

**MIGRATION FLOWS
IN EUROPE:
SPACE AND TIME
TRANSFORMATION**

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One of the key manifestations of globalisation is an increase in the spatial mobility of population involving growing numbers of people into international migration processes. This article is an attempt to assess the density of migration connections between European states based on the 1990—2015 quantitative data. An analysis of migration flows and relevant net migration and migration localisation at the national and regional levels makes it possible to identify key trends in the spatial and temporal transformation of this phenomenon on the European continent. Calculations suggest that an increase in migration has not narrowed the gap between countries of origin and destination countries but, on the contrary, it has made it more pronounced over the recent decades. The article presents an attempt at classifying European countries by the direction and intensity of migration connections and stresses the impact of international migration on the demographic and sociocultural situation in different European states.

Key words: immigration, emigration, net migration rate, intensity of migration, Europe, regions and countries, migration flow

Comprising the westernmost part of Eurasia, until recently, Europe was far from major migration routes. In historical time, which extends back 2,500 years for most of the continent, major migrations were observed in Europe only in the 4th — 7th centuries AD. These events, known as the Migration Period, dramatically changed the political and ethnic map of Europe. Over many centuries, Europe did not attract significant migration flows. The Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, Norman invasions, and the expansion of the Ottoman Port changed the political structure of individual regions but did not result in mass migration. On the contrary, in the end of the 11th century, European

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Submitted on February 19, 2016.

doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2016-2-6

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2016



countries became a source of migration, which reached a massive scale in the late 19th century. The crusades of the 11th — 14th centuries, the colonisation of North and South Americas, Australia, and New Zealand, and colonial wars in Asia and Africa forced millions of Europeans to leave the continent. Only in the second half of the 20th century, Europe started to turn from a migration source to a destination territory.

Of course, the attractiveness of a territory depends on the standards of living which are a result of its socioeconomic development. European states differ in this respect. However, the gap between Europe and the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is even greater than intra-continental differences.

However, a disparity in living standards is not sufficient for triggering international migration. It requires high population mobility and technology for long-distance travel. It took three years for Magellan's caravels to circumnavigate the globe. It took several months for caravans travelling along the Silk Road to deliver goods from China to Byzantium. Even in the early 20th century, a journey from Europe to Australia took several weeks and not everyone could afford it. Since the mid-20th century, mass travel opportunities have been developing. As a worldwide integration process, globalisation affects all aspects of human lives. As a result, migration mobility increases. This creates an entirely new migration situation, which also holds true for the European continent. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a new Migration Period, which swept all European countries by the beginning of this century [13].

Although one can argue with E. A. Narochitskaya's statement that 'modern migration processes do not have any analogues in the past' [9, p. 10—11], the scale of current migration flows is very impressive. According to the UN Population Division, in 1990—2015, the total number of *international migrants*¹ in the world and in Europe increased 1.6-fold. By the total number of people living in a country other than their country of birth, Europe ranks first in the world. Out of 244 million international migrants, 76.2 million (31 %) live in European countries. Today, each tenth resident of Europe is a migrant. In such countries as Switzerland and Luxembourg, foreign-born residents comprise 25 % of the population [2]. The interest in the problem of migration in Europe is increasing. Recent studies focus on both individual aspects of migration processes and general problems [1; 9; 18].

Most scholars explain migration mechanisms by a joint effect of two large groups of factors:

1) *push factors* making people leave their homeland (a difficult economic situation, regime change, social instability, wars) [14; 20];

2) *pull factors* encouraging people to come to a certain country.

Three major aspects are identified:

a) *economic aspects* — a high level of economic development in the destination country leads to imbalances in the labour market (increased demand for labour), which is corrected through the inflow of migrants [16; 17];

¹ Statistics produced by the UN and other international organisations define international migrants as persons living in a country other than the country of birth regardless of the length of stay.

b) *cultural influences* (the core/periphery and the world systems theory): most migrations occur in periphery and semi-periphery postcolonial countries and they are targeted at former metropolises, which earlier had a profound effect on all spheres of life in their colonies. The countries are bound by strong cultural, educational, and foreign economic ties. A common language is of special importance [15];

c) *social network theory* (chain migration theory): new migrations often occur along the established channels (social ties between a migrant community and the home country). Building on the existing cores, migrations along social channels continues when objective economic factors — for instance, increased demand for labour — become less urgent. In this case, new migrants count on saving moving expenses and a more comfortable adaptation among compatriots rather than finding a job and decent remuneration. Numerous studies have focused on social networks of immigrants and chain migrations [12; 19; 21].

However, this work deliberately avoids considering the circumstances urging people to leave home and move to another country and reasons behind such decisions. Moreover, a migration decision is not only a composite and multi-factor but also individual process. Each potential migrant is guided by individual reasons. However, all these reasons fit into the paradigm of looking for a better place.

In view of the recently increasing intensity of migrations processes, this study aims to evaluate spatial changes in the migration situation in Europe after 1990 and identify the causes of territorial differences. These objectives can be attained through analysing the direction and scale of migration.

The analysis of international migration geography based on studying cumulative migration (immigration and emigration), which is carried out in this article, makes it possible to obtain more reliable data on the intensity and direction of migration processes than the summation of net immigration and net migration in each European state over several decades would.

The involvement of European states in international migration processes can be described using several parameters having both absolute and relative values. Let us consider parameters elucidating the trends in migration development in Europe and the effects of spatial and temporal transformation of migration ties between European states. A major source of statistics used in the analysis is the data of the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs [2].

International migration coefficient (IMC)

Based on the direction of migration processes, all European countries² can be divided into those where the number of immigrants is higher than that of migrants and vice versa. To class a state as one of these categories, one

² This work analyses all European countries with a population of above 100,000 and Cyprus, which is geographically located in Asia but is closely integrated in Europe, being a member of the EU. Forty states are examined. Microstates (Lichtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Andorra, and Vatican) are not considered. Dependencies (Faroe Islands, Gibraltar) are analysed as part of metropolises.

can use the *international migration coefficient* — a ratio between the number of immigrants living in the country and locally born population living abroad, i. e. the number of emigrants.

$$\text{IMC} = I / E,$$

where I stands for the number of immigrants and E — for that of emigrants.

In 2015, the number of immigrants exceeded that of emigrants by 28%, i. e. the IMC reached 1.28. However, this coefficient ranges from country to country. The first group of countries with an IMC of above 1.2 brings together 15 states situated in the North-West of the continent. All these countries, with the exception of Slovenia and Cyprus, are historically the most developed countries of the world having a very high Human Development Index and a high per capita income (fig. 1). In Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, France, Norway, and Germany, the ratio is 3—5 immigrants per one emigrant. Italy and Great Britain — the most popular destination countries in the recent decades — have a moderate IMC ranging from 1.5 to 2. This is explained by the fact that, until recently, these countries were the largest sources of emigration. Just quarter a century ago, Great Britain and Italy were classed as countries, where the number of immigrants was much higher than that of foreign-born residents (the IMC of 0.9 and 0.4 respectively) [2].



Fig. 1. International migration coefficient (IMC) in European states, 2015.

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

Group 2 comprises countries, where the number of foreign-born population is much lower than that of emigrants living abroad. Today, 17 European

states are identified as principal countries of origin. Most of them are located in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.³ The most significant imbalance between immigrants and emigrants is observed in the socially unstable Balkan countries, which witnessed wars and ethnic conflicts, — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. Today in these countries, there are ten to fifty emigrants, looking for a better life in prosperous European states⁴, per one foreign-born resident.

If IMC ranges from 0.8 to 1.2, a country is classed as category 3, which comprises states that act as both countries of origins and destination countries in international exchange. A balanced ratio between immigrants and emigrants is observed in eight European countries situated in different parts of the continent. These are Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Cyprus, and Serbia. Countries, where the number of immigrants and emigrants is almost equal, include Russia and such former Soviet countries as Estonia and Ukraine. In the Soviet period, mass migrations within the state borders resulted in a multi-ethnic population of constituent countries. However, there was no ‘melting pot’ in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russian-speaking communities lived a parallel life to the ‘titular’ population. It is important to understand that, despite the seeming similarity in ethnodemographic situations, the political history of these republics was rather disparate over the past centuries [8]. This manifested not only in the particularities of foreign and domestic policies in each of the three Baltic States after regaining independence but also in the migration situation [6].

It is worth noting that, since 1990, the IMC has been increasing in most European countries. An imbalance between immigrants and emigrants is especially pronounced in Scandinavian countries and Southern European states. In Norway and Sweden — once immigration-dominated countries — there are 3.8—2.9 foreign-born residents per one emigrant (1.3 and 3.5 in 1990) (fig. 1). In Spain twenty-five years ago, there were two emigrants looking for a better life per one foreign-born resident. Today, there are 4.8 immigrants coming from North Africa and Latin America per one Spanish emigrant. Other European states that turned from countries of origin into destination countries over a rather short period include the UK, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus.

A dramatic change in international migration took place in Finland and Ireland. In the late 1980s, these countries were considered poor by European

³ The regional division of Europe used in this article classes the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland) and Finland as Nordic Europe; the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, France, and Switzerland as Western Europe; Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus as Southern Europe; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova as Southeastern Europe; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as Eastern Europe.

⁴ For most Bulgarian emigrants, the destination country is Turkey, since ethnic Turks comprise a significant proportion of expatriates from this Balkan state.

standards. Finns and the Irish preferred to leave the country looking for a better life. The obvious choice was the metropolises — Sweden and the UK, where the Finnish and Irish communities are ones of the largest to this day. In 1990, there were four emigrants per one immigrant in Finland and Ireland. However, in 2015, the number of immigrants was almost equal to that of emigrants in Ireland and exceeded it in Finland [2].

Considerable changes occurred not only in the relatively poor countries but also in the largest European states. In the 19th — early 20th century, Great Britain was also a country of emigrants. Numerous British citizens were leaving the country for the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. For Italy, the key destination countries were the US and France and for Spain, France and Latin American countries. Most migrants from Russia (within its current borders) settled in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The direction of migration flows started to change in the 1950s and the process accelerated towards the end of the century. In some countries, this change was associated with the disintegration of states (the British Empire and the USSR), in others (Italy, Spain, and Germany), with an economic boom, which made them attractive not only for local but also foreign-born population.

However, not in all European countries, the ratio between immigrants and emigrants skewed towards the former in the recent decades. In 1990—2015, the IMC decreased 3—6-fold in the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Poland, Romania, and Moldova and 11-fold in Albania. Ukraine also became an emigrant-dominated state. In Russia, the ratio between immigrants and emigrants changed insignificantly over quarter a century (an IMC of 0.90 in 1990 and 1.10 in 2015). However, considering Russia as a whole, it is important to understand that its internal differences — even those within the European territory of the country — are not of solely economic nature [7], they concern all aspects of public life, including demographic development.

Proportion of immigrants (PI) in the total population

Alongside the direction of migration flows, it is important to analyse the effect of migration on the population of a country. The key indicator is the *proportion of immigrants (PI) in total population*. A high IMC does not always mean a high PI. In Estonia, Ireland, Iceland, Cyprus, and Ukraine foreign-born residents comprise 10% of population. However, the number of immigrants and emigrants is almost equal. A small proportion of foreign-born population is observed in Western Europe. Alongside Luxembourg and Switzerland, the highest proportion of immigrants is registered in Sweden, Austria, Ireland, and Cyprus. Among Eastern European states with much lower economic performance, Estonia has a high proportion of immigrants (fig. 2), which is explained by the country's strong migration ties with its former metropole. Russian-born residents account for 11% of Estonia's population and almost three fourths of all immigrants in the country [2].



Fig. 2. Proportion of immigrants in total population of European countries, 2015

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

During the last 25 years, the proportion of immigrants changed differently across Europe. In 1990—2015, the proportion of immigrants increased from 6.8 to 10.3%⁵ in the 40 European countries. The most dramatic increase in the number of immigrants is observed in the countries that earlier had a low proportion of foreign-born population — Serbia, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Italy. If in Bulgaria, the proportion of foreign-born residents is slightly above 1% of population, in Spain, the proportion of immigrants increased from 2 to 12.7% of the population over two and a half decades. A rapid economic growth of the late 20th — early 21st centuries and the role of a gateway to Europe made Spain a major destination for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Latin American and North African states [11].

At the same time, both the absolute number and proportion of immigrants in the total population reduced in a number of European states. This is the case in Eastern Europe, primarily, the former Soviet Republics. For instance, in Ukraine and Belarus, the reduction in the proportion of migrants was insignificant, ranging from 7 to 20%. In others, (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina), the reduction was 30—75%. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and

⁵ For the accuracy of comparisons, 1990 data are adjusted for 2015 state borders, i.e. the migration exchange between the former Soviet and Yugoslavian republic and between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is considered as international migration.

Moldova, this reduction was accounted for by return migration after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR. Serbs were returning to Serbia, Russians and ‘Russian-speaking’ individuals to Russia [24]. In Poland, an almost twofold reduction in the number of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian-born residents in 1990—2015 is explained by the natural change in population — the post-war generation (1944—1957) of immigrants from Lithuania, Western Belarus, and Western Ukraine was dying of old age⁶.

Russia shows a rather moderate proportion of foreign-born individuals as compared to the other European states. Only 8.1% of its population was born abroad. However, despite a significant inflow of immigrants in the post-Soviet period, their proportion did not significantly change over the last 25 years [2].

An important indicator was the contribution of migration flows localised in a certain country to the total number of immigrants. However, size matters and four states — Russia, Germany, the UK and France account for more than a half of all European immigrants. Seventy-four percent of all European immigrants live in these countries and Spain, Italy, and Ukraine. The list of top destination countries (table 1) changed dramatically after 1990. Over this period, Russia and Ukraine moved down in the list of leaders in immigration, whereas the UK, Italy, and especially Spain moved up.

Table 1

**European states with the highest proportion
of immigrants and emigrants, 1990—2015**

State	Number, 1,000 people	% of the country's population	State	Number, 1,000 people	% of the country's population
<i>Emigrants</i>					
1990			2015		
Russia	12,750	8.6	Russia	10,577	7.4
Ukraine	5,575	10.8	Ukraine	5,826	13.0
Great Britain	4,070	7.0	Great Britain	4,917	7.6
Italy	3,497	6.1	Poland	4,450	12.2
Germany	3,471	4.4	Germany	4,045	5.0
Portugal	1,919	19.4	Romania	3,408	17.5
Belarus	1,892	18.4	Italy	2,901	4.8
Poland	1,628	4.3	Portugal	2,306	22.3
Spain	1,464	3.8	France	2,146	3.3
Serbia and Montenegro	1,305	12.5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,651	43.3

⁶ In 1944—1947, after the revision of the Soviet-Polish border, many Belarusians and Ukrainians moved to the Soviet Union (Belarus and Ukraine), whereas Poles were leaving the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus for Poland. This migration was mostly compulsory. More than 500,000 Ukrainians and Belarusians and more than 1.3 million Poles (including Poles who had been persecuted and deported to Siberia and Central Asia) were forced to resettle.

End of table 1

State	Number, 1,000 people	% of the country's population	State	Number, 1,000 people	% of the country's population
<i>Immigrants</i>					
1990			2015		
Russia	11,525	7.8	Germany	12,006	14.9
Ukraine	6,893	13.3	Russia	11,643	8.1
Germany	5,936	7.5	Great Britain	8,543	13.1
France	5,897	10.4	France	7,784	12.1
Great Britain	3,662	6.3	Spain	5,853	12.7
Italy	1,428	2.5	Italy	5,789	9.7
Switzerland	1,392	20.7	Ukraine	4,835	10.8
Belarus	1,249	12.2	Switzerland	2,439	29.4
Netherlands	1,192	8.0	Netherlands	1,979	11.7
Poland	1,128	3.0	Sweden	1,640	16.8

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

Although the number of immigrants increased in most European states, in the largest countries — Russia, Germany, the UK, France, and Italy, — the proportion of foreign-born residents is not very high, ranging from 7.8% (Russia) to 14.9% (Germany).

While acknowledging an increase in the number and proportion of immigrants in most European countries, it is important to understand that it is not a linear process. Economic crises and a deteriorating situation in the labour markets of certain countries have a profound effect on the scale and direction of migration leading to return migration. For instance, considerable deterioration of the economic situation in Spain is accompanied by an increasing unemployment rate, which forces immigrants to leave the country. For a certain period, Spain even turned into a country of origin [10].

Migration process intensity (MPI)

The migration situation in a country can be described through a ratio between *gross international migration (GIM)* and the total population. It makes it possible to calculate the *migration process intensity (MPI)* demonstrating the involvement of a country's population in international migration⁷.

$$\text{MPI} = (\text{I} + \text{E}) / \text{P} \cdot 100,$$

where I stands for the number of immigrants, E — for the number of emigrants, and P — for the total population.

⁷ This study defines gross international migration as a total of immigrants and emigrants. i. e. foreign-born residents of the country (immigrants) and nationals living abroad (emigrants).

A low intensity of migration processes is observed in so-called *traditional societies*, where contacts with the outer world are reduced to the minimum, which contributes to the preservation of ethnocultural traits and social structure. Vice versa, a high MPI is characteristic of societies actively participating in globalisation processes. In countries with a high international migration intensity, customs and traditions rapidly transform, conventional values disappear or change radically. Researchers stress that this is taking place in a number of European states [4; 5; 9].

In 1990, the highest MPI was registered in very different European countries both west and east of the Iron Curtain. 13 countries, where the proportion of immigrants and emigrants was above 20% of the total population, included Soviet republics (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia), republics of Yugoslavia (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Southern and Western European states. In Western and Southern Europe, these were both ‘poor’ (Malta, Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland) and rich (Luxembourg, Switzerland) countries (fig. 3). In countries with low standards of living (Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Ireland), a high MPI was accounted for by emigration. In those with standards of living higher than in neighbouring countries (Estonia, Latvia, Switzerland, Luxembourg), high migration intensity was a result of immigration. Only in three Soviet republics — Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, — emigration and immigration made equal contributions to MPI [2].



Fig. 3. Migration process intensity (MPI) in European countries, 1990

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

Twenty-five years ago, low migration intensity was characteristic of countries situated in very different parts of Europe. An MPI of below 10% was observed in Scandinavian countries (Finland, Denmark, and Norway) and the most densely populated states of Southern Europe — Italy and Spain. Countries of the socialist camp (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), where international travel was restricted, were also characterised by a low migration intensity.

After 1990, the pattern of involvement in international migration changed dramatically in most European countries. An average MPI increased from 13.6 to 18.4%. There are almost no countries with a low MPI. The minimum value (9.6%) is observed in Slovakia — a country that is neither prosperous enough to attract migrants from developing countries nor poor enough to become a country of origin. Today, immigrants and emigrants account for 20% of the total population in 22 out of the 40 European countries, and over 30% in 13 European states (fig. 4).



Fig. 4. Migration process intensity (MPI) in European countries, 2015

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

In 2015, the MPI was the highest in Luxembourg (55%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (44%), Albania (41%), Switzerland (37%), and Montenegro (35%). As in the late 1980s, the highest population mobility is observed in the poorest and richest countries. Moreover, migration mobility is increasing. At the regional level, MPI increased most dramatically in the Balkan countries. The proportion of migrants (immigrants + emigrants) increased

2.6-fold in Bulgaria, 4.4-fold in Romania, and 7-fold in Albania. Over the last 25 years, MPI increased more than twofold in Norway, Spain, Iceland, and countries with low population mobility — the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

A reduction in international migration intensity took place only in seven European states — Malta and the former USSR republics with the exception of Lithuania. In all the above countries, the MPI decreased insignificantly — by not more than 12% of the 1990 level, i. e. 1—4 percentage points.

In the Russian Federation, the migration activity of population did not increase in comparison to the Soviet years. On the contrary, in the 1990—2010, the number of migrations between both Russian regions and Russia and post-Soviet republics decreased [3].

A consolidated typology of European countries by the type and nature of migration

An analysis of quantitative indicators of international migration processes makes it possible to identify several types of states based on the criteria of *intensity and direction of migration processes* (fig. 5).



Fig. 5. Typology of European countries by the type and nature of migration, 2015

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

Type I is characterised by intense involvement in international migration processes. However, this involvement — migration process intensity (MPI) — is a result of emigration surpassing immigration. In the states belonging to this category, the *international migration coefficient* (IMC) is below 0.4 and the proportion of nationals living abroad is above 16% of the population.

This category includes ten states located in Eastern and Southern Europe (table 2). In Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, emigrants account for 1/3 of the total population.

Table 2

Classification of European states by the nature of migration

Type	States	Migration situation
I	Portugal, Malta, Lithuania, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova (10)	Emigration exceeds immigration (IMC < 0.4); a significant proportion of nationals (above 16% of the population, except for Poland) live abroad. Deep involvement in international migration processes. Over the past decades, emigration from most of these states (8 out of 10) significantly increased. In the other two countries, emigration either reduced (Malta) or stabilised (Portugal), which was accompanied by a significant increase in immigration.
II	Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Montenegro, Ireland, Iceland, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia (10)	Emigration and immigration are almost equal (IMC ranging from 0.6 to 1.2) and they reach a significant level (MPI > 20%). In most of the countries, the trend changed from prevalent emigration to immigration (Ireland, Iceland, Cyprus) and vice versa (Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Croatia)
III	Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia (5)	Low migration activity (MPI < 15%); emigration and immigration is almost equal. A low proportion of immigrants in the total population.
IV	Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Бельгия, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, Slovenia (15)	Most countries are 'moderately involved' in international migration (MPI ranging from 14 to 24%), whereas Switzerland and Luxembourg are characterised by intense involvement. In all the countries, immigration exceeds emigration (IMC > 1.4); the proportion of immigrants ranges from 9.7 (Italy) to 44% (Luxembourg) and it was increasing over the last decades.

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

A special case among Type I countries is Poland. In terms of the IMC, Poland is a country of origin. The number of Poles living abroad is seven times the number of foreign-born residents of the country. Although Polish diasporas are the largest in most Western European states (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Great Britain, Ireland) and Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark), the proportion of emigrants is slightly above 12% of the total population of Poland. To a degree, it is explained by the fact that Poland has a large population (38 million people in 2015), ranking 8th among European states and that international emigration was restricted by the Iron Curtain until the 1990s [2].

Type II comprises countries with a different 'migration profile', where emigration and immigration are balanced (IMC ranging from 0.6 to 1.2) and migration involvement is rather intense (MPI over 20%). Most of the countries have a population of several million people. Characterised by high levels of both emigration and immigration, these states serve as giant interna-

tional terminals, territories with an intense rotation of population. Population is being rapidly replaced, which results in identity crises, when the rate of ethnosocial transformations is too high. This type includes ten European countries, which (except for Ukraine and Belarus) have a rather small population (table 2).

The countries of Type III are characterised by a low migration rate. Historically, these countries — Finland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia — were sandwiched between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries. Major migration routes bypassed their territories (table 2). Immigrants from the Balkan Peninsula and the poorer countries of Eastern Europe and Asia view these states as a mere ‘transit zone’ on their way to Western Europe. The only exception is Finland, which was a poor and semi-patriarchal country until the 1990s. Achieving impressive progress in all areas of social and economic development, Finland turned from a country of origin into a destination country. Today, being one of the most economically developed countries of Europe, Finland has an increasing proportion of immigrants.

The Russian Federation demonstrates similar migration performance. The number and proportion of Russian residents born beyond its current borders is slightly above the number of Russians living abroad (IMC = 1.1). A high level of cumulative immigration (11.6 million people) and emigration (10.6 million people) in the most populous countries of Europe leads to an MPI of slightly above 15 percent [2].

The largest group of European states belongs to Type IV. These are 15 largest and most economically developed European states. Since this group comprises countries with the highest GDP per capita, the number of immigrants exceeds that of emigrants (IMC over 1.4) and a proportion of immigrants in the total population is rather high (table 3). In Switzerland and Luxembourg, the proportion of immigrants reaches 29 and 44% respectively (fig. 6).

Table 3

**European states with the highest proportion of emigrants
in immigrants in the total population, 1990—2015**

State	% of the population	1,000 people	State	% of the population	1,000 people
<i>Emigrants</i>					
1990			2015		
Malta	31.9	113	Bosnia and Herzegovina	43.3	1,651
Ireland	26.5	927	Albania	38.8	1,123
Cyprus	24.1	164	Macedonia	24.8	516
Bosnia and Herzegovina	20.6	887	Malta	24.6	103
Portugal	19.4	1,919	Portugal	22.3	2,306
Belarus	18.4	1,892	Montenegro	22.0	138
Macedonia	17.8	360	Moldova	21.8	889
Moldova	15.3	669	Croatia	20.4	865
Serbia and Montenegro	12.5	1,305	Lithuania	18.9	544
Ukraine	10.8	5,575	Ireland	18.8	882

End of table 3

State	% of the population	1,000 people	State	% of the population	1,000 people
<i>Immigrants</i>					
1990			2015		
Luxembourg	29.8	114	Luxembourg	43.9	249
Estonia	24.3	382	Switzerland	29.4	2,439
Latvia	24.2	646	Austria	17.5	1,492
Switzerland	20.7	1,392	Sweden	16.8	1,640
Ukraine	13.3	6,893	Cyprus	16.8	196
Moldova	13.3	579	Ireland	15.9	746
Belarus	12.2	1,249	Estonia	15.4	202
France	10.4	5,897	Germany	14.9	12,006
Austria	10.3	793	Norway	14.2	742
Croatia	9.9	475	Croatia	13.6	577

Compiled by the authors based on [2].




Fig. 6. European states grouped by key characteristics of migration processes, 2015

Compiled by the authors based on [2].

In all countries of this group, the proportion of immigrants in the total population was increasing over the last decades. However, the growth rates differed significantly. In 1990—2015, the most rapid growth in the proportion of immigrants was observed in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Italy. However, the leader in terms of absolute numbers is Spain, where the number of foreign-born residents increased sevenfold from 830 thousand to 5.85 million people in less than 25 years (table 1).

Conclusions

An analysis of the geography of international migration flows and their quantitative and qualitative characteristics makes it possible to make certain generalisations and identify not only the causes but also consequences of transformations in migration ties between European states. Today, one can observe two opposite processes.

Firstly, emigration from European countries is mostly limited to the continent. European states accounted for 57% of European emigrants in 1990 and 67% in 2015. The total number of emigrants in Europe increased by 21%. The countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe accounted for most of the growth. After the Iron Curtain had fallen, the number of emigrants from Eastern Europe increased more than twofold (and even 4 and 6-fold in Romania and Albania). The only exceptions from this trend are two former Soviet republics — Russia and Belarus, where the number of nationals living abroad reduced by 16—17%.

Another change in the migration flows was a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants, which affected almost all European states. In 1990—2015, the number of Europeans born outside the country of residence increased by half from 49 to 76 million people. Today, each tenth European is a first-generation immigrant.

Regional differences in migration trends significantly increased and resulted in a sharper division between poorer countries of origin and richer destination countries. The surplus of immigration over emigration reflected in the *international migration coefficient (IMC)* is observed in the most economically developed countries of Europe⁸. In some countries, this ratio reaches 3.5—5 to 1.

Over the past decades, five largest European states — Spain, Italy, the UK, Germany, and France — accounted for 82% of the increase in immigration. Half of all European immigrants live in these countries. At the same time, a significant increase in foreign-born population was also observed in small and medium-sized European countries. After 1990, the proportion of immigrants increased by 8.7 percentage points (pp) in Switzerland (from 20.7 to 29.4%), by 9.4 pp in Ireland (from 6.5 to 15.9%), by 9.6 pp in Norway (from 4.6 to 14.2%), by 10.3 pp in Cyprus (from 6.5 to 16.8%), by 10.6 pp in Spain (from 2.1 to 12.7%), and by 14.1 pp in Luxembourg (from 29.8 to

⁸ In accordance with the regionalisation pattern used in this article, these are Western and Southern European states and the Nordic countries.

43.9%). Today, in seven European states, the proportion of foreign-born residents is above 15% of the total population, which neither reduces xenophobic attitudes nor contributes to tolerance in the destination societies.

The above data do not fully reflect the 2015—2016 changes in the migration situation in Europe, which are brought about by millions of new immigrants coming from Africa and the Middle East. However, it is evident that, in many European states, the rates of increase in the number of immigrants exceed the integration capacities of societies. In countries, where a significant inflow of immigrants is accompanied by high emigration rates, there is a risk of losing the sociocultural identity. The corresponding migration process intensity (MPI) indicator increased in 33 out of the 40 European countries over the 25 years (see fig. 3, 4).

The proposed typology of European states based on their role in international migration processes does not claim to be original. However, it makes it possible to consider different migration scenarios for the identified groups of European states.

The migration wave sweeping over Europe in the past decades is often called the new Migration Period. This metaphor is not an exaggeration. The observed changes in the sociocultural composition of population in most European countries are as rapid and significant as they were during that historical period. Being contemporaries of these changes, we cannot fully understand their significance and possible consequences. As the Russian 20th century poet Sergey Esenin wrote, 'One cannot discern a face when standing face to face.// What is big can be seen only from a distance'. In ethnodemographic terms, Europe is rapidly changing and international migrations are playing the key role in this process. This time, changing the European identity will take much less time than during the Migration Period. In several decades, we might not recognise our continent. It will be a different Europe. What will it be like? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study.

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To cite this article:

Zhitin D. V., Krasnov A. I., Shendrik A. V. Migration Flows in Europe: Space and Time Transformation, Baltic region, Vol. 8, no. 2, p. 68—86. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2016-2-6.