

МЕЖДИСЦИПЛИНАРНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ АРГУМЕНТАЦИИ

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ARGUMENTOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Argumentology as a philosophy of argumentation studies ontological, epistemological, methodological, logical, rhetorical, dialectical etc. fundamentals of argumentation. Ontology in argumentological perspective answers the following question: "Does a Homo arguer really exist as a theoretical problem?"

Аргументология является философией аргументации, которая изучает онтологические, эпистемологические, методологические, логические, риторические, диалектические предельные основания аргументации. В аргументологической перспективе главной проблемой онтологии являются поиски ответов на вопрос о том, как возможен человек аргументирующий (Homo arguer) в качестве теоретического конструкта.

Keywords: *argumentology, Homo arguer, logic, ontology, rhetoric of argumentation.*

Ключевые слова: *аргументология, человек аргументирующий, логика, онтология, риторика аргументации.*

In 1993 I used the term 'argumentology' in my second PhD dissertation *Theoretical and historical backgrounds of argumentology* (defended at Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia) [7]. I had an idea that argumentology is the philosophy of theory and practice of argumentation. It is not a scientific theory or empirical model of argumentation.

Argumentology studies backgrounds or ultimate presuppositions of theory and practice of argumentation. Being a philosophical enterprise, argumentology is based on three intellectual pillars. The first one is ordinary experience of argumentation. The second one is scientific experience, or theory of argumentation, and the third one is philosophical experience or the

history of Western and Orient philosophy of argumentation [8, pp. 34-77].

From Russian etymological perspective and ordinary experience there are at least *four* approaches to theorizing about the ultimate foundations of argumentation. Firstly, the approach which deals with persuasion, or *persuasive* approach. Secondly, there is one that concerns demonstration, or *demonstrative* approach. Thirdly, there is an approach which covers confirmation, or *confirmative* approach. Fourthly, there is one which is associated with explanation, or *explanatory* approach. Consequently, ordinary experience supposes that there are four ways (directions) of transformation of approaches into theories of argumentation. The demonstrative approach to studying of ultimate foundations of argumentation has been often associated with logic (formal logic); the persuasive one – with rhetoric; the confirmative one – with dialectic [10, pp.162-164]. Recently the features of theoretical approaches to argumentation and relations between its inseparable levels have been considered by such scholars as J. Wenzel, A. Blair, R. Johnson, F. van Eemeren, D. Walton, C. Tindale and others. It should be mentioned that studying argumentation requires *a clear demarcation between* its levels and non-discrimination of all approaches. The non-discrimination means that an argumentation theorist should not consider his/her favorite approach to be discriminatory to other inferior or subordinate levels. Consequently, theoretical and practical realization of these approaches must be based on a clear difference between *logic* and *rhetoric*, *rhetoric* and *dialectic*, *dialectic* and *epistemology* of argumentation and their multi- and interdisciplinary connection.

One of the consequences of clearness violation is the emergence of various and today not yet well studied *argumentological dilemmas*. For example: the dilemma of persuasive demonstrativeness (in accordance with which persuasiveness is a criterion for demonstrativeness) and demonstrative persuasiveness (according to this dilemma, for example, logic is persuasive itself, that is logic is something like rigorous, ironclad logic). The dilemma of confirmative explanativeness (according to it a standpoint is supported, but this support is not an obvious one) and

explanative confirmativeness should also be pointed out. Therefore, one may consider that there are four theoretical perspectives for the argumentological twist in argumentation theory: logical, rhetorical, dialectical, and epistemological.

The possibility of the existence of at least four relatively independent approaches to theorizing about argumentation focuses on the problem of their *general justification* or, philosophically speaking, ontology of theory and practice of argumentation. But what is ontology of argumentation? This question is relatively new in contemporary theory and philosophy of argumentation. To answer the question, one may suppose that this ontology should be connected to anthropological turn in ontology that was proposed by M. Heidegger and J.-P. Sartre in the first half of the XX century [3, 6].

However, general and particular peculiarities of ontology of argumentation should be more reasonably connected with the concept of *Homo arguer*. Moreover, we can make much clearer the *ontological minimum* of argumentation, according to which (as H. Johnstone Jr. indirectly mentioned) man is a “persuading and persuaded animal” [2, pp.41-46], or speaking in other words, who has no ability to argue is not yet man in the real sense of the word, or is not a *Homo arguer*. Following the American philosopher H. W. Johnstone Jr.’s discourse about the persuading and persuaded animal, we may also say that ontology of argumentation should be the ontology of *Homo arguer*. The status of *Homo arguer* as a concept in contemporary theory of argumentation as well as in ontology of argumentation can hardly be overestimated.

It is ontology of argumentation that defines perspectives of its epistemology, dialectic, rhetoric, and logic. *Homo arguer* is a person who would argue and has knowledge of logical laws and their rhetorical imitation as well as dialectical rules of argumentation and so would rebut logical, rhetorical, dialectical, and epistemological fallacies that contest basic ontological principle of argumentation.

Ontological minimum of argumentation is realized in *logical maximum* of argumentation. This maximum is concretized in three fundamental principles of formal logic: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. As

it was shown by G. Leibniz, "our reasoning is grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; (*Theod.* 44, 169.)...and that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us". (*Theod.* 44, 196.) [4].

It seems to me that the principle of sufficient reason is a kind of 'bridge' from logic to rhetoric and maybe even dialectic of argumentation.

Logical maximum of argumentation represented in three basic logical laws is imitated and extended in its rhetorical minimum [9, pp.37-49].

One may suppose that rhetorical minimum of argumentation is founded on the rule of justice. According to Ch. Perelman, this rule "requires giving identical treatment to beings or situations of the same kind" [5, p. 218].

Consequently, it is ontology of argumentology that is a pillar of logic, rhetoric, and dialectic of argumentation.

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