "If the majority of the residents are unemployed immigrants, refugees and their descendants, these areas can develop into real ethnic enclaves or parallel societies without significant economic, social, and cultural contacts with society".[2]

To address the segregation of immigrant communities, the strategy involved changing laws in the public housing sector,[3] where most immigrants and their descendants lived. The government's housing initiative to prevent ghettoization was based on the principle of a more balanced composition of residents of disadvantaged areas.[4] However, these long-term measures were not effective in solving current problems. As a result, by 2010 the number of ghettos had increased to 29 areas.[5] Due to the current situation, new housing initiative aimed to reduce the public housing sector in ghettos by demolishing apartment buildings.[6] This approach involved the resettlement of immigrant families in more prosperous areas, as well as the improving the ghettos infrastructure and the increasing their

[1] Regeringens strategi mod ghettoisering, s. 16, 2004, *Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration*, URL: https://docplayer.dk/270581-Regeringens-strategi-mod-ghettoisering.html (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] Ibid. S. 12.

[3] Denmark has one of the largest public housing sectors in Europe, accounting for around 22 % of housing managed by housing associations and municipalities: Social rental housing stock, 2020, *The OECD Affordable Housing Database,* URL: https://www.oecd.org/els/family/PH4-2-Social-rental-housing-stock.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

[4] Regeringens strategi mod ghettoisering, s. 9, *Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration.*

[5] *Ghettoen* tilbage til samfundet. Et opgør med parallelsamfund i Danmark, s. 5, 2010, *Regeringen*, URL: https://www.regeringen.dk/aktuelt/tidligere-publikationer/ghettoen-tilbage-til-samfundet/ (accessed 10.04.2023).

[6] Ibid. S. 6.

attractiveness to the Danes. Nevertheless, these actions were also not effective against the background of the increasing territorial division of Danish cities and the marginalization of ghetto residents.

At the same time, the Danish government's systematic tightening of immigration policy contributed to positive dynamics in the labour market for non-Western migrants and their descendants and increased their employment rate by 10 %.[1] Another important aspect of the government's strategy against ghettoization was the work with immigrant youth and children in the field of education. The strategy paid special attention to the language adaptation of children from immigrant families who have reached the age of three. Failure to attend public educational institutions by children has become a legal basis for non-payment of family benefits and the imposition of an administrative fine on their parents. Measures to reduce crime among youth involved state guardianship of juvenile offenders or those who have problems with social adaptation.[2] It is important to note that the measures are not just recommendations, but they must be implemented by the police.

New government's strategy 2010 — "The Ghetto Back Into Society. Combating Parallel Societies in Denmark" published for the first time the definition of a ghetto, according to which it is a residential area with 1,000 or more residents and meeting at least two of three criteria:[3]

— the share of immigrants and their descendants from non-Western countries exceeds 50 %;

— the share of people aged 18–64 with no connection to the labour market or education exceeds 40 %;

— the number of persons convicted of criminal offences per 10,000 inhabitants exceeds 270 people.

Denmark became the first European country to use in government documents and statistical reports of migration departments the concepts 'immigrants and their descendants' and 'non-Western countries to analyze changes in this field [26, p. 13]. Denmark introduced ethnic criteria to define a ghetto, after which it became associated with immigrants and their descendants from Muslim coun-

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[1] *Ghettoen* tilbage til samfundet. Et opgør med parallelsamfund i Danmark, s. 19, 2010, *Regeringen*, URL: https://www.regeringen.dk/aktuelt/tidligere-publikationer/ghettoen-tilbage-til-samfundet/ (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] Ibid. S. 24.

[3] Ibid. S. 37.

tries.[1] A decade of active anti-immigrant socio-political discourse contributed to the perception of ghetto residents as depersonalized 'others' to Danish culture. The main criteria for defining the 'other' were ethnicity and religious affiliation as opposed to 'Danish identity' [15, p. 473] — a concept based on a single Danish language, culture and religion. Although religion is not a significant part of life for most modern Danes, with 68 % of them identifying as atheists,[2] it is still an important part of their civic identity: 75 % of Danes are members of the National Evangelical Lutheran Church.[3]

Modern Muslim 'parallel societies' in Denmark

Since 2011, a Social Democratic government began to make changes to Denmark's integration policy, which were recorded in the new strategic plan 2013 — "Vulnerable residential areas — the next steps".[4] This was preceded by the Kokkedal administration's refusal to install a Christmas tree and the dilemma of the rights of Muslim and Danish minorities in a democratic society. The Christmas events of 2012 caused a wide public response and demonstrated the rejection of ethno-confessional ghettos in Denmark not only by the Danes but also by those Muslims with immigrant background who have successfully integrated into the cultural and value system of a democratic society [10, p. 63].

The new government did not support a number of the Venstre-Conservative coalition's initiatives, including the leading role of ethnic criteria in determining a segregated area and the use of the concept of 'ghetto' in official political discourse [11, p. 164]. But it still retained anti-immigrant rhetoric. Thus, the definition of a "vulnerable residential area" (*udsatte boligområder*) included two additional criteria: 'education' and 'income' associated with vocational education for less than 60 % of residents aged 30—59 and the level of taxable income for res-

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[1] The largest immigrant diaspora in Denmark is Turkish. The number of immigrants and their descendants with Turkish background was 8.8 % by 2016: International Migration — Denmark, p. 15, 2015, *The Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing*, URL: https://integrationsbarometer.dk/tal-og-analyser/filer-tal-og-analyser/arkiv/internationalmigrationdenmark20151.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] Most Atheist Countries, 2022, *The Muslim Times*, URL: https://themuslimtimes. info/2022/09/01/most-atheist-countries-2022/ (accessed 10.04.2023).

[3] Religion in Denmark. Religion and Identity, 2022, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark*, URL: https://www.denmark.dk/people-and-culture/religion (accessed 10.04.2023).

[4] Udsatte boligområder — de næste skridt : regeringens udspil til en styrket indsats, 2013, *Regeringen*, URL: https://bibliotek.dk/da/moreinfo/netarchive/870970-basis%253A50757811 (accessed 10.04.2023).

idents aged over 15 less than 60 % of the average gross income in the region.[1] In addition, the abolition of the Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration[2] led to the decentralization of integration policy at the national level [3, p. 102].

In 2015, the European migration crisis and the strengthening of the DPP's position in parliamentary elections allowed it to propose for discussion a new strategic plan to counter ghettoization — "One Denmark without Parallel Societies: No Ghettos in 2030".[3] This plan represented the most radical approach of the Danish authorities to solving the problem of segregation of Muslim minorities. The tightening of immigration and integration policies contributed to a decrease in new flows of refugees and migrants. This allowed the Danish authorities to focus on the integration of non-Western migrants who lived in the ghetto.

These changes in integration policy again affected the definitions of a ghetto and divided disadvantaged areas into three categories: 'vulnerable residential areas', 'ghettos' and 'hard ghettos' (*hårde ghetto*). A 'vulnerable area' had to meet at least two of five criteria: '50 % of residents are immigrants and their descendants from non-Western countries', 'employment', 'crime', 'education', and 'income'.[4] To classify as a 'ghetto,' an area had to satisfy additional conditions, including having over 60 % immigrant residents or exhibiting a high crime rate. Furthermore, if a residential area was labelled as a ghetto for four consecutive years, it was deemed a 'hard ghetto'. This approach underscored ethnicity as a primary determinant for ghetto designation and underscored the shortcomings of Danish integration policies in recent decades.

In 2018, the most significant government measures to eliminate the ghetto were the deprivation of ghetto residents' right to participate in the family reunification programme; the reduction of social benefits in case of moving to a "hard ghetto"; higher fines for offences; increased police presence; commitment of municipalities to reduce the public housing sector to 40 %.[5] Almost all measures were confirmed by law. However, the culmination of the new immigration policy was a reorientation from 'integration' to 'repatriation' of refugees and immigrants who had committed offences [4, s. 173].

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[1] Udsatte boligområder — de næste skridt : regeringens udspil til en styrket indsats, s. 5, 2013, *Regeringen*, URL: https://bibliotek.dk/da/moreinfo/netarchive/870970-basis%253A50757811 (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] The Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration (Ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration) was created in 2001 and abolished in 2011 by the Social Democratic government.

[3] Ét Danmark uden parallelsamfund — Ingen ghettoer i 2030, 2018, *Regeringen*, URL: https://oim.dk/media/19035/et_danmark_uden_parallelsamfund_pdfa.pdf (accessed 11.04.2023).

[4] Ibid. S. 11.

[5] Ibid. S. 13.

The tough anti-immigrant policy of the Danish authorities caused a negative reaction from the European public.[1] At the same time, the EU's migration policy is also increasingly criticized. According to the Danish independent migration expert Morten Lisborg, the current migration paradigm has proven its failure.[2] In the future, this will be a real threat to internal security and stability in Europe. Lisborg outlined the two main vectors of this trend: 1. European countries pay more attention to rescuing refugees rather than regulating border crossings by migrants; 2. the distribution of quotas for the placement of migrants in EU countries. A large number of important questions remain unanswered. One of the most pressing problems is the deportation of migrants who are denied residence in Europe: countries deport only about 50 % of those whom they decide to deport. Thus, a significant number of migrants are in the EU illegally or awaiting deportation. In addition, the costs of deportation are not justified. According to Lisborg's report, the deportation of a migrant costs approximately 4 thousand euros. However, experts admit that it is impossible to expel everyone who is refused permission to stay. Therefore, some of them believe that these funds could be more usefully invested in improving living conditions in the regions of mass arrival of migrants. But in reality, this approach cannot significantly improve the situation. EU countries spend significant resources on solving migration problems and this becomes a significant burden. For example, Sweden spends an average of 6 thousand euros per year on asylum seekers and refugees, which is comparable to the total budget of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[3]

Nevertheless, Danish anti-immigrant policies have led to a positive trend in reducing the number of segregated areas. This is reflected in the "ghetto lists" published annually since 2010. Thus, if in 2018 there were 29 ghettos in Denmark, then in 2019 their number was 28,[4] and in 2020 it decreased to 15.[5] The government explained such significant indicators by such positive factors as the decline in the number of immigrants and the increase in the level of their income and education.

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[1] For example: An Island for 'Unwanted' Migrants Is Denmark's Latest Aggressive Anti-Immigrant Policy, 2018, *TIME*, URL: https://time.com/5504331/denmark-migrants-lindholm-island/ (accessed 11.04.2023).

[2] EU migration policy is a disaster, 2023, *InoSMI*, URL: https://inosmi.ru/20170403/239022762.html (accessed 16.12.2023).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Liste over ghettoområder pr. 1. december 2019, 2019, *Regeringen*, URL: https://www.regeringen.dk/media/7698/ghettolisten-2019-007.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

[5] Liste over ghettoområder pr. 1. december 2020, 2020, *Regeringen*, URL: https://im.dk/Media/637589266252595089/haarde-ghettoomraader-2020ny_final-a.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

Although the DPP was defeated in the 2019 parliamentary elections, the continuity of its tough policy towards immigrants [28, p. 44] allowed the government coalition to maintain positive dynamics in countering ethno-confessional enclaves. According to the lists of 'parallel societies" (the "ghetto list" until 2021), the number of these areas has decreased to 12 in 2021 and to 10 in 2022.[1] In 2021, the new government initiative "Mixed residential areas — the next step in the fight against parallel societies" published a project for 'mixed cities' (*blundede byer*)[2] that involved cohabitation of the residents, despite their economic, social and ethnic differences.

In December 2022, "The political basis for Denmark's government" outlined the course of the Danish authorities towards "a strict, responsible and consistent immigration policy, where there is control over the number of refugees and immigrants who come to Denmark. Denmark must have control over the influx into our country, so that we continue to have the capacity to ensure proper integration and not weaken the cohesion in Denmark".[3] This reflects the continuity of the initiative to eliminate ethno-confessional "parallel societies" by 2030, which are still positioned as a threat to Danish society. The document pays special attention to the fact that "Denmark is a Christian country, and the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church has a special status as a national church. The government will maintain this special status".[4] Thus, despite freedom of religion in a democratic society, the Danish government emphasizes the importance of national religion for the formation of the civic identity of the Danes. This approach to the consolidation of Danish society is a significant obstacle to the integration of Muslim immigrants for whom religion plays a central role in their identity.

Ethnic and socio-economic segregation
of vulnerable areas in Sweden

Danish anti-immigration policies have attracted close attention from the world community. Actions regarding immigrants and refugees not only aroused criticism but also became valuable experience for solving the problem of segre-

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[1] Liste over parallelsamfund pr. 1. december 2022. URL: https://im.dk/Media/638054017996341610/Parallelsamfundslisten%202022.pdf (accessed 11.04.2023).

[2] Blandede boligområder — næste skridt i kampen mod parallelsamfund, s. 8, 2021, *Regeringen*, URL: https://im.dk/Media/8/4/Pjece_Blandede%20boligomr%C3%A5der.pdf (accessed 11.04.2023).

[3] Ansvar for Danmark. Det politiske grundlag for Danmarks regering, s. 44, 2022, *Regeringen*, URL: https://www.stm.dk/statsministeriet/publikationer/regeringsgrundlag-2022/ (accessed 11.04.2023).

[4] Ibid. S. 51.

gation of ethno-religious enclaves. The Swedish government did not share the Danish approach but also looked for ways to counter the segregation of 'parallel societies'.

In the mid-1999s, Sweden for the first time officially declared ethnic segregation of immigrant areas as a socio-economic and demographic problem. During the period 1995—1999, the government programme "Blommanpengarna" worked to reduce the segregation of ethnic enclaves in 8 municipalities of Stockholm by involving unemployed immigrants in the labour market.[1] In addition, this programme included measures to counter ethnic discrimination and social integration of women from immigrant families with "Muslim background". By that time, the globalization of Islam had already led to the emergence of a "neo-ethnic" phenomenon, according to which immigrants from countries with a predominantly Muslim culture were perceived by Western society as Muslims not by religious affiliation, but rather as an ethnic group [13, p. 117].

In 1999—2004, the "Storstadssatsningen" programme outlined further government initiatives in which government structures signed cooperation agreements with 7 municipalities including 24 areas.[2] Socio-political discourse predominantly labelled such areas as "immigrant," "vulnerable," or "outsider" [18, p. 15—38]. The new programme became the basis for further government measures taken from 2008 to 2014. These were aimed at improving the institutional structures of segregated areas in spheres of employment, education and security. The main government initiatives to counter segregation have focused on working with municipalities to reduce the social and economic vulnerability of these areas. The number of vulnerable areas increased to 38 by 2010,[3] and their definition began to meet clearly defined criteria:

— the employment rate among residents is below 52 %;
— long-term social security above 4.8 %;
— less than 70 % of residents have secondary education.

The list of criteria for defining a segregated area stated by the Swedish authorities corresponds to the Danish ghetto indicators published in 2010—2013. However, the Swedish version does not have a criterion of 'crime'. In addition, there is a trend whereby the ethno-religious factor disappears in Swedish government

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[1] Vad hände med "Blommanpengarna"?, s. 9, 2000, *Integrationsverkets*, URL: https://mkcentrum.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/blommanslut.pdf (accessed 11.04.2023).

[2] Regeringens långsiktiga strategi för att minska och motverka segregation, s. 12, 2018, *Regeringen*, URL: https://docplayer.se/106979329-Regeringens-langsiktiga-strategi-for-att-minska-och-motverka-segregation.html (accessed 11.04.2023).

[3] Ibid. S. 12.

documents on countering segregation, while in Denmark ethnicity becomes a key indicator of a 'vulnerable area'. Thus, the changes in Swedish official rhetoric towards immigrant enclaves led to the designation of segregation not as ethnic, but as socio-economic. However, the lack of specified criteria in government documents is compensated for by data provided by the police departments.

Since 2015, the National Operational Department of the Swedish police has officially published reports for the Swedish government that contain statistics and recommendations for reducing social risks and offences in segregated areas. According to the official definition, the "vulnerable area" (*utsatt område*) is "a geographically separated area with a low social and economic status, where the criminals have an impact on the local population".[1] The main criteria for determining areas with a low degree of social and economic security include:

— parallel social structures;

— extremism (systematic violations of freedom of religion or strong fundamentalist influence limited freedom and human rights);

— residents who periodically leave the territory of Sweden to participate in hostilities in conflict zones [30];

— developed criminal structure.

The Swedish police reports reflected the gradation of the degree of vulnerability of areas by analogy with the division into three categories of immigrant areas in Denmark due to tightening immigration policy after 2015. If a segregated area complies with some criteria, it is a 'risk zone' (*riskområde*), while the complete correspondence of theme is characteristic of an 'especially vulnerable area' (*särskilt utsatt område*). A sense of insecurity among residents of "parallel societies" determines their unwillingness to take part in the judicial system of Sweden to avoid acts of violence against witnesses and informants. At the same time, the police often do not have physical access to these areas and the ability to implement their own tasks.

Swedish integration policy influenced by the Danish model of countering the ghettoization

Due to the migration crisis of 2015, Sweden gradually began to reorient on the Danish model of countering the segregation of immigrant areas. In Sweden, a wide public discussion about the definition of "Swedish identity" revealed a

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[1] Lägesbild över utsatta områden. Regeringsuppdrag 2021, s. 7, 2021, *Polismyndigheten*, URL: https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/ovriga_rapporter/lagesbild-over-utsatta-omraden-2021.pdf/download (accessed 07.04.2023).

confessional affiliation as one of its criteria. As in Denmark, in Sweden there is a significant number of atheists — about 78 % of the population.[1] Nevertheless, 53 % of the Swedes consider themselves as followers of the Evangelical Lutheran national church in Sweden and consider religion as a cultural tradition.[2] At the same time, over $\frac{4}{5}$ immigrants have "Muslim background" and are considered as the least adaptable to integration into Swedish society [6, p. 44]. The growth in the number of Muslim diasporas in Swedish society has led to trends of nationalism, manifestations of ethnic discrimination and xenophobia [5, p. 119]. The situation is largely complicated by the "heterogeneity" and the decentralization of Swedish Muslims caused by linguistic, cultural, theological and political disagreements within the multinational immigrant communities.

The cooperation of the Swedish Muslim organizations prepared a report for the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of the UN, which stated the inability of the Swedish government to solve the problem of Islamophobia in Swedish society and protect the rights of Swedish Muslims [12, p. 8]. In particular, the report openly declared "Islamophobic" [12, p. 2] the right-wing nationalist party "Sweden Democrats", which entered the Riksdag in 2010 and aimed at tightening immigration policy. The political situation in the country has largely contributed to a stereotype about the threat to Swedish democratic values from immigrants with Muslim background, whose number is about 14 % of the religious population of Sweden [19, p. 101].

The increase in the number of immigrants influenced changes in integration policy. This was reflected in the new strategic document for 2018 — "The government's long-term strategy to reduce and counteract segregation" based on the "Long-term reform programme to reduce segregation for 2017—2025".[3] This programme was proposed by the government, headed by Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and represented by the coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. These reforms were aimed at the socio-economic rehabilitation of vulnerable areas and the elimination of their segregation.

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[1] Most Atheist Countries, 2022, *The Muslim Times*, URL: https://themuslimtimes. info/2022/09/01/most-atheist-countries-2022/ (accessed 10.04.2023).

[2] Religion in Sweden, 2021, *Svenska institutet*, URL: https://sweden.se/life/society/religion-in-sweden (accessed 10.04.2023).

[3] Långsiktigt reformprogramme för minskad segregation år 2017—2025, 2016, *Regeringen*, URL: https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/94760eec95e04a45b0a1e462368b0095/langsiktigt-reformprogram-for-minskad-segregation-ar-2017-2025.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

The new strategy has used the concept 'an area with socio-economic problems' (*områden med socioekonomiska utmaningar*)[1] to refer to vulnerable areas". According to current data of the Swedish police, the number of such areas in Sweden is gradually increasing: from 53 in 2015 to 61 in 2021 with approximately 550,000 residents.[2] The lack of changes in the ethnic composition of vulnerable areas and the strengthening of socio-economic segregation largely determined the change in government rhetoric. At the same time, the strategy notes the strengthening of the link between socio-economic and ethnic segregation, as the concentration of low-income people in vulnerable areas coincides with the concentration of people of non-European origin.[3] By analogy with the situation in Denmark, the unbalanced composition of residents in disadvantaged areas and increasing economic inequality are the main reasons for segregation in Sweden.

The strategy identifies five main criteria for strengthening segregation. First of all, this is the problem of housing shortage and the failure of the "Eget boende" (EBO) policy — the independent resettlement of immigrants and refugees, due to the migration crisis of 2015. At the beginning of 2019, Löfven formed a second government coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens, involving the Liberals and Center Party. It introduced a project to reform the housing market and allowed the municipalities to limit EBO in areas with socio-economic problems.[4] According to the second criterion, educational reforms have led to school segregation caused by an increased concentration of children and youth from families with foreign background in free schools. Whereas the Danish experience shows that the number of students from disadvantaged areas should not exceed 30 %.[5] At the same time, the level of education directly affects the third criterion — employment. The socio-economic segregation is related to the labour market. The unemployment and lack of education among large numbers of immigrants leads to the fourth criterion based on low levels of democratic participation in civil society. Such democratic exclusion of residents of vulner-

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[1] Regeringens långsiktiga strategi för att minska och motverka segregation, s. 11, 2018, *Regeringen*.

[2] Lägesbild över utsatta områden. Regeringsuppdrag, 2021, s. 14—18.

[3] Regeringens långsiktiga strategi för att minska och motverka segregation, s. 15.

[4] Sakpolitisk överenskommelse mellan Socialdemokraterna, Centerpartiet, Liberalerna och Miljöpartiet de gröna, par. 43, 2019, *Socialdemokraterna*, URL: https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/download/18.1f5c787116e356cdd25a4c/1573213453963/Januariavtalet.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

[5] Ét Danmark uden parallelsamfund — Ingen ghettoer i 2030. København: Økonomi-og Indenrigsministeriet. S. 8.

able areas[1] undermines their trust in social and political institutions. This is one of the factors for the formation and successful functioning of parallel social and legal structures in vulnerable areas. Thus, the fifth criterion — crime, is a combination of previous unfavourable factors. The developed criminal structures and networks of their cooperation contribute to the strengthening of Islamist radicalization [31, s. 40], which primarily affects immigrants in the first and second generations.

Currently, Sweden has a tendency to borrow the experience of Denmark in countering the segregation of ethno-religious areas. In 2021, the Liberal Party led by Nyamko Sabuni, the former Minister of Integration, announced the need to reform Swedish immigration and integration legislation and, similar to the Danish government strategy of 2018, proposed a plan "Förortslyftet"[2] to eliminate 'parallel societies' by 2030. One of the key aspects of solving the problem is overcoming ethnic, gender, and religious discrimination.[3] This is widespread in various social spheres of Swedish society and significantly hinders the effective integration of non-Western immigrants.

Conclusion

The historically determined similarity in the social and economic development of Denmark and Sweden led these two countries to the problem of 'parallel societies' segregated on ethno-confessional grounds. However, the approaches of the Danish and Swedish governments to solving this problem are largely opposite. Denmark has an anti-immigration policy aimed at the cultural assimilation of immigrants to 'Danish standards' of a single language, religion and culture; the reduction in the influx of new migrants; and the repatriation of those who have shown their inability to adapt to Danish democratic society. Sweden favours a policy of cultural diversity aimed at preserving the ethnic identities and cultural traditions of citizens with foreign background who number about a quarter of the population. However, the ethnic and religious aspects gradually became similar for these two countries in a cultural context and united into a single ethno-confessional factor. This formed in the public consciousness the image of a non-Western immigrant opposed to society.

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[1] Regeringens långsiktiga strategi för att minska och motverka segregation. S. 36.

[2] En plan för att Sverige inte ska ha några utsatta områden år 2030, 2021, *Förortslyftet*, URL: https://www.liberalerna.se/wp-content/uploads/forortslyftet-hela.pdf (accessed 10.04.2023).

[3] Ibid. S. 41.

Since 2004, Denmark has systematically tightened its immigration policy in several stages. Despite the controversy and widespread criticism of these measures by the European community, this approach has proven effective in reducing the number of disadvantaged areas. At the same time, significant restrictions on immigrants have negative consequences, such as the escalation of anti-Muslim discourse and the marginalization of ghetto residents who are predominantly immigrants with Muslim background. On the other hand, liberal Sweden has also failed to avoid cultural segregation and the stereotyping of vulnerable areas as Muslim enclaves that are opposed to Western values and undermined the foundations of a safe and free democratic society.

In Sweden, segregated areas with socio-economic problems are high on the political agenda. But if in Denmark ghettos are determined primarily by the ethnic composition of their residents, then in Sweden this criterion is excluded from the reasons for the socio-economic disadvantage of vulnerable areas. Nevertheless, ethnic and religious factors are openly or implicitly present in the integration models of both countries. In particular, the religious aspect is important for the formation of civic identity in Denmark and Sweden.

By borrowing from the experience of Danish immigration and integration policies, Sweden has the opportunity to analyze the positive and negative results of the Danish approach and apply to its own model the most appropriate schemes for combating segregation in the Swedish context.

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